THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREECE,

ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the Earliest Accounts till the

Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East.

INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF

LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.

By JOHN GILLIES, L.L.D. F.A.S.

Εκ μεν τοιγε της απαντων προς αλληλα συμπλοκης και παραθεσεως, ετι δε ομοιοτητος και διαφορας, μονως αν τις εφικοιτο και δυνηθειη κατοπτευσας, αμα και το χρησιμον και το τερπνον εκ της ιστοριας λαβειν. POLYBIUS, l. i. c. v.

VOL. II.

BASIL:

Printed for J. J. TOURNEISEN; and J. L. LEGRAND.

MDCCXC.

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CHAP. IX. Introduction to the history of the Persian invasion.

IN attempting to give the reader a general, but tolerably complete, view of the ancient history of Greece, it was often necessary to have recourse to very obscure materials; to arrange and combine the mutilated fragments of poets and mythologists; and to trace, by the established principles of critical conjecture, and the certain, because uniform,

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current of human paſſions, thoſe events and tranſactions which ſeem moſt curious and important. In this ſubſequent part of my work, the difficulty conſiſts not in diſcovering, but in ſelecting, the materials; for the magnificent preparations, the ſplendid commencement, and the unexpected iſſue, of the Perſian war, have been related with the utmoſt accuracy of deſcription, and adorned by the brighteſt charms of eloquence. The Grecian poets, hiſtorians, and orators, dwell with complacency on a theme, not leſs important than extenſive, and equally adapted to diſplay their own abilities, and to flatter the pride of their country. The variety of their inimitable performances, generally known and ſtudied in every country converſant with literature, renders the ſubject familiar to the reader, and difficult to the writer. Yet does the merit of thoſe performances, however juſtly and univerſally admired, fall ſhort of the extraordinary exploits which they deſcribe; exploits which, though ancient, ſtill preſerve a freſh and unfading luſtre, and will remain, to the lateſt ages, precious monuments of that generous magnanimity, which cheriſhes the ſeeds of virtue, inſpires the love of liberty, and animates the fire of patriotiſm.

Subject divided into three acts. Olymp. lxxii. 3. A. C. 490.

The memorable tragedy (to adopt on this occaſion an apt alluſion of Plutarch), which ended in the eternal diſgrace of the Perſian name, may be divided, with propriety, into three principal acts. The firſt contains the invaſion of Greece by

Darius's generals, Datis and Artaphernes, who were defeated in the battle of Marathon. The second conſiſts in the expedition undertaken ten years afterwards by Xerxes, the ſon and ſucceſſor of Darius, who fled precipitately from Greece, after the ruin of his fleet near the iſle of Salamis. The third, and concluding act, is the deſtruction of the Perſian armies in the bloody fields of Mycalé and Platea; events which happened on the ſame day, and nearly two years after Xerxes's triumphal entry into Greece.

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Olymp. lxxv. 1. A. C. 480.

Olymp. lxxv. 2. A. C. 479.

The complete reduction of the inſurgents on the Aſiatic coaſt, prompted Darius to take vengeance on ſuch Greeks as had encouraged and aſſiſted the unſucceſsful rebellion of his ſubjects. The proud monarch of the Eaſt, when informed that the citizens of Athens had co-operated with the Ionians in the taking and burning of Sardis, diſcovered evident marks of the moſt furious reſentment; ſhooting an arrow into the air, he prayed that heaven might aſſiſt him in puniſhing the audacious inſolence of that republic; and every time he ſat down to table, an attendant reminded him of the Athenians, leſt the delights of eaſtern luxury ſhould ſeduce him from his fell purpoſe of revenge. [t].

Darius's reſentment againſt the Athenians.

The execution of his deſign was intruſted to Mardonius, a Perſian nobleman of the firſt rank, whoſe perſonal, as well as hereditary advantages,

Unfortunate expedition of Mardonius; Olymp. lxxi. 4. A. C. 493.

[t] Herodot. l. v. c. cv. et ſeq.

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had entitled him to the marriage of Artazoſtra, daughter of Darius; and whoſe youth and inexperience were compenſated, in the opinion of his maſter, by his ſuperior genius for war, and innate love of glory. In the ſecond ſpring after the cruel puniſhment of the Ionians, Mardonius approached the European coaſt with an armament ſufficient to inſpire terror into Greece. The rich iſland of Thaſus, whoſe golden mines yielded a revenue of near three hundred talents, ſubmitted to his fleet; while his land-forces added the barbarous province of Macedon to the Perſian empire. But having ſteered ſouthward from Thaſus, the whole armament was overtaken, and almoſt deſtroyed, by a violent ſtorm, while endeavouring to double the promontory of mount Athos, which is connected with the Macedonian ſhore by a low and narrow neck of Land, but forms a long and lofty ridge in the ſea. Three hundred veſſels were daſhed againſt the rocks; twenty thouſand men periſhed in the waves. This diſaſter totally defeated the deſign of the expedition; and Mardonius having recovered the ſhattered remains of the fleet and army, returned to the court of Perſia, where, by flattering the pride, he averted the reſentment of Darius; while he repreſented, that the Perſian forces, invincible by the power of man, had yielded to the fury of the elements; and while he deſcribed and exaggerated, to the aſtoniſhment and terror of his countrymen, the exceſſive cold, the violent tempeſts, the monſtrous marine animals, which diſ-

who loſes the greateſt part of his fleet.

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tinguiſh and render formidable thoſe diſtant and unknown ſeas [2].

Succeeded by Datis and Artaphernes. Olymp. lxxii. 3. A. C. 490.

The addreſs of Mardonius reſcued him from puniſhment; but his misfortunes removed him from the command of Lower Aſia. Two generals were appointed in his room, of whom Datis, a Mede, was the more diſtinguiſhed by his age and experience, while Artaphernes, a Perſian, was the more conſpicuous for his rank and nobility, being deſcended of the royal blood, and ſon to Artaphernes, governor of Sardis, whoſe name has frequently occurred in the preſent hiſtory. That his lieutenants might appear with a degree of ſplendor ſuitable to the majeſty of Perſia, Darius aſſembled an army of five hundred thouſand men [3] conſiſting of the flower of the provincial troops of his extenſive empire. The preparation of an adequate number of tranſports and ſhips of war, occaſioned but a ſhort delay. The maritime provinces of the empire, Egypt, Phœnicia, and the coaſts of the Euxine and Egean ſeas, were commanded to fit out, with all poſſible expedition, their whole naval ſtrength; the old veſſels were repaired, many new ones were built, and in the courſe of the ſame year in which the preparations

Their armament and views.

[2] Herodot. l. vi. c. xliii. et ſeq.

[3] Beſides Herodotus, Plutarch, and Diodorus Siculus, this expedition is related by Lyſias, Orat. Funeb. Iſocrat. Panegyr. Plato, Menex. Pauſan. l. x. c. xx. Juſtin. l. ii. c. ix. Corn. Nepos, in Milt.

CHAP. IX. commenced, a fleet of six hundred sail was ready to put to sea. This immense armament the Persian generals were ordered to employ, in extending their conquests on the side of Europe, in subduing the republics of Greece, and more particularly in chastising the insolence of the Eretrians and Athenians, the only nations which had conspired with the revolt of the Ionians, and assisted that rebellious people in the destruction of Sardis. With respect to the other nations which might be reduced by his arms, the orders of Darius were general, and the particular treatment of the vanquished was left to the discretion of his lieutenants; but concerning the Athenians and Eretrians, he gave the most positive commands, that their territories should be laid waste, their houses and temples burned or demolished, and their persons carried in captivity to the eastern extremities of his empire. Secure of effecting their purpose, his generals were furnished with a great number of chains for confining the Grecian prisoners; a haughty presumption (to use the language of antiquity) in the superiority of man over the power of fortune, which on this, as on other occasions, was punished by the just vengeance of heaven.

They reduce the Cyclades,

The Persian fleet enjoyed a prosperous voyage to the isle of Samos, from whence they were ready to proceed to the Athenian coast. The late disaster which befel the armament commanded by Mardonius, deterred them from pursuing a direct course along the shores of Thrace and Macedonia;

they determined to ſteer in an oblique line through the Cyclades, a cluſter of ſeventeen ſmall iſlands, lying oppoſite to the territories of Argos and Attica. The approach of ſuch an innumerable hoſt, whoſe tranſports darkened the broad ſurface of the Egean, ſtruck terror into the unwarlike inhabitants of thoſe delightful iſlands. The Naxians took, refuge in their inacceſſible mountains; the natives of Delos, the favorite reſidence of Latona and her divine children, abandoned the awful majeſty of their temple, which was overſhadowed by the rough and lofty mount Cynthus. Paros [4], famous for its marble; Andros [5], celebrated for its vines; Ceos, the birth-place of the plaintive Simonides; Syros, the native country of the ingenious and philoſophic Pherecydes; Ios the tomb of Homer [6]; the induſtrious Amorgos [7]; as well as all

[4] The marble of Paros was ſuperior in whiteneſs, and the fineneſs of its grain, to the hard ſparkling veins of mount Pentelicus in Attica; which, from the ſize and brilliancy of its component particles, ſomewhat reſembling ſalt, is called by the Italians *Marmo ſalino*. Theſe two kinds of marble were always the moſt valued by the Greeks; but the marble of Paros was preferred by artiſts, as yielding more eaſily to the graving tool, and, on account of the homogeneouſneſs of its parts, leſs apt to ſparkle, and give falſe lights to the ſtatue. The works of Parian marble, in the Farneſian palace at Rome, are mentioned by Winkelman, Geſchichte der Kunſt des Alterthums, l. i. c. 2.

[5] The wines of Andros and Naxos were compared to Nectar. See Athenæus, l. i.

[6] Strabo, l. x. et Plin. l. iv. Pauſanias (in Phocic.) ſays, that Climenes, the mother of Homer, was a native of the iſle of Ios; and Aulus Gellius, l. iii. aſſerts, on the authority of Ariſtotle, that this island was the birth-place of Homer himſelf.

[7] Amorgos was long famous for the robes made there, and

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the other [8] islands which surrounded the once sacred shores of Delos, either spontaneously offered the usual acknowledgment of earth and water, as a testimony of their friendship, or submitted, after a feeble resistance, to the Persian arms [9].

and Eubœa;

The invaders next proceeded westward to the isle of Eubœa, where, after almost a continued engagement of six days, their strength and numbers, assisted by the perfidy of two traitors, finally prevailed over the valor and obstinacy of the Eretrians [10].

invade Attica.

Hitherto every thing was prosperous; and had the expedition ended with the events already related, it would have afforded just matter of triumph. But a more difficult task remained, in the execution of which the Persians (happily for Europe) experienced a fatal reverse of fortune. After the reduction of Eubœa, the Athenian coasts, separated from that island only by the narrow strait

distinguished by its name. Suid. ad voc. They were died red, with a species of lichen, which abounds in that island, and which was formerly used by the English and French in dying scarlet.

[8] Herodot. l. vi. c. 94.

[9] Herodot. l. vi. c. 101. et seq.

[10] The present deplorable state of these once fortunate islands may be seen in Tournefort, the most learned of Travellers. Despotism, a double superstition (the Grecian and Mahommedan), pirates, banditti, and pestilence, have not yet depopulated the Cyclades, which respectively contain three, five, ten, and the largest, twenty thousand inhabitants.

of Euripus, ſeemed to invite the generals of Darius to an eaſy conqueſt. They readily accepted the invitation, as the puniſhment of Athens was the main object which their maſter had in view when he fitted out his ſeemingly invincible armament. The meaſures which they adopted for accompliſhing this deſign appear abundantly judicious; the greater part of the army was left to guard the iſlands which they had ſubdued; the uſeleſs multitude of attendants were tranſported to the coaſt of Aſia; with an hundred thouſand choſen infantry, and a due proportion of horſe, the Perſian generals ſet ſail from Eubœa, and ſafely arrived on the *Marathonian ſhore*, a diſtrict of Attica about thirty miles from the capital, conſiſting chiefly of level ground, and therefore admitting the operations of cavalry, which formed the main ſtrength of the Barbarian army, and with which the Greeks were very poorly provided. Here the Perſians pitched their camp, by the advice of Hippias, the baniſhed king of Athens [21], whoſe perfect knowledge of the country, and intimate acquaintance with the affairs of Greece, rendered his opinion on all occaſions reſpectable.

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Meanwhile the Athenians had raiſed an army and appointed ten generals, with equal power, choſen, as uſual, from the ten tribes, into which the citizens were divided. Their obſtinate and

The Athenians take meaſures for their defence.

[21] Thucyd. l. vi. c. lix. Herodot. ubi ſupra.

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almoſt continual hoſtilities with the Phocians, the Thebans, and their other northern neighbours, prevented them from entertaining any hopes of aſſiſtance from that quarter: but, on the firſt appearance of the Perſian fleet, they ſent a meſſenger to Sparta, to acquaint the ſenate of that republic with the immediate danger which threatened them, and to explain how much it concerned the intereſt, as well as the honor of the Spartans, who had acquired juſt pre-eminence among the Grecian ſtates, not to permit the deſtruction of the moſt ancient and the moſt ſplendid of the Grecian cities. The ſenate and aſſembly approved the juſtice of this demand, they collected their troops, and ſeemed ready to afford their rivals, whoſe danger now converted them into allies, a ſpeedy and effectual relief. But it was only the ninth day of the month; and an ancient, unaccountable, and therefore the more reſpected, ſuperſtition prevented the Spartans from taking the field, before the full of the moon [12]. When that period ſhould arrive, they promiſed to march, with the utmoſt expedition, to the plains of Marathon.

Demand aſſiſtance from Sparta.

Meanwhile the Athenians had been reinforced by a thouſand choſen warriors from Platæa, a ſmall city of Bœotia, diſtant only nine miles from Thebes. The independent ſpirit of the Platæans rendered them as deſirous of preſerving their freedom, as they were unable to defend it againſt the Theban power. But that invaluable poſſeſſion, which their own weakneſs would have made it neceſſary for

Reinforced by the Platæans.

[12] Strabo, l. ix. p. 611 and Herodot. ibid.

them to ſurrender, the protection of Athens enabled them to maintain, and, in return for this ineſtimable favor, they diſcovered towards their benefactors, on the preſent as well as on every future occaſion, the ſincereſt proofs of gratitude and reſpect. The Athenian army, now ready to take the field, conſiſted of about ten thouſand freemen, and of probably a ſtill greater number of armed ſlaves. The generals might certainly have collected a larger body of troops; but they ſeem to have been averſe to commit the ſafety of the ſtate to the fortune of a ſingle engagement; neither would it have been prudent to leave the walls of Athens, and the other fortreſſes of Attica, altogether naked and defenceleſs. It had been a matter of deliberation in the aſſembly, whether they ought not to ſtand a ſiege rather than venture a battle. The Athenian fortifications, indeed, had not attained that ſtrength which they afterwards acquired, yet they might have long reſiſted the artleſs aſſaults of the Perſians; or had the latter got poſſeſſion of the walls, the long, narrow, and winding ſtreets [11] of Athens would have enabled a ſmall number of men to make an obſtinate, and perhaps a ſucceſsful defence, againſt a ſuperior but leſs determined enemy. But all hopes from this mode of reſiſtance were damped by the conſideration, that an immenſe hoſt of Perſians might ſur-

[11] Ariſtotle informs us, that this was the ancient mode of building in all the cities of Greece. ARIST. Polit.

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round, their city on every ſide, intercept their ſupplies, and inſtead of conquering them by aſſault, reduce them by famine. At the ſame time Miltiades, one of the ten generals, whoſe patriotiſm and love of liberty we have already had occaſion to applaud, animated his countrymen with the deſire of victory and glory. This experienced commander knew the Perſians; he knew his fellow-citizens; and his diſcerning ſagacity had formed a proper eſtimate of both.

The Athenians encouraged by Miltiades to risk a battle.

The Athenians were few in number, but choſen men; their daily practice in the gymnaſtic had given them agility of limbs, dexterity of hand, and an unuſual degree of vigor both of mind and body. Their conſtant exerciſe in war had inured them to hardſhip and fatigue, accuſtomed them to the uſeful reſtraints of diſcipline, and familiarized them to thoſe ſkilful evolutions which commonly decide the fortune of the field. Their defenſive as well as offenſive armor was remarkably complete; and an acknowledged pre-eminence over their neighbours, had inſpired them with a military enthuſiaſm, which on this occaſion was doubly animated, in defence of their freedom and of their country. In their pertinacious ſtruggles with each other, for whatever men hold moſt precious, the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, had adopted a mode of military arrangement which cannot be too highly extolled. Drawn up in a cloſe and firm phalanx, commonly ſixteen deep, the impetuous vigor of the moſt robuſt youth

His motives explained in the military character of the Athenians,

held the first ranks; the last were closed by the steady courage of experienced veterans, whose resentment against cowardice seemed more terrible to their companions than the arms of an enemy. As the safety of the last ranks depended on the activity of the first, their united assaults were rendered alike furious and persevering, and hardly to be resisted by any superiority of numbers [14].

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[14] The attention given by the Greeks to the relative disposition of the ranks, according to the respective qualities of the men who composed them, introduced certain rules in ancient tactics which would be unnecessary in the modern. To convert the rear into the front, a modern army has only to face about, because it is not very material in what order the ranks are placed. But we learn from the tactics of Arrian, that the Greeks had contrived three other ways of performing this evolution, in all of which the same front was uniformly presented to the enemy.—The first was called the *Macedonian*. In this evolution the file-leader faced to the right-about, without stirring from his place; the other men in the file passed behind him, and, after a certain number of paces, also faced about, and found themselves in their respective places.—The second was called the *Cretan*. In this the file-leader not only faced about, but paced over the depth of the phalanx. The rest followed him, and the whole found themselves in the same place as before, the ranks only reversed.—The third was called the *Lacedæmonian*, which was precisely the reverse of the first. In the Lacedæmonian evolution the bringer-up, or last man in each file, whom the Greeks called ουραγος, faced about, then halted. The file-leader faced about, and paced over twice the depth of the phalanx, the rest following him; the whole thus found themselves with the same front towards the enemy, the ranks only reversed. The difference between these three evolutions consisted in this, that the Macedonian, where the file-leader stood still, and the rest went behind him, had the appearance of a retreat; since the whole line receded by the depth of the phalanx from the enemy: in the Cretan, the men preserved the same ground which they had

CHAP. IX. and of the Perſians.

The Perſians (for under the name of Perſians are comprehended the various nations which followed the ſtandard of Datis and Artaphernes) were not deficient in martial appearance, nor perhaps entirely deſtitute of valor, being ſelected with care from the flower of the Aſiatic provinces. But, compared with the regularity of the Greek battalions, they may be regarded as a promiſcuous crowd, armed in each diviſion with the peculiar weapons of their reſpective countries, incapable of being harmonized by general movements, or united into any uniform ſyſtem of military arrangement. Darts and arrows were their uſual inſtruments of attack; and even the moſt completely armed truſted to ſome ſpecies of miſſile weapon. They carried in their left hand light targets of reed or oſier, and their bodies were ſometimes covered with thin plates of ſcaly metal; but they had not any defenſive armor worthy of being compared with the firm corſelets, the brazen greaves, the maſſy bucklers of their Athenian opponents. The braveſt of the Barbarians fought on horſeback; but in all ages the long Grecian ſpear has proved the ſureſt defence againſt the attack of cavalry, in-

originally occupied; but the Lacedæmonian carried the whole line, by the depth of the phalanx, forward on the enemy. Among the firſt military changes introduced by Philip of Macedon, hiſtorians mention his having adopted the Lacedæmonian evolution, for changing the front, in preference to that formerly uſed by his own countrymen.

ſomuch that even the Romans, in fighting againſt the Numidian horſemen, preferred the ſtrength of the phalanx to the activity of the legion. The inferiority of their armor and of their diſcipline, was not the only defect of the Perſians; they wanted that ardor and emulation which, in the cloſe and deſperate engagements of ancient times, were neceſſary to animate the courage of a ſoldier. Their ſpirits were broken under the yoke of a double ſervitude, impoſed by the blind ſuperſtition of the Magi, and the capricious tyranny of Darius; with them their native country was an empty name; and their minds, degraded by the mean vices of wealth and luxury, were inſenſible to the native charms, as well as to the immortal reward of manly virtue.

Prudent conduct of Miltiades.

Miltiades allowed not, however, his contempt of the enemy, or his confidence in his own troops, to ſeduce him into a fatal ſecurity. Nothing on his part was neglected; and the only obſtacle to ſucceſs was fortunately removed by the diſintereſted moderation of his colleagues. The continual dread of tyrants had taught the jealous republicans of Greece to blend, on every occaſion, their civil with their military inſtitutions. Governed by this principle, the Athenians, as we already had occaſion to obſerve, elected ten generals, who were inveſted, each in his turn, with the ſupreme command. This regulation was extremely unfavorable to that unity of deſign which ought to pervade all the ſucceſſive operations of an army; an in-

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convenience which ſtruck the diſcerning mind of Ariſtides, who on this occaſion diſplayed the firſt openings of his illuſtrious character. The day approaching when it belonged to him to aſſume the ſucceſſive command, he generouſly yielded his authority [15] to the approved valor and experience of Miltiades. The other generals followed this magnanimous example, ſacrificing the dictates of private ambition to the intereſt and glory of their country; and the commander in chief thus enjoyed an opportunity of exerting, uncontrolled, the utmoſt vigor of his genius.

Generous patriotiſm of Ariſtides.

Diſpoſition of both armies.

Leſt he ſhould be ſurrounded by a ſuperior force, he choſe for his camp the declivity of a hill, diſtant about a mile from the encampment of the enemy. The intermediate ſpace he cauſed to be ſtrewed in the night with the branches and trunks of trees, in order to interrupt the motion, and break the order of the Perſian cavalry, which in conſequence of this precaution ſeem to have been rendered incapable of acting in the engagement. In the morning his troops were drawn up in battle-array, in a long and full line; the braveſt of the Athenians on the right, on the left the warriors of Platæa, and in the middle the ſlaves [16], who

[15] Plutarch. in Ariſtid. tom. ii. p. 489.

[16] There is not any hiſtorian, indeed, who makes mention of this arrangement, although, by comparing the accounts of the havoc made in the centre, with the ſmall number of Athenian citizens who were ſlain, it is evident that the ſlaves muſt have been the greateſt ſufferers in the action, and therefore poſted, as is ſaid in the text.

had

had been admitted on this occaſion to the honor of bearing arms. By weakening his centre, the leaſt valuable part, he extended his front equal to that of the enemy: his rear was defended by the hill above mentioned, which, verging round to meet the ſea, likewiſe covered his right; his left was flanked by a lake or marſh. Datis, although he perceived the ſkilful diſpoſition of the Greeks, was yet too confident in the vaſt ſuperiority of his numbers to decline the engagement, eſpecially as he now enjoyed an opportunity of deciding the conteſt before the expected auxiliaries could arrive from Peloponneſus. When the Athenians ſaw the enemy in motion they ran down the hill, with unuſual ardor, to encounter them; a circumſtance which proceeded, perhaps, from their eagerneſs to engage, but which muſt have been attended with the good conſequence of ſhortening the time of their expoſure to the ſlings and darts of the Barbarians. CHAP. IX.

Defeat of the Perſians in the battle of Marathon; Olymp. lxxii. 3. A. C. 490.

The two armies cloſed; the battle was rather fierce than long. The Perſian ſword and Scythian hatchet penetrated, or cut down, the centre of the Athenians; but the two wings, which compoſed the main ſtrength of the Grecian army, broke, routed, and put to flight the correſponding diviſions of the enemy. Inſtead of purſuing the vanquiſhed they cloſed their extremities, and attacked the Barbarians who had penetrated their centre. The Grecian ſpear overcame all oppoſition: the braveſt of the Perſians periſhed in the field; the remainder were purſued with great ſlaughter; and ſuch was their terror and ſurpriſe, that they ſought

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for refuge, not in their camp, but in their ſhips. The baniſhed tyrant of Athens fell in the engagement: two Athenian generals, and about two hundred citizens, were found among the ſlain: the Perſians left ſix thouſand of their beſt troops in the ſcene of action. Probably, a ſtill greater number were killed in the purſuit. The Greeks followed them to the ſhore; but the lightneſs of the Barbarian armor favored their eſcape. Seven ſhips were taken; the reſt ſailed with a favorable gale, doubled the cape of Sunium; and, after a fruitleſs attempt to ſurpriſe the harbour of Athens, returned to the coaſt of Aſia [27].

who ſail to Aſia.

The loſs and diſgrace of the Perſians on this memorable occaſion, was compenſated by only one conſolation. They had been defeated in the engagement, compelled to abandon their camp, and driven ignominiouſly to their ſhips; but they carried with them to Aſia the Eretrian priſoners, who, in obedience to the orders of Darius, were ſafely conducted to Suſa. Theſe unhappy men had every reaſon to dread being treated as victims of royal reſentment; but when they were conducted in chains to the preſence of the great king, their reception was very different from what their fears naturally led them to expect. Whether reflection ſuggeſted to Darius the pleaſure which he might derive in peace, and the aſſiſtance which he might receive in war, from the arts and arms of the Eretrians, or that a ray of magnanimity for once

Unexpected treatment of the Eretrians.

[27] Herodot. l. vi. c. cxi. et ſeq.

enlightened the ſoul of a deſpot, he ordered the Greeks to be immediately releaſed from captivity, and ſoon afterwards aſſigned them for their habitation the fertile diſtrict of Anderica, lying in the province of Ciſſia, in Suſiana, at the diſtance of only forty miles from the capital. There the colony remained in the time of Herodotus, preſerving their Grecian language and inſtitutions; and after a revolution of ſix centuries, their deſcendants were viſited by Apollonius Tyaneus[21], the celebrated Pythagorean philoſopher, and were ſtill diſtinguiſhed from the ſurrounding nations by the indubitable marks of European extraction.

Obſtacles to the ſecond invaſion of Greece.

When any diſaſter befel the Perſian arms, the great, and once independent, powers of the empire were ever ready to revolt. The neceſſity of watching the firſt ſymptoms of thoſe formidable rebellions gradually drew the troops of Darius from the coaſt of Leſſer Aſia; whoſe inhabitants, delivered from the oppreſſion of foreign mercenaries, reſumed their wonted ſpirit and activity; and except in paying, conjunctly with ſeveral neighbouring provinces, an annual contribution of about an hundred thouſand pounds, the Aſiatic Greeks were ſcarcely ſubjected to any proof of dependence. Diſputes concerning the ſucceſſion to the univerſal empire of the eaſt, the revolt of Egypt, and the death of Darius retarded for ten years the reſolution formed by that prince, and adopted by his ſon and ſucceſſor Xerxes, of reſtoring the luſtre of the Perſian arms,

[21] Philoſtrat. in Vit. Apollon.

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not only by taking vengeance on the pertinacious obſtinacy of the Athenians, but by effecting the complete conqueſt of Europe [19]. We ſhall have occaſion fully to deſcribe the immenſe preparations which were made for this purpoſe; but it is neceſſary firſt to examine the tranſactions of the Greeks, during the important interval between the battle of Marathon and the expedition of Xerxes; and to explain the principal circumſtances which enabled a country, neither wealthy nor populous, to reſiſt the moſt formidable invaſion recorded in hiſtory.

The ſentiments and behaviour of the Athenians in conſequence of their victory.

The joy excited among the Athenians by a victory, which not only delivered them from the dread of their enemies, but raiſed them to diſtinguiſhed pre-eminence among their rivals and allies, is evident from a remarkable incident which happened immediately after the battle. As ſoon as fortune had viſibly declared in their favor, a ſoldier was diſpatched from the army to convey the welcome news to the capital. He ran with incredible velocity, and appeared, covered with duſt and blood, in the preſence of the ſenators. Exceſs of fatigue conſpired with the tranſports of enthuſiaſm to exhauſt the vigor of his frame. He had only time to exclaim, in two words, *Rejoice with the victors* [20], and immediately expired.

It is probable that the ſame ſpirit which animated this nameleſs patriot, was ſpeedily diffuſed through the whole community; and the Athenian

[19] Herodot. l. vii. c. i. et ii. [20] Χαιρετε χαιρομεν.

institutions were well calculated to keep alive the generous ardor which ſucceſs had inſpired. Part of the ſpoil was gratefully dedicated to the gods; the remainder was appropriated as the juſt reward of merit. The obſequies of the dead were celebrated with ſolemn pomp; and according to an ancient and ſacred cuſtom, their fame was commemorated by annual returns of feſtive magnificence [21]. The honors beſtowed on thoſe who had fallen in the field, reflected additional luſtre on their companions who ſurvived the victory. In extenſive kingdoms, the praiſe of ſucceſsful valor is weakened by diffuſion; and ſuch too is the inequality between the dignity of the general and the meanneſs of the ſoldier, that the latter can ſeldom hope to attain, however well he may deſerve, his juſt proportion of military fame [22]. But the Grecian republics were ſmall; a perpetual rivalſhip ſubſiſted among them; and when any particular ſtate eclipſed the glory of its neighbours, the ſuperiority was ſenſibly felt by every member of the commonwealth.

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That pre-eminence, which by the battle of Marathon Athens acquired in Greece, Miltiades, by his peculiar merit in that battle, attained in Athens. His valor and conduct were celebrated by the artleſs praiſes of the vulgar, as well as by the more

Honors beſtowed of Miltiades;

[21] Diodor. Sic. l. xi. Herodot. ubi ſupra.

[22] Plutarch. in Cimon. p. 187. et Æſchin. adverſ. Cteſiphont. p. 301. furniſh us with examples of the jealouſy of the Greeks, leſt the fame due to their troops in general ſhould be engroſſed by the commanders.

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elaborate encomiums of the learned. Before the æra of this celebrated engagement, tragedy, the unrivalled diſtinction of Athenian literature, had been invented and cultivated by the ſucceſsful labors of Theſpis, Phrynicus, and Æſchylus. The laſt, who is juſtly regarded as the great improver of the Grecian drama, diſplayed in the battle of Marathon the ſame martial ardor which ſtill breathes in his poetry. We may reaſonably imagine, that he would employ the higheſt flights of his fancy in extolling the glory of exploits in which he had himſelf borne ſo diſtinguiſhed a part; and particularly that he would exert all the powers of his lofty genius in celebrating the hero and patriot, whoſe enthuſiaſm had animated the battle, and whoſe ſuperior talents had inſured the victory. The name of the conqueror at Marathon re-echoed through the ſpacious theatres of Athens, which, though they had not yet acquired that ſolid and durable compoſition ſtill diſcernible in the ruins of ancient grandeur, were already built in a form ſufficiently capacious to contain the largeſt proportion of the citizens. The magnificent encomiums beſtowed on Miltiades in the preſence of his aſſembled countrymen, by whoſe conſenting voice they were repeated and approved, fired with emulation the young candidates for fame, while they enabled the general to obtain that mark of public confidence and eſteem which was the utmoſt ambition of all the Grecian leaders.

who is appointed to command the fleet;

Theſe leaders, while they remained within the territories of their reſpective ſtates, were intruſted

(as we already had occaſion to obſerve) with only that moderate authority which ſuited the equal condition of freedom. But when they were appointed to the command of the fleet in foreign parts, they obtained almoſt unlimited power, and might acquire immenſe riches. To this exalted ſtation Miltiades was advanced by the general ſuffrage of his country; and having ſailed with a fleet of ſeventy gallies, the whole naval ſtrength of the republic, he determined to expel the Perſian garriſons from the iſles of the Ægean; to reduce the ſmaller communities to the obedience of Athens, and to ſubject the more wealthy and powerful to heavy contributions. CHAP. IX.

Beſieges Paros unſucceſsfully.

The firſt operations of the Athenian armament were crowned with ſucceſs: ſeveral iſlands were ſubdued, conſiderable ſums of money were collected. But the fleet arriving before Paros, every thing proved adverſe to the Athenians. Miltiades, who had received a perſonal injury from Tiſagoras, a man of great authority in that iſland, yielded to the dictates of private reſentment, and confounding the innocent with the guilty, demanded from the Parians the ſum of an hundred talents (near twenty thouſand pounds ſterling). If the money were not immediately paid, he threatened to lay waſte their territory, to burn their city, and to teach them by cruel experience the ſtern rights of a conqueror. The exorbitance of the demand rendered compliance with it impoſſible; the Parians prepared for their defence, guided however by the motives of a generous deſpair, rather than by any

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well grounded hope of reſiſting the invaders. For twenty-ſix days they maintained poſſeſſion of the capital of the iſland, which the Athenians, after ravaging all the adjacent country, beſieged by ſea and land. The time now approached when Paros muſt have ſurrendered to a ſuperior force; but it was the good fortune of the iſlanders, that an extenſive grove, which happened to be ſet on fire in one of the Sporades, was believed by the beſiegers to indicate the approach of a Perſian fleet. The ſame opinion gained ground among the Parians, who determined, by their utmoſt efforts, to preſerve the place, until they ſhould be relieved by the aſſiſtance of their protectors. Miltiades had received a dangerous wound during the ſiege; and the weakneſs of his body impairing the faculties of his mind, and rendering him too ſenſible to the impreſſions of fear, he gave orders to draw off his victorious troops, and returned with the whole fleet to Athens.

Accuſed by his enemies.

His conduct in the preſent expedition ill correſponded to his former fame; and he ſoon experienced the inſtability of popular favor. The Athenian citizens, and particularly the more eminent and illuſtrious, had univerſally their rivals and enemies. The competitions for civil offices, or military command, occaſioned eternal animoſities among thoſe jealous republicans. Xantippus, a perſon of great diſtinction, and father of the celebrated Pericles, who in the ſucceeding age obtained the firſt rank in the Athenian government, eagerly ſeized an opportunity of depreſſing the character of a man which had ſo long overtopped

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that of every competitor. Miltiades was accuſed of being corrupted by a Perſian bribe to raiſe the ſiege of Paros; the precipitance with which he abandoned the place, ſo unlike to the general firmneſs of his manly behaviour, gave a probable color to the accuſation; and the continual terror which, ever ſince the uſurpation of Piſiſtratus, the Athenians entertained of arbitrary power, diſpoſed them to condemn, upon very ſlight evidence, a man whoſe abilities and renown ſeemed to endanger the ſafety of the commonwealth. The crime laid to his charge inferred death, a puniſhment which his accuſer inſiſted ought to be immediately inflicted on him. But his judges were contented with fining him the ſum of fifty talents (near ten thouſand pounds ſterling), which being unable to pay, he was thrown into priſon, where he ſoon after died of his wounds.

His death.

But the glory of Miltiades ſurvived him; and the Athenians, however unjuſt to his perſon, were not unmindful of his fame. At the diſtance of half a century, when the battle of Marathon was painted by order of the ſtate, they directed the figure of Miltiades to be placed in the fore-ground, animating the troops to victory: a reward which, during the virtuous ſimplicity of the ancient commonwealth, conferred more real honor, than all that magnificent profuſion of crowns and ſtatues[23], which in the later times of the republic were rather extorted by general fear, than beſtowed by public admiration.

Honors beſtowed on his memory.

[23] Æſchin. p. 301. et Polybius paſſim.

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[21] Æſchin. p. 301. et Polybius paſſim.

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His ſucceſſors in command.

The jealouſies, reſentments, dangers, and calamities, which often attend power and pre-eminence, have never yet proved ſufficient to deter an ambitious mind from the purſuit of greatneſs. The rivals of Miltiades were animated by the glory of his elevation, not depreſſed by the example of his fall. His accuſer Xantippus, though he had acted the principal part in removing this favorite of the people, was not deemed worthy to ſucceed him. Two candidates appeared for the public confidence and eſteem, who alternately outſtripped each other in the race of ambition, and whoſe characters deſerve attention even in general hiſtory, as they had a powerful influence on the fortune, not of Athens only, but of all Greece.

Compariſon of Ariſtides and Themiſtocles.

Ariſtides and Themiſtocles were nearly of the ſame age, and equally noble, being born in the firſt rank of citizens, though not of royal deſcent, like Solon and Piſiſtratus, Iſagoras and Cliſthenes, Xantippus and Miltiades, who had hitherto ſucceſſively aſſumed the chief adminiſtration of the Athenian republic. Both had been named among the generals who commanded in the battle of Marathon. The diſintereſted behaviour of Ariſtides on this memorable occaſion has been already mentioned. It afforded a promiſe of his future fame. But his dawning glories were ſtill eclipſed by the meridian luſtre of Miltiades. After the death of this great man, Ariſtides ought naturally to have ſucceeded to his influence, as he was eminently diſtinguiſhed by valor and moderation, the two great virtues of a republican. Formed in ſuch

schools of moral and political knowledge as then flourished in Athens, he had learned to prefer glory to pleasure; the interest of his country to his own personal glory; and the dictates of justice and humanity, even to the interests of his country. His ambition was rather to deserve, than to acquire, the admiration of his fellow-citizens; and while he enjoyed the inward satisfaction, he was little anxious about the external rewards of virtue. The character of Themistocles was of a more doubtful kind. The trophy, which Miltiades had raised at Marathon, disturbed his rest. He was inflamed with a desire to emulate the glory of this exploit; and while he enabled Athens to maintain a superiority in Greece, he was ambitious to acquire for himself a superiority in Athens. His talents were well adapted to accomplish both these purposes; eloquent, active, enterprising, he had strengthened his natural endowments by all the force of education and habit. Laws, government, revenue, and arms, every branch of political and military knowledge, were the great objects of his study. In the courts of justice he successfully displayed his abilities in defence of his private friends, or in accusing the enemies of the state. He was forward to give his opinion upon every matter of public deliberation; and his advice, founded in wisdom, and supported by eloquence, commonly prevailed in the assembly. Yet with all these great qualities, his mind was less smit with the native charms of virtue, than captivated with her splendid ornaments. Glory was the idol which he

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adored. He could injure, without remorſe, the general cauſe of the confederacy, in order to promote the grandeur of Athens [34]; and hiſtory ſtill leaves it as doubtful, as did his own conduct, whether, had an opportunity offered, he would not have ſacrificed the happineſs of his country to his private intereſt and ambition.

Their rivalſhip.

The diſcernment of Ariſtides perceived the danger of allowing a man of ſuch equivocal merit to be intruſted with the ſole government of the republic; and on this account, rather than from any motives of perſonal animoſity, he oppoſed every meaſure that might contribute to his elevation. In this patriotic view, he frequently ſolicited the ſame honors which were ambitiouſly courted by Themiſtocles, eſpecially when no other candidate appeared capable of balancing the credit of the latter. A rivalſhip thus began, and long continued between them [35]; and the whole people of Athens could alone decide the much conteſted pre-eminence. The intereſt of Themiſtocles ſo far prevailed over the authority of his opponent, that he procured his own nomination to the command of the fleet; with which he effected the conqueſt of the ſmall iſlands in the Ægean, and thus completed the deſign undertaken by Miltiades. While *he* acquired fame and fortune abroad, Ariſtides increaſed his popularity at home. The oppoſition to his power, ariſing from the ſplendid

[34] Plutarch. in Themiſtocle et Ariſtide.
[35] Plutarch. ibid. Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxix.

eloquence and popular manners of his rival, was now fortunately removed, and he became the chief leader of the people. His opinion gave law to the courts of juſtice, or rather, ſuch was the effect of his equity and diſcernment, he alone became ſovereign umpire in Athens. In all important differences he was choſen arbitrator, and the ordinary judges were deprived of the dignity and advantages formerly reſulting from their office. This conſequence of his authority, offending the pride of the Athenian magiſtrates, was ſufficient to excite their reſentment, which, of itſelf, might have effected the ruin of any individual.

Ariſtides banished. Olymp. lxxiii. 3. A. C. 486.

But their views on this occaſion were powerfully promoted by the triumphant return of Themiſtocles from his naval expedition. The admiral had acquired conſiderable riches; but wealth he deſpiſed, except as an inſtrument of ambition. The ſpoils of the conquered iſlanders were profuſely laviſhed in ſhows, feſtivals, dances, and theatrical entertainments, exhibited for the public amuſement. His generous manners and flowing affability were contraſted with the ſtern dignity of his rival; and the reſult of the compariſon added great force to his inſinuation, that, ſince his own neceſſary abſence in the ſervice of the republic, Ariſtides had acquired a degree of influence inconſiſtent with the conſtitution, and, by arrogating to himſelf an univerſal and unexampled juriſdiction in the ſtate, had eſtabliſhed a ſilent tyranny, without pomp or guards, over the minds of his fellow-citizens. Ariſtides, truſting to the innocence and integrity

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of his own heart, disdained to employ any unworthy means, either for gaining the favor, or for averting the resentment, of the multitude. The contest, therefore, ended in his banishment for ten years, by a law entitled the Ostracism (from the name of the materials[26] on which the votes were marked), by which the majority of the Athenian assembly might expel any citizen, however inoffensive or meritorious had been his past conduct, who, by his present power and greatness, seemed capable of disturbing the equality of republican government. This singular institution, which had been established soon after the Athenians had delivered themselves from the tyranny of Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, was evidently intended to prevent any person in future from attaining the same unlawful authority. At Athens, even virtue was proscribed, when it seemed to endanger the public freedom; and only four years after the battle of Marathon, in which he had displayed equal valor and wisdom, Aristides, the justest and most respectable of the Greeks, became the victim of popular jealousy[27]; an example of cruel rigor, which will for ever brand the spirit of democratical policy.

The great ascendant acquired by Themistocles;

The banishment of Aristides exposed the Athenians still more than formerly to the danger which they hoped to avoid by this severe measure. The removal of such a formidable opponent enabled Themistocles to govern without control. Army,

[26] Ὄστρακον, a shell. [27] Plutarch. et Herodot. ibid.

navy, and revenue, all were ſubmitted to his in- CHAP. IX.
ſpection. It happened, indeed, moſt fortunately for the fame of this great man, as well as for the liberty of Athens, that his active ambition was called to the glorious taſk of ſubduing the enemies of his country. The ſmaller iſlands in the Ægean were already reduced to obedience, but the poſſeſſion of them was uncertain while the fleet of Ægina covered the ſea, and bid defiance to that of the Athenians. This ſmall iſland, or rather this rock, inhabited time immemorial by merchants and pirates, and ſituate in the Saronic Gulph, which divides the territories of Attica from the northern ſhores of Peloponneſus, was a formidable enemy to the republic; the jealouſy of commerce and naval power embittered their mutual hoſtility; and as the inhabitants of Ægina, who were governed by a few leading men, had entered into an alliance with the Perſians, there was every circumſtance united which could provoke, to the utmoſt, the hatred and reſentment of the Athenians.

who perſuades the Athenians to augment their navy.

A motive leſs powerful than the exceſs of republican antipathy could not probably have prevailed on them to embrace the meaſure which they now adopted by the advice of Themiſtocles. There was a conſiderable revenue ariſing from the ſilver-mines of Mount Laurium, which had been hitherto employed in relieving the private wants of the citizens, or diſſipated in their public amuſements. This annual income Themiſtocles perſuaded them to deſtine to the uſeful purpoſe of building ſhips of war, by which they might ſeize or deſtroy the fleet

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They defeat the fleets of Ægina and Corcyra.

of Ægina. The propoſal was approved; an hundred gallies were equipped; the naval ſtrength of Ægina was broken, and ſucceſs animated the Athenians to aſpire at obtaining the unrivalled empire of the ſea. Corcyra formed the only remaining obſtacle to their ambition. This iſland which, under the name of Phœacia, is celebrated by Homer for its amazing riches and fertility, had been ſtill further improved by a colony of Corinthians. It extends an hundred miles along the weſtern ſhores of Epirus; and the natural abundance of its productions, the convenience of its harbours, and the adventurous ſpirit of its new inhabitants, gave them an indiſputed advantage over their neighbours, in navigation and commerce. They became ſucceſſively the rivals, the enemies, and the ſuperiors of Corinth, their mother-country; and their ſucceſsful cruiſers infeſted the coaſts, and diſturbed the communication of the iſlands and continent of Greece. It belonged to Athens, who had ſo lately puniſhed the perfidy of Ægina, to chaſtiſe the inſolence of the Corcyreans. The naval depredations of theſe iſlanders made them be regarded as common enemies; and Themiſtocles [28], when, by ſeizing part of their fleet, he broke the ſinews of their power, not only gratified the ambition of his republic, but performed a ſignal ſervice to the whole Grecian confederacy.

Strength and ſpirit of Athens.

Victorious by ſea and land againſt Greeks and Barbarians, Athens might now ſeem entitled to

[28] Plutarch. in Themiſt. Thucydid. lib. i. Corn. Nepos, in Themiſt.

enjoy

enjoy the fruits of a glorious ſecurity. It was ge- C. H. A. P. XI.
nerally believed in Greece, that the late diſaſter of the Perſians would deter them from invading, a ſecond time, the coaſts of Europe. But Themiſtocles, who, in the words of a moſt accompliſhed hiſtorian [29], was no leſs ſagacious in foreſeeing the future, than ſkilful in managing the preſent, regarded the battle of Marathon, not as the end of the war, but as the prelude to new and more glorious combats. He continually exhorted his fellow-citizens to keep themſelves in readineſs for action; above all, to increaſe, with unremitting aſſiduity, the ſtrength of their fleet; and, in conſequence of this judicious advice, the Athenians were enabled to oppoſe the immenſe armaments of Xerxes, of which the moſt formidable tidings ſoon arrived from every quarter, with two hundred gallies, of a ſuperior ſize and conſtruction to any hitherto known in Greece [30].

State of the other republics immediately preceding the invaſion of Xerxes

This fleet proved the ſafety of Greece, and prevented a country, from which the knowledge of laws, learning, and civility was deſtined to flow over Europe, from becoming a province of the Perſian empire, and being confounded with the maſs of barbarous nations. While the Athenians were led, by the circumſtances which we have endeavoured to explain, to prepare this uſeful engine of defence, the other Grecian ſtates afford, in their unimportant tranſactions, few materials for hiſtory [31]. The Spartans had long preſerved an

[29] Thucydides, ibid. [30] Plato, de Leg. l. iii.
[31] Herodot. l. vii. Diodor. l. xi.

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colleague [32]. He was ſucceeded by the heroic Leonidas, whoſe death (as ſhall be related) at Thermopylæ, was ſtill more illuſtrious and happy than that of Cleomenes was wretched and infamous. During the domeſtic diſturbances of Sparta, the other ſtates of Peloponneſus enjoyed a relaxation from the toils of war. The Arcadians and Argives tended their flocks, and cultivated their ſoil. Elis was contented with the ſuperintendence of the Olympic games. The Corinthians increaſed and abuſed the wealth which they had already acquired by their fortunate ſituation between two ſeas, and by long continuing the centre of the internal commerce of Greece. Of the republics beyond the iſthmus, the Phocians wiſhed to enjoy, in tranquillity, the ſplendor and riches which their whole territory derived from the celebrated temple of Delphi. They were frequently diſturbed, however, by invaſions from Theſſaly; the inhabitants of which, though numerous and warlike, yet being ſituated at the extremity of Greece, ſtill continued, like the Etolians, barbarous and uncultivated [33]. The Thebans maintained and extended their uſurpations over the ſmaller cities of Bœotia, and rejoiced that the ambition of the Athenians, directed to the command of the ſea and the conqueſt of diſtant iſlands, prevented that aſpiring people from giving the ſame minute attention as uſual to the affairs of the continent. The other republics were inconſiderable, and commonly followed the fortunes

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Of the colonies.

[32] Herodot. v. 75. [33] Thucydid. l. 1.

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of their more powerful neighbours. The Aſiatic colonies were reduced under the Perſian yoke; the Greek eſtabliſhments in Thrace and Macedon paid tribute to Xerxes; but the African Greeks bravely maintained their independence; and the flouriſhing ſettlements in Italy and Sicily were now acting a part which will be explained hereafter, and which rivalled, perhaps ſurpaſſed, the glory of Athens and Sparta in the Perſian war [14].

The preparations of Xerxes for invading Greece. Olymp. lxxiv. 4. A. C. 481.

Meanwhile the reduction of revolted provinces had given employment and luſtre to the Perſian arms. Nine years after the battle of Marathon, and in the fourth year of his reign, Xerxes found himſelf uncontrolled maſter of the Eaſt, and in poſſeſſion of ſuch a fleet and army as flattered him with the hopes of univerſal empire. The three laſt years of Darius were ſpent in preparing for the Grecian expedition. Xerxes, who ſucceeded to his ſceptre and to his revenge, dedicated four years more to the ſame hoſtile purpoſe. Amidſt his various wars and pleaſures, he took care that the artiſans of Egypt and Phœnicia, as well as of all the maritime provinces of Lower Aſia, ſhould labor, with unremitting diligence, in fitting out an armament adequate to the extent of his ambition. Twelve hundred ſhips of war, and three thouſand ſhips of burthen, were at length ready to receive his commands. The former were of a larger ſize and firmer conſtruction than any

[14] Diodor. l. xi. c. xvi. et xvii.

hitherto ſeen in the ancient world: they carried on board, at a medium, two hundred ſeamen, and thirty Perſians who ſerved as marines. The ſhips of burthen contained, in general, eighty men, fewer being found incapable of rowing them. The whole amounted to four thouſand two hundred ſhips, and about five hundred thouſand men, who were ordered to rendez-vous in the moſt ſecure roads and harbours of Ionia. We are not exactly informed of the number of the land-forces, which were aſſembled at Suſa. It is certain, however, that they were extremely numerous, and it is probable that they would continually increaſe on the march from Suſa to Sardis, by the confluence of many tributary nations, to the imperial ſtandard of Xerxes. CHAP. IX.

When the army had attained its perfect complement, we are told that it conſiſted of ſeventeen hundred thouſand infantry, and four hundred thouſand cavalry; which, joined to the fleet abovementioned, made the whole forces amount to near two millions of fighting men. An immenſe crowd of women and eunuchs followed the camp of an effeminate people. Theſe inſtruments of pleaſure and luxury, together with the ſlaves neceſſary in tranſporting the baggage and proviſions, equalled, perhaps exceeded [15], the number of the ſoldiers; ſo. Their magnitude.

[15] A military friend has favored me with the actual return of an army ſerving under British officers in the East:

Officers and troops, -	6,727
Servants and followers, -	19,772

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that according to the univerſal teſtimony of ancient hiſtorians, the army of Xerxes appears the greateſt that was ever collected [16].

But many circumſtances ſerve to prove that its ſtrength by no means correſponded to its magnitude. The various nations which compoſed it, were not divided into regular bodies, properly diſciplined and officered. Their muſter-roll was taken in a manner that is remarkable for its ſimplicity. Ten thouſand men were ſeparated from the reſt, formed into a compact body, and ſurrounded by a paliſade. The whole army paſſed ſucceſſively into this encloſure, and were thus numbered, like cattle, without the formality of placing them in ranks, or of calling their names.

Xerxes paſſes the Helleſpont. Olymp. lxxv. 1. A. C. 480.

Xerxes having wintered at Sardis, ſent ambaſſadors early in the ſpring to demand earth and water, as a mark of ſubmiſſion, from the ſeveral Grecian republics. With regard to Athens and Sparta, he thought it unneceſſary to obſerve this ceremony, as they had treated, with the moſt inhuman cruelty, and in direct contradiction to their own laws of war, the meſſengers intruſted with a ſimilar commiſſion by his father Darius. The

[16] Herodot. l. vii. c. lxxxix. et ſeq. enters into a circumſtantial detail of the Perſian forces. His account is confirmed, with leſs difference than uſual in ſuch caſes, by Lyſias Orat. Funeb. Iſocrat. Panegyr. Diodor. l. xi. p. 244. He repeatedly expreſſes his aſtoniſhment at the immenſity of the Barbarian hoſts. He appears fully ſenſible of the difficulties with which they had to ſtruggle, in order to procure proviſions. His account of the Grecian fleet and army is acknowledged to be faithful and exact in the higheſt degree; circumſtances which all ſtrongly confirm the credibility of his evidence.

ſlow march of his immenſe army, and, ſtill more, its tedious tranſportation acroſs the ſeas which ſeparate Europe from Aſia, ill ſuited the rapid violence of his revenge. Xerxes therefore ordered a bridge of boats to be raiſed on the Helleſpont, which, in the narroweſt part, is only ſeven ſtadia or ſeven eighths of a mile in breadth. Here the bridge was formed with great labor; but whether owing to the awkwardneſs of its conſtruction, or to the violence of a ſucceeding tempeſt, it was no ſooner built than deſtroyed. The great king ordered the directors of the work to be beheaded; and, proud of his tyrannic power over feeble man, diſplayed an impotent rage againſt the elements. In all the madneſs of deſpotiſm he commanded the Helleſpont to be puniſhed with three hundred ſtripes, and a pair of fetters to be dropped into the ſea, adding theſe frantic and ridiculous expreſſions: "It is thus, thou ſalt and bitter water, that thy maſter puniſhes thy unprovoked injury, and he is determined to paſs thy treacherous ſtreams notwithſtanding all the inſolence of thy malice[37]." After this abſurd ceremony, a new bridge was made of a double range of veſſels, fixed by ſtrong anchors on both ſides, and joined together by cables of hemp and reed, faſtened to immenſe beams driven into the oppoſite ſhores. The decks of the veſſels, which exceeded ſix hundred in number, were ſtrewed with trunks of trees and earth, and their ſurface was ſtill further ſmoothed by a

[37] Herodot. vii. 35.

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covering of planks. The sides were then railed with wicker work, to prevent the fear and impatience of the horses; and upon this singular edifice the main strength of the army passed in seven days and nights, from the Asiatic city of Abydos to that of Sestus in Europe [38].

Cuts a canal through the isthmus of Sana.

But before this general transportation, a considerable part of the forces had been already sent to the coast of Macedonia, in order to dig across the isthmus which joins to that coast the high promontory of Athos. The disaster which befel the fleet commanded by Mardonius, in doubling the cape of this celebrated peninsula, was still present to the mind of Xerxes. The neck of land, only a mile and a half in breadth, was adorned by the Grecian city of Sana; and the promontory being rich and fertile, was well inhabited by both Greeks and Barbarians. The cutting of this narrow isthmus, by a canal of sufficient width to allow two gallies to sail abreast, was a matter not beyond the power of a potentate who commanded the labor of so many myriads [39]; but it is observed by

[38] Herodot. l. vii. c. lvi.

[39] Herodot. l. vii. c. xxi. et seq. et Diodor. l. xi. c. ii. It is difficult to say, whether we ought most to condemn the swelling exaggeration with which Lysias, Isocrates, and other writers, speak of these operations of Xerxes, which they call, "navigating the land, and walking the sea," or the impudent incredulity of Juvenal:

——— creditur olim
Velificatus Athos, et quidquid Græcia mendax
Audet in historiâ; constratum classibus iisdem
Suppositumque rotis solidum mare. ———

Nothing is better fitted to perpetuate error than the smart sentence of a satirist. A line of the same Juvenal has branded Cicero as a bad

Herodotus, to have been a work of more oſtentation than utility, as the veſſels might, according to the cuſtom of the age, have been conveyed over land with greater expedition, and with leſs trouble and expenſe. The eaſtern workmen were in general ſo extremely unacquainted with operations of this kind, that they made the opening at the ſurface of the ground of the ſame breadth with that neceſſary at the bottom of the channel. In order to excite their diligence by national emulation, a particular portion of the ground was aſſigned to each diſtinction of people engaged in this undertaking. The Phœnicians alone, by giving a proper width at the top, avoided the inconvenience of ſubmitting to a double labor. In performing this, and every other taſk, the ſoldiers of Xerxes were kept to their work by ſtripes and blows; a circumſtance which gives us as mean an opinion of their ſpirit and activity, as all that has been already related, gives us of their ſkill and diſcipline.

Xerxes reviews his forces near Doriſcus.

The Perſian forces were now ſafely conducted into Europe; and the chief obſtacle to the eaſy navigation of their fleet along the coaſts of Thrace, Macedon, and Theſſaly, to the centre of the Grecian

poet, though that univerſal literary genius left admirable verſes behind him, which have been tranſmitted to modern times. The digging of the canal of Athos is ſupported by the uniform teſtimony of all antiquity, and might be credited on the ſingle evidence of Thucydides (l. iv. c. cix.), the moſt faithful, accurate, and impartial of all hiſtorians, ancient or modern; and who himſelf lived long in the neighbourhood of Athos, where he had an eſtate, and was director of the Athenſan mines in Thrace; as will appear hereafter.

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ſtates, was removed by the dividing of mount Athos. Through the fertile plains of Leſſer Aſia the whole army had kept in a body; but the difficulty of ſupplies obliged them to ſeparate into three diviſions in their march through the leſs cultivated countries of Europe. Before this ſeparation took place, the whole fleet and army were reviewed by Xerxes, near Doriſcus, a city of Thrace, at the mouth of the river Hebrus. Such an immenſe collection of men aſſembled in arms; and attended with every circumſtance of martial magnificence, gave an opportunity for ſeeing, or at leaſt for ſuppoſing, many affecting ſcenes. The ambition of the great king had torn him from his palace of Suſa, but it could not tear him from the objects of his affection, and the miniſters of his pleaſure. He was followed by his women, and by his flatterers [40], and all the effeminate pride of a court was blended with the pomp of war. While the great body of the army lay every night in the open air, Xerxes and his attendants were provided with magnificent tents. The ſplendor of his chariots, the mettle of his horſes, which far excelled the ſwifteſt racers of Theſſaly, the unexampled number of his troops, and above all, the bravery of the immortal band, a body of ten thouſand Perſian cavalry, ſo named becauſe their number was conſtantly maintained from the flower of the whole army, ſeemed ſufficient, to the admiring crowd, to raiſe the glory of their ſovereign above

His ſplendor,

[40] Plato de Legibus, l. iii. p. 536.

the condition of humanity; eſpecially ſince, among ſo many thouſands of men as paſſed in review, none could be compared to Xerxes in ſtrength, in beauty, or in ſtature [41].

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But amidſt this ſplendor of external greatneſs, Xerxes felt himſelf unhappy. Having aſcended an eminence to view his camp and fleet, his pride was humbled with the reflection, that no one of all the innumerable hoſt could ſurvive an hundred years. The haughty monarch of Aſia was melted into tears. The converſation of his kinſman and counſellor, Artabanus, was ill calculated to conſole his melancholy. That reſpectable old man, whoſe wiſdom had often moderated the youthful ardor of Xerxes, and who had been as aſſiduous to prevent, as Mardonius had been to promote, the Grecian war, took notice that the miſery of human life was an object far more lamentable than its ſhortneſs. "In the narrow ſpace allotted them, has not every one of theſe in our preſence, and indeed the whole human race, often wiſhed rather to die than to live? The tumult of paſſions diſturbs the beſt of our days; diſeaſes and weakneſs accompany old age; and death, ſo vainly dreaded, is the ſure and hoſpitable refuge of wretched mortals."

and miſery.

Xerxes was not of a diſpoſition ſteadily to contemplate the dictates of experience and the maxims of philoſophy. He endeavoured to divert thoſe gloomy reflections which he could not

He converſes with Demaratus, the baniſhed king of Sparta.

[41] Herodot. l. vii. c. clxxxiv.

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remove, by amuſing his fancy with horſe-races, mock-battles, and other favorite entertainments. In the intervals of theſe diverſions, he ſometimes converſed with Demaratus, the baniſhed king of Sparta, who, as we have already mentioned, had ſought refuge in the Perſian court, from the perſecution of his countrymen. A memorable interview between them is deſcribed by Herodotus. The Perſian, diſplaying oſtentatiouſly the magnitude of his power, aſked the royal fugitive, Whether he ſuſpected the Greeks would yet venture to take the field, in order to oppoſe the progreſs of his arms? Demaratus replied, that if he might ſpeak without giving offence, he was of opinion that the Perſians would meet with a very vigorous reſiſtance. "Greece had been trained in the ſevere, but uſeful ſchool of neceſſity; poverty was her nurſe and her mother; ſhe had acquired patience and valor by the early application of diſcipline; and ſhe was habituated to the practice of virtue by the watchful attention of the law. All the Greeks were warlike, but the Spartans were peculiarly brave. It was unneceſſary to aſk their number, for if they exceeded not a thouſand men, they would defend their country and their freedom againſt the aſſembled myriads of Aſia [42]."

Receives the ſubmiſſion of many Grecian communities.

Xerxes was rather amuſed than inſtructed by this diſcourſe. His hopes of ſucceſs ſeemed built on too ſolid principles to be ſhaken by the opinion of a prejudiced Greek. Every day meſſengers

[42] Herodot. l. vii. c. cii. et ſeq.

arrived with the ſubmiſſion of new nations. The inhabitants of the rocky country of Doris, many tribes of Theſſaly, the mountaineers of Pindus, Oſſa, Pelion, and Olympus, which like a lofty rampart ſurround that country, offered the uſual preſent of earth and water, as the ſymbol of ſurrendering their territories to a power which it ſeemed vain to reſiſt. Theſe diſtricts formed only the northern frontier of Greece. But what gave peculiar pleaſure to Xerxes, the Thebans who inhabited the central parts, and all the cities of Bœotia, except Theſpiæ and Platæa, privately ſent ambaſſadors to teſtify their good-will to his cauſe, and to requeſt the honor of his friendſhip.

Meaſures of the Athenians and their confederates.

Meanwhile thoſe Grecians, who, unmoved by the terrors of invaſion, obeyed the voice of liberty and their country, had ſent deputies to the iſthmus of Corinth, to deliberate about the common intereſt. They conſiſted of repreſentatives from the ſeveral ſtates of Peloponneſus, and from the moſt conſiderable republics beyond that peninſula. By common conſent, they ſuſpended their domeſtic animoſities, recalled their fugitives, conſulted their oracles, and diſpatched ambaſſadors, in the name of united Greece, to demand aſſiſtance from the iſlands of Crete, Cyprus, and Corcyra, as well as from the Grecian colonies on the coaſts of Italy and Sicily. All their meaſures were carried on with great appearance of unanimity and concord. Even the Thebans, careful to conceal their treachery, had ſent repreſentatives to the common council. The general danger ſeemed to unite and

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harmonize the moſt diſcordant members: and although the perpetual diſſenſions between rival ſtates, frequently weakened the authority of the Amphictyonic confederacy, it appeared on the preſent, as on many other occaſions, that the Greeks acknowledged the obligation of a tacit alliance to defend each other againſt domeſtic tyrants and foreign barbarians.

The Theſſalians crave their aſſiſtance.

Before they had an opportunity of learning the will of the gods, or of diſcovering the intentions of their diſtant allies, ambaſſadors arrived from thoſe communities of Theſſaly which ſtill adhered to the intereſt of Greece, praying a ſpeedy and effectual aſſiſtance to guard the narrow paſſes which lead into their country. There is a valley near the coaſt of the Egean, between the lofty mountains of Oſſa and Olympus, which afforded the moſt convenient paſſage from Macedon into Theſſaly. This ſingular ſpot, commonly called the valley of Tempé, is about five miles in length, and, where narroweſt, ſcarcely an hundred paces in breadth; but is adorned by the hand of nature with every object that can gratify the ſenſes or delight the fancy. The gently-flowing Peneus [a] interſects the middle of the plain. Its waters are increaſed

The valley of Tempé;

[a] I know not why Ovid ſays,

Peneus ab imo
Effuſus Pindo *ſpumoſis* volvitur *undis*
Metam. l. i. ver. 570.

Ælian (from whom the deſcription in the text is taken) ſays, that the Peneus flows

Δίκην ἐλαίου, ſmooth as oil.

by perennial caſcades from the green mountains, and thus rendered of ſufficient depth for veſſels of conſiderable burden. The rocks are every where planted with vines and olives, and the banks of the river, and even the river itſelf, are overſhadowed with lofty foreſt-trees, which defend thoſe who ſail upon it from the ſun's meridian ardor. The innumerable grottoes and arbors careleſsly ſcattered over this delightful ſcene, and watered by fountains of peculiar freſhneſs and ſalubrity, invite the weary traveller to repoſe; while the muſical warbling of birds conſpires with the fragrant odor of plants to ſooth his ſenſes, and to heighten the pleaſure which the eye and fancy derive from viewing the charming variety of this enchanting landſcape; from examining the happy intermixture of hill and dale, wood and water; and from contemplating the diverſified beauty and majeſtic grandeur of Nature under her moſt blooming and beneficent aſpects.

This delicious valley, which an ancient writer, by a bold figure of ſpeech, calls "a feſtival for the eyes," and which the bounty of the gods had formed for happy ſcenes of love, innocence, and tranquillity, the deſtructive ambition of man was ready to convert into a field of bloodſhed and horror. It was natural for the Theſſalians to expect that the troops of Xerxes would paſs by this inlet into their territories; and hither their ambaſſadors entreated the allied Greeks to ſend an army. The propoſal ſeemed juſt and uſeful; ſhips were prepared at the Iſthmus; and a body of ten thouſand

is occupied by the Greeks;

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men were embarked under the command of Themiſtocles, with orders to ſail through the narrow Euripus, to land in the harbours of Tempé, and to remain there in order to guard that important paſs.

but ſoon abandoned.

They had not continued in thoſe parts many days, when a meſſenger arrived from Alexander, ſon of Amyntas, tributary prince of Macedonia, adviſing them to depart from that poſt, unleſs they meant to be trodden under foot by the Perſian cavalry. It is not probable, however, that this menace could have changed their reſolution. But they had already learned that there was another paſſage into Theſſaly, through the territory of the Peræbians, near the city Gonnus in Upper Macedonia. Their army was inſufficient to guard both; and the defending of one only, could not be of eſſential advantage to themſelves, to the Theſſalians, or to the common cauſe.

The dangers which threaten Greece become more imminent and alarming.

Meantime, the dangers which thickened over their reſpective republics, rendered it neceſſary to return ſouthward. Their diſtant colonies, particularly thoſe of Sicily, which were the moſt numerous and powerful, could not afford them any aſſiſtance, being themſelves threatened with a formidable invaſion from the Carthaginians, the cauſe and conſequences of which we ſhall have occaſion fully to explain. The oracles were doubtful, or terrifying. To the Spartans they announced, as the only means of ſafety, the voluntary death of a king of the race of Hercules. The Athenians were commanded to ſeek refuge within their wooden walls.

The

The reſponſes given to the other ſtates are not particularly recorded; but it appears in general, that all were dark, ambiguous, or frightful. The Grecian army returned therefore to their ſhips, repaſſed the Euripus, and arrived in ſafety at Corinth; while the Theſſalians, thus abandoned by their allies, reluctantly ſubmitted to the common enemy. C. H. A. 4. P. 3. Ol. 1.

The terror inſpired by the critical ſituation of affairs, rendered the preſence of the leaders neceſſary in their reſpective communities. Themiſtocles found the Athenians divided about the meaning of the oracle, the greater part aſſerting, that by wooden walls was underſtood the incloſure of the citadel, which had been formerly ſurrounded by a paliſade. Others gave the words a different conſtruction, and each according to his fears or his intereſt; but Themiſtocles aſſerted that all of them had miſtaken the advice of the god, who deſired them to truſt for ſafety to their fleet. This opinion, ſupported by all the force of his eloquence, and the weight of his authority, at length prevailed in the aſſembly, although Epicides, a demagogue of great influence among the lower ranks of people, oppoſed it with the utmoſt vehemence; and ſeizing this opportunity to traduce the character of Themiſtocles, inſiſted that he himſelf ſhould be appointed general in his room. But the prudent Athenian knew the weakneſs of his adverſary; his great paſſion was avarice; and a ſeaſonable bribe immediately ſilenced his clamorous oppoſition. The Athenian gallies were fitted out with The Grecian fleet ſails to Artemiſium.

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The Greeks aſſemble an army.

Beſides the force neceſſary for manning this fleet, the confederates could raiſe an army of about ſixty thouſand freemen, beſides a ſtill greater proportion of armed ſlaves. As the paſſes leading from Theſſaly to the territories of Phocis and Locris were ſtill narrower and more difficult of acceſs than thoſe from Macedon into Theſſaly, it ſeems extraordinary that they did not immediately direct their whole military ſtrength towards that quarter: but this neglect may be explained by their ſuperſtitious veneration for oracles, the neceſſity of celebrating their accuſtomed feſtivals, and the dangerous delays and inactivity inherent in the nature of a republican confederacy. As they were acquainted with only one paſs, by which the Perſians could arrive from Theſſaly, they thought that a body of eight thouſand pike-men might be equally capable with a larger proportion of troops, to defend it againſt every invader. This narrow defile was called the Straits of Thermopylæ, in alluſion to the warm ſprings in that neighbourhood, and was deemed the gate or entrance into Greece. It was bounded on the weſt by high and inacceſſible precipices, which join the lofty ridge of mount

Guard the Straits of Thermopylæ.

Oeta; and on the eaſt terminated by an impracticable moraſs, bordered by the ſea. Near the plain of the Theſſalian city Trachis, the paſſage was fifty feet broad; but at Alpené, there was not room for one chariot to paſs another. Even theſe paſſes were defended by walls, formerly built by the Phocians to protect them againſt the incurſions of their enemies in Theſſaly, and ſtrengthened, on this occaſion, with as much care as time would allow. The troops ſent to Thermopylæ, which was only fifteen miles diſtant from the ſtation of the Grecian fleet at Artemiſium, conſiſted chiefly of Peloponneſians, commanded by Leonidas the Spartan king, who was prepared, in obedience to the oracle, to devote his life for the ſafety of his country. CHAP. IX.

Their army marches to the plains of Trachis.

Before the Grecian confederates adopted theſe vigorous meaſures for their own defence, the Perſian army had marched, in three diviſions, from Thracian Doriſcus. They were accompanied by the fleet, which, coaſting about two hundred miles along the ſhores of Thrace, Macedon, and Theſſaly, at length reached Cape Sepias, which is twenty miles north of Artemiſium. As they advanced ſouthward, they laid under contribution Abdera [**], Thaſus, and Eion, the principal Grecian

The Perſian fleet arrive near Cape Sepias.

[**] The places on the road prepared not only vaſt magazines of corn and other proviſions for the troops, but ſumptuous entertainments for Xerxes and his attendants. A ſaying of Megacreon of Abdera expreſſed the devouring rapacity of the invaders: "That the Abderites ought to thank the gods, that Xerxes feaſted but once a day; it would ruin Abdera to furniſh him with both a dinner and a ſupper."

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colonies in Thrace, as well as the cities of Torona, Olynthus, Potidæa, and other places of ſmaller note on the coaſt of Macedonia. The whole fleet anchored, after performing the moſt tedious and dangerous part of the voyage, near the entrance of the rivers Axius and Lydius, which flow into the Thermaic gulph; and, after quitting theſe harbours, ſpent eleven days in ſailing eighty miles, along a ſmooth unbroken coaſt, from the northern extremity of this gulph to the general rendezvous near Cape Sepias.

Their army marches to the plains of Trachis.

The fleet was commanded by Achæmines and Arabignes, ſons of Darius. Xerxes, in perſon, headed his army, which made a conſiderable halt during the march at the Macedonian towns of Therma and Pella, and encamped in the Thracian plains on each ſide of the above-mentioned rivers Axius and Lydius. From hence they proceeded in three bodies; the diviſion neareſt the ſhore was commanded by Mardonius and Maſiſtes. Sergis, an experienced general, conducted the march through the higher parts of the country; and the great king, accompanied by Smerdones and Megabyzus, who occaſionally relieved him from the trouble of command, choſe the middle paſſage as the ſafeſt, the moſt convenient, and the moſt entertaining; for hitherto the Perſian expedition was rather a journey of pleaſure, than an undertaking of fatigue or danger. Xerxes examined at leiſure ſuch objects of nature or art as appeared moſt intereſting and curious. His fancy was amuſed, as he paſſed the various ſcenes of ſuperſtition, with the legendary tales

carefully related by his conductors. He viewed, with pleaſure, the wide plains of Theſſaly, which bore indubitable marks of being once an extenſive lake; and contemplated, with wonder, the lofty mountains which ſeparated that country from the reſt of Greece, and which evidently appeared to be rent aſunder, and to have received their preſent form, from the terrible operation of volcanoes and earthquakes. After fully ſatisfying his curioſity, he joined, with the diviſion more immediately under his command, the remainder of the army, aſſembled and encamped on the wide plains of Trachis, about forty miles in circumference, ſtretching along the ſhore of Theſſaly, oppoſite to the ſtation of the Perſian fleet, and adjacent to the Straits of Thermopylæ [45].

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Circumſtances that rendered the Spartans reſpectable to Xerxes.

For more than twelve months, Xerxes had never ſeen the face of an enemy. He had traverſed, without reſiſtance, the wide regions of Aſia, and the countries which in ancient times were deemed moſt warlike in Europe. All the territories beyond Trachis acknowledged his power; and the diſtricts of Greece, which ſtill preſented a ſcene of action to his invincible arms, were leſs extenſive than the meaneſt of his provinces. Yet it is probable that he heard, not without emotion, that an army of Greeks, headed by the Spartan king, had taken poſt at Thermopylæ, in order to diſpute his paſſage. What he had been told by Demaratus concerning the character and principles of that

[45] Herodot. Diodor. Plutarch. ibid.

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heroic people, he might now, when the danger drew near, be the more inclined to believe, from the ſuggeſtions of his own memory and experience. In the warmth of generous indignation, the Spartans, as we have already obſerved, had put to death the Perſian heralds, ſent to demand their ſubmiſſion; but upon cool reflection, they were prompted, chiefly indeed by ſuperſtitious motives, to make atonement for a violation of the ſacred law of nations. When proclamation was made in the aſſembly, "Who would die for Sparta?" two citizens, of great rank and eminence, offered themſelves as willing ſacrifices for the good of the community. Sperthies and Bulis (for theſe were their names) ſet out for Suſa on this ſingular errand. As they paſſed through Leſſer Aſia, they were entertained by Hydarnes, the governor of that province, who actually accompanied Xerxes, as commander of the Immortal Band, to which dignity he had been raiſed on account of his ſuperior merit. Hydarnes, among other diſcourſe with the Spartans, teſtified his ſurpriſe, that their republic ſhould be ſo averſe to the friendſhip of the king his maſter, who, he obſerved, as they might learn by his own example, well underſtood the value of brave men. That if they complied with the deſires of Xerxes, he would appoint them governors over the other cities of Greece. The Spartans coolly replied, "That he talked of a matter of which he was not a competent judge. With the condition and rewards of ſervitude he was indeed ſufficiently acquainted; but as to the enjoyments

of liberty, he had never proved how ſweet they were; for if he had once made that experiment, he would adviſe them to defend their freedom not only with lances, but with hatchets[46]."

The ſame magnanimity diſtinguiſhed their behaviour at Suſa. The guards told them, that, when admitted into the preſence of Xerxes, they muſt obſerve the uſual ceremony of proſtrating themſelves on the ground. But the Spartans declared, "That no degree of violence could make them ſubmit to ſuch mean adulation: That they were not accuſtomed to adore a man, and came not thither for ſuch an impious purpoſe." They approached Xerxes, therefore, in an erect poſture, and told him with firmneſs, they were ſent to ſubmit to any puniſhment which he might think proper to inflict on them, as an atonement for the death of his heralds. Xerxes admiring their virtue, replied, "That he certainly ſhould not repeat the error of the Greeks, nor, by ſacrificing individuals, deliver the ſtate from the guilt of murder and impiety." The Spartans having received this anſwer, returned home, perſuaded that they had done their duty in offering private ſatisfaction; which, though not accepted, ought ſufficiently to atone for the public crime[47].

He ſends meſſengers to treat with them.

The example of theſe diſtinguiſhed patriots probably gave Xerxes a very favorable idea of the general character of their community. As he had not any particular quarrel with the Spartans, whoſe

[46] Herodot. l. vii. c. cxxxv. [47] Idem, l. vii. c. cxxxiv. et ſeq.

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opposition, though it could not prevent, would certainly retard, his intended punishment of Athens, he sent messengers to desire them to lay down their arms; to which they replied, "Let him come, and take them." The messengers then offered them lands, on condition of their becoming allies to the great king; but they answered, "That it was the custom of their republic to conquer lands by valor, not to acquire them by treachery." Except making these smart replies, they took not the smallest notice of the Persians; but continued to employ themselves as before their arrival, contending in the gymnastic exercises, entertaining themselves with music and conversation, or adjusting their long hair to appear more terrible to their enemies. The messengers of Xerxes, equally astonished at what they saw and heard, returned to the Persian camp, and described the unexpected event of their commission, as well as the extraordinary behaviour of the Spartans; of which Xerxes desired an explanation from their countryman Demaratus [49]. The latter declared in general, that their whole carriage and demeanour announced a determined resolution to fight to the last extremity; but he found it difficult to make the Persian conceive the motives of men, who fought, at the certain price of their own lives, to purchase immortal renown for their country. — That a few individuals should be animated, on some extraordinary occasions, with this patriotic magnanimity, may easily be understood. Of this,

Magnanimity of the Spartans.

[49] Herodot. l. vii. c. ccix. et seq.

history in all ages furnishes illustrious examples; but that a whole nation should be habitually impressed with the same generosity of character, cannot readily be believed, without reflecting on the institutions and manners of the Spartans. The laws of that celebrated people prohibiting, as it has been already observed [49], the introduction of wealth and luxury, and rigidly confining each individual to the rank in which he was born, had extinguished the great motives of private ambition, and left scarcely any other scope to the active principles of men, but the glory of promoting the interests of their republic. Their extraordinary military success, the natural fruit of their temperance and activity, had given them a permanent sense of their superiority in war, which it became their chief point of honor to maintain and to confirm; and as the law which commanded them to die, rather than break their ranks, or abandon their posts in battle, was, like all the ordinances of Lycurgus, conceived to be of divine authority, the influence of superstition happily conspired with the ardor of patriotism and the enthusiasm of valor, in preparing them to meet certain death in the service of the public. CHAP. IX.

Xerxes could not be made to enter into these motives, or to believe, as Herodotus observes with inimitable simplicity, "that the Grecians were come to Thermopylæ only as men desirous to die, and to destroy as many of their enemies as they could; though nothing was more true." He

Xerxes waits four days, in hopes of changing their resolution.

[49] See vol. i. p. 133.

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therefore waited four days, continually expecting they would either retreat into their own country, or ſurrender their arms, agreeably to his meſſage. But as they ſtill continued to guard the paſſage, he aſcribed this conduct to obſtinacy or folly; and on the fifth day determined to chaſtiſe their inſolent oppoſition.

Gives orders to attack them and their confederates.

The Medes and Ciſſians, who, next to the Sacæ and Perſians, formed the braveſt part of his army, were commanded to attack theſe obſtinate Greeks, and to bring them alive into his preſence. The Barbarians marched with confidence to the engagement, but were repulſed with great ſlaughter. The places of thoſe who fell, were inceſſantly ſupplied with freſh troops, but they could not make the ſmalleſt impreſſion on the firm battalions of the Greeks; and the great loſs which they ſuſtained in the attempt, proved to all, and particularly to the king, that he had indeed many men, but few ſoldiers. The Sacæ, armed with their hatchets, next marched to the attack, but without better ſucceſs; and laſt of all, the choſen band of Perſians, headed by Hydarnes, deigned to diſplay their valor in what appeared to them a very unequal conteſt. But they ſoon changed their opinion when they came to cloſe with the enemy; for, ſays Herodotus, their numbers were uſeleſs, as they fought in a narrow paſs, and their ſhort-pointed weapons were ill calculated to contend with the length of the Grecian ſpear. The Greeks had the advantage ſtill more in the ſuperiority of their diſcipline, than in the excellence of their armor.

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Tired with deſtroying, they retreated in cloſe order, and when purſued unguardedly by the Barbarians, they faced about on a ſudden, and killed an incredible number of the Perſians, with ſcarcely any loſs to themſelves. Xerxes, who was ſeated on an eminence to behold the battle, frequently ſtarted in wild emotion from his throne; and, fearing leſt he ſhould be deprived of the flower of his army, he ordered them to be drawn off from the attack. But as the Grecian numbers were ſo extremely inconſiderable, and as it ſeemed probable that the greateſt part of them muſt have ſuffered much injury in theſe repeated aſſaults, he determined next day to renew the engagement. Next day he fought without better ſucceſs than before; and after vainly endeavouring to force the paſs, both in ſeparate bodies, and with the collected vigor of their troops, the Perſians were compelled to abandon the enterpriſe, and diſgracefully to retire to their camp.

His troops are repelled.

It was a ſpectacle which the world had never ſeen before, and which it was never again to behold, the perſevering intrepidity of eight thouſand men reſiſting the impetuous fury of an army compoſed of millions. The pertinacious valor of Leonidas, and of his little troop, oppoſed, and might have long retarded, the progreſs of the Barbarians. But it was the fate of Greece, always to be conquered rather by the treachery of falſe friends, than by the force of open enemies. When Xerxes knew not what meaſures to purſue in order to effect his purpoſe, and felt the inconvenience of

The Greeks betrayed by Epialtes;

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remaining long in the ſame quarters with ſuch an immenſe number of men, a perfidious Greek, induced by the hopes of reward, offered to remove his difficulties [50]. The name of the traitor was Epialtes, and he was a native of the obſcure diſtrict of Mœlis, which ſeparates the frontiers of Theſſaly and Phocis. His experience of the country made him acquainted with a paſſage through the mountains of Oeta, ſeveral miles to the weſt of that guarded by Leonidas. Over this unfrequented path he undertook to conduct a body of twenty thouſand Perſians, who might aſſault the enemy in rear, while the main body attacked them in front. By this means, whatever prodigies of valor the Greeks might perform, they muſt be finally compelled to ſurrender, as they would be encloſed on all ſides among barren rocks and inhoſpitable deſerts.

who conducts a Perſian detachment over the mountains.

The plan ſo judiciouſly concerted, was carried into immediate execution. On the evening of the ſeventh day after Xerxes arrived at the Straits, twenty thouſand choſen men left the Perſian camp, commanded by Hydarnes, and conducted by Epialtes. All night they marched through the thick foreſts of oak which abound in thoſe parts; and by day-break they had advanced near to the top of the hill. But how much were they ſurpriſed to ſee the firſt rays of the morning reflected by the glittering ſurfaces of Grecian ſpears and helmets! Hydarnes was afraid that this guard, which ſeemed at no

[50] Herodot. l. vii. c. ccxii. et ſeq.

great distance, had been also composed of Lacedæmonians; but a nearer approach showed that they consisted of a thousand Phocians, whom the foresight of Leonidas had sent to defend this important but unknown pass, which chance or treachery might discover to the Persians. The thick shade of the trees long concealed the enemy from the Greeks; at length the rustling of the leaves, and the tumult occasioned by the motion of twenty thousand men, discovered the imminence of danger; the Phocians with great intrepidity flew to their arms, and prepared, if they should not conquer, at least to die gallantly. The compact firmness of their ranks, which might have resisted the regular onset of the enemy, exposed them to suffer much from the immense shower of darts which the Persians poured upon them. To avoid this danger, they too rashly abandoned the pass which they had been sent to guard, and retired to the highest part of the mountain, not doubting that the enemy, whose strength so much exceeded their own, would follow them thither. But in this they were disappointed; for the Persians prudently omitting the pursuit of this inconsiderable party, whom to defeat they considered as a matter of little moment, immediately seized the passage, and marched down the mountain with the utmost expedition, in order to accomplish the design suggested by Epialtes.

Alarm in the Grecian camp.

Meanwhile obscure intimations from the gods had darkly announced some dreadful calamity impending on the Greeks at Thermopylæ. The appearance of the entrails, which were carefully

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inſpected by the Augur Magiſtias, threatened the Spartans with death; but when, or by what means, it did not clearly appear, until a Grecian deſerter, a native of the city Cymé in Ionia, named Tyraſtiades, arrived with information of the intended march of the Perſians acroſs the mountain. Animated by the love of his country, this generous fugitive had no ſooner diſcovered the treacherous deſign of Epialtes, than he determined, at the riſk of his life, and ſtill more at the riſk of being ſubjected to the moſt excruciating tortures, to communicate his diſcovery to the Spartan king [51]. Zeal for the ſafety of Greece gave ſwiftneſs to his ſteps, and he appeared in the Grecian camp a few hours after the Perſians, conducted by Epialtes, had left the plains of Trachis. Leonidas immediately called a council of war, to deliberate upon the meaſures neceſſary to be taken in conſequence of this information, equally important and alarming. All the confederates of Peloponneſus, except the Spartans, declared their opinion, that it was neceſſary to abandon a poſt, which, after the double attack announced to them ſhould take place, it would be impoſſible with any hopes of ſucceſs to maintain. As their exertions could not be of any avail to the public cauſe, it was prudent to conſult their private ſafety; and while time was yet allowed them, to retire to the iſthmus of Corinth, where joining the reſt of the auxiliaries, they might be ready to defend the Grecian peninſula againſt the

[51] Herodot. l. vii. c. ccxix. et ſeq.

fury of the Babarians. It belonged to Leonidas to explain the ſentiments of the Spartans. The other inhabitants of Peloponneſus, he obſerved, might follow the dictates of expedience, and return to the iſthmus, in order to defend their reſpective territories; but glory was the only voice which the Spartans had learned to obey. Placed in the firſt rank by the general conſent of their country, they would rather die than abandon that poſt of honor; and they were determined, therefore, at the price of their lives, to purchaſe immortal renown, to confirm the pre-eminence of Sparta, and to give an example of patriotiſm, worthy of being admired, if it ſhould not be imitated, by poſterity.

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Magnanimity of Leonidas.

The dread of unavoidable and immediate death deterred the other allies from concurring with this magnanimous reſolution. The Theſpians alone, amounting to ſeven hundred men, declared they would never forſake Leonidas. They were conducted by the aged wiſdom of Demophilus, and the youthful valor of Dithyrambus. Their republic was united in the ſtricteſt alliance with Sparta, by which they had often been defended againſt the uſurpation and tyranny of the Thebans. Theſe circumſtances added force to their natural generoſity of ſentiment, and determined them, on this occaſion, to adhere with ſteadfaſt intrepidity to the meaſures of their Spartan allies. As the Theſpians remained at Thermopylæ, from inclination, and from principles of diſtinguiſhed bravery, the Thebans were detained by the particular deſire of Leonidas, who was not unacquainted with the intended treachery

Seven hundred Theſpians determine to remain with Leonidas;

who detains the perfidious Thebans.

CH. XI. of their republic. The four hundred men whom that perfidious community had ſent to accompany his expedition, he regarded rather as hoſtages than auxiliaries; nor was he unwilling to employ their doubtful fidelity in a deſperate ſervice. He thought that they might be compelled by force, or ſtimulated by a ſenſe of ſhame, to encounter the ſame dangers to which the Spartans and Theſpians voluntarily ſubmitted; and without diſcovering his ſuſpicion of their treachery, he had a ſufficient pretence for retaining them, while he diſmiſſed his allies of Peloponneſus, becauſe the Theban territories, lying on the north-ſide of the iſthmus of Corinth, would neceſſarily be expoſed to hoſtility and devaſtation, whenever the Barbarians ſhould paſs the ſtraits of Thermopylæ. Beſides the Theſpians[*] and Thebans, the troops who remained with Leonidas conſiſted of three hundred Spartans, all choſen men, and fathers of ſons. This valiant band, with unanimous conſent, ſolicited their general to dedicate to the glory of Greece, and their own, the important interval yet allowed them, before they were ſurrounded by the Perſians. The ardor of Leonidas happily conſpired with the ready zeal of the ſoldiers. He therefore

[*] From the narrative of Herodotus, it would ſeem that the Theſpians alone voluntarily remained with Leonidas and the Spartans. Yet the inſcription which he cites makes the whole number who fought at Thermopylæ amount to four thouſand.

Μυριασιν ποτε τηδε τριηκοσιαις εμαχοντο
Εκ Πελοποννησου χιλιαδες τεταρες.

Hoerates likewiſe (p. 164.) ſays, that ſome Peloponneſians remained to fight.

commanded

commanded them to prepare the laſt meal of their lives, and to ſup like men who ſhould tomorrow dine in Elyſium. His own example confirmed the propriety of the command, for he took an abundant repaſt, in order to furniſh ſtrength and ſpirits for a long continuance of toil and danger. CHAP. IX.

The Greeks ſurpriſe the Perſian camp in the night.

It was now the dead of night, when the Spartans, headed by Leonidas, marched in a cloſe battalion towards the Perſian camp, with reſentment heightened by deſpair [13]. Their fury was terrible; and rendered ſtill more deſtructive through the defect of Barbarian diſcipline; for the Perſians having neither advanced guards, nor a watch-word, nor confidence in each other, were incapable of adopting ſuch meaſures for defence as the ſudden emergency required. Many fell by the Grecian ſpear, but much greater multitudes by the miſtaken rage of their own troops, by whom, in the midſt of this blind confuſion, they could not be diſtinguiſhed from enemies. The Greeks, wearied with ſlaughter, penetrated to the royal pavilion; but there the firſt alarm of noiſe had been readily perceived, amidſt the profound ſilence and tranquillity which uſually reigned in the tent of Xerxes; the great king had immediately eſcaped, with his

[13] Diodor. l. xi. p. 247. The nocturnal aſſault, omitted by Herodotus, is mentioned not only by Diodorus, but by Plutarch, Juſtin, and moſt other writers. The general panegyric of Plato (in Menex.), of Lyſias (Orat. Funeb.), and of Iſocrates (Panegyr.), required not their deſcending into ſuch particulars. Yet, notwithſtanding theſe circumſtances, I ſhould have omitted this incident, if it had appeared inconſiſtent with the honeſt narrative of Herodotus.

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favorite attendants, to the farther extremity of the encampment. Even there, all was tumult, and horror, and deſpair; the obſcurity of night increaſing the terror of the Perſians, who no longer doubted that the detachment conducted by Epialtes had been betrayed by that perfidious Greek; and that the enemy, reinforced by new numbers, now co-operated with the traitor, and ſeized the opportunity of aſſailing their camp, after it had been deprived of the diviſion of Hydarnes, its principal ornament and defence.

Battle of Thermopylæ.

The approach of day diſcovered to the Perſians a dreadful ſcene of carnage; but it alſo diſcovered to them that their fears had multiplied the number of the enemy, who now retreated in cloſe order to the ſtraits of Thermopylæ. Xerxes, ſtimulated by the fury of revenge, gave orders to purſue them; and his terrified troops were rather driven than led to the attack, by the officers who marched behind the ſeveral diviſions, and compelled them to advance by menaces, ſtripes, and blows. The Grecians, animated by their late ſucceſs, and perſuaded that they could not poſſibly eſcape death on the arrival of thoſe who approached by way of the mountain, bravely halted in the wideſt part of the paſs, to receive the charge of the enemy. The ſhock was dreadful, and the battle was maintained on the ſide of the Greeks with perſevering intrepidity and deſperate valor. After their ſpears were blunted or broken, they attacked ſword in hand, and their ſhort, but maſſy and well-tempered weapons, made an incredible havoc. Their progreſs

was marked by a line of blood, when a Barbarian dart pierced the heart of Leonidas. The conteſt was no longer for victory and glory, but for the ſacred remains of their king. Four times they diſpelled the thickeſt globes of Perſians; but as their unexampled valor was carrying off the ineſtimable prize, the hoſtile battalions were ſeen deſcending the hill, under the conduct of Epialtes. It was now time to prepare for the laſt effort of generous deſpair. With cloſe order and reſolute minds, the Greeks, all collected in themſelves, retired to the narroweſt part of the ſtrait, and took poſt behind the Phocian wall, on a riſing ground, where a lion of ſtone was afterwards erected in honor of Leonidas. As they performed this movement, fortune, willing to afford every occaſion to diſplay their illuſtrious merit, obliged them to contend at once againſt open force and ſecret treachery. The Thebans, whom fear had hitherto reſtrained from defection, ſeized the preſent opportunity to revolt; and approaching the Perſians with outſtretched arms, declared that they had always been their friends; that *their* republic had ſent earth and water, as an acknowledgment of their ſubmiſſion to Xerxes; and that it was with the utmoſt reluctance they had been compelled by neceſſity to reſiſt the progreſs of his arms. As they approached to ſurrender themſelves, many periſhed by the darts of the Barbarians; the remainder ſaved a periſhing life, by ſubmitting to eternal infamy. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians and Theſpians were aſſaulted on all ſides. The neareſt of the enemy

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beat down the wall, and entered by the breaches. Their temerity was puniſhed by inſtant death. In this laſt ſtruggle every Grecian ſhowed the moſt heroic courage; yet if we believe the unanimous report of ſome Theſſalians, and others who ſurvived the engagement, the Spartan Dioneces deſerved the prize of valor. When it was obſerved to him, that the Perſian arrows were ſo numerous, that they intercepted the light of the ſun, he ſaid it was a favorable circumſtance, becauſe the Greeks now fought in the ſhade. The brothers Alpheus and Maron are likewiſe particularized for their generous contempt of death, and for their diſtinguiſhed valor and activity in the ſervice of their country. What theſe, and other virtues, could accompliſh, the Greeks, both as individuals, and in a body, had already performed; but it became impoſſible for them longer to reſiſt the impetuoſity and weight of the darts, and arrows, and other miſſile weapons, which were continually poured upon them; and they were finally not deſtroyed or conquered, but buried under a trophy of Perſian arms. Two monuments were afterwards erected near the ſpot where they fell; the inſcription of the firſt announced, the valor of a handful of Greeks [54], who had reſiſted three millions of Barbarians:

[54] Iſocrates, p. 164. makes the Spartans who fought at Thermopylæ amount to one thouſand. Diodorus, l. xi. p. 410 agrees with Herodotus, whoſe narrative is followed in the text. According to the moſt probable accounts, the Theſpians were twice as numerous as the Spartans; although the latter have carried away all the glory of this ſingular exploit.

the second was peculiar to the Spartans; and contained these memorable words; "Go stranger, and declare to the Lacedæmonians, that we died here in obedience to their divine laws[1]."

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[1] Ω ξεινε αγγειλον Λακεδαιμονιοις ὁτι τηδε
Κειμεθα τοις κεινων ῥημασι πειθομενοι.
Herodot. c. cxxviii.

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Sea-Fight off Artemiſium. — Xerxes ravages Phocis. — Enters Attica. — Magnanimity of the Athenians. — Sea-Fight of Salamis. — Xerxes leaves Greece. — His miſerable Retreat. — Campaign of Mardonius. — Battles of Platæa and Mycalé. — Iſſue of the Perſian Invaſion.

CHAP. X. Diſaſter of the Perſian fleet on the coaſt of Theſſaly.

DURING the military operations at Thermopylæ, the Grecian fleet was ſtationed in the harbour of Artemiſium, the northern promontory of Eubœa. That of the Perſian, too numerous for any harbour to contain, had anchored in the road that extends between the city of Caſtanæa and the promontory of Sepias, on the coaſt of Theſſaly. Here this formidable armada ſuffered the calamities foretold by the wiſdom of Artabanus. In a converſation with Xerxes, that prudent old man had warned him againſt two enemies, the ſea and the land, from whom his own raſh inexperience ſeemed not to apprehend any danger. Yet both theſe enemies occaſioned dreadful miſfortunes to the Perſians, whoſe numbers firſt expoſed them to be deſtroyed at ſea by a tempeſt, and afterwards to periſh on land by a famine. The firſt line of their fleet was ſheltered by the coaſt of Theſſaly; but the other lines, to the number of ſeven, rode at anchor, at ſmall intervals, with the

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prows of the veſſels turned to the ſea. When they adopted this arrangement, the waters were ſmooth, the ſky clear, the weather calm and ſerene; but on the morning of the ſecond day after their arrival on the coaſt, the ſky began to lour, and the appearance of the heavens grew threatening and terrible. A dreadful ſtorm of rain and thunder ſucceeded; and, what was more alarming, the billows began to riſe to an amazing height, occaſioned by a violent Helleſpontin, or north-eaſt wind, which, when it once begins to blow in thoſe ſeas with any conſiderable force, ſeldom ceaſes for ſeveral days. The neareſt veſſels were ſaved by hauling under the ſhore: of the more remote, many were driven from their anchors; ſome foundered at ſea, others ſplit on the promontory of Sepias, and ſeveral bulged on the ſhallows of Melibœa. Three days the tempeſt raged with unabating fury. Four hundred gallies were deſtroyed by its violence, beſide ſuch a number of ſtoreſhips and tranſports, that the Perſian commanders, ſuſpecting this diſaſter might occaſion the revolt of the Theſſalians, fortified themſelves with a rampart of conſiderable height, entirely compoſed of the ſhattered fragments of the wreck [1].

The Perſians ſail to the Pegaſean bay.

This bulwark was ſufficient to protect them againſt the irruptions of the Greeks; but it could not defend them againſt the more dangerous fury of the waves. In a ſhort time, therefore, they quitted

[1] Herodot. l. vii. c. clxxxviii. et ſeq. Diodor. Sicul. l. xi. c. xii.

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their inſecure ſtation at Sepias, and with eight hundred ſhips of war, beſides innumerable veſſels of burden, ſailed into the Pegaſean bay, and anchored in the road of Apheté, which, at the diſtance of a few miles, lies directly oppoſite to the harbour of Artemiſium.

The commanders of the Grecian fleet think of retiring ſouthward;

The Grecians had poſted centinels on the heights of Eubœa to obſerve the conſequences of the ſtorm, and to watch the motions of the enemy. When informed of the dreadful diſaſter which had befallen them, they poured out a joyous libation, and ſacrificed, with pious gratitude, to "Neptune the Deliverer;" but the near approach of ſuch a ſuperior force ſoon damped their tranſports of religious feſtivity. Neptune had favored them in the ſtorm, yet he might aſſiſt their enemies in the engagement. In the council of war, called to deliberate on this important ſubject, it was the general opinion of the commanders, that they ought immediately to retire ſouthward. The Eubœans, whoſe coaſts muſt have thus been abandoned to the fury of invaders, were peculiarly intereſted in oppoſing this puſillanimous reſolution. The paſſage into the continent of Greece, they obſerved, was ſtill guarded by the magnanimity of Leonidas, and the bravery of the Spartans. Following this generous example, the Grecian fleet, however inferior in ſtrength, ought to reſiſt the Perſians, and to protect the eſtates and families of a rich and populous iſland [a]. This remonſtrance had not any

[a] Herodot. l. viii. c. ii. et ſeq.

effect on the determined purpoſe of Euribiades the Spartan, who, on account of the ancient preeminence of his republic, was intruſted with the command of the fleet; an honor rather due to the perſonal merit of Themiſtocles, and the naval ſuperiority of Athens.

but are prevailed on to remain at Artemiſium, by the addreſs of Themiſtocles.

To the Athenian commander the Eubœans ſecretly applied, and, by a preſent of thirty talents, engaged him to uſe his influence to retain the Grecian armament for the defence of their coaſts. Themiſtocles was well pleaſed at being bribed into a meaſure which his good ſenſe and diſcernment approved. By a proper diſtribution of only eight talents, he brought over the other captains to his opinion, and thus effectually promoted the intereſt, and ſecured the good-will, of the Eubœans, while he retained for himſelf an immenſe ſum of money which might be uſefully employed, on many future occaſions, in fixing, by largeſſes and expenſive exhibitions, the fluctuating favor of his fellow-citizens.

Both ſides prepare for battle.

Meanwhile the Perſians, having recovered from the terrors of the ſtorm, prepared for the engagement. As they entertained not the ſmalleſt doubt of victory, they determined not to begin the attack, until they had ſent two hundred of their beſt ſailing veſſels around the iſle of Eubœa, to intercept the expected flight of the enemy through the narrow Euripus. In order to conceal this deſign, they ordered the detached ſhips to ſtand out to ſea until they loſt ſight of the eaſtern coaſt of Eubœa, ſailing behind the little iſland of Sciathus,

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and afterwards ſhaping their courſe by the promontories of Caphaneus and Gereſtus. The ſtratagem, concerted with more than uſual prudence, was, however, diſcovered to the Greeks by Scyllias, a native of Scioné, now ſerving in the Perſian fleet, but who had long languiſhed for an opportunity of deſerting to his countrymen. While the attention of the Barbarians was employed in the preparations neceſſary for their new arrangement, Scyllias availed himſelf of his dexterity in diving, to ſwim, unperceived, to a boat which had been prepared at a ſufficient diſtance, in which he fortunately eſcaped to Artemiſium. He immediately gained admittance to the Grecian council, where the boldneſs of his enterpriſe gave perſuaſion to his words. In conſequence of his ſeaſonable and important information, the Greeks determined to continue till midnight in the harbour, and then weighing anchor, to ſail in queſt of the fleet which had been ſent out to prevent their eſcape. But this ſtratagem, by which they would have met the art of the enemy with ſimilar addreſs, was not carried into execution. The advice-boats, which had been immediately diſpatched to obſerve the progreſs of the Perſians, returned before evening, without having ſeen any ſhips approaching in that direction.

The firſt ſea-fight at Artemiſium.

This intelligence was welcome to the Greeks, who were unwilling, without evident neceſſity, to abandon their preſent ſituation. The enemy, who had lately ſuffered ſo ſeverely in the ſtorm, were now further weakened by a conſiderable diminu-

tion of their fleet. The ſtrength of the adverſe parties being thus reduced nearer to an equality, the weaker ſeized the opportunity to diſplay their courage in fight, and their ſuperior ſkill in naval action. About ſun-ſet they approached in a line, and offered battle to the Perſians. The latter did not decline the engagement, as their ſhips were ſtill ſufficiently numerous to ſurround thoſe of their opponents. At the firſt ſignal the Greeks formed into a circle, at the ſecond they began the fight. Though crowded into a narrow compaſs, and having the enemy on every ſide, they ſoon took thirty of their ſhips, and ſunk many more. Night came on, accompanied with an impetuous ſtorm of rain and thunder; the Greeks retired into the harbour of Artemiſium; the enemy were driven to the coaſt of Theſſaly. As the wind blew from the ſouth, the dead bodies and wrecks daſhed with violence againſt the ſides of their ſhips, and diſturbed the motion of their oars. The barbarians were ſeized with conſternation and deſpair; for ſcarcely had they time to breathe, after the former ſtorm and ſhipwreck near Mount Pelion, when they were compelled to a dangerous ſea-fight; after darkneſs put an end to the battle, they were again involved in the gloom and horrors of a nocturnal tempeſt. By good fortune, rather than by deſign, the greateſt part of the fleet eſcaped immediate deſtruction, and gained the Pegaſean Bay. *Their* calamities were great and unexpected; but the ſhips ordered to ſail round Eubœa met with a ſtill more dreadful diſaſter. They were overtaken by

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the ſtorm, after they had adventured further from the ſhore than was uſual with the wary mariners of antiquity. Clouds ſoon intercepted the ſtars, by which alone they directed their courſe. They were driven they knew not whither by the force of the winds, or impelled by the impetuoſity of currents. In addition to theſe misfortunes, they were terrified by the thunder, and overwhelmed by the deluge; and after continuing during the greateſt part of the night, the ſport of the elements, they all periſhed[1] miſerably, amidſt the ſhoals and rocks of an unknown coaſt.

The morning aroſe with different proſpects and hopes to the Perſians and Greeks. To the former it diſcovered the extent of their misfortunes; to the latter it brought a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian ſhips. Encouraged by this favorable circumſtance, they determined again to attack the enemy, at the ſame hour as on the preceding day, becauſe their knowledge of the coaſt, and their ſkill in fighting their ſhips, rendered the duſk peculiarly propitious to their deſigns. At the appointed time, they ſailed towards the road of Apheté, and having cut off the Cilician ſquadron from the reſt, totally deſtroyed it, and returned at night to Artemiſium.

The ſecond ſea-fight at Artemiſium.

The Perſian commanders being deeply affected with their repeated diſaſters, but ſtill more alarmed at the much dreaded reſentment of their king, they determined to make one vigorous effort, for reſtoring the glory of their arms. By art and

[1] Herodot. l. viii. c. xlii. Diodor. l. xi. c. xiii.

ſtratagem, and under favor of the night, the Greeks had hitherto gained many important advantages. It now belonged to the Perſians to chuſe the time for action. On the third day at noon, they ſailed forth in the form of a creſcent, which was ſtill ſufficiently extenſive to infold the Grecian line. The Greeks, animated by former ſucceſs, were averſe to decline any offer of battle; yet it is probable that their admirals, and particularly Themiſtocles, would much rather have delayed it to a more favorable opportunity. Rage, reſentment, and indignation, ſupplied the defect of the Barbarians in ſkill and courage. The battle was longer, and more doubtful, than on any former occaſion; many Grecian veſſels were deſtroyed, five were taken by the Egyptians, who particularly ſignalized themſelves on the ſide of the Barbarians, as the Athenians did on that of the Greeks. The perſevering valor of the latter at length prevailed, the enemy retiring, and acknowledging their ſuperiority, by leaving them in poſſeſſion of the dead and the wreck. But the victory coſt them dear; ſince their veſſels, particularly thoſe of the Athenians, were reduced to a very ſhattered condition; and their great inferiority in the number and ſize of their ſhips, made them feel more ſenſibly every diminution of ſtrength.

The Greeks fail to the Saronic Gulph.

This circumſtance was ſufficient to make them think of retiring (while they might yet retire in ſafety) to the ſhores of the Corinthian Iſthmus. The inclination to this meaſure received additional force from conſidering, that the Perſians, however

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unfortunate by ſea, had ſtill an immenſe army; whereas the principal hope of Greece centered in its fleet. While the commanders were occupied with theſe reflections, Abronycus, an Athenian, who had been intruſted with a galley of thirty oars, to cruiſe in the Malian bay, and to watch the event of the battle of Thermopylæ, arrived with an account of the glorious death of Leonidas. The engagements by ſea and land had been fought on the ſame day. In both the Greeks defended a narrow paſs, againſt a ſuperior power; and in both the Perſians had, with very different ſucceſs, attempted, by ſurrounding, to conquer them. The intelligence brought by Abronycus confirmed their reſolution of ſailing ſouthward; for it ſeemed of very little importance to defend the ſhores, after the enemy had obtained poſſeſſion of the centre of the northern territories. Having paſſed the narrow Euripus, they coaſted along the ſhore of Attica, and anchored in the ſtrait of the Saronic Gulph, which ſeparates the iſland of Salamis from the harbours of Athens[4].

Themiſtocles's ſtratagem for making the Ionians deſert their allies.

Before they left Artemiſium, Themiſtocles, ever watchful to promote the intereſt of his country, endeavoured to alienate[5] from the great king the affections of his braveſt auxiliaries. Contrary to the advice of the prudent Artabanus, Xerxes had conducted the Aſiatic Greeks to an unnatural expedition againſt their mother-country. His wife kinſman in vain perſuaded him to ſend them back, becauſe it appeared equally diſhonorable and

[4] Herodot. l. viii. c. xxi.

[5] Ibid. l. viii. c. xxii.

dangerous to depend on the ſervice of men, which could only be employed in his favor at the expenſe of every principle of duty, and of every ſentiment of virtue. By hope and fear, by threats and promiſes, and chiefly by honoring them with marks of diſtinguiſhed preference, Xerxes had hitherto preſerved their reluctant fidelity. In order at once to deſtroy a connexion, which of its own accord ſeemed ready to diſſolve, Themiſtocles engraved on the rocks, near the watering-place of Artemiſium, the following words; "Men of Ionia, your conduct is moſt unjuſt in fighting againſt your anceſtors, and in attempting to enſlave Greece; reſolve, therefore, while it is yet in your power, to repair the injury.—If you cannot immediately deſert from the Perſian fleet, yet it will be eaſy for you to accompliſh this deſign when we come to an engagement. You ought to remember, that yourſelves gave occaſion to the quarrel between us and the Barbarians; and farther, that the ſame duties which children owe to their parents, colonies owe to their mother-country[6]."

When news arrived that the Grecian fleet had abandoned Artemiſium, Xerxes regarded this retreat of the enemy as equal to a victory. He therefore iſſued orders, that his naval force, after ravaging the coaſts of Eubœa, ſhould proceed to take poſſeſſion of the harbours of Athens; while,

Xerxes advances with his army towards Attica.

[6] This ſentiment is the dictate of nature, and occurs often in the Roman as well as the Greek writers. "Quæ liberi parentibus ea coloni antiquæ patriæ debent." T. Livius.

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at the head of his irreſiſtible army, he intended to make a victorious proceſſion, rather than a march, into the Attic territory. The road thither from Thermopylæ paſſed through the countries of Phocis and Bœotia, the latter of which had already acknowledged his authority. The Phocians adhered to the cauſe of Greece; and were ſtill farther confirmed in their allegiance, after the Theſſalians, their inveterate enemies, had embraced the party of Xerxes. Such were the violent animoſities which divided theſe hoſtile ſtates, that, in the opinion of Herodotus, whichever ſide the Theſſalians had taken, the Phocians would ſtill have oppoſed them. He might perhaps have extended the obſervation to the other principal republics. The enthuſiaſm of Athens and Sparta in defending the cauſe of Greece, rendered the rival ſtates of Thebes and Argos zealous in the ſervice of Perſia; and it is to be remembered, to the immortal glory of the friends of liberty and their country, that they had to ſtruggle with domeſtic ſedition, while they oppoſed and defeated a foreign invaſion.

Ravages Phocis.

Having entered the territory of Phocis, the Perſian army ſeparated into two diviſions, with a view to obtain more plentiful ſupplies of the neceſſaries of life, and to deſtroy more completely the poſſeſſions of their enemies. The moſt numerous diviſion followed the courſe of the river Cephiſſus, which flows from the Theſſalian mountains, to the lake Copais in Bœotia. The fertile banks of the Cephiſſus were adorned by Charadra, Neon, Elatæa, and other populous cities, all of which were burned

burned or demoliſhed by the fury of Xerxes, and the reſentment of the Theſſalians. Hiſtorians particularly regret the deſtruction of the ſacred walls of Abé, a city held in peculiar reſpect on account of the temple of Apollo, ſamed for its unerring oracles, and enriched from the earlieſt times by the pious donations of ſuperſtition. The inhabitants had in general abandoned their towns, and taken refuge in the moſt inacceſſible retreats, of mount Parnaſſus. But the natives of Abé, vainly confiding for ſafety in the ſanctity of the place, became a prey to an undiſtinguiſhing rage, which equally diſregarded things ſacred and profane. The men periſhed by the ſword, the women by the brutal luſt of the Barbarians. CHAP. X.

Extraordinary adventure of a detachment that attacked Delphi.

After committing theſe dreadful ravages, the principal diviſion of the army marched into Bœotia, by the way of Orchomenus. The *ſmaller* part (if either portion of ſuch an immenſe hoſt may be diſtinguiſhed by that epithet) ſtretched to the right, along the weſtern ſkirts of mount Parnaſſus, and traced a line of devaſtation from the banks of the Cephiſſus to the temple of Delphi. Such was the fame of the immenſe riches collected in this ſacred edifice, that Xerxes is ſaid to have been as well acquainted with their amount as with that of his own treaſury; and, to believe the adulation of his followers, he alone was worthy to poſſeſs that invaluable depoſitory. The Delphians having learned, by the unhappy fate of Abé, that their religious employment could not afford protection, either to their property or to their perſon, conſulted

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the oracle, "Whether they ſhould hide their treaſures under ground, or tranſport them to ſome neighbouring country?" The Pythia replied, "That the arms of Apollo were ſufficient for the defence of his ſhrine." The Delphians, therefore, confined their attention to the means neceſſary for their perſonal ſafety. The women and children were tranſported by ſea to Achaia; the men climbed to the craggy tops of mount Cirphis, or deſcended to the deep caverns of Parnaſſus. Only ſixty perſons, the immediate miniſters of Apollo, kept poſſeſſion of the ſacred city. But, could we credit the teſtimony of ancient hiſtorians, it ſoon appeared that the gods had not abandoned Delphi: ſcarcely had the Perſians reached the temple of Minerva the Provident, ſituated at a little diſtance from the town, when the air thickened into an unuſual darkneſs. A violent ſtorm aroſe; the thunder and lightning were terrible. At length the tempeſt burſt on mount Parnaſſus, and ſeparated from its ſides two immenſe rocks, which rolling down with increaſed violence, overwhelmed the neareſt ranks of the Perſians. The ſhattered fragments of the mountain, which long remained in the grove of Minerva, were regarded by the credulity of the Greeks as a ſtanding proof of the miracle. But without ſuppoſing any ſupernatural intervention, we may believe, that an extraordinary event happening on an extraordinary occaſion, would produce great terror and conſternation in the Barbarian army, ſince many of the nations which compoſed it acknowledged the divinity of Apollo, and muſt therefore have been ſenſible of their intended

impiety, in deſpoiling his temple. The awful ſolemnity of the place conſpired with the horrors of the tempeſt, and the guilty feelings of their own conſciences. Theſe united terrors were ſufficient to diſturb all the rational principles of their minds, and even to confound the cleareſt perceptions of their ſenſes. They imagined, that they heard many ſounds, which they did not hear; and that they ſaw many phantoms, which they did not ſee. An univerſal panic ſeized them; at firſt they remained motionleſs, in ſilent amazement; they afterwards fled with diſordered ſteps and wild deſpair. The Delphians, who perceived their confuſion, and who believed that the gods, by the moſt manifeſt ſigns, defended their favorite abode, ruſhed impetuouſly from their faſtneſſes, and deſtroyed great numbers of the terrified and unreſiſting enemy[7]. The remainder took the road of Bœotia, in order to join the main body under Xerxes, which having already deſtroyed the hoſtile cities of Theſpiæ and Platæa, was marching with full expectation to inflict complete vengeance on the Athenians.

Xerxes invades Attica,

The united army arrived in the Attic territory three months after their paſſage over the Helleſpont. They laid waſte the country, burned the cities, and levelled the temples with the ground. At length they took poſſeſſion of the capital; but the inhabitants, by a retreat no leſs prudent than magnanimous, had withdrawn from the fury of their reſentment.

[7] Herodot. l. viii. c. xxxvii. et ſeqq. et Diodor. l. xi. p. 250.

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which the Athenians had evacuated,

It was impoſſible for the Athenians at once to oppoſe the Perſian army, which marched from Bœotia, and to defend the weſtern coaſts of Greece againſt the ravages of a numerous fleet. The inhabitants of Peloponneſus, deſpairing of being able to reſiſt the enemy in the open field, had begun to build a wall acroſs the iſthmus of Corinth, as their only ſecurity on the ſide of the land againſt the Barbaric invaſion. In theſe circumſtances, the Athenians, by the advice of Themiſtocles, embraced a reſolution which eclipſed the glory of all their former exploits. They abandoned to the Perſian rage their villages, their territory, their walls, their city itſelf, with the revered tombs of their anceſtors; their wives and children, and aged parents, were tranſported to the iſles of Salamis and Ægina, and to the generous city of Træzoné, on the Argolic coaſt, which, notwithſtanding the defection of Argos, the capital of that province, ſteadfaſtly adhered to the maxims of patriotiſm, and the duties of friendſhip. The embarkation was made with ſuch haſte, that the inhabitants were obliged to leave behind them their houſehold furniture, their ſtatues and pictures, and in general the moſt valuable part of their property. But they were willing to relinquiſh all for the ſake of their country, which they well knew conſiſted not in their houſes, lands, and effects [a], but in that equal

[a] Ου λιοι, ουδε ξυλαθ ουδε
Τεχνη τεκτονων αι πολεις εισιν,
Αλλ ὁπῃ ποτ' αν ωσιν ΑΝΔΡΕΣ
Αυτης σωζειν ειδοτες,
Ἐνταυθα τειχη και πολεις.
ALCÆUS. apud Ariſtid.

constitution of government, which they had received from their ancestors, and which it was their duty to transmit unimpaired to posterity. This constitution it was impossible for them to defend, unless they determined, at the risk of their lives, and of every thing dear to them, to maintain the general independence of the Grecian confederacy; the interest of which became doubly precious, by being thus inseparably connected with their own.

and embarked in the fleet at Salamis.

The Athenians capable of bearing arms or of handling an oar, embarked on board the fleet stationed at Salamis. The ships equipped and manned by them alone, exceeded in number those of all their allies together, although the combined force was considerably augmented by the naval strength of Epirus and Acarnania, which, formerly doubtful and irresolute, had been determined to the side of Greece by the fortunate issue of the engagements at Artemisium. The whole Grecian armament, thus increased, amounted to three hundred and eighty vessels. That of the Persians, which now took possession of the Athenian harbours, lying to the south of the strait occupied by the Greeks, had also received a powerful reinforcement. The Locrians, Bœotians, and in general every people who had submitted to their arms, readily supplying them with ships; and several of the Egean islands having at length prepared the quota which they had formerly been commanded to furnish. We are not exactly informed of the number or strength of the additional squadron; but it was supposed fully to compensate the loss occasioned

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by ſtorms and ſea-fights, and to reſtore the Perſian fleet to its original complement of twelve hundred ſail [9].

Xerxes determines to fight again at ſea.

Truſting to the immenſe ſuperiority of his armament, Xerxes was ſtill deſirous to make trial of his fortune at ſea, notwithſtanding his former diſaſters on that element. But before he came to a final reſolution, he ſummoned a council of war, in order to hear the opinion of his maritime ſubjects or allies. The tributary kings of Tyre and Sidon, the leaders of the Egyptians, Cyprians, and Cilicians, ever ready to flatter the paſſions of their ſovereign, offered many frivolous reaſons in favor of the alternative to which they perceived him inclined. But in the fleet of Xerxes there was a Grecian queen named Artemiſia, widow of the prince of Halicarnaſſus, and who had aſſumed the government of that city and territory for the benefit of her infant ſon. Compelled by the order of Xerxes, or perhaps irritated againſt the Athenians, for ſome reaſons which hiſtory does not record, ſhe not only fitted out five ſhips to attend the Perſian expedition, but took upon herſelf the command of her little ſquadron, and on every occaſion conducted it with equal ſkill and bravery. Such vigor of mind, united with ſo delicate a form, deſerved to excite admiration in every part of the world; but the manly ſpirit of Artemiſia becomes ſtill more admirable, when we conſider the ſevere reſtraints which have been in all ages impoſed on the female

Is powerfully diſſuaded from that meaſure by Artemiſia.

[9] Herodot, Diodor. ubi ſupra; et Plut. in Themiſtocle.

ſex, by the manners and climate of Aſia. Her ſuperior genius recommended her to the peculiar favor of Xerxes, who was obliged to eſteem in a woman the virtues which he himſelf wanted ſpirit to practiſe. Truſting to his advantageous opinion of her courage and fidelity, Artemiſia diſſented from the general voice of the allies, and even oppoſed the inclination of the prince. "Her former exploits on the coaſt of Eubœa afforded ſufficient proof that her preſent advice was not the child of timidity. She had been ever forward to expoſe her perſon and her fame in the ſervice of the great king; but it was impoſſible to diſſemble the manifeſt ſuperiority of the Greeks in naval affairs. Yet, were the two armaments as much on a foot of equality in point of bravery and experience, as they were unequal in numbers, what motive could induce Xerxes to venture another engagement at ſea? Was he not already in poſſeſſion of Athens, the great object of the war? The Spartans, who had oppoſed his progreſs at Thermopylæ, had reaped the juſt fruits of their temerity: thoſe aſſembled at the iſthmus of Corinth might eaſily be involved in a ſimilar fate. The Peloponneſus might then be laid waſte by fire and ſword, which would complete the deſtruction of Greece. Inſtead of proceeding immediately to that peninſula, ſhould Xerxes chuſe to continue only a few weeks in the Attic territory, four hundred Grecian ſhips could not long be ſupplied with proviſions from the barren rocks of Salamis. Neceſſity muſt compel them to ſurrender, or drive them to their

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respective cities, where they would become an easy prey to the Persian arms." These judicious observations were heard without approbation; the worst opinion prevailed, being the best adapted to flatter the vanity of Xerxes.

Deliberations of the Greeks.

When the Grecian commanders observed that the enemy prepared to venture another engagement at sea, they likewise assembled to deliberate whether they should continue in the strait between Salamis and Attica, or proceed further up the gulph, towards the Corinthian isthmus. The latter proposal was generally approved by the confederates of Peloponnesus, who anxiously desired, in the present emergency, to approach as near as possible to their respective cities. Some hastened to their ships, and hoisted sail, in order to depart; and it seemed likely that their example would be soon followed by the whole fleet. On board the ship of Themistocles was Mnesiphilus, formerly mentioned as the instructor of his youth, and who now accompanied him as his counsellor and friend. The experienced wisdom of Mnesiphilus readily discerned, that should the Greeks sail from Salamis, it would be impossible to prevent the general dispersion of their armament. He therefore exhorted Themistocles, to endeavour, by all means possible, to prevent this fatal measure; and particularly to persuade the Spartan admiral, Euribiades, to alter his present intention.

Guided by the abilities of Themistocles.

Themistocles readily embraced the opinion of his friend. Having waited on Euribiades, he obtained his consent to summon a second assembly

of the confederates. After they were fully convened, the Athenian began to call their attention to the ſtate of their affairs; but his diſcourſe was inſolently interrupted by Adimantus, the commander of the Corinthians, who had conſtantly diſcovered a particular ſolicitude for returning to the iſthmus. Themiſtocles, no leſs prudent than brave, anſwered his reproaches with calmneſs, and then addreſſing himſelf to Euribiades, "The fate of Greece," ſaid he, "depends on the deciſion of the preſent moment, and that deciſion on you; if you reſolve to ſail to the iſthmus, we muſt abandon Salamis, Megara, and Ægina; we ſhall be compelled to fight in an open ſea, where the enemy may fully avail themſelves of their ſuperior numbers; and as the Perſian army will certainly attend the motions of their fleet, we ſhall draw their combined ſtrength towards the Grecian peninſula, our laſt and only retreat. But if you determine to retain the ſhips in their preſent ſtation, the Perſians will find it impoſſible, in a narrow channel, to attack us at once with their whole force: we ſhall preſerve Megara and Salamis, and we ſhall effectually defend Peloponneſus; for the Barbarians being, as I firmly truſt, defeated in a naval engagement, will not penetrate further than Attica, but return home with diſgrace." He had ſcarcely ended his words, when Adimantus broke forth into new invectives, affecting ſurpriſe that Euribiades ſhould liſten to a man who, ſince the taking of Athens, had not any city to defend: that the Athenians ought *then* to have a voice in the council,

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CHAP. X. when they could ſay they had a home. Themiſtocles replied, "that the Athenians had indeed undervalued their private eſtates and poſſeſſions, in compariſon of their political independence, and the general ſafety of Greece, and glorioufly abandoned their *city* in defence of their *country*. But notwithſtanding this ſacrifice for the public good, they had ſtill a home far more valuable than Corinth, two hundred ſhips of war well armed and manned, which no nation of Greece could reſiſt. That ſhould the confederates perſiſt in their preſent dangerous reſolution, the Athenians would in theſe ſhips embark their wives and families; deſert a country, which had firſt forſaken itſelf; and repair to the coaſt of Italy, where it was foretold by ancient oracles, that Athens ſhould, in ſome future time, form a great and flouriſhing ſettlement. That the Greeks would then remember and regret the advice of Themiſtocles, when, abandoned by the moſt conſiderable part of their allies, they became an eaſy prey to the Barbarian invader." The firmneſs of this diſcourſe ſhook the reſolution of the confederates; and it was determined by the majority to continue at Salamis.

Between this important reſolve and the engagement, there intervened a moment of the moſt anxious ſolicitude. The minds of men, impreſſed with the awful idea of the events about to be tranſacted, were thrown off their ordinary bias; and as the operations of nature, and the agency of inviſible beings, are always fondly connected in the imagination with the momentous concerns of human

life, the Greeks felt, or believed they felt, extraordinary convulsions of the elements; they saw, or fancied they saw, hideous spectres in the air; and heard, or imagined they heard, the most terrible and threatening voices [20]. But all these strange and supernatural appearances, which would otherwise have been doubtful or alarming, were proved, by a clear and explicit oracle, to foretel the destruction of the Barbarians. CHAP. X.

ready to change their opinion;

Notwithstanding this favorable intimation of the divine will, which was carefully improved by the wisdom and eloquence of Themistocles, the Peloponnesians were ready to return to their first determination. A vessel arriving from the Isthmus, brought advice that the fortifications there were almost completed; if the fleet retired to the neighbouring shore, the sailors might, even after a defeat at sea, take refuge behind their walls; but if conquered near the coasts of Salamis, they would be for ever separated from their families and friends, and confined, without hope or resource, within the narrow limits of a barren island. In important alternatives, when the arguments on each side are almost equally persuasive, the party which we have embraced often appears the worst, merely because we have embraced it. Any new circumstance or consideration is always capable of changing the balance, and we hastily approve what we rejected after much deliberation. Lest this propensity should, as there was much reason to fear, again

prevented by a daring mea-

[20] Lysias Fun. Orat. Herodot. ibid.

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ſure of Themiſtocles

diſconcert his meaſures, Themiſtocles determined to prevent the Greeks from the poſſibility of gratifying it. There commonly lived in his family a man named Sicinus, who at preſent accompanied him. He was originally a ſlave, and employed in the education of his children; but by the generoſity of his patron, had acquired the rank of citizen, with conſiderable riches. The firmneſs and fidelity of this man rendered him a proper inſtrument for executing a ſtratagem, which concealed, under the maſk of treachery, the enthuſiaſm of publie virtue. Having received his inſtructions from Themiſtocles, he privately ſailed to the Perſian fleet, and obtaining admiſſion into the preſence of Xerxes, declared, "That he had been ſent by the captain of the Athenians, who could no longer endure the inſolence of his countrymen, to acquaint the great king, that the Greeks, ſeized with conſternation at the near approach of danger, had determined to make their eſcape under cover of the night: that now was the time for the Perſians to atchieve the moſt glorious of all their exploits, and, by intercepting the flight of their enemies, accompliſh their deſtruction at once[11]." The deceit was believed; the whole day, and the greateſt part of the ſucceeding night, the Perſians employed in ſecuring the ſeveral paſſages between the iſlands and the adjacent coaſt; and that nothing might be neglected that could contribute to their ſucceſs, they filled the little iſle, or rather rock, of Pſyttalea,

[11] Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxv.

lying between Salamis and the continent, with the flower of the Perſian infantry, in order to intercept the miſerable remnant of the Greeks, who, after the expected defeat, would fly thither for refuge.

His interview with Ariſtides.

The firſt intelligence of theſe operations was brought to the Grecian fleet by Ariſtides the Athenian, who ſeems not to have availed himſelf of the general act of indemnity to return from baniſhment, but who readily embraced every opportunity to ſerve his country. Having with difficulty eſcaped in a ſmall veſſel from the iſle of Ægina, the generous patriot immediately communicated an account of what he had ſeen there to his rival and enemy, Themiſtocles, who, meeting his generoſity with equal frankneſs, made him the confidant of his ſecret. Their interview was as memorable as the occaſion; and, after a continued life of oppoſition and hatred, they now firſt agreed to ſuſpend their private animoſities, in order to promote the common intereſt of their country. As the Peloponneſian commanders were either wavering and irreſolute, or had determined to ſet ſail, Ariſtides was deſired to inform them of the arrangement which he had ſeen; the conſideration of his country however rendered his evidence ſuſpected, and it was imagined that he meant to ſacrifice the general intereſt of the confederates to the ſafety of the Athenian families in Salamis. But the arrival of a veſſel belonging to the iſle of Tenos confirmed the veracity of his report, and the Peloponneſians

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Sea-fight off the iſle of Salamis.

reſolved to fight, becauſe it was impoſſible to fly [22].

Before the dawn of the day the Grecian ſhips were drawn up in order of battle; and the Perſians, who had been ſurpriſed at not finding them attempt to eſcape during night, were ſtill more ſurpriſed when morning diſcovered their cloſe and regular arrangement. The Greeks began with the light their ſacred hymns and pœans, which preceded their triumphant ſongs of war, accompanied by the animating ſound of the trumpet. The ſhores of Attica re-echoed to the rocks of Salamis and Pſyttalea. The Grecian acclamations filled the ſky. Neither their appearance nor their words betokened flight or fear, but rather determined intrepidity, and invincible courage. Yet was their valor tempered with wiſdom. Themiſtocles delayed the attack until the ordinary breeze ſhould ſpring up, which was no leſs favorable to the experience of the Grecian mariners, than dangerous to the lofty unwieldineſs of the Perſian ſhips [23]. The ſignal was then given for the Athenian line to bear down againſt that of the Phœnicians, which rode on the weſt, off the coaſt of Eleuſis; while the Peloponneſians advanced againſt the enemy's left wing ſtationed on the eaſt, near the harbour of the Piræus. The Perſians, confiding in their number, and ſecure of victory, did not decline the fight. A Phœnician galley, of uncommon ſize and ſtrength, was diſtinguiſhed in the front of their

[22] Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxix. et ſeqq. [23] Id. Ibid.

line by every circumſtance of naval pomp. In the eagerneſs to engage, ſhe far outſtripped her companions; but her career was checked midway between the two fleets by an Athenian galley which had ſailed forth to meet her. The firſt ſhock ſhattered her ſculptured prow, the ſecond buried her in the waves. The Athenians, encouraged by this auſpicious prelude, proceeded with their whole force, animating each other to the combat by a martial ſong: "Advance, ye ſons of Athens, ſave your country, defend your wives and children, deliver the temples of your gods, regain the ſacred tombs of your renowned forefathers; *this day*, the common cauſe of Greece demands your valor." The battle was bloody and deſtructive, and diſputed on the ſide of the Perſians with more obſtinate reſiſtance than on any former occaſion; for, from the Attic coaſt, ſeated on a lofty throne on the top of Mount Ægialos, Xerxes obſerved the ſcene of action, and attentively remarked, with a view to reward and puniſh, the various behaviour of his ſubjects. The preſence of their prince operated on their hopes, and ſtill more powerfully on their fears. But neither the hope of acquiring the favor, nor the fear of incurring the diſpleaſure of a deſpot, could furniſh principles of action worthy of being compared with the patriotiſm and love of liberty which actuated the Greeks. To the dignity of their motives, as much as to the ſuperiority of their ſkill, the latter owed their unexampled ſucceſs in this memorable engagement. The foremoſt ſhips of the Phœnicians were diſperſed or ſunk.

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The Perſians totally defeated.

Amidſt the terror and confuſion occaſioned by their repulſe, they ran foul of thoſe which had been drawn up in two lines behind them. The Athenians ſkilfully encircled them around, compreſſed them into a narrower ſpace, and increaſed their diſorder; they were at length entangled in each other, deprived of all power of action, and, to uſe the humble, but expreſſive figure of an eye-witneſs, "caught and deſtroyed like fiſh in a net.[14]" Such was the fate of the right wing; while the Ionians, who, on the left, oppoſed the fleets of Peloponneſus and Ægina, furniſhed them with an opportunity to complete the victory. Many of the Aſiatic Greeks, mindful of the advice given by Themiſtocles, abandoned the intereſt of the great king, and openly declared for their countrymen; others declined the engagement; the remainder were ſunk and put to flight. Among thoſe which eſcaped was the ſhip of queen Artemiſia, who in the battle of Salamis diſplayed ſuperior courage and conduct: ſhe was cloſely purſued by an Athenian galley, commanded by Amenias, brother of the poet Æſchylus. In this extremity ſhe employed a ſucceſsful, but very unwarrantable ſtratagem. The neareſt Perſian veſſel was commanded by Damaſithymus, a tributary prince of Calynda in Lycia, a man with whom Artemiſia was at variance. With great dexterity ſhe darted the beak of her galley againſt the Lycian veſſel. Damaſithymus was buried in the waves; and Amenias, deceived

[14] Æſchylus Perſæ.

deceived by this meaſure, equally artful and audacious, believed the veſſel of Artemiſia one of thoſe which had deſerted the Perſian intereſt. The Phœnician and Ionian ſquadrons (for that of the Egyptians had been exceedingly weakened by the action on the coaſt of Eubœa) formed the main ſtrength of the Perſian armament; after theſe were defeated, the ſhips at a diſtance ventured not to advance, but haſtily changing ſail, meaſured back their courſe to the Athenian and other neighbouring harbours. The victors, diſdaining to purſue them, dragged the moſt valuable part of the wreck to the coaſts of Pſyttalea and Salamis. The narrow ſeas were covered with the floating carcaſes of the dead, among whom were few Greeks, as even thoſe who loſt their ſhips in the engagement, ſaved their lives by ſwimming, an art which they univerſally learned as a neceſſary branch of education, and with which the Barbarians were totally unacquainted [15].

Xerxes had ſcarcely time to conſider and deplore the deſtruction and diſgrace of his fleet, when a new ſpectacle, not leſs mournful, offered itſelf to his ſight. The flower of the Perſian infantry had taken poſt, as we have already obſerved, on the rocky iſle of Pſyttalea, in order to receive the ſhattered remains of the Grecian armament, which, after its expected defeat, would naturally take refuge on that barren coaſt. But equally fallacious and fatal was their conjecture concerning the event

[15] Before this period it was a law at Athens and other ſtates, τὰς παιδὰς διδάσκεσθαι πρῶτον νεῖν τε καὶ γράμματα, that boys firſt learn reading and ſwimming. Sam. Petit. de Leg. Att. p. 11.

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of the battle. The Greeks, diſembarking from their ſhips, attacked, in the enthuſiaſm of victory, thoſe aſtoniſhed troops, who, unable to reſiſt, and finding it impoſſible to fly, were cut down to a man. As Xerxes beheld this dreadful havoc, he ſtarted in wild agitation from his ſilver throne, rent his royal robes, and, in the firſt moment of his returning tranquillity, commanded the main body of his forces, poſted along the Athenian coaſt, to return to their reſpective camps.

Xerxes determines to leave Greece.

From that moment he reſolved to return with all poſſible expedition into Aſia. Yet did his fears and his policy conceal, for a few days, the deſign, not only from the Grecian but from the Perſian generals. Mardonius alone was too well acquainted with the genius of his maſter, to believe that his concern for the ſafety of his illuſtrious perſon would allow him to remain longer than neceſſary, in a country which had been the ſcene of ſo many calamities. The artful courtier availed himſelf of the important ſecret, to divert the ſtorm of royal reſentment which threatened the principal author of this inglorious undertaking. In his firſt interview with Xerxes, he exhorted him, "not to be too deeply affected by the defeat of his fleet: that he had come to fight againſt the Greeks, not with rafts of wood, but with ſoldiers and horſes: that the valor of the Perſians had oppoſed all reſiſtance, and their invincible ſovereign was now maſter of Athens, the main object of his ambition: that having accompliſhed the principal end of the enterpriſe, it was time for the great king to return

from the fatigues of war to the cares of government; for with three hundred thouſand choſen men he would undertake to proſecute his deſigns, and to complete his victory." Such is the language of adulation, too often held to princes. The other courtiers confirmed, by their approbation, the advice of Mardonius; and the Perſian monarch, while he obeyed the dictates of his own puſillanimity, ſeemed to leave Greece in reluctant compliance with the anxious ſolicitude of his ſubjects.

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Mardonius remains there with 300,000 men.

The remains of the Perſian fleet, frightened from the coaſt of Greece, returned to the harbours of Aſia Minor, and afterwards aſſembled and rendezvouſed, during the enſuing winter, in the port of Cymé. The tranſports were ordered to the Helleſpont, on the banks of which Xerxes arrived with his troops in forty-five days, after intolerable hardſhips and fatigue. Famine and peſtilence filled up the meaſure of their calamities; and, excepting the three hundred thouſand choſen men committed to Mardonius, a detachment of whom guarded the royal perſon to the coaſt, ſcarcely a remnant was left of ſo many millions [16]. The bridge oſtentatiouſly erected on the Helleſpont would have preſented, had it remained entire, a mortifying monument of paſt greatneſs. But this magnificent fabric had been deſtroyed by a tempeſt: and ſuch is the obſcurity with which Xerxes returned from Greece, compared with the blaze of

The miſerable retreat of his army.

[16] Ουδεν μερος ὡς ειπαι, ſays Herodotus, emphatically.

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grandeur in which he arrived there, that it is uncertain whether he croſſed the channel in a Phœnician ſhip of war, or only in a fiſhing-boat[17]. Having returned to Sardis, he endeavoured to compenſate for the diſappointment of ambition by the gratification of ſenſuality, and buried himſelf in pleaſures more infamous and degrading, and not leſs frightfully criminal, than all the diſgrace which his pride had incurred, and all the calamities which his ſubjects had either inflicted or ſuffered[18].

Meaſures taken by the Greeks after their victory.

When the Greeks had leiſure to examine the extent and completeneſs of their ſucceſs, they determined, in the firſt emotions of triumph and reſentment, to purſue the ſhattered remains of the enemy. That no Barbarian might eſcape, they purpoſed immediately to ſail northward, to deſtroy the Perſian bridge over the Helleſpont, and thus to intercept their return. This deſign was recommended, and chiefly ſupported by the Athenians, who having experienced the greateſt ſhare of the danger, felt moſt ſenſibly the joys of deliverance. But upon more mature deliberation, it occurred that the Perſians were ſtill ſufficiently numerous to afford juſt grounds of terror. To their cowardice and inexperience, not to their want of ſtrength, the Greeks owed all their advantages over them; but ſhould the impoſſibility of retreat be added to their other calamities, they might derive courage

[17] Confer. Herod. Juſtin. Corn. Nepos.

[18] Herodot. et Dioder. ibid.

from deſpair, and, by efforts hitherto unexerted, repair the conſequences of their paſt errors and misfortunes. Theſe conſiderations, firſt ſuggeſted, it is ſaid, by Euribiades the Spartan, were adopted by Themiſtocles, who convinced his countrymen that the jealouſy of the Grecian gods, unwilling that one man ſhould be lord of Europe and Aſia, rather than their own proweſs, had given them the victory over Xerxes; a prince of ſuch folly and madneſs, that he had treated with equal irreverence things human and divine, deſtroyed the ſacred temples, overthrown the venerable altars and images, and impiouſly inſulted the gods of the Helleſpont with ſtripes and fetters. That it was the duty of the Athenians, after having glorioufly repelled the common enemy, to provide for the ſubſiſtence of their wives and families, to ſow their lands, rebuild their houſes, and thus to repair, by the moſt induſtrious activity, the dreadful ravages committed in their territories [19].

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Themiſtocles had no ſooner perſuaded the Athenians to embrace his opinion, than he ſecretly diſpatched his confidant Sicinus to acquaint the great king with the danger which he had ſo nearly eſcaped, and to adviſe him to purſue his journey with all poſſible expedition. Xerxes readily believed a piece of information, which agreed with the ſuggeſtions of his own timidity. The rapidity of his march conſpired with other circumſtances above-mentioned in proving fatal to the lives of

Bold ſtratagem of Themiſtocles.

[19] Herodot. l. viii. c. cviii. et ſeqq.

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The victory at Salamis terminated the ſecond act of the Perſian expedition, which has, with much propriety, been compared to a tragedy. The Greeks ſoon underſtood that, notwithſtanding the return of Xerxes, three hundred thouſand men, commanded by Mardonius, were cantoned for the winter in Thrace, Macedon, and Theſſaly, with a deſign to take the field early in the ſpring, and again to try the fortune of war. This intelligence deterred the Athenians from bringing home their wives and children, as they originally intended, from Trœzené, Salamis, and Ægina, becauſe they had reaſon to dread that their country would experience new effects of Barbarian reſentment. It appears, however, that a few citizens, more ſanguine in their hopes than the reſt, returned to their ancient habitations; while the greater part continued on board the fleet, or went to reſide with their friends in the Peloponneſus.

Employment of the Greeks during the winter.

According to modern ideas, it would be natural to expect, that, under the apprehenſion of another formidable invaſion, the Greeks ſhould have

employed the winter in raiſing contributions, levying and diſciplining troops, and concerting proper meaſures for the public defence. But ſuch preparations were in ſome degree unneceſſary, becauſe in the Grecian republics almoſt every citizen was a ſoldier; and the different ſtates were at all times too weakly united, to agree in any uniform plan of operations. Beſides, the cuſtoms and prejudices of that early age obliged them to obſerve many forms and ceremonies, which interfered with employments ſeemingly more uſeful, on ſuch an important emergency. We find, accordingly, that inſtead of increaſing or improving their military eſtabliſhment, the Greeks ſpent the winter [20] in dividing the ſpoil; aſſigning to the different commanders the prizes of conduct and valor; performing the laſt offices to the dead; celebrating their games and feſtivals; and diſplaying, both in the multitude of their prayers, and in the magnificence of their offerings, the warmeſt gratitude to their protecting divinities. The dedications to the gods were intrinſically valuable. The rewards beſtowed on their generals were ſimple tokens of public eſteem. The firſt conſiſted in vaſes, ſtatues, and other ornaments of gold and ſilver; the ſecond in a wreath of pine, laurel, or olive: a circumſtance which made Tigranes the Perſian exclaim, "Heavens! againſt what men have we come to contend? inſenſible to intereſt, they fight only for glory!"

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[20] Herodot. l. viii. c. cxxi. et ſeqq.

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It is not ſurpriſing, that the inſtitutions of Greece ſhould have deceived an untutored Barbarian, when we conſider that even the modern philoſopher and hiſtorian have been too often dazzled by their ſplendor. Yet notwithſtanding what Tigranes believed, and what, from the fond admiration of antiquity, many modern writers have aſſerted, the indiſcriminate praiſe of diſintereſtedneſs by no means belonged to the Grecians. When the commanders of their ſeveral ſhips and ſquadrons aſſembled to regulate the diſtribution of naval and military rewards, each captain, with a ſelfiſhneſs equally indelicate and unjuſt, arrogated to himſelf the firſt prize of merit; though moſt of them acknowledged the deſert of Themiſtocles as ſecond to their own [21]. This general aſſignment of the ſecond, while all alike aſſumed the firſt place, was equivalent to a public declaration in favor of the Athenian: and the honors which were conferred on him, both in his own country and in Sparta, ſufficiently confirmed the deciſion. The uſual marks of the public eſteem were not indeed attended with any immediate profit; but their conſequences were extremely beneficial. Supported by the favorable opinion of his countrymen, a commander by ſea or land frequently attained an authority, the exerciſe of which was equally adapted to flatter pride and to gratify avarice. The behaviour of Themiſtocles, after he had acquired ſufficient merit with the public to juſtify his rapacity,

[21] Herodot. l. viii. c. xxiii.

affords one memorable example of this kind; and we ſhall meet with many more, in examining the ſubſequent events of the Grecian hiſtory. Inſtead of remaining at home, in order to concert a plan for repelling the danger which threatened his country, the Athenian commander ſailed with a little ſquadron to the Cyclades, laid theſe unfortunate iſlands under an heavy contribution, and without the participation, or even knowledge of his colleagues in command, enriched himſelf and his favorites [22].

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Mardonius prepares to open the campaign.

On the approach of ſpring, Mardonius prepared to take the field. His army conſiſted of the Medes, Perſians, Scythians, and Indians; and though reduced from the millions which followed Xerxes to about three hundred thouſand men, it was thereby rather delivered from an uſeleſs incumbrance, than deprived of any real ſtrength. Before marching from Theſſaly, his ſuperſtition engaged him to conſult the Grecian oracles, and moved probably by an erroneous explanation of their ambiguous reſponſes, he determined to try the effect of negociation, before he had recourſe to arms. He might treat either with individuals, or with communities. By the former method, the Thebans aſſured him, that he might become maſter of Greece, without hazarding a battle. "You have only," ſaid they, "to ſend money to the leading men in the ſeveral republics. In this manner you will divide each ſtate into factions; engage them in a civil war;

[22] Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxv.

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Endeavours to detach the Athenians from their allies;

and, when exhauſted by mutual hoſtilities, they will readily ſubmit to your demands." Mardonius, inſtead of purſuing this judicious ſyſtem, which would probably have been ſucceſsful, ſent Alexander, king of Macedon, to treat with ſuch Athenians as had returned to their city. This illuſtrious ambaſſador, who boaſted an Argive extraction, was the tributary prince of a barbarous country; but of a country deſtined, in a future age, to attain empire and renown, by the arts of Philip and the arms of his immortal ſon. The firſt Alexander was peculiarly well qualified for executing the office with which Mardonius had intruſted him, becauſe his family had long been connected with the republic of Athens, by the ſacred ties of hoſpitality. But his commiſſion was as unwelcome as his viſit was acceptable. The Athenians, therefore, delayed calling an aſſembly to hear and anſwer his diſcourſe, until the Spartans (who were apprized of the intention of Mardonius) ſhould ſend ambaſſadors to aſſiſt at the deliberation. When all parties were convened, Alexander declared, "That he was ſent on the part of Mardonius, who had received a meſſage from the great king, intimating his will to forgive their paſt injuries, to reinſtate them in their poſſeſſions, to rebuild their houſes and temples, and to receive them into the number of his friends and confederates." Mardonius then ſpoke for himſelf: "What madneſs, O Athenians, can impel you to maintain war againſt a monarch, whom you cannot expect *ever* to conquer, nor hope *always* to reſiſt? You are acquainted with the

number and proweſs of the troops under my command, which, formidable as they are, make but a ſmall part of the unbounded reſources of Xerxes. Every year he can invade you with an increaſing ſuperiority of ſtrength; ſubmit, therefore, to a power which it is impoſſible to oppoſe; profit, ere it be too late, of the diſpoſition of the great king, and accept the offer of an alliance which folly alone, not fortitude and firmneſs, can engage you to decline." Alexander endeavoured to add weight to theſe conſiderations, by obſerving, "That his paſt conduct had uniformly proved the ſincerity of his attachment to the Athenians; and that he was firmly convinced of the expedience, and even neceſſity of the meaſures now in agitation, otherwiſe he ſhould not have undertaken to propoſe them. He therefore exhorted them to reflect on the advantages which would accrue to them from being alone, of all the Greeks, admitted into the alliance of Xerxes, to reflect alſo on the dreadful conſequences which would attend their refuſal, ſince their country, placed as a prize between the contending parties, would thereby be expoſed to inevitable deſtruction[23]."

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As ſoon as Alexander had ended his diſcourſe, the Lacedæmonian ambaſſadors repreſented to the aſſembly, "That they had been ſent on the part of their republic, to thwart the meaſures of the Barbarians, with whom, in order to reſent the quarrel of her Athenian allies, Sparta had engaged in a bloody and deſtructive war. Could the Athenians then, for whoſe ſake alone the war which now

but without ſucceſs.

[23] Herodot. l. viii c. cxl.

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extended over all Greece was originally undertaken, abandon their friends and confederates, whoſe ſervices they had every reaſon to approve? Could they aſſociate with Barbarians, whoſe hoſtilities they had every reaſon to reſent? Sparta affectionately ſympathized with their ſufferings, in the loſs of their houſes and their harveſts; yet the confederates in general had endeavoured to prevent or repair the unhappy conſequences of their loſs: They had maintained their wives and families, ſupported and educated their helpleſs children, cheriſhed and ſuſtained the declining years of their parents. Their generoſity was not yet exhauſted; if the Athenians ſhould be compelled again to abandon their country, they would again find the ſame hoſpitable reception in Peloponneſus; and their families, if it became neceſſary, would be maintained at the common expenſe, during the continuance of the war. Let them not, therefore, be deceived by the ſpecious words of the tyrant Alexander, who, at the expenſe of truth, endeavoured to promote the intereſt of a tyrant like himſelf. The Athenians ought to remember, that neither juſtice, nor honor, nor fidelity, can be expected from Tyrants and Barbarians [24]." Having thus ſpoken, the Lacedæmonians, as well as Alexander, withdrew; and the Athenians, after a ſhort deliberation, anſwered both parties by the voice of Ariſtides, who, as archon, or chief magiſtrate, preſided in the aſſembly: Firſt, to the Macedonian they replied, "That as they were ſufficiently acquainted with the ſtrength of Xerxes, he might have ſpared them the inſult of

[24] Herodot. l. viii. c. cxlii.

describing its vaſt ſuperiority to their own. Yet, in defence of liberty, there was no power too great to oppoſe. Return then, and tell Mardonius, that the Athenians will never make peace with Xerxes, while the ſun performs his annual courſe in the heavens; but that, truſting to the aſſiſtance of the Gods and Heroes, whoſe temples and images the tyrant has impiouſly deſtroyed, we will reſiſt him to the laſt extremity. To conclude: Come not a ſecond time to Athens with ſuch meſſages, the inſolence of which may make us forget that you are our friend, and connected with us by the ſacred ties of reciprocal hoſpitality." The anſwer given to the Lacedæmonian ambaſſadors was delivered in a ſtill higher ſtrain of patriotiſm: "That the Barbarians, or even the peaſants of Laconia, ſhould ſuppoſe us capable of coming to an accommodation with the Perſians, does not ſurpriſe us; but it is indeed ſurpriſing, that you, citizens of Sparta, ſhould entertain the ſame groundleſs fears; you, who have ſo often heard by report, and who, on ſo many occaſions, have yourſelves witneſſed, the diſintereſted magnanimity of our republic. Know then, that the richeſt poſſeſſions on earth, that all the treaſures of the great king, are not ſufficient to ſeduce our unalterable attachment to Greece. The laws of God and man equally forbid our ingratitude; or if all ties of *duty* were diſſolved, our *reſentment* againſt the Perſians would reſtrain us. We muſt avenge our plundered altars, our proſtrate images, our deſolated temples. We muſt avenge the cauſe of our allies, and our own; for

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all the Greeks have the ſame religion, language, lineage, and manners; and, while an Athenian ſurvives, will never, with his conſent, make peace with the Barbarians. We acknowledge with gratitude your proffered kindneſs to our families; but henceforth we hope to provide for them, without giving the confederates any trouble on their account. What we requeſt of you is, that your army march with all poſſible expedition towards Bœotia, that our united reſiſtance may ſtop the progreſs of the Barbarian, who, as ſoon as he is apprized of our determined hoſtility, will not fail to proceed ſouthward, to invade Attica a ſecond time [25]."

The Peloponneſians deſert the common cauſe.

This conjecture was juſtified by the event. The Perſians within a few weeks marched into Bœotia, but the Athenians looked in vain for the expected arrival of their Spartan auxiliaries. To have witneſſed the proceedings juſt deſcribed in the Athenian aſſembly, we ſhould have imagined that there was a generous conteſt of patriotiſm between the two republics; and that the happineſs and glory of Greece, not the intereſt of their particular communities, was the great object of their ambition. But the Greeks had often much patriotiſm in their ſpeeches, when there was little in their hearts; and the Spartans, who had lately employed ſuch powerful arguments to engage Athens in defence of the common cauſe, totally abandoned their principles whenever it ſuited their convenience [26]. Inſtead of iſſuing forth in order to ſupport their allies in Bœotia, they

[25] Herodot l. viii. c. cxl. et ſeqq. [26] Lyſias, Orat. Funeb.

remained within the iſthmus, and endeavoured to fortify that inlet into their territory with ſuch additional walls and bulwarks as might render it impenetrable. The work was now complete; and the Peloponneſians, ſecure, as they imagined, behind this ſolid rampart, equally diſregarded the ſafety, and deſpiſed the reſentment, of their northern allies.

Magnanimity of the Athenians.

The Athenians, a ſecond time forſaken by their confederates, were obliged again to deſert their country. They had ſcarcely failed to their families in Salamis, when Attica was invaded by the Perſians. While the fugitives continued in that iſland, they received another embaſſy from Mardonius, offering them the ſame terms which they had formerly rejected. They ſtill perſiſted in rejecting them; in conſequence of which, they beheld without apparent uneaſineſs, from the ſhores of Salamis, their territories[27] again laid waſte; their cities, and villas, and temples, devoured by the flames; and every thing that had eſcaped the fury of the firſt invaſion, deſtroyed or conſumed by the ſecond. After committing theſe ravages, which, as he had already obtained complete poſſeſſion of the country, deſerve to be conſidered only as the effect of a childiſh reſentment, Mardonius returned into Bœotia, that his troops might be ſupplied with proviſions, and that, ſhould the enemy offer them battle, they might engage in a country better adapted than Attica to the operations of cavalry.

[27] Herodot. l. ix. c. i. et ſeqq.

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They remonſtrate with their confederates.

The Athenians, who had been ſent from Salamis to remonſtrate with the Spartan council againſt the delays or deſertion of the Peloponneſians, were accompanied by the ambaſſadors of Platæa and Megara, who confirmed their arguments and complaints. With the indignation of diſappointed confidence, they upbraided the indifference and lukewarmneſs of the Spartans in the common cauſe; ſentiments which ill correſponded with their own generous ardor. They contraſted the baſe treachery of Sparta, formerly the honor, now the diſgrace of Greece, with the patriotic magnanimity of Athens. The latter, they obſerved, compelled by neceſſity, or urged by reſentment of the ſhameful dereliction on the part of her allies, would doubtleſs accept the terms offered by Mardonius, and then the Peloponneſians muſt become ſenſible, when it was too late, that the wall acroſs the iſthmus formed but a partial and feeble defence; and however it might ſecure them from inroads on the ſide of the land, would ill protect their coaſts againſt the deſcents of the Perſian, reinforced by the Athenian fleet [28].

Perſuade them to take the field.

Whether the eloquence of the ambaſſadors, or the returning ſenſe of public utility, overcame the puſillanimous reſolutions formerly embraced by the Spartans, it is certain that they now firſt determined to take the field. Five thouſand Spartan pike-men were accompanied by thirty-five thouſand Helots. Their Peloponneſian allies ſent their

[28] Lyſias, Orat. Funeb.

reſpective

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respective contingents; so that the heavy-armed men raised in the peninsula exceeded twenty thousand, commanded by Pausanias, the guardian and kinsman of Pleistarchus, son of Leonidas. Having marched beyond the isthmus, they were joined by Aristides, at the head of eight thousand Athenians, and by a superior number of their allies of Megara, Thespiæ, Platæa, Salamis, Eubœa, and Ægina. The whole heavy-armed troops amounted to nearly forty thousand; the light-armed were the thirty-five thousand Helots, attendants on the Spartans, and about as many more, one to each soldier, attended the other divisions of the army[19].

Mardonius encamps on the Æsopus, in Bœotia;

Mardonius having marched into Bœotia, encamped on the banks of the Æsopus. His army of three hundred thousand men, while they waited the enemy's approach, of which they were secretly informed by the Argives, were employed in building a square fortification, about five quarters of a mile in front; a work of little utility, since it could only defend a small portion of a camp which extended many miles, from the Theban town of Erythræa, to the territory of the Platæans. The Greeks having arrived in those parts, took post at the foot of mount Citheron, directly opposite to the enemy.

the Greeks on the opposite bank.

Incidents preceding the battle of Platæa.

The hostile armies remained eleven days in their encampments, during which several incidents happened, which tend to display the manners and character of those great bodies of men, who were

[19] Herodot. l. ix. c. i. et seqq. Diodor. Sicul. l. xi. et Plut. in Aristid.

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ſoon to attempt the deſtruction of each other. Of the Grecians inhabiting the countries north of Attica, the Phocians, as we have already had occaſion to obſerve, were the leaſt diſpoſed to embrace the cauſe of Mardonius. Yet as all their neighbours had ſubmitted to his arms, they reluctantly ſent to his camp a thouſand ſoldiers, well armed, and commanded by Harmocydes, a citizen of great influence and authority. They had not continued many days in the Perſian army, when an order came from Mardonius (the reaſon was unknown), for the Phocians to be detached from the reſt, and encamped in a ſeparate body on the plain. They had no ſooner obeyed his command, than the whole Perſian cavalry appeared in ſight, and ſoon formed themſelves in hoſtile array. It immediately occurred to the Phocians, and particularly to their prudent commander, that Mardonius, ſuſpecting their fidelity, or yielding to the ſolicitations of their inveterate enemies the Theſſalians, had determined their deſtruction. Harmocydes therefore, pointing to the cavalry, called to his companions, "You ſee thoſe men, who come with an evident intention to deſtroy us: but let us die like Grecians, and exert ourſelves with all the fury of a deſperate defence, rather than tamely ſubmit to a diſhonorable fate." While he yet ſpoke, the Phocians ſeized their arms, arranged themſelves in order of battle, and ſupporting each other in redoubled ranks, preſented on every ſide a firm circle of protended lances. Their warlike appearance ſtruck terror into the ſurrounding cloud of Barbarians, who

advanced brandiſhing, and a few of the neareſt throwing, their javelins: but farther they ventured not to proceed; the determined countenance of the Greeks ſufficed to repel them; they retired in haſte to the Perſian camp. A herald was then ſent by Mardonius, "deſiring the Phocians to take courage, nor to dread farther hoſtilities; that they had ſhown themſelves to be brave men, contrary to the account which he had received of them; and, if they diſplayed their valor in the Perſian cauſe, they ſhould find it impoſſible to conquer either Xerxes or himſelf in good offices [19]."

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The above relation tends to prove, that none of the Greeks, not even thoſe who joined the enemy, were deficient in courage. Another incident related by the ſame hiſtorian proves, that notwithſtanding the extreme folly of their commanders, the Perſians were not univerſally deficient in wiſdom. While they were encamped on the Æſopus, a wealthy Theban, named Attaginus, invited Mardonius, with fifty of his moſt diſtinguiſhed officers, to a magnificent entertainment. The feaſt was given at Thebes, and an equal number of Bœotians were called to it. Among theſe was Therſander, a native of Orchomenus, and a perſon of the higheſt diſtinction in that city. Two of the gueſts were placed on each couch; and, as Therſander himſelf related to Herodotus, his Perſian companion, after ſupper, entering into converſation in the Greek tongue, teſtified, under the ſeal of ſecrecy, his gloomy

[19] Herodot. l. ix. c. i. et ſeqq.

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apprehenſions concerning the event of the preſent war. He did not even heſitate to declare his firm perſuaſion, that few Perſians would ſurvive an engagement. When aſked by the Theban, Why he did not communicate his opinion to his general? he ſaid, that men of plain ſenſe and honeſty had ſeldom much influence with the great. It appeared from the whole tenor of his diſcourſe, that there were many people in the Perſian army, who, like himſelf, lamented the mad ambition of Xerxes, and the fatal raſhneſs of Mardonius; and who, while they reſpected their ſtations and dreaded their power, deſpiſed their characters, and condemned their conduct [31]. This obſervation it is proper to make for the honor of human nature. In abſolute governments, it is ſaid that men obey, like a flock of ſheep, the voice of a deſpot; yet it may be ſaid with equal truth, that amidſt the obedience extorted by fear, they often ſee and regret the folly of their ſhepherd.

Skirmiſhes between the Greeks and the Perſian cavalry.

In this ſituation, it was ſcarcely to be expected that the hoſtile camps ſhould remain without frequent ſkirmiſhes. Theſe preludes to the general engagement ended favorably for the Grecians. Three thouſand ſoldiers, furniſhed by the rocky diſtrict of Megara, were poſted on the ſide moſt expoſed to the enemy's cavalry, by whoſe incurſions they had been ſo much haraſſed, that they determined to abandon that difficult ſtation. Before executing their deſign, they ſent a herald to

[31] Herodot. l. ix. c. xv.

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the Grecian generals, intimating the reſolution they had taken from neceſſity, and at the ſame time hinting the injuſtice of detaining them, from the time of the firſt encampment, in a poſt of peculiar danger, which though they had hitherto indeed maintained with ſingular conſtancy and fortitude, they now found themſelves unable longer to defend. Pauſanias addreſſed himſelf ſucceſſively to the whole army, to know whether any diviſion was willing to change poſts with the Megarians. All were ſilent, or declined the propoſal on frivolous pretences. The Athenians alone, actuated by that love of pre-eminence which they did not more ardently deſire than they juſtly deſerved, voluntarily offered their ſervices on this trying occaſion. They had not long occupied the important poſt, when the enemy's cavalry began to aſſault them. The aſſault they repelled with vigor, and Maſiſtius the Perſian general fell in the action. A terrible conflict enſued, according to ancient cuſtom, around the body of the dead. The Athenians at length gained poſſeſſion of it; though they began to give way before the general attack of the horſe, yet upon being ſupported by a reinforcement from the main body, they again recovered their ground, and compelled the Perſians to retire. When the firſt unwelcome meſſengers arrived in the camp with an account of their own defeat, and the death of the general, Mardonius and his attendants burſt into tears; their lamentations were ſoon communicated to the troops, and diffuſed over the army, whoſe plaintive cries filled the whole land of

CHAP. X. Bœotia. The Perſians tore their hair, diſfigured their faces, and diſplayed every ſymptom of intolerable woe; for they had loſt Maſiſtius, who in comelineſs and ſtature was the firſt of their generals, and in military courage and addreſs only ſecond to Mardonius [13].

The Greeks move to Hyſia, in the territory of Platæa.

The Grecians having thus bravely delivered themſelves from the incurſions of the Perſian cavalry, were now expoſed to a ſtill greater inconvenience, the ſcarcity of freſh water, which ſoon obliged them to decamp. Their late ſucceſs afforded a favorable moment for executing this dangerous meaſure. They proceeded in arms along the foot of mount Citheron, prepared to repel the attack of the enemy, by converting the column of march into an order of battle. They arrived without oppoſition at the place appointed. This was a plain near the village of Hyſia, in the territory of Platæa, interſperſed with many gentle eminences, adorned with a grove and temple ſacred to the genius of the place, and enriched by the copious fountain Gargaphia; a neceſſary reſource to the Greeks, as the enemy, by means of their cavalry and archers, commanded both ſides of the Æſopus.

Diſſenſions in the allied army.

It might be expected, that men prepared to defend every thing moſt dear to them, ſhould have preſerved in the field perfect agreement and unanimity; eſpecially as the Greeks, on ſome occaſions at leaſt, ſeemed ſenſible that mutual union was neceſſary for the general ſafety. When the allies

[13] Herodot. l. ix. c. ccxxiv.

on both ſides the iſthmus had aſſembled in Attica, they vowed with common conſent to the gods, and bound themſelves by the moſt tremendous oaths, to maintain with ſteadfaſt adherence an unſhaken fidelity to Greece, to prefer liberty to life, to obey the command of their leaders, and to bury their companions ſlain in battle. Should fortune render them victorious (which to their preſent ardor ſeemed ſcarcely a matter of doubt), they ſwore never to demoliſh any city whoſe inhabitants had concurred with the general voice on this important occaſion, and never to rebuild the temples defaced by the Barbarians, but to leave them to the moſt diſtant poſterity, as a monument of ſacrilegious rage, and an incitement to honorable revenge. They ſwore alſo to inſtitute an annual feſtival, denominated the Common Liberty[1], and to conſecrate public games and ſacrifices to the goddeſs, the great author of their union, and the venerable object of their worſhip. But theſe public-ſpirited ſentiments continued not long to actuate them. We have already had occaſion to remark ſeveral ſymptoms of approaching animoſity. Their diſſenſions ſoon broke out into an open rupture, and prevailed, even on the eve of a battle, not only between rival republics, but in the boſom of almoſt every community. CHAP. X.

The firſt conteſt aroſe between the Athenians and Tegeans, about the command of the left wing. Both parties yielded the right, as the place of between the Athenians and Tegeans.

[1] Herodot. l. ix. c. viii. et ſeqq.

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greateſt honor, to the Spartans. But the citizens of Tegea, in number three thouſand, had been long deemed the beſt ſoldiers in Arcadia; and in all the conjunct expeditions of the Peloponneſians, they had always obtained, unrivalled, the ſecond honors of the field. Theſe they profeſſed themſelves unwilling to relinquiſh, alleging the heroic exploits of their ancient kings; and aſſerting, "That the actions of the Athenians, performed either during their royal or democratical government, could not bear a compariſon with their own: they appealed on this ſubject to the Lacedæmonians, in conjunction with whom they had often fought and conquered, and whoſe deciſion in their favor they rather claimed than requeſted." This bold pretenſion the Athenians eaſily repelled, by the luſtre of their uſual eloquence. "We know," ſaid they, "that the Greeks are here aſſembled, not to diſpute about precedence, but to fight the Barbarian. Yet, as the Tegeans have mentioned *their* anceſtors, it becomes us to maintain the immortal renown of our own. Need we mention their ancient victories over the impious Thebans; their chaſtiſement of the inſolent Euryſtheus; their generous protection of the unfortunate ſons of Hercules? When Greece was invaded by the warlike Amazons, and afterwards by the fiercer ſavages of Scythia and Thrace, the Athenians reſiſted and overcame the common enemy. What people fought with more bravery than they in the war of Troy? But perhaps *we*, who now addreſs you, have degenerated from the glory of our anceſtors. Let the battle of

Marathon efface the foul ſuſpicion. There, unaided and alone, we defended the general ſafety, maintained the glory of Greece, and raiſed, by the proweſs of our ſingle republic, a trophy over forty nations. This exploit, had we no other to allege, entitles us to the rank claimed by the Tegeans, and to far higher honors. But the preſent is not a time for ſuch conteſts; place us therefore, O Spartans! in whatever ſtation you think fit; there, we will behave like brave men." Their words were ſcarcely ended, when the whole army of the Lacedæmonians cried out with one conſent, "That the Athenians were far more worthy than the Tegeans, or any nation of Arcadia, to ſtand at the head of the left wing;" and accordingly they aſſumed that important poſt [14]. CHAP. X.

The Perſians encamp near the enemy.

Meantime the Barbarian army approached. The Medes and Perſians encamped on the plain, fronting the Spartans: the Grecian auxiliaries were placed in direct oppoſition to the Athenians. It is eaſy to perceive, even at this diſtance of time, the reaſon of ſuch an arrangement. The Perſians, avoided to encounter the Athenian bravery, which they had already fatally experienced in the field of Marathon; and as the Thebans were the moſt powerful and the warmeſt of their foreign allies, as well as the inveterate enemies of Athens, it was thought proper to oppoſe them to that ſide on which the Athenians were poſted. Ambiguous oracles, attended by unfavorable omens and

[14] Herodot. l. ix. c. xxvi. et ſeqq. Plut. in Ariſtid.

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prophecies, had hitherto deterred Mardonius from venturing a general engagement; and he was at length determined to this measure, not from any auspicious[15] change in the admonitions of heaven, but from the apparent timidity occasioned by the real dissensions of the Greeks.

The Greeks decamp a second time.

The same reasons which made Mardonius desire to preserve, made Pausanias wish to alter, the relative disposition of their respective camps. Excepting in the glorious contest at Thermopylæ, in which they devoted themselves to death for the safety of their country, the Spartans had never contended with the Medes; but they had often fought and conquered the Bœotians. Pausanias therefore desired (for, though dignified with the title of General, he could not command) the Athenians to change places with his countrymen: This request was cheerfully complied with; but other circumstances sowed dissension in the Athenian camp[16]. The quiet likewise of the Lacedæmonians was disturbed by the quarrels between Pausanias and Anompharetus, the Spartan next in command; and conspiring with these internal animosities, the Persian horse beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, and, by an unexpected incursion, destroyed their watering-place. It thus became

[15] The prophets consulted were Greeks, who perhaps secretly served the cause of their country. Mardonius resolved to engage the enemy, as we learn from Herodotus, without regarding their predictions. Alexander of Macedon came in the night to the Grecian camp, to give intimation of that resolution; yet Mardonius seems to have been immediately determined to attack, by the circumstances mentioned in the text.

[16] Plutarch. in Aristid.

neceſſary again to decamp. The obſcurity of midnight was choſen as the moſt convenient time for effecting this purpoſe; and the deſtined place of retreat was a narrow ſlip of ground lying towards the ſource of the Æſopus, and confined between that river and mount Citheron. This poſt was at leaſt preferred by the majority; for the Greeks were by no means unanimous: ſo that when the march was ordered, many of the allies abandoned their leaders; others took refuge in the neighbouring temples, to elude the purſuit of the horſe, while Anompharetus the Spartan declared, "That neither he, nor the diviſion under his command, ſhould ever fly from the enemy:" and in conſequence of its diſperſion in ſo many different directions, the Grecian army preſented next morning the appearance, not of a regular march, but of a flight or rout.

Mardonius attacks them.

Mardonius was apprized that the Greeks had changed their order of battle. He was now informed, that they had abandoned their camp. Not doubting that fear had precipitated their retreat, he ordered his ſoldiers to purſue the fugitives, and to complete the victory. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians were ſtill within his reach; the former near the foot of the mountain, the latter in the middle of the plain. Having ſent his Grecian auxiliaries, amounting to fifty thouſand, againſt the Athenians, he advanced with the braveſt of the Perſian troops againſt that portion of the enemy which had ſhown an anxious ſolicitude to avoid his arms. Never did the contraſt appear greater, than

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in the oppoſite appearance and behaviour of the hoſtile armies on this occaſion. The Barbarians, ill armed, and totally ignorant of diſcipline, advanced without order, and with a loud inſulting noiſe. The Lacedæmonians, carefully covered with their ſhields, obſerved in ſilence the reſult of their ſacrifices. While the heavenly admonitions were unfavorable, they patiently received the darts and javelins which the enemy threw upon them. But as ſoon as Pauſanias, caſting his eyes towards a neighbouring temple of Juno, and devoutly entreating the protection of the goddeſs, had obtained, in the changing aſpect of the victims, a propitious anſwer to his prayer, they proceeded with intrepidity to cloſe with their opponents [37]. The Perſians, reinforced with the Sacæ, a Scythian tribe, ſuſtained the attack with great bravery. Immenſe numbers were ſlain; but new numbers ſucceeded, crowding together in tumultuous diſorder, and making an hideous outcry, as if they had intended to tear in pieces and to devour the enemy. Mardonius, mounted on a white ſteed of uncommon ſtrength and ſwiftneſs, was diſtinguiſhed in every part of the battle by the ſplendor of his appearance, but ſtill more by deeds of ſignal valor. He was attended by a thouſand horſemen, conſiſting of the flower of the Perſian nobility, all alike ambitious to imitate the example, and to emulate the fame, of their leader. Had their ſkill been equal to their courage, or had they previouſly

The battle of Platæa.

[37] Herodot. l. ix. c. lxii. et ſeqq.

beſtowed as much pains in diſciplining their troops, as in improving their own agility and addreſs, either the Greeks muſt have been conquered, or the battle muſt have remained doubtful. But the Barbarians acted without union or concert; and as they fought ſingly, were ſucceſſively defeated. It is the nature, and the greateſt diſadvantage of cavalry, not to increaſe in force in proportion to the reduplication of their ranks. The Grecian phalanx, on the other hand, received an acceſſion of ſtrength from every addition to its depth; the ranks behind ſupported thoſe before; no power was miſſpent or unexerted; and the effect might be continually augmented, till it became irreſiſtible. Availing themſelves of this circumſtance, the Lacedæmonians thickened their ranks, extended their ſpears, ſuſtained the ſhock, and penetrated the depth, of the brave Perſian ſquadron. Mardonius fell by the fortunate arm of the Spartan Aicimneſtus [38]. The death of the general was immediately followed by the defeat of the Perſians, and the defeat of the Perſians by the flight of the Barbarian army. Artabazus, the Parthian chief, had from the beginning condemned the raſh meaſures of Mardonius. He commanded forty thouſand men, who were prepared on every occaſion to follow the example of their leader. As ſoon as he

Death of Mardonius, and defeat of the Barbarians.

[38] Compoſed of two Greek words, which may be tranſlated "of immortal memory;" an inſtance, among many, that the Greeks frequently gave names characteriſtic of perſons; a cuſtom which likewiſe prevailed much among the Jews. See Michaelis's Tranſlation and Annotations on Geneſis, p. 37. et paſſim.

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perceived the confuſion of the Perſians, he made the ſignal for his troops to quit the field. He conducted them through the territory of the Phocians, and arriving by haſty marches at the Helleſpont, before the news of the defeat and death of Mardonius, returned in ſafety to the Aſiatic coaſt, with the forces intruſted to his care [89].

Defeat of their auxiliaries.

The remainder of the diſcomfited Barbarians ſought refuge in their camp, which, as we have already mentioned, had been ſtrengthened by a conſiderable fortification. The Spartans purſued them with great ardor, but were unable to force their encampment. The Tegeans and other troops ſeconded the attack, but no impreſſion could be made on the wall, till the arrival of the Athenians. Theſe generous defenders of the cauſe of liberty had repulſed the Grecian auxiliaries, who impiouſly aſſiſted the enemies of their country. The behaviour of the greater part of the traitors furniſhed the occaſion of an eaſy victory; for, unable to meet the juſt reproaches and indignant looks of their countrymen, they ſoon betook themſelves to flight, which, in the preſent caſe, ſeemed more honorable than reſiſtance. The Thebans alone oppoſed with great perſeverance the Athenian valor; they did not deſiſt from hoſtility, till ſeveral hundreds were ſlain; and when compelled to quit the field, they fled towards Bœotia, and ſhut themſelves up within the ſtrong walls of their city. Inſtead of purſuing theſe fugitives, though their

[89] Herodot. l. ix. c. lxv.

domeſtic and inveterate foes, the Athenians, with a laudable moderation and prudence, probably inſpired by Ariſtides, then one of their generals, directed their march towards the Lacedæmonian forces, which had already engaged and put to flight the main ſtrength of the enemy. The Athenians, however, came in time to complete the glory of that memorable day. They attacked with redoubled vigor the fortification, which had been in vain aſſailed by their allies; and having effected a breach in the wall, entered the Perſian camp. They were followed by the brave ſoldiers of Tegea, and afterwards, by the Spartans. The Barbarians were ſeized with conſternation at ſeeing ſo many myriads confined within a narrow ſpace. The means of their expected ſafety became the principal cauſe of their deſtruction. Fear hindered them to fight; the wall hindered them to fly; the great number of the enemy made it dangerous for the victors to give quarter; reſentment of paſt injuries prompted them to revenge; of near two hundred thouſand Barbarians, not two thouſand eſcaped the fury of the Grecian ſpear [40].

The Perſians maſſacred in their camp.

The event of this bloody engagement not only delivered the Greeks from the danger of ſervitude, but gave them poſſeſſion of greater wealth than they could ever have expected to poſſeſs. In his precipitate retreat from Greece, Xerxes left behind him all his riches and magnificence. His moſt valuable effects were beſtowed on Mardonius, the

The valuable booty found there.

[40] Herodot. l. ix. cap. c.

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flatterer of his inclinations, and the unfortunate minister of his revenge. The rest was divided among his inferior favorites; and independent of the bounty of the prince, the tents of the Persian nobles furnished a wide profusion of elegance and splendor. Couches magnificently embroidered; tables of gold and silver; bowls and goblets of gold; stalls and mangers of brass, curiously wrought and ornamented; chains, bracelets, scymitars, some of solid gold, others adorned with precious stones; and, to crown all, many chests of Persian money, which began at that time, and continued long afterwards, to be current in Greece. Among the common mass of spoil, Herodotus reckons a great many Persian women, besides innumerable horses and camels. The whole being collected into one place, the tenth was consecrated to the gods. A tenth of the remainder was bestowed on the general. Peculiar presents were offered to the temples of Olympian Jove, Isthmian Neptune, and Delphian Apollo, the favorite divinities of the whole Grecian name; nor did the Athenians forget to show particular gratitude to their adored Minerva. Prizes were afterwards distributed among the bravest of the surviving warriors; for though the victory had been obtained with little blood, yet several hundreds had fallen, especially of the most generous and daring; among whom were ninety-one Spartans, fifty-two Athenians and sixteen men of Tegea. Callicratides, a Spartan, the bravest and most beautiful of the Greeks, was slain by an arrow, before Pausanias, who had

How applied.

not

not yet finiſhed the ſacrifice, had given the ſignal of engagement. As he fell, he ſaid to thoſe around him, that he was contented to die for Greece, but regretted dying inglorioufly, having performed nothing worthy of himſelf or the common cauſe. But in the battle itſelf none of the warriors behaved with ſuch diſtinguiſhed bravery as Ariſtodemus, who alone of three hundred Spartans ſurvived the action at Thermopylæ. This circumſtance had rendered him contemptible in the eyes of his countrymen. He was continually upbraided with the baſe deſertion of his companions. The moſt heroic deeds could not reſtore him to the good opinion of the public; and it was aſſerted by the Spartans, that even on the preſent occaſion, as he had determined to ſeek a voluntary death in order to efface the ſtain of his former infamy, he was not entitled to any of thoſe honors which are deſervedly beſtowed on the genuine efforts of ſpontaneous valor [41].

The confederate Greeks chaſtiſe the perfidy of the Thebans.

The Greeks buried their dead with every circumſtance of funeral pomp, erected in the field of battle conſpicuous trophies of their renown, and appropriated about twenty thouſand pounds for dedicating temples and ſtatues to the tutelary deities of Platæa, the illuſtrious ſcene of victory. A few days were ſpent in theſe tranſactions; after which it was determined, by univerſal conſent, to march into Bœotia, in order to chaſtiſe the perfidy of the Thebans. On the eleventh day after the

[41] Herodot. l. ix. c. lxx.

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battle they arrived in the neighbourhood of Thebes, ravaged the territory, and made approaches to the walls. The citizens, who were not all equally guilty or equally obnoxious, eſcaped general deſtruction by ſurrendering the leaders of the faction which abetted the intereſt of the Medes. The traitors were carried to Corinth, condemned without trial, and ſacrificed to the manes of their countrymen who had fallen at Marathon, Salamis, and Platæa, in defence of political liberty and national independence[42].

Battle of Mycalé in Ionia.

The battle of Platæa was fought the twenty-ſecond of September; and on the ſame day another battle, not leſs glorious or leſs deciſive, was fought between the ſame nations at the promontory of Mycalé in Ionia, oppoſite to the iſle of Samos. The ſhattered remnant of the Perſian fleet, which had eſcaped deſtruction on the fatal twentieth of October of the preceding year, took refuge in the friendly ports of Aſia Minor. The victorious armament had ſuffered too much in repeated ſhocks with a ſuperior force, to engage at that late ſeaſon in the purſuit of an enemy, whoſe ſtrength, amounting to above four hundred veſſels, was ſtill nearly the double of their own. The little ſquadron of Themiſtocles, averſe to inactivity, found occupation, as we already had occaſion to notice, in laying the iſlands of the Ægean under contribution. The great body of the fleet rendezvouſed in the harbours of Ægina. There the Grecians continued during the winter, and before the ſeaſon for action approached,

[42] Herodot. l. ix. c. lxxxv.

the command was beſtowed on Xantippus the Athe- CHAP.
nian, and on Leotychides the Spartan king. To X.
theſe commanders, whoſe abilities and influence in their reſpective republics we formerly had an opportunity to mention, there arrived early in the ſpring a ſecret deputation from ſeveral cities of Ionia, entreating that the valor of the European Greeks, which had been ſo ſucceſsfully employed in their own defence, might be ſtill farther exerted in delivering from bondage their brethren in Aſia. In conſequence of this invitation the fleet ſailed eaſtward, and had ſcarcely reached the coaſt of Delos, when a ſecond embaſſy came from the Samians, propoſing the ſame meaſures as the firſt, and farther adding, that the Perſian fleet, now lying in the harbour of Samos, might be attacked and defeated without danger or difficulty. The Grecians ſeized with eagerneſs the favorable opportunity of terminating the war; but before they arrived at Samos, the enemy ſuſpecting their motions, and unwilling to hazard another engagement at ſea, had retired to the Ionic coaſt, and according to the cuſtom of that age, not only drawn their ſhips on ſhore, but ſurrounded them with a ditch and paliſade, and even a ſtone wall of conſiderable ſtrength. The veſſels thus ſecured, the ſailors amounting to forty thouſand, commanded by Artayndes, formed a camp along the ſhore. They were reinforced by the Perſian army under Tigranes, computed at ſixty thouſand. It appears not whether this powerful body of men made any attempt to diſturb the landing of the Greeks, who at the higheſt computation

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could not amount to a fourth part of their number. It ſeems moſt probable that they diſdained this meaſure, and though they acknowledged their inferiority at ſea, determined to hazard at land a general engagement, in which the iſles and Helleſpont, as well as the flouriſhing cities of the Aſiatic coaſt, ſhould form the important prize of victory.

The Greeks victorious.

The Greeks did not decline the battle. Xantippus is ſaid to have made uſe of a ſimilar contrivance with that employed by Themiſtocles at Artemiſium, for depriving the enemy of their Grecian auxiliaries [43]. A more probable ſtratagem is aſcribed to Leotychides, who, in order to encourage his troops, is ſaid to have induſtriouſly ſpread a report that their countrymen had obtained a ſignal victory at Platæa. This report, by whatever means [44] it was raiſed and circulated, had doubtleſs a conſiderable effect in deciding the fortune of the day. Other circumſtances, not leſs powerful, were, the general revolt of the Aſiatic Greeks, and the ſilent conteſt of honor between the Spartans and Athenians. Among the Barbarian troops the Perſians behaved with uncommon bravery; and on the ſide of the Grecians,

[43] The ſtory is improbable, becauſe the Aſiatic Greeks had already declared their intention to revolt. It was not the intereſt of Xantippus, therefore, to make the Perſians ſuſpect their fidelity, ſince treacherous friends are always more dangerous than open enemies.

[44] Herodotus (l. ix. cap. c.) and Diodorus (l. xi. cap. xxxv.) differ in their accounts.

the battle of Mycalé was more bloody than any other fought in the courſe of the war. It deſerves attention, that, in all theſe memorable actions, the Greeks had no reſource but in victory. But the Barbarians had provided probable means of ſafety, even in caſe of a defeat. On the preſent occaſion they had endeavoured not only to ſecure a retreat within a ſtrongly fortified camp, but to acquire an undiſturbed paſſage through the narrow defiles of Mycalé. Yet all their precautions were ineffectual againſt the valor and fortune of the Greeks. The Mileſians, poſted by the enemy to guard the paſſes of the mountain, prevented, inſtead of promoting, their eſcape. The Spartans purſued them with great ſlaughter in that direction; while the Athenians, aſſiſted by the allies of Corinth, Sicyon, and Trœzené, advanced with undaunted bravery to attack their camp. The Aſiatic Greeks, who at all times acknowledged the warlike pre-eminence of their European brethren, emulated, in the preſent engagement alone, in which they fought for every thing dear to them, the admired valor of their anceſtors. Above forty thouſand Perſians periſhed in the field; many fell in the purſuit, or in defending their intrenchments; the remainder fled in diſorder, nor thought themſelves ſecure till they had reached the walls of Sardis. Their ſhips, their camp, the freedom of Ionia, and the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the Aſiatic coaſt, formed the ineſtimable prize of

Concluſion and conſequences of the Perſian invaſion.

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the victors; and thus the expedition of Xerxes, undertaken with a view to enslave Europe, restored liberty to the fairest portion of Asia[ee].

[ee] Herodot. l. ix. c. xc. — c. cxiv; Diodorus Siculus, l. xi, c. xxxiv. — c. xxxviii.

Consequences of the Persian invasion.

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Military Glory of Greece. — Enemies to whom that Country was expoſed. — Foundation and Growth of Carthage. — The flouriſhing Condition of Magna Græcia Excites the Jealouſy of the Carthaginians. — Who enter into a League with Xerxes. — The Object of this Alliance. — Cauſes of the ſingular Proſperity of Magna Græcia. — Hiſtory of Pythagoras, and of his Philoſophy. — The Carthaginians invade Sicily. — Their Diſaſters. — Glory of Gelon. — His Treaty with the Carthaginians. — Cauſes of the Decay of Magna Græcia.

CHAP. XI. State of Greece. Olymp. lxxv. 1. A. C. 480.

THE beginning of the fifth century before Chriſt forms the moſt glorious æra in the hiſtory of Greece. While the republics of Athens and Sparta humbled the pride of Aſia, the flouriſhing ſettlements on the Helleſpont and the Hadriatic overawed the fierce Barbarians of Europe [1]; and the ſouthern colony of Cyrené reſtrained, within their native limits, the ſavage ferocity of the Libyans [2]. The north, ſouth, and

[1] Herodot. l. vi. Thucydid. l. i. [2] Strabo, l. xvii.

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east thus acknowledging the ascendant of the Grecian valor and genius, Rome still contended in the west, with the obstinacy of the Volsci[3], for the rude villages of Latium: yet on this side, from which the stream of conquest was destined, in a future age, to flow over the world, the Greeks had already most danger to apprehend, and most laurels to acquire; not, however, from Rome, but from the implacable[4] enemy of the Roman name.

The foundation and growth of Carthage, which have been so successfully adorned by poetical fiction, are very imperfectly explained in history. It is known, that at least eight hundred and ninety years[5] before the Christian æra, a Phœnician colony settled on that fertile projecture of the African coast, which boldly advances into the Mediterranean, to meet, as it were, and to defy the shores of Sicily and Italy, planted in the following century by Greeks, with whom the republic of Carthage, long before the age of her great Hannibal, waged many

The foundation and growth of Carthage,

[3] Diodor. l. xi.

[4] With what energy does Virgil express the eternal enmity between Rome and Carthage!

Littora littoribus contraria, fluctibus undas,
Imprecor, arma armis; pugnent ipsique nepotes. Æneid. l. iv.

[5] B. C. 891. Petav. de Doctr. Temporum. Yet, as there is a gap in the Carthaginian history of several centuries, every man of taste will be desirous of extending the duration of this dark and unknown period, to have the pleasure of believing that Æneas and Dido were contemporaries: an opinion more probable than that of Sir Isaac Newton, who would bring down the time of Æneas and the æra of the Trojan war to the age of Dido and the foundation of Carthage.

cruel and bloody wars. For three centuries after their eſtabliſhment, the Carthaginians ſeem to have ſilently but ſucceſsfully availed themſelves of the natural fertility of their ſoil, the convenience of their harbours, the ſkill and dexterity of their artiſans, the adventurous ſpirit of their mariners; above all, of the profound wiſdom of their government, which had been eſtabliſhed on ſuch admirable principles, that, from the foundation of their city till the age of the philoſopher Ariſtotle [6], no tyrant had oppreſſed the freedom, no ſedition had diſturbed the tranquillity of Carthage [7].

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From this peaceful and happy obſcurity the Carthaginians firſt emerged into notice in conſequence of their oppoſition to the naval enterpriſes of the Aſiatic Greeks, who, about the middle of the ſixth century before Chriſt, flying the oppreſſive domination of Perſia, threw themſelves on the weſtern ſhores and iſlands of the Mediterranean. As a maritime and enterpriſing nation the Greeks were naturally the rivals of the Carthaginians; and the Phocæans, who had left the coaſt of Ionia to avoid the cruel tyranny of the ſatrap Harpalus, had landed at, or perhaps founded, Alcria in the iſle of Corſica,

which oppoſes the naval enterprifes of the Greeks.

[6] Ariſtot. de Repub. l. ii. c. xi.

[7] If Dido laid the foundation of ſo much proſperity and happineſs, ſhe might boaſt, with becoming dignity, of having ſecured immortal fame:

Vixi, et quem dederat curſum fortuna peregi,
Urbem præclaram ſtatui, mea mœnia vidi:
Et nunc magna mei ſub terris ibit imago. VIRGIL, ibid.

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before they finally ſettled at Velia[9] in Italy, and Marſeilles in Gaul[9]. The Carthaginians, who had already formed eſtabliſhments in Corſica, regarded the whole iſland as a dependence of their republic, and ſet themſelves to oppoſe with vigor the Grecian invaders. From a ſimilar motive the Tuſcans embraced the ſame deſign; and the moſt ancient naval engagement, diſtinctly recorded in hiſtory, was fought in the Sardinian ſea, between the Phocæans with ſixty ſail on the one ſide, againſt the Tuſcans and Carthaginians with double that number on the other[10]. The Greeks had the whole glory of the battle; they deſtroyed forty of the enemy's ſhips, and compelled the reſt to fly. But the ſmallneſs of their numbers, greatly diminiſhed by their deſperate efforts in defence of the honor of their nation againſt a ſuperior force, obliged them to abandon the project of ſettling in Corſica.

Hinders them from ſettling in Corſica.

Though the iſſue of this memorable ſea-fight tends to diſpel the cloud of fiction concerning the remote voyages and ancient naval power of the Carthaginians, yet it cannot be doubted, that in the beginning of the following century, and before the invaſion of Xerxes, they were the moſt powerful commercial nation in the world. The proud centre of their empire was ſurrounded by a cluſter of colonies and tributary cities, which extended

Power and ſplendor of Carthage. Olymp. lxx. 1. A. C. 500.

[9] Diodor. l. v. and Cluverius Sicil. Ant. p. 507.
[9] Thucydid. l. i.
[10] Id. ibid. et Herodot. l. vi.

above a thouſand miles [11] along the coaſt of Africa. They were maſters of Sardinia and the northern coaſt of Sicily [12]. They had eſtabliſhed colonies not only in Corſica, but in Malta and the Balearian iſles. They often viſited the Caſſeterides. They probably firſt diſcovered the Canaries, whoſe equable and happy temperature entitled them to the epithet of Fortunate. They had appropriated the gold mines of Spain, the Peru and Mexico of the ancient world [13]; and all theſe advantages being directed by the prudent enterpriſe of the magiſtrates, conſiſting chiefly of merchants [14], and improved by the patient

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[11] From the weſtern boundary of Cyrenaica to the Straits of Gibraltar, Shaw reckons 1420 geographical miles; but this was the extent of the Carthaginian dominion in the greateſt ſplendor of the republic. SHAW'S Travels, p. 150.

[12] Polyb. l. iii. c. xxii.

[13] Auctor, apud Hendreich, Reſpub. Carthag. l. 1.

[14] In this reſpect the government of Carthage was very different from that of Crete, and particularly of Sparta, with both which Ariſtotle compares it. Iſocrates (ad Nicoclem) ſays, that in civil affairs the Carthaginian government was ariſtocratical; in military, royal: this probably was the caſe in the earlieſt times. The chief magiſtrates were called Suffetes, which, in the Hebrew language, ſignifies judges (Bochart, Canaan), and might therefore be naturally tranſlated by the word βασιλεις, in Greek. But it appears from Ariſtotle, that theſe judges or kings, who were two in number, were nothing more than annual magiſtrates, who convoked the ſenate, and preſided in that aſſembly. When the ſenate and the ſuffetes were of one mind, the people had no vote in the management of public affairs; but when their opinions were different, it belonged to the people to decide. Ariſtotle regards this as an imperfection in their conſtitution; and time juſtified his opinion. In a commercial republic, where the people gradually become more rich and more licentious, ſuch a regulation naturally tended to throw too much power into their hands. During the century which elapſed from Ariſtotle to Hannibal, the people of Carthage became more powerful than the ſenate; at Rome

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induſtry of the people, who knew that by gaining wealth they muſt attain reſpect, rendered Carthage the centre of general commerce. From Egypt they imported linen and the papyrus; the coaſts of the Red Sea furniſhed them with ſpices, perfumes, gold, pearls, and precious ſtones[15]. The rich carpets of Perſia adorned the palaces of the Carthaginian magiſtrates. From Spain they drew the precious metals neceſſary to facilitate their commerce; and from Britain and other provinces of the north they derived iron, lead, tin, and copper, equally neceſſary to ſecond all the efforts of their induſtry. The Carthaginian exports conſiſted partly in the produce of their fertile ſoil, but chiefly in the ingenious labors of their artificers; grains, fruits, honey, leather, and flax of a ſuperior kind[16]; naval ſtores, particularly ropes made of a ſpecies of broom called ſpartum; houſehold furniture, toys, and the materials of the highly valued *Punicean* color. Their mechanic arts had attained a degree of perfection which was acknowledged and admired by their enemies[17]; but the liberal arts, and particularly poetry and eloquence[18], ſeem never

the ſenate were more powerful than the people; and to theſe circumſtances chiefly, the moſt judicious author of antiquity aſcribes the very different fortune of the two nations in the ever memorable wars waged between them. POLYB. l. vi

[15] Pliny, l. xxxviii. c. vii. tells us, that carbuncles were ſo common in Carthage, that they were generally known by the name of Carthaginian.

[16] Xenophon, de Venatione.

[17] Cato de Re Ruſticâ, et Valerius Maximus, l. vii.

[18] The great Hannibal was a lover of Greek learning, and compoſed ſeveral books in that language. Cornelius Nepos in Hannibal.

to have flouriſhed or taken root in their republic; a circumſtance more fatal to the renown of Carthage than all the deſtructive ravages of the Romans, whoſe immortal hate would have found it more difficult to aboliſh the elegant inventions of genius, than to extinguiſh the moſt ſplendid monuments of wealth and grandeur.

The ambitious and jealous ſpirit of that republic.

Few individuals are able to enjoy, without abuſing, the gifts of fortune; and no nation ever poſſeſſed power, without aſpiring at conqueſt. But the commercial ambition of the Carthaginians was diſtinguiſhed by an excluſive and jealous ſpirit, which ſought to ſtifle the activity and improvements of every people that might ever become their rival. In the end of the ſixth century before Chriſt, and twenty-eight years before the invaſion of Xerxes, they concluded a treaty with Rome, recently delivered from the tyranny of its kings, which marks the utmoſt ſolicitude to prevent the new republic from ever entering into correſpondence, or ever gaining acquaintance [19] with the dependences of Carthage. The Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, which, within the courſe of ſixty years, had (for

The proſperity of Greece alarms the Carthaginians,

Silenus, another Carthaginian, wrote hiſtory in Greek. Cicer. de Divinat. Salluſt ſpeaks of *Punic books* in his hiſtory of the Jugurthine war; and we know that Mago's Treatiſe of Rural Oeconomy, in 28 books, was tranſlated by order of the Roman ſenate, although the elder Cato had previouſly handled that important ſubject. I mention not the ſpurious voyage of Hanno, ſince better proofs of the Carthaginian literature may be found in the ſecond and eighteenth books of Pliny. But two obſervations naturally preſent themſelves, which juſtify what is ſaid in the text; firſt, that the Carthaginians wrote rather on the uſeful than ornamental arts; and ſecondly, that their greateſt writers preferred the Greek to the Punic language.

[19] Polyb. l. iii. c. xxii.

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reaſons that will immediately be explained) received ſuch acceſſions of ſtrength and ſplendor, as entitled thoſe countries to the appellation of Magna Græcia [20], more juſtly alarmed the jealouſy, and provoked the envious reſentment of the Carthaginian magiſtrates. The Greeks were already maſters of the eaſtern iſles and ſhores of the Mediterranean. They were not only a warlike, but an ingenious and commercial nation. The naval force of the Phocæans alone had defied and diſgraced the united fleets of the Tuſcans and Carthaginians. The latter therefore beheld, with the utmoſt ſatisfaction, the continual ſparks of hoſtility that broke out between the Greeks and Perſians. They learned, with admiration and delight, the mighty preparations of Xerxes; but were ſtill more delighted when the great king, who had been accuſtomed to receive the preſents and the adulation of the tributary princes of Aſia, condeſcended to demand an equal alliance with their republic; probably granted them ſubſidies to raiſe troops in Spain, Gaul, and the northern parts of Italy; and only required them to join their efforts with his own, to puniſh, and, if poſſible, to extirpate the natural enemies of both. The crafty Africans greedily accepted propoſitions, ſeemingly ſo favorable to their intereſt; and, after three years preparations, had collected an armament of two thouſand ſhips of war, and three thouſand tranſports, to convey an army of three hundred thouſand men into Magna Græcia [21]. It was determined between the confederates, that while Xerxes poured his millions into the centre of Greece,

who enter into an alliance with Xerxes.

[20] Strabo, l. viii. p. 389. [21] Herodot. l. vii. et Diodor l. xi.

and rooted out the original ſtock of the devoted nation, the Carthaginians ſhould cut off its flouriſhing branches in Italy and Sicily. The terms of the agreement were carefully obſerved; the combined attack was made at the time appointed; and Europe is intereſted in knowing to what particular cauſes muſt be aſcribed the failure of expeditions, which, if ſucceſsful, would probably have inverted her deſtiny, and deprived her of the boaſted ſuperiority which ſhe thenceforth maintained over the other quarters of the world.

Their views in adopting this meaſure.

Whoever has obſerved the deſolate barbarity of Calabria, or reflected on the narrow extent and preſent weakneſs of Sicily, cannot hear, without a mixture of ſurpriſe and incredulity, that five centuries before Chriſt, thoſe countries contained above twenty warlike communities, ſeveral of whom could ſend into the field an hundred thouſand fighting men. The haſty glance of impatient ignorance will confidently reject, on this ſubject, the evidence of antiquity, as contrary to probability and experience; the contemplative viſionary will admit the fact, and deduce from it many gloomy reflections on the old age and decay of the world; but the more practical philoſopher will attempt to diſcover the cauſes of the ancient and actual ſtate of Magna Græcia, in the hiſtory and inſtitutions of that country during the reſpective periods of time which are the objects of his reſearch.

The flouriſhing condition of Magna Græcia.

The eſtabliſhments of Eubœan Cumæ, the mother of Parthenopé, or Naples, and the foundation of a few other Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily,

Hiſtory of the coloniſation of that country.

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remounts, as already mentioned, to the heroic ages; but by far the greater number of Greek colonies in thoſe parts were planted during the eighth century before the Chriſtian æra [22], and chiefly, 1. by the Eubœans, whoſe principal city, Chalcis, uſually furniſhing the conductor of the colony, gave the epithet of Chalcidian to the new ſettlements; 2. by the Achæans of Peloponneſus, who were of the Eolian tongue and lineage; and, 3. by the Dorian ſtates of that peninſula, eſpecially Corinth; to which city may be applied the obſervation of ancient republicans concerning the fathers of Cato and Brutus, that as children often derived luſtre from the merit of their parents, ſo Corinth acquired renown from the ſplendor and proſperity of its children. Beſides their powerful colonies in Corcyra, Leucas, Anactorium, Ambracia, whoſe tranſactions form ſuch an important part of the hiſtory of ancient Greece, the Corinthians founded Syracuſe, which ſoon became, and long continued, the capital of Sicily. Seventy years after their eſtabliſhment there, the inhabitants of Syracuſe built Acras, and afterwards, at an equal diſtance of time, Camerina. Many other cities of leſs note owed their birth to the ſame metropolis; ſo that in the ſixth century before Chriſt, the Syracuſans had extended their ſettlements over all the ſouthern coaſt of the iſland [23]. We had already

The Dorian colonies moſt powerful in Sicily. Olymp. xi. 2. A. C. 729.

[22] Between the 10th and 30th Olympiads, and the years 737 and 777 B. C.

[23] Scymnus, v. 293. Thucyd. l. vi. et Herodot. l. vii.

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already an opportunity to mention on what occaſion the Lacedæmonians founded the city of Tarentum in Italy; thirty-nine years afterwards, Rhegium was built by the Meſſenians and Chalcidians, the former of whom (as we have related above) had already ſettled at Meſſené, on the oppoſite ſhore of Sicily. The citizens of Tarentum founded Heraclea, ſituated on the Tarentine gulph, and perhaps gave an acceſſion of inhabitants to Locri, which, though originally planted by the Eolians, ſeems early to have uſed the Doric dialect. The Rhodians, who were alſo of the Doric race, built the city of Gela in Sicily, forty-five years after the foundation of Syracuſe [24]; and Gela planted the flouriſhing colony of Agrigentum, which ſoon ſurpaſſed the ſplendor of its metropolis, and became the ſecond city in the iſland.

Olymp. viii. 2. A. C. 707.

Olymp. xlix. 3. A. C. 582.

By means of theſe powerful eſtabliſhments, the *Dorians* acquired, and always maintained, an aſcendant in Sicily; but the Achæan colonies, who were of the *Eolian* blood and language [25], commanded the Italian ſhore. Crotona, the moſt conſiderable city of the Achæans, and of all Italy in ancient times, was built ſeven hundred and ten years before Chriſt [26]. Sybaris, its rival, was founded about the ſame time, and by the ſame nation. The former ſent colonies to Tirina,

The Eolian, in Italy.

[24] Thucyd. l. vi.

[25] Strabo, l. viii. p. 513. aſſures us of the latter circumſtance, which is of more importance than the uncertain genealogy of the ancient Grecian tribes.

[26] Dionyſ. Halicarn. l. ii.

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Caulonia, and Pandoſia; the latter built Laus, Metapontum, and Poſidonia, or Pæſtum [27], whoſe admired ruins atteſt the ancient wealth and grandeur of the Greek cities of Italy.

The Ionian the weakeſt in both countries.

In this deduction, had we followed the order of time, we ought to have mentioned, firſt of all, the Ionian colonies, who came from the iſle of Eubœa. The inhabitants of that iſland built Naxus in Sicily, a year before the foundation of Syracuſe [28]; but neither that, nor their ſettlements at Catana, Egeſta, Leontium, ever attained conſiderable populouſneſs or ſplendor. And it deſerves to be particularly remarked, that, for reaſons which will appear in the ſequel of this work, the Ionians, who ſettled chiefly near the eaſtern ſhore of Sicily, never rivalled the power and fame of their Dorian and Eolian neighbours, but fell ſhort of thoſe nations in Magna Græcia, as much as they ſurpaſſed them in the ſhores and iſlands of Aſia.

General cauſes of the wealth and populouſneſs of all theſe colonies.

Inſtead of fatiguing the memory of our readers with the names of leſs conſiderable ſtates or cities, which had little influence on the general affairs of the whole country [29], it is of more importance to

[27] Scymnus, v. 245. [28] Thucyd. l. vi.

[29] The Magna Græcia, which I always uſe in the ſenſe of Strabo, cited above, to denote the Greek ſettlements in Sicily as well as Italy, being the moſt acceſſible part of the Grecian dominions, has been more fully deſcribed by the moderns than any other. The immenſe collection of the Theſaurus Siculus, and particularly vols. i. iv. vii. viii. and xiii. afford uſeful materials, as well as Cluverii Sicil. Antiqua, and Fazellus de Rebus Siculis, and the excellent work of Gio. Balt. Caruſo, Memorie iſtoriche di quanto è accaduto in Sicilia dal tempo de' ſuoi primi abitanti fino ai Normanni.

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examine the circumſtances to which the inhabitants of Magna Græcia owed their flouriſhing ſituation at the period of time of which we write, when (it may be boldly affirmed) theſe colonies equalled, and exceeded, the wealth and power of the mother-country. We ſhall not inſiſt on the well-known phyſical and moral cauſes which uſually contribute to the rapid growth of newly-eſtabliſhed colonies. It is evident, that amidſt the equality of fortune, and ſimplicity of manners, which commonly prevail in ſuch communities, men who have a wide country before them muſt naturally multiply far beyond the proportion of nations corrupted and weakened by the vices of wealth, luxury, and above all, of vanity, which perhaps is the greateſt enemy to the increaſe of the human ſpecies. It is ſufficient barely to mention the natural fertility of Magna Græcia, and particularly of Sicily, which in many places produced an hundred fold [30]. The Greeks who ſailed thither from Peloponneſus, carried with them the knowledge and practice of agriculture, which had early attained an high degree of perfection in their peninſula; and the exuberant ſoil of Sicily, improved by cultivation, ſoon exhibited a picture of that rich abundance, which, in later times, made that beautiful iſland be entitled the granary of Rome [31].

Olymp. lxx. 1. A. C. 500.

The peculiar ſituation of the Achæans and Dorians, from whom, chiefly, the colonies in Magna Græcia derived their origin, had a conſiderable

Particular cauſes. The Achæan laws.

[30] Strabo, l. viii. [31] Diodorus, l. xvi.

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influence in accelerating the population and grandeur of theſe new eſtabliſhments. The Achæans, whoſe republic became ſo famous in later times, and that in conſequence of circumſtances which it is neceſſary at preſent to deſcribe, originally inhabited a long, but narrow ſtrip of ground, not more fertile than extenſive, along the Corinthian gulph, whoſe rocky ſhores were deſtitute of good harbours [32]. But the impartial and generous ſpirit of the Achæan laws early compenſated the natural defects of their territory. They were the firſt, and long the only republic of Greece, who admitted ſtrangers into their community on equal terms with the ancient citizens [33]. In *their* truly free country, no powerful capital, like Thebes in Bœotia, or Athens in Attica, domineered over the inferior towns and villages. Twelve cities, which had common laws and inſtitutions, and afterwards common weights and meaſures [34], ſent deputies to Helicé, which is diſtinguiſhed by Homer [35] as the moſt conſiderable town of Achaia. That place being deſtroyed by an earthquake [36] three hundred and ſeventy-three years before Chriſt, Ægæ became the ſeat of the general congreſs, which regulated public affairs, and appointed annual

[32] Plutarch, in Arato, p. 1031. [33] Polybius, l. ii. p. 178.

[34] Polybius, ibid. mentions this circumſtance, to ſhow how deſirous they were to have every thing common and equal among them.

[35] Il. ii. in the catalogue.

[36] Strabo, l. viii. p. 589. ſays, the earthquake happened two years before the battle of Leuctra, which was fought 371 years before Chriſt.

magiſtrates and generals to execute their reſolutions, who were accountable to the congreſs, or council, as the members of the council themſelves were to the cities by which they had been named and conſtituted [37]. This excellent ſyſtem of government, which checked the ambition, while it maintained the independence of Achaia [38], defended that fortunate country againſt the convulſions which ſhook and overwhelmed the moſt powerful republics of Greece. It was then that the Achæans, who during many ages had enjoyed their equitable laws in ſilence, emerged from obſcurity; and communicating their government on equal terms to the neighbouring cities of Peloponneſus, preſerved the feeble ſpark of liberty, every where extinguiſhed around them, for one hundred and thirty-ſix years, till they finally yielded to the power and policy of Rome [39]. This ſhort period of war and tumult has been minutely deſcribed in hiſtory, while the many happy centuries that preceded it are but occaſionally glanced at by ancient writers: And were it not for the defeats and calamities which the Achæans ſuffered in later times, we ſhould, perhaps, be ignorant that their anceſtors anciently poſſeſſed an equitable and generous policy, which being tranſported with them into Magna Græcia, could not fail to promote the happineſs and proſperity of that delightful country [40].

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A. C. 281.

[37] Polybius, l. ii. p. 178.

[38] Schook. Achaia, apud. Gronov. Theſ. t. v.

[39] Polyb. Excerp. Legat. et Titus Livius, l. xxxviii. et xxxix.

[40] Xenophon, in his Greek hiſtory, ſpeaks of the excellence of the Achæan laws, in treating a paſſage of hiſtory which will be related

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The state of the Dorians at the time of their emigration to Magna Græcia.

The condition of the Dorians, at the time when they planted colonies in Italy and Sicily, is not less worthy of remark. The Dorian states of Peloponnesus were then universally subject to the gentle government of limited but hereditary princes, or to magistrates chosen from the descendants of their ancient royal families [41], and who, thus adorned by birth, were sometimes still more ennobled by wisdom and virtue [42]. It is the nature of colonies to preserve with affectionate respect the institutions of the mother-country, which often improve by transplantation, and thrive and flourish in foreign lands, when they have withered and perished in the soil which originally produced and propagated them. Time and accident, and the various causes which have been explained in the course of this history, tended to change the ancient constitution, and to diminish the strength of the Grecian states on both sides the Corinthian Isthmus. While fierce and frequent wars exhausted their population, the exclusive spirit of republican jealousy, which sternly refused strangers any participation in their government, or any

Circumstances favorable to the new settlers in that country.

in the sequel Polybius was evidently engaged to enter deeper into this subject, by the reason assigned in the text.

[41] These were properly the only nobility in Greece; they were called ευπατριδαι, and long held sway in all the Grecian states. S. Petitus has collected the most important passages concerning them in his commentary on the ancient Athenian law, "Τους Ευπατριδας γινωσκειν τα θεια, και παρεχειν αρχοντας, και νομων διδασκαλους ειναι, και ὁσιων και ἱερων εξηγητας." "That the Eupatridæ, or nobility, administer the rites of religion, fill the offices of magistracy, interpret the laws, and explain all sacred and divine matters."

[42] Thucyd. l. i.

protection from their laws, naturally repreſſed their vigor and ſtunted their growth. The colonies in Magna Græcia, enjoying a wide territory before them, had not the ſame interference of intereſt, and found ſufficient employment in ſubduing the original inhabitants of that country, without commencing hoſtilities againſt each other. Nor were they more ambitious to ſubdue the barbarous natives, than ſolicitous to incorporate them into their own communities. The kings, or nobility, of Magna Græcia, ſecure of their own pre-eminence, felt [43] nothing of the republican jealouſies which prevailed in the mother-country. They received with pleaſure new citizens, or rather ſubjects, from whatever quarter they might come. The Barbarians adopted the language and manners of the nation to whom they were aſſociated; their children received a Grecian education; and the ſtates of Italy and Sicily thus increaſing by degrees, could ſoon boaſt, the former of Crotona, Tarentum, Sybaris, Rhegium; the latter of Syracuſe, Agrigentum, Meſſené, Himera, and ſeveral other cities, which rivalled or ſurpaſſed the wealth of Athens or Corinth, and the populouſneſs of Thebes, Argos, or Sparta.

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The wars, conqueſts, or oppreſſions, but above all, the civil diſſenſions, which in the ſixth century before Chriſt diſturbed and deformed the coaſt of

The oppreſſion of the Aſiatic Greeks brought

[43] The ſame policy was practiſed by Macedon; and, as we ſhall have occaſion to relate, was the primary cauſe of the Macedonian greatneſs.

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new inhabitants to Italy and Sicily;

Ionia, and the other Grecian colonies in the iſlands and continent of Aſia, brought frequent acceſſions of inhabitants to the ſhores of Magna Græcia. In that age the Aſiatic Greeks had attained greater proficiency, both in the uſeful and in the agreeable arts, than any other portion of the Grecian name; but they had alſo ſunk deeper in voluptuouſneſs and luxury. Their poetry, which ſtill remains, alike atteſts the refinement of their taſte, and the corruption of their morals. The effeminate vices, for which the Ionians were thenceforth in all ages infamous [44], ſeem to have taken deep root in that century; and it is probable, that along with their poetry, muſic, and painting, they communicated alſo their diſſolute and artificial appetites to the Greeks of Italy and Sicily.

who improved arts, and corrupted manners;

But whether this be admitted, or whether we ſuppoſe that, according to the ordinary courſe of events, the inhabitants of Magna Græcia having attained opulence by induſtry, diſſipated it in idleneſs and licentiouſneſs, it is acknowledged by all writers on this part of hiſtory, that the Greek cities of Italy, and particularly Sybaris and Crotona, had degenerated from their ancient maxims, and fallen a prey to the moſt dangerous errors and vices, when Pythagoras came to their relief, about five hundred and fifty years before the Chriſtian æra.

which are reformed by Pythagoras.

The philoſophy of Pythagoras forms an important object in the hiſtory of the human mind:

[44] Motus doceri gaudet *Ionicos*
Matura virgo, et fingitur artibus
Jam nunc, et incestos amores
De tenero meditatur ungue. HORACE.

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and if we admit the concurring teſtimony of ancient authors [45], the philoſophy, or rather the legiſlation, of this extraordinary man, reformed and improved the manners and policy of Magna Græcia, and contributed in an eminent degree, not only to the quiet and happineſs, but to the induſtry, power, and ſplendor, of that celebrated country. Leſt this influence ſhould appear too great, and even incredible, in a ſtranger, who is known to have ſtudiouſly declined all public offices and authority, the occaſion requires that we ſhould explain the means by which ſuch extraordinary effects were produced.

Hiſtory of that philoſopher. Olymp. xlv. 1. A. C. 600.

Pythagoras was born at Samos [46], when Samos was the richeſt and moſt flouriſhing of all the Grecian iſles. His father, Mneſarchus, being a perſon of diſtinction in his country [47], the promiſing youth was carefully inſtructed in the learning known or valued in that early age. Muſic, poetry, and the gymnaſtic exerciſes, formed the principal part of his education; but the young philoſopher, if we may anticipate that name, was not indifferent [48]

His education.

[45] Particularly Ariſtoxenus, the learned diſciple of Ariſtotle (apud Stobæum, Serm. xli.); various ancient authors cited by Jamblicus and Porphyry, as well as by Diogenes Laertius, l. viii; to which add Juſtin, l. xx. and Cicero, Tuſc. Quæſt. de Amicitiâ, et de Oratore. "Pythagoras exornavit eam Græciam quæ Magna dicta eſt, et privatim et publice, præſtantiſſimis et inſtitutis et artibus." Cicero de Amicitiâ.

[46] Iſocrates in Buſiri. Titus Livius, l. i. c. xviii. Lucian. Lexiphanes. To theſe authorities we may add, that Pythagoras is repreſented on ſeveral Samian coins. Fabric. Bibl. Græca, t. i. p. 455.

[47] Mneſarchus was ſent from Samos to conſult the oracle of Delphi, probably on ſome public occaſion. Jamb. in Vit. Pythag.

[48] Apollon. apud Jamblichum.

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to the diſcoveries of Thales, the firſt Grecian who nearly calculated an eclipſe of the ſun; and he early ſet himſelf to rival the Mileſian ſage in his favorite ſtudies. It is recorded, that he learned eloquence from Pherecydes of Syros [49], who reſided a conſiderable time in the iſle of Samos, and who is famous in the literary hiſtory of Greece, as the firſt author in proſe [50]. Pittacus of Leſbos, Bias of Priené, and the other ſophiſts, or wiſe men (as they were emphatically ſtyled by their contemporaries) who then flouriſhed in Aſiatic Greece, and whoſe abilities and virtue had raiſed them, in troubled times, to the head of the ſeveral communities of which they were reſpectively members, excited the kindred ambition of Pythagoras, who appears to have been early animated with the deſire of acquiring juſt renown, by promoting public happineſs. In his eighteenth year he viſited the continent of Greece, and gained the prize of wreſtling at the Olympic games [51], where his vigor, addreſs, and beauty, were beheld with admiration by the multitude; while the opening virtues of his mind were ſtill more admired by men of ſenſe and diſcernment. In conformity with the practice of an age when the feeble rays of knowledge were ſcattered over a wide ſurface, and much pains were requiſite to collect them, he withdrew himſelf from the applauſes of his countrymen, and for a longer time than was uſual with the Grecian

Travels.

[49] Diogenes apud Porph.

[50] Plin. N. H. l. vii. c. lvi.

[51] Jambl. Porph. etc.

travellers. This circumſtance gave occaſion to many fables concerning the extent and variety of his voyages [52]. But it is certain that he reſided CHAP. XI.

[52] The travels of the Greek philoſopher were ſpoken of in vague terms, and magnified even by great writers. *Ultimas* terras luſtrâſſe Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem accepimus. Cicero de Finibus, l. iv. c. xix. We may well believe then, that ſuch men as Hermippus (apud Joſeph. adverſ. Appionem), Apollonius, Jamblichus, etc. would carry their exaggerations to the higheſt degree of incredibility on this fertile ſubject. The chief ſource of theſe fables, and of the ſuppoſed learning of the Magi, Chaldæans, Indians, etc. may be found in the credulous or lying writers who accompanied Alexander in his eaſtern expedition. At their return to Greece, they magnified the learning, as well as the power and wealth, of the nations conquered by their patron; they were ſolicitous to perſuade their countrymen, that their anceſtors had learned their philoſophy from people whoſe names they had never before heard; and their own vanity was flattered by having viſited, and familiarly known thoſe fancied inſtructors of mankind. Clearchus, Oneſicretus, and Calliſthenes, were the moſt celebrated of theſe writers, of whom Diogenes Laertius, or rather a far ſuperior man whom he cites, ſays, Λανθανυσι δε κυτυς τα των Ἑλληνων καταρθωματα Βαρβαροις προσαπτοντες. "They are miſtaken, when they refer the Grecian diſcoveries to the Barbarians." It was natural for the Eaſtern nations, when they had adopted the language and learning of the Greeks, to avail themſelves of Grecian authorities, to prove how much that celebrated nation owed to people whom they proudly denominated Barbarians. Hence the fables of Beroſus the Chaldæan, of Manetho the Egyptian, of Sanchoniothon the Phœnician. We except from this claſs of fabuliſts the Jew, Joſephus, the antiquity of whoſe nation reſts on evidence which it would be irreverent to name in ſuch company. Had Pythagoras or Thales been acquainted with the Jewish religion, they would have learned far nobler notions of the Deity, than thoſe which it appears they entertained. Anaxagoras, ſurnamed ὁ νους, the preceptor of the great Pericles, was the firſt Grecian philoſopher who ſaw, by the light of reaſon, the natural and moral attributes of God, ſo ſublimely deſcribed in the Pſalms of David. Yet it never was ſaid, that Anaxagoras had ſeen the Pſalms, the Books of Moſes, or any part of the ſacred writings; and it may be remarked, that Joſephus himſelf, in his firſt book (cont. Ap.), however zealous to prove, that the Greeks derived their knowledge from the Eaſt, can cite no author in favor of this opinion, who lived before the age of Alexander.

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ſeveral years in the ancient kingdom of Egypt [51], which had been long familiarly known to the Grecian mariners, and where the ſon of Mneſarchus might probably enjoy the protection of many hereditary friends. In that country he probably made ſome additions to his knowledge in arithmetic and geometry; he certainly learned many traditions concerning the gods, and the human ſoul: but what particularly deſerved his attention,

[51] There is a famous paſſage in Iſocrates's panegyric of Buſiris, which might ſeem to contradict what is ſaid in the preceding note, if we did not reflect, that the rules of panegyric require not always a ſtrict adherence to hiſtorical truth. In ſpeaking of the ancient wiſdom and piety of the Egyptians, and particularly of the ſacerdotal order, he ſays, that he himſelf is not the firſt who perceived and acknowledged their merit; that many philoſophers had done this before him, and particularly Pythagoras the Samian. Ὃς ἀφικομενος εις Αιγυπτον, και μαθητης εκεινων γενομενος, την τε αλλην φιλοσοφιαν πρωτος εις τους Ἑλληνας εκομισε, και τα περι τας θυσιας τε και τας ἁγιστειας τας εν τοις ἱεροις επιφανεστερον των αλλων εσπουδασεν. ἡγουμενος, ει και μηδεν αυτω δια ταυτα πλειον γιγνοιτο παρα των θεων, αλλα παρα γε τοις ανθρωποις εκ της των μαλιστα αν ευδοκιμησειν, ὁπερ αυτω και συνεβη. Τοσουτον γαρ ευδοξια της αλλης ἁπαντας ὑπερεβαλεν, ὡστε και τους νεωτερους ἁπαντας επιθυμειν αυτου μαθητας ειναι, και τους πρεσβυτερους ἡδιον ὁραν τους παιδας των αυτων εκεινω συγγιγνομενους η των οικειων επιμελουμενους. "Who coming to Egypt, and being inſtructed by the prieſts of that country, firſt introduced other kinds of learning into Greece, and particularly a more accurate knowledge of religious rites and ceremonies," (I have generalized the expreſſion θυσιας και ἁγιστειας εν τοις ἱεροις,) "of which he was a careful obſerver, thinking that although he were entitled to no peculiar favor on that account from the gods, he would thereby, at leaſt, procure eſteem among men, which alſo happened to him; for he ſo far eclipſed the glory of all other philoſophers, that all the young deſired to become his diſciples, and the old were better pleaſed to ſee their ſons in the company of Pythagoras, than engaged in the moſt lucrative or honorable purſuits." If what is ſaid in my account of the life and writings of Iſocrates be conſidered with attention, this paſſage will only ſerve to confirm the obſervations in the text.

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was, the ſecret ſymbolic writing of the prieſts and the ſingular inſtitutions and policy of the ſacerdotal order, by which that body of men had long been enabled to govern prince and people [54]. At his return from Egypt and the Eaſt, Pythagoras found his native country governed, or rather inſulted, by the artful and long fortunate Polycrates; a tyrant whoſe power ſeemed ſo firmly eſtabliſhed, that there remained no hopes to ſubvert it, and under whoſe jealous eye the ſon of Mneſarchus could neither diſplay his talents, nor enjoy perſonal ſecurity: he therefore returned to European Greece, and again aſſiſted at the Olympic games; where being ſaluted by the then honored name of Sophiſt, he modeſtly declined that diſtinction for the humbler title of Philoſopher; and when aſked what he preciſely meant by this new appellation, he is ſaid to have replied. "That, in the ſame manner as at the Olympic aſſembly, ſome men came to contend for crowns and honors, others to ſell their merchandiſe, and a third claſs merely to ſee and examine every thing which paſſed in that celebrated convention; ſo, on the greater theatre of the world, while many ſtruggled for the glory of a name, and many for the advantages of fortune; a few, and but a few, neither covetous of money, nor ambitious of fame, were contented with beholding the wonders of ſo magnificent a ſpectacle [55]." This definition has

Olymp. lvi. A. C. 560.

[54] Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, paſſim; and Strabo, l. x. p. 482.

[55] Cicero (Tuſc. Quæſt. v. 3.) has tranſlated a paſſage to this purpoſe from Heraclides Ponticus, the ſcholar of Plato; and the

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been often cited, becauſe it well agrees with the contemplative notions generally entertained of the Pythagorean ſchool; but it will appear in the ſequel, that the philoſophy of Pythagoras was of a more practical kind.

From Olympia and the republic of Elis, he travelled to the neighbouring territory of Sparta [56], and ſpent a conſiderable time in that capital, diligently ſtudying the laws and inſtitutions of Lycurgus, and obſerving the manners and genius of the beſt governed, moſt virtuous, and moſt proſperous of all the Grecian ſtates. Here he beheld a conſtitution of government (the wiſdom of which had been long approved by experience) founded on a ſyſtem of education; and combining, in his clear capacious mind, the Spartan laws and diſcipline with a mixture of the Egyptian craft and policy, he framed that ſublime plan of legiſlation, which was to be far more extenſive than the laws of Lycurgus; and which, at firſt fixing its root in a ſmall ſect at Crotona, was deſtined, in twenty or thirty years, to diffuſe its flouriſhing branches over Italy and Sicily.

Cauſes of his authority in Italy.

Pythagoras arrived at the capital of Italian Greece in his fortieth year, in the full vigor of mind and body [57]. His fame, doubtleſs, preceded him; ſince, whoever had honorably diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the general convention at Olympia, was ſpeedily

original paſſage of Heraclitus is ſtill preſerved in Jamblichus.

[56] Porphyr. Jambl. et Juſtin. l. xx.

[57] Ariſtoxen. apud Jambl.

known and celebrated in the remoteſt provinces of Greece. His perſonal acquaintances among the Italian Greeks, whoſe eſteem, or rather reſpect, he had acquired in that auguſt aſſembly, would naturally be loud in his praiſes; and the manners of the age, in which men lived together in crowds, and enjoyed their paſtimes, or tranſacted their ſerious buſineſs with undiſguiſed freedom, in temples and gymnaſia, contributed to the rapid increaſe of his friends and admirers. Upon his arrival at Crotona, he appeared in the public places, diſplaying his dexterity in thoſe exerciſes and accompliſhments, which were the faſhionable objects of purſuit, and the principal ſources of honor. His ſkill in muſic and medicine, ſciences which were far better underſtood in his native country than in Magna Græcia, procured him particular regard; nor can we heſitate to believe, that his mathematical and natural knowledge would be highly admired by the Greeks of Italy, who, having recently received the firſt tincture of arts and ſciences from the Aſiatics, cultivated them with that ardor which novelty inſpires; and who ſeem hitherto to have gained in point of knowledge and civility, in proportion as they had loſt in purity of life and manners, by an acquaintance with their Eaſtern brethren.

His ſuperior talents.

Neither the voluptuouſneſs nor the refinement of the inhabitants of Magna Græcia, were incompatible with the hopes and fears of the moſt puerile ſuperſtition; and Pythagoras, who had ſeen and examined the rites and ceremonies employed by

His manner of life.

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remote nations, celebrated for their antiquity and their wiſdom, to avert the diſpleaſure, or to gain the good-will of their inviſible protectors, called forth the whole force of this powerful, yet dangerous inſtrument of policy, to excite reſpect for his perſon, and reverence for his inſtructions. He carefully frequented, at an early hour, the temples of the gods; his regular purifications and ſacrifices announced ſuperior ſanctity of character; his food was of the pureſt kind, that no corporeal ſtain might interrupt his fancied communication with his celeſtial friends; and he was clothed in the linen of Egypt, which was the dreſs [58] of the ſacerdotal order in that native land of ſuperſtition, as well as of the Athenian magiſtrates and nobles, in the early and pious times of the republic [59]. The reſpect excited by ſuch artifices (if we may degrade by that name the means uſed to deceive men into their duty and happineſs) was enhanced by the high renown the long travels, the venerable aſpect, the harmonious voice, the animated and affecting eloquence, of the Samian philoſopher. His hearers ſometimes amounted to two thouſand of the principal citizens of Crotona; and the magiſtrates of that republic erected, ſoon after his arrival among them, an elegant and ſpacious edifice, which was appropriated to the virtuous leſſons of this admired ſtranger, who pleaſed their taſte, and gratified their fancy, while he condemned their manners, and reproached their vices. Equally rapid and aſtoniſhing, and

The happy revolution which he produced at Crotona.

[58] Diodorus. [59] Thucyd. l. i.

not

not more aſtoniſhing than advantageous, if we may credit the general voice of antiquity, was the reformation produced at Crotona in perſons of every age, and of either ſex, by this ſingular man. The women laid aſide their ornaments, and reſumed their modeſty; the youth preferred their duty to their pleaſures; the old improved their underſtanding, and almoſt neglected to improve their fortunes. CHAP. XI.

Yet this revolution of manners was not ſurely ſo inſtantaneous, as the concurring exaggerations of wonder and credulity were naturally inclined to repreſent it. The ſame writers, who would thus magnify the fame of Pythagoras, acknowledge, that ſoon after coming to Crotona, he choſe a ſelect number of his moſt aſſiduous diſciples, and thoſe chiefly perſons of weight in the republic, whoſe temper, character, and views, beſt ſuited his own. Theſe were formed into an aſſociation, or ſeparate order of men, into which none were admitted who poſſeſſed not qualities and endowments worthy of that honor. In order to confirm this aſſociation, as well as to obtain the purpoſes for which it had been inſtituted, Pythagoras employed the cypher, or ſymbolic writing, and other ſecrets, which he had learned from the wiſdom, or rather cunning, of the Egyptian prieſts: his ſcholars were taught certain ſigns or words, by which they might know each other; they could correſpond, when ſeparated by place, in an unknown character; and ſtrangers of all countries, Greeks and Barbarians, were promiſcuouſly admitted into the ſociety, after undergoing His ſchool.

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a due probation as to their diſpoſitions and underſtanding. In a few years, three hundred men, all Pythagoreans, held the ſovereignty of Crotona; the influence of the new ſect extended with rapidity over Locri, Rhegium, Catana, and other cities of Italy and Sicily; the diſciples of Pythagoras were diffuſed over ancient Greece, and the iſles of the Ægean ſea, and it ſeemed as if the ſage of Samos whoſe nobler ambition declined and diſdained any particular office of power and dignity, had conceived the ſublime idea of forming a ſchool; or rather an aſſociation of men, who might govern the world, while they were themſelves governed by wiſdom and virtue.

Its influence on affairs of ſtate. Olymp. lvii. 3. A. C. 550.

His great views.

Pythagoras was deeply perſuaded, that the happineſs of nations depends chiefly on the government under which they live; and the experience of his own times, and of his own iſland in particular, might teach him the dangerous tendence of democratic turbulence on the one hand, and jealous tyranny on the other [*]. He preferred, therefore,

His politics.

[*] A ſtriking example of this appeared at that time in Sicily, if we credit Jamblichus, who places the reign of Phalaris, at Agrigentum, in the age of Pythagoras. The doubtful, or rather incredible, hiſtory of this tyrant, may be compriſed in few words. His reign, of about ſixteen years, was diſtinguiſhed by intolerable atrocities. He burned his enemies in a brazen bull; and, as luſt or cruelty happened to direct, ſometimes abuſed, and ſometimes eat, boys. Phalaris, together with his mother and friends, (could ſuch a monſter have friends?) were burned, by the long-injured Agrigentines, in his own bull. This is the abominable tyrant, whoſe ſpurious letters furniſhed an opportunity to Dr. Bentley to diſplay his profound erudition (ſee his Diſſert. upon Phalaris). But that very learned man ſeems not to ſuſpect that the hiſtory of Phalaris is as ſpurious as his epiſtles. It was a common artifice among Greek poets and orators (ſee, in vol. p. 367.

to all governments, a moderate ariſtocracy; which ſeems, without exception, to have been the well-founded opinion of the greateſt men of antiquity, ſince, under the adminiſtration of a ſenate, the republics of Greece, of Rome, and a Carthage, attained their higheſt proſperity and ſplendor. Yet he was extremely averſe to arbitrary power,

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the ſpeech of Soſicles the Corinthian), to exaggerate the vices of bad princes. Of this we ſhall find many examples in the following parts of this work. This practice began early; for Pindar ſays,

Τον δε ταυρῳ χαλκειῳ καυτηρα νηλεα γοον
Εχθρα Φαλαριν κατεχει παντα Φατις.

PYTH. i. Επωδ. κωλ. ιι.

Ariſtotle mentions, Το περι Φαλαριν λεγομενον, the hearſay about Phalaris, which Aſpaſius explains, Ὁ δε Φαλαρις λεγεται Φαγειν τον ἑαυτου παιδα. Phalaris is ſaid to have eat his own ſon. In the ſame chapter (c. v. l. vi. Ethic. Nicom.), ſpeaking of brutal paſſions, Ariſtotle inſtances Phalaris ſometimes devouring boys, ſometimes uſing them as the inſtruments of an abſurd venereal pleaſure; "Προς αφροδισιων ατοπον ἡδονην." The philoſopher does not ſay, that he believes theſe monſtrous fictions, any more than Cicero, "Ille nobilis taurus, quem crudeliſſimus omnium tyrannorum Phalaris *habuiſſe dicitur*;" l. iv. in Verrem, c. xxxiii. Timæus, the hiſtorian of Sicily, who was more likely than any other writer to be well informed concerning the tranſactions in his own iſland, repreſents the ſtory of Phalaris's bull as a mere fable. Polyb. Excerp. ver. 3. p. 47. Polybius, indeed, attempts to refute Timæus, but I think, as to the main point, with little ſucceſs. Nor is it ſurpriſing that this judicious writer ſhould be carried along by the torrent. The republicans of Greece and Rome delighted in blackening the characters of tyrants; Τραγωδουντες δε την ωμοτητα των τροπων, και την ασεβειαν των πραξεων; "exaggerating, after the manner of tragedians, the fierceneſs of their manners, and the impiety of their actions." For this reaſon, the abſurd fictions concerning Dionyſius of Syracuſe, Alexander of Pheræ, etc. are related by many reſpectable writers. For this reaſon Hieronymus was deſcribed in the blackeſt colors, vide Excerp. ex Polyb. l. vii. p. 10. And for this reaſon the enormous cruelties of Phalaris, which no nation, and far leſs the Sicilians, in that age, could have tolerated, receive countenance from ſome of the higheſt authorities of antiquity.

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whatever ſhape it might aſſume; and the main aim of his inſtitution was, to prevent oppreſſion in the magiſtrates and licentiouſneſs in the people. The dead letter of the law could never, he thought, effect that ſalutary purpoſe, until men were ſo trained by education and diſcipline, as to regard the great duties of life as its moſt agreeable amuſement, and to conſider the eſteem of their fellow-citizens, and their own, as the chief ſource of their enjoyment. Magiſtrates, thus formed, would command a willing obedience, and the inhabitants of Magna Græcia muſt ſoon attain the moſt perfect ſtate of which political ſociety is ſuſceptible.

Morality.

To explain at large the ſyſtem of Pythagoras, would be to write a treatiſe of ſublime, yet practical morality, ſince his concluſions are ſtrictly founded on the nature of man. Beſides the propenſities common to us with inferior natures, and beſides the ſelfiſh and artificial paſſions of avarice and ambition, he found in the human breaſt the ſeeds of nobler faculties, fitted to yield an incomparably more durable, more perfect, and more certain gratification. The chief happineſs of the mind muſt be ſought in itſelf, in the enjoyment of intellectual and moral pleaſure. Our thoughts are ever, and intimately preſent with us; and although the buſtle of external objects, and the tumult of paſſion, may ſometimes divert their current, they can never dry up their ſource. The reflections on our own conduct will be continually occurring to our fancy, whatever pains we may take to exclude them; nor can voluptuous enjoyment, or ambitious activity,

ever so totally occupy the mind of a Persian satrap, or a Grecian demagogue, but that their principal happiness or misery, in the whole course of life, must chiefly depend upon the nature of their reflections on the past, and upon their hopes and fears about futurity. To strengthen this great groundwork of morality, Pythagoras employed the whole force of education and habit. Rules were laid down, to which the members of his respected order bound themselves to conform, and from which none could swerve, without being excluded from a society of which they proved themselves unworthy. The different periods of life had each its appropriated employment. The youth were carefully instructed in the gymnastic exercises, in literature, and in science, and especially in the laws and constitution of their country. Their time was so diversified by successive study, exercise, and repose, that no leisure remained for the premature growth of dangerous passions; and it was an important maxim of the Pythagorean school, that many things

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[42] So I have translated Εν γραμματα και τοις αλλοις μαθημασι, of Aristoxenus apud Stobæum, Serm. xli. The learned reader will perceive, that I comprehend under the name of youth, the two different periods of life, or ηλικιαι, which the Greeks denoted by the words παις and νεανισκος, boy, and young man. I have done this because it was not the intention of Aristoxenus to say, that the young men were not still to be employed in literature and science, or that the boys were to be kept ignorant of the laws and constitution. The rules of the Pythagorean school, and the laws of Lycurgus, often explain each other. See vol. i. p. 229, et seqq. It may be worthy of remark, that Jean Jacques Rousseau has borrowed what is rational and practical in his system of education from these two great sources.

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were beſt learned late [22], eſpecially love; from which, if poſſible, the youth ſhould be reſtrained till their twentieth year, and after that period ſhould rarely, and with many precautions, indulge a paſſion, always hurtful to the weak, and which, when injudiciouſly indulged, enfeebled the moſt vigorous. He required in thoſe who had attained the age of manhood, that they ſhould no longer live for themſelves, but for the buſineſs of the community of which they were members. They were to employ the greateſt part of the day in the duties of public ſpirit and patriotiſm; in the laborious or dangerous offices committed to their charge; and to derive their chief reward from reading, in the eyes of their admiring countrymen, the hiſtory of their generous exploits; and from beholding the happy effects of their probity, beneficence, and fortitude.

Rules for the conduct of his diſciples;

The Pythagoreans were ſtrictly enjoined, as their earlieſt and lateſt work, to review the actions of the paſt, and, if time permitted, of many preceding days. In the morning they repaired alone to the temples, to ſolitary mountains and foreſts; and after there converſing with themſelves, joined in the converſation of their friends, with whom they aſſembled, in ſmall companies, to an early and frugal meal, diſcuſſed different ſubjects of philoſophy or politics, regulated their conduct for the enſuing day, and by the mutual ſtrength and encourage-

[22] Ariſtoxen. apud Stobæum, Serm. lxiv. This is the great principle of Rouſſeau in his *Emile*. The paſſage of Ariſtoxenus concerning love, is almoſt literally tranſlated in that ingenious but fanciful work.

ment acquired in this ſelect ſociety, prepared for the tumultuous buſtle of the world, and the contentions of active life. The evening was ſpent as the morning, with this difference, that they then indulged in the moderate uſe of fleſh and wine, from which they rigidly abſtained during the day; and the whole concluded with that ſelf-examination, which was the capital precept of the Pythagorean ſchool. CHAP. XIX.

which coincide with the inſtitutions of Lycurgus.

To enter more fully into the principles of this aſſociation, would be repeating what has been formerly obſerved concerning the laws of Lycurgus. It is ſufficient barely to mention, that, like the legiſlator of Sparta, Pythagoras enjoined the higheſt reſpect for age; that, like him, he raiſed the weaker ſex from that ſtate of inferiority in which they were ungenerouſly kept in all other countries of Greece; that he inured his diſciples to temperance and ſobriety by the ſame means employed by Lycurgus; and that both theſe great men regarded health and vigor of body as the firſt principle of mental ſoundneſs and energy; that the probationary ſilence of the Pythagoreans, which credulity has ſo much exaggerated, was nothing more than that prudent, recollected behaviour, required by Lycurgus, who prized higher the caution of ſilence than the readineſs[63] of ſpeech; and that the intimacy of the Spartan and Pythagorean friendſhips, and almoſt the community of goods, naturally flowed from the general ſpirit and genius of their reſpective ſyſtems[64]; ſo that the rules of the Pythagorean order

[63] Plut. in Lycurg.

[64] See vol. i. p. 131.

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were little more than a tranſcript of the Spartan laws, as theſe laws themſelves were only a refinement on the generous and manly inſtitutions of the heroic ages [95].

Origin of the fictions concerning Pythagoras.

In the hiſtory of a man who entertained ſuch juſt notions of human life, as did the founder of the Pythagorean ſchool, we may at once reject, as fabulous, the tales related by the vain, lying Greeks, who lived in and after the age of Alexander, when their nation ſeems to have loſt their love of truth along with their liberty, as well as the ridiculous wonders of the later Platoniſts, thoſe contemplative viſionaries, who, during the firſt centuries of the Chriſtian æra, degraded ancient philoſophers, by deſcribing *their* active and uſeful lives, as if they had reſembled their own ſpeculative tranquillity. Yet, after all, ſhould the leaſt extraordinary account of the Pythagorean order ſtill ſeem incredible, it need only be obſerved, that modern hiſtory, and even our own obſervation, may have made us acquainted with orders of another kind, of which the rules are more difficult to be obſerved than thoſe of the Pythagoreans: and it is equally unreaſonable and ungenerous, to ſuppoſe, that what our own experience teaches us may be done by the illiberal ſpirit of ſuperſtition, could not, in a happier age, be effected by the love of glory, of virtue, and of mankind.

War between Crotona and Sybaris.

The concurring teſtimony of hiſtorians aſſures us, that the ſchool of Pythagoras had flouriſhed above forty years, to the unſpeakable benefit of

[95] Diodor. l. xii. p. 77, etc.

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Magna Græcia, when a war aroſe between Crotona and Sybaris, the latter of which had ever contemptuouſly rejected the Pythagorean inſtitutions. The city of Sybaris was founded (as above-mentioned) by the Achæans, on the confluence of the river Sybaris; from which the city derives its name, and the winding ſtream of Cratis, which deſcends from the Lucanian mountains. The fertility of the ſoil, the happy temperature of the climate, the reſources of fiſhing, navigation, manufactures, and commerce, conſpired, with the ſalutary effect of the Achæan laws, wonderfully to increaſe, in the courſe of two centuries, the ſtrength and populouſneſs of Sybaris, which was ſurrounded by walls nine miles in extent, commanded twenty-five ſubordinate cities, and, could we credit the evidence of writers often prone to exaggeration, brought three hundred thouſand men into the field[67]. Riches and luxury proved fatal to the Sybarites, whoſe effeminacy paſſed into a proverb[68], which has been tranſmitted to modern times. In a deciſive battle, they were defeated by the citizens of Crotona, under the command of Milo, a favorite diſciple of Pythagoras, who had already obtained univerſal renown by his Olympic victories[69].

The Sybarites conquered by Milo the Pythagorean. Olymp. lxvii. 4. A. C. 509.

But the deſtruction of Sybaris was almoſt alike fatal to Crotona. The inferior ranks of men in that city, intoxicated with proſperity, and inſtigated by the artful and ambitious Cylon, whoſe turbulent

Sedition in Crotona.

[67] Strabo, l. vi. p. 263. Diodor. ibid.

[68] Athenæus, l. xii. p. 518.

[69] Strabo, ibid. Pauſanias, l. vi. p. 369.

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manners had excluded him from the order of Pythagoras, into which he had repeatedly attempted to enter, became clamorous for an equal partition of the conquered territory of Sybaris; which being denied, as inconsistent with the nature of aristocratical government, they secretly conspired against their magistrates, attacked them by surprise in the senate-house, put many to death, and drove the rest from their country. Pythagoras himself died soon afterwards, in extreme old age, at Metapontum in Lucania[70]. His disciples were scattered over Magna Græcia, and particularly Sicily, which, at the time of the Carthaginian invasion, was governed by men who had imbibed the sublime spirit of their illustrious master.

Proves fatal to the Pythagoreans there.

Gelon, who, eleven years before that event, had mounted the throne of Syracuse, was entitled, by the unanimous suffrage of his subjects, to the glorious, though often prostituted, appellation, of Father of his country[71]. The mildness of his government restored the felicity of the heroic ages; whose equitable institutions had much affinity (as above observed) with the political system of Pythagoras. This virtuous prince had cemented an alliance with Theron, king of Agrigentum, by accepting his daughter in marriage; and the confederacy of the two principal states of Sicily seemed to have diffused security and happiness over the whole island, when the immense armament of Carthage was beheld off the northern coast. Though

The Carthaginians invade Sicily. Olymp. lxxv. 1. A. C. 480.

[70] Aristoxenus.

[71] Ælian. Var. Hist. l. xiii. c. xxxvii. Plut. in Timol.

not abſolutely deſtitute of naval ſtrength, the Sicilians had nothing by which they could oppoſe a fleet of two thouſand gallies. The enemy landed without oppoſition in the ſpacious harbour, or rather bay, of Panormus, whoſe name may be ſtill recogniſed in the modern capital Palermo, where the Carthaginians had planted one of their moſt ancient colonies. Their forces were commanded by Hamilcar, who was deemed a brave and experienced leader. The firſt care of this general was, to fortify two camps; the one deſtined for his fleet, which, according to the practice of that age, was drawn on ſhore; the other intended as a ſafe retreat for his army, which immediately prepared to form the ſiege of Himera. Theron uſed proper meaſures to defend the ſecond city in his dominions, until his kinſman, the intrepid Gelon, ſhould arrive to his aſſiſtance, at the head of an army of fifty thouſand foot and five thouſand horſe. While this numerous army advanced, by rapid marches, towards Himera, they rencountered a foraging party of the enemy, and took ten thouſand priſoners. But what appeared a ſtill more important booty to the diſcernment of Gelon, they ſeized a meſſenger from Selinus, a city in the neigbourhood of Agrigentum, which had entered into a treacherous correſpondence with the Carthaginians. The priſoner conveyed a letter to Hamilcar, acquainting him, that the Selinuntines would not fail to ſend the cavalry demanded from them at the appointed time, which was likewiſe particularly ſpecified. Upon this diſcovery, Gelon founded a ſtratagem, not more

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daring than ſucceſsful. He commanded a choſen body of troops to advance in the night towards the Carthaginian camp, and by day-break to preſent themſelves to Hamilcar, as his Selinuntine auxiliaries; and when admitted, by this artifice, within the rampart, to aſſaſſinate the general, and ſet fire to the fleet[72].

Defeated by a ſtratagem.

It happened on the fatal day, that Hamilcar offered a ſolemn ſacrifice to the bloody divinity of Carthage, who delighted in human victims. While he performed this abominable rite, the ſoldiers ſurrounded him unarmed, in the gloomy ſilence of their deteſted ſuperſtition, with which their minds were totally penetrated. The Sicilian cavalry, being admitted without ſuſpicion, thus found no difficulty to execute their audacious deſign. Hamilcar, while he ſacrificed an innocent and noble youth to the abhorred genius of ſuperſtition, was himſelf diſpatched with a dagger; and next moment the Carthaginian ſhips were in a blaze. A chain of Sicilian ſentinels, poſted on the neighbouring eminences, intimated to Gelon the happy ſucceſs of his ſtratagem; of which, in order fully to avail himſelf, that gallant commander immediately conducted the main body of his troops to the Carthaginian army, while it was yet agitated by ſurpriſe and terror at the ſudden conflagration.

Their diſaſters.

The furious onſet of the Sicilians made a dreadful havoc among the aſtoniſhed Barbarians, who recovering, however, their faculties, began to defend

[72] Diodor. l. ix. ſect. 25, et ſeqq. Polyæn. l. i. c. xxvii.

themſelves with vigor; when the melancholy tidings, that their ſhips were all burnt, and their general ſlain, drove them to deſpair and flight. Gelon commanded his troops not to give quarter to an enemy, who, though defeated, ſtill ſeemed formidable by their numbers. It is reported, that an hundred and fifty thouſand periſhed in the battle, and the purſuit. The remainder ſeized an eminence, where they could not long maintain themſelves, for want of water and proviſions. In the language of an ancient hiſtorian, all Africa ſeemed to be taken captive in Sicily. Gelon diſtributed the priſoners among the Sicilian cities, in proportion to the contingents of troops which they had reſpectively raiſed for this memorable ſervice. The greater part falling to the ſhare of Syracuſe and Agrigentum, were employed in beautifying and enlarging thoſe capitals[73], whoſe magnificent monuments, ſtill conſpicuous in their ruins, are ſuppoſed, with great probability, to be the effect of Carthaginian labor.

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Treaty of peace between Gelon and the Carthaginians.

The melancholy tidings affected Carthage with conſternation and deſpair. The inhabitants of that city, ever ſhamefully depreſſed by bad fortune, in proportion as they were immoderately elated by the deceitful gifts of proſperity, dreaded every moment to behold the victorious enemy in their harbour. To ward off this calamity their ambaſſadors were ſent to crave a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities on any terms the victorious Greeks might think

[73] Cicero, Orat. iv. in Verrem.

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proper to impoſe. Gelon received them with ſuch moderation as marked the ſuperiority of his character, and told them, that he would deſiſt from every purpoſe of revenge, on condition that the Carthaginians paid two thouſand talents of ſilver, to be diſtributed among the cities of Sicily, which had incurred trouble and expenſe by the war; that they thenceforth abſtained from the abominable practice of inſulting the gods by human victims; that they erected two temples, one in Carthage, another in Syracuſe, to preſerve the memory of the war, and the articles of the peace[74].

Olymp. lxxxii. A. C. 449.

This honorable treaty was a prelude to that ſtill more famous, concluded thirty years afterwards between the Athenians and the Perſians. It marked a nation ſuperior to its enemies not only in valor but humanity, and conferred more true glory than could be acquired by the moſt ſplendid ſeries of victories. It might be expected, however, and ſeems much to have been deſired, that a people ſo advantageouſly diſtinguiſhed as were the Greeks during that age in arts and arms; a people who had repelled, defeated, and diſgraced the moſt populous and powerful nations, and who were alike prompted, by ambition and revenge, to the attainment of diſtant conqueſt, ſhould have united their efforts againſt the enemies who ſtill made war on them, and, advancing in a rapid career of victory, have diffuſed, along with their dominion, their manners, knowledge, and civility over the

A. C. 504.

[74] Diodor. Sicul. ibid.

eaſtern world. But various events and cauſes, which we ſhall have occaſion afterwards to explain, tended to detach the colonies of Magna Græcia from the affairs of the mother-country, as well as to diſunite the two moſt powerful republics of that country by inteſtine diſcord.

While the fortune of Athens raiſed her to ſuch power as threatened the liberty of Sicily and Greece, the kings of Syracuſe and Agrigentum contented themſelves with the humbler glory of embelliſhing their capitals with barbaric ſpoils, and producing thoſe wonders of art, which, in the time of Cicero and Verres, were eſteemed among the moſt precious monuments of antiquity [75]. The golden medals of Gelon, ſtill preſerved and of the higheſt beauty [76], juſtify the glowing expreſſions of the Roman orator.

Decay of Magna Græcia, and deſtruction of the Pythagoreans.

In Italy, the citizens of Crotona had too ſoon cauſe to lament their inſurrection againſt their magiſtrates, and their forſaking the diſcipline of Pythagoras. They who had hitherto defeated ſuperior numbers, who had furniſhed ſo many victors in the Olympic conteſt, and whoſe country was diſtinguiſhed by the epithet of healthy, on a ſuppoſition that the vigorous bodies of its inhabitants proceeded from an effect of the climate, were now totally routed and put to flight at the river Sagra, with an army of an hundred and thirty thouſand men, by the Locrians and Rhegians,

[75] Cicero in Verrem, paſſim.

[76] Mém. de Trevoux, l'ann. 1727, p. 1449.

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whoſe forces were far leſs numerous. The other Greek cities of Italy, which are ſaid to have imitated the fatal example of Crotona, were haraſſed by wars againſt each other, or againſt their barbarous neighbours. In conſequence of theſe misfortunes, the Pythagoreans again recovered their credit; and about ſixty years after the death of the great founder of their order, Zaleucus and Charondas, the firſt in Locri, the ſecond in Thurium, endeavoured to revive the Pythagorean inſtitutions, which, perhaps, were too perfect for the condition of the times. In leſs than forty years a new perſecution entirely drove the Pythagoreans from Italy, and completed, according to Polybius, the confuſion and miſery of that once happy country [77].

[77] Polybius, i. 203.

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Glory of Athens. — Military Succeſs of the Confederates. — Athens rebuilt and fortified — Extent of its Walls and Harbours. — The Confederates take Byzantium. — Conſpiracy of Pauſanias. — Banishment of Themiſtocles. — Virtue of Ariſtides. — Cimon aſſumes the Command. — His illuſtrious Merit and Succeſs. — Revolt of Egypt. — War in Cyprus. — Peace with Perſia. — Domeſtic Tranſactions of Greece. — The Athenian Greatneſs. — Envy of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos. — Earthquake in Sparta. — Revolt of the Helots. — War between the Elians and Piſans. — The Temple and Statue of Olympian Jupiter. — Diſſenſions in Argoſis. — Revolt in Bœotia. — Truce of Thirty Years. — Character of Pericles. — Subjection of the Athenian Allies and Colonies. — Spirit of the Athenian Government.

CHAP. XII. The glory of Athens; A. C. 479—431.

FROM the battles of Mycalé and Platæa, to the memorable war of Peloponneſus, elapſed half a century, the moſt illuſtrious in the Grecian annals. A ſingle republic, one of ſixteen ſtates, whoſe united poſſeſſions hardly equalled the extent of Scotland, and whoſe particular territory is ſcarcely viſible in a map of the world, carried on an offenſive war againſt the Perſian empire, and, though ſurrounded by jealous allies or open enemies,

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in arms;

proſecuted this extraordinary enterpriſe with unexampled ſucceſs; at length, granting ſuch conditions of peace as the pride of victory may dictate, and the weight of accumulated diſaſters condeſcend to ſolicit or accept. In that narrow ſpace of time the ſame republic erected, on the feeble baſis of her ſcanty population and diminutive territory, a mighty maſs of empire; eſtabliſhed and confirmed her authority over the extent of a thouſand miles of the Aſiatic coaſt, from Cyprus to the Thracian Boſphorus; took poſſeſſion of forty intermediate iſlands [1], together with the important ſtraits which join the Euxine and the Ægean; conquered and colonized the winding ſhores of Macedon and Thrace; commanded the coaſt of the Euxine from Pontus to the Cherſoneſus Taurica, or Crim Tartary; and, overawing the barbarous natives by the experienced terrors of her fleet [2], protected againſt *their* injuſtice and violence, but at the ſame time converted to the purpoſes of her own ambition and intereſt, the numerous but ſcattered colonies which Miletus, and other Greek cities of Aſia, had at various times eſtabliſhed in thoſe remote regions [3]. Our wonder will be juſtly increaſed, if we conſider that Athens obtained thoſe immortal trophies, not over ignorant ſavages or effeminate ſlaves, but over men who had the ſame language and laws, the ſame

[1] Several of theſe iſlands had been formerly conquered by Athenian commanders, particularly Miltiades, as we have related above; but having rebelled againſt the ſevere government of Athens, they were finally ſubdued by Pericles.

[2] Plut. in Pericle. [3] Strabo, Geograph. paſſim.

blood and lineage, the ſame arts and arms, in ſhort, every thing common with the victors but their audacity and fortune. CHAP. XII.

in arts;

But it is the peculiar glory of the Athenians that, during this rapid ſeries of military and naval triumphs, they cultivated, with a generous enthuſiaſm, the arts which adorn peace as well as war, and improved theſe decorations of poliſhed life into ſuch perfection as few nations have been able to imitate, and none have found it poſſible to ſurpaſs. During the adminiſtration of a ſingle man, more works of elegance and ſplendor, more magnificent temples, theatres, and porticoes were erected within the walls of Athens, than could be raiſed during many centuries in Rome, though miſtreſs of the world, by the wealth and labor of tributary provinces [t]. In the ſame period of time ſculpture attained a ſublimity, from which that noble art could never afterwards but deſcend and degenerate; and a republic hitherto inferior in works of invention and genius to ſeveral of her neighbours, and even of her own colonies, produced, in the ſingle lifetime of Pericles, thoſe ineſtimable models of poetry, eloquence, and philoſophy [u], which, in every ſucceeding age, the enlightened portion of mankind hath invariably regarded as the beſt ſtandards, not merely of compoſition and ſtyle,

[t] Plutarch. in Pericle.

[u] Pericles may be conſidered as the cohtemporary of Socrates, Sophocles, Euripides, Thucydides, etc. ſince, although he died before them of the plague, theſe and other great men flouriſhed during his adminiſtration.

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but of taſte and reaſon. The name of Greek ſeemed thenceforth to be ſunk in that of Athenian; Athenian writers are our ſureſt and almoſt only guides in relating the ſubſequent tranſactions of the whole nation[6]; and from them we learn what is yet the moſt extraordinary circumſtance reſpecting the Athenian empire, that it had been built on ſuch ſtable foundations, and reared with ſuch art and ſkill, as might have long defied the hoſtile jealouſy of Greece and Perſia, confederate in arms and reſentment, if various cauſes, which human prudence could neither foreſee nor prevent, had not ſhaken its firmneſs, and precipitated its downfal[7].

Such is the ſubject which I have undertaken to treat in this and the two following Chapters; a ſubject worthy to animate the diligence, and call forth the vigor of an hiſtorian: but, if he truly deſerves that reſpected name, he will remember that it is leſs his duty to amuſe the fancy by general deſcription, than to explain, with preciſion and perſpicuity, the various tranſactions of this intereſting and ſplendid theme; to give the reader a full and diſtinct view of the complicated matter which it involves; and to remove every adventitious circumſtance that might diſtract or dazzle the attention, as aſtronomers, in viewing the ſun, are careful to ward off its ſurrounding ſplendor.

[6] I mean Thucydides and Xenophon, together with the Athenian orators, philoſophers, and poets.

[7] Thucydid. l. vii. et viii. paſſim.

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The military ſucceſs of the Athenians[a] (which naturally forms the firſt branch of the ſubject, becauſe it not only ſupplied the materials of future improvements, but awakened that energy requiſite to cultivate and complete them) includes three ſeparate actions which were carried on at the ſame time, and conſpired to the ſame end, yet cannot be related in one perpetual narrative, without occaſioning ſome confuſion of ideas, alike deſtructive of the pleaſure and of the uſe of hiſtory. While we endeavour to keep each ſeries of events unbroken and diſtinct, we muſt be careful to point out its influence on the ſimultaneous or ſucceeding tranſactions of the times, that our relation may be at once ſatisfactory and faithful. In ſuch a delineation the trophies of the Perſian war juſtly claim the firſt and moſt conſpicuous place; the hoſtile animoſity of rival ſtates, which continually envied and oppoſed, but, for reaſons that will be fully explained, could neither prevent nor retard the growing ſuperiority of Athens, ſhall occupy the middle of the picture; and we ſhall throw into the back ground the ſucceſſive uſurpations of that fortunate republic over her allies, colonies, and neighbours.

Military ſucceſs of that republic.

Diviſion of the ſubject.

[a] The chief materials for this portion of hiſtory conſiſt in the firſt and ſecond books of Thucydides; the eleventh and twelfth of Diodorus Siculus; Plutarch's lives of Themiſtocles, Ariſtides, Cimon, Pericles; Pauſanias's Deſcription of Greece, and Pliny's Natural Hiſtory: ſcattered facts are ſupplied by other ancient writers, whoſe works will be carefully cited.

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The Athenians take Seſtos. Olymp. lxxv. 2. A. C. 479.

The common fears which, notwithſtanding innumerable ſources of animoſity, had formed, and hitherto upheld a partial confederacy of the Greeks, were removed by the deciſive victories of Platæa and Mycalé. After theſe memorable events, it was the firſt care of the Athenians to bring home their wives, children, and moſt valuable effects from the iſles of Ægina and Salamis. In the latter iſland they celebrated their good fortune by a national ſolemnity. The ſublime Sophocles joined in the chorus of boys which danced, in exultation, around the Barbarian ſpoils [10]; the valor of his predeceſſor, Æſchylus, had contributed to the victories by which they were obtained; and his rival, the tender Euripides, was born in the iſle of Salamis [11], on that important day which proved alike glorious to Greece, and fatal to Perſia. But an attention to domeſtic concerns prevented not the Athenians from puſhing the war with vigor, though deſerted by the Spartans and other Peloponneſians, who ſailed home before winter. The Aſiatic colonies, animated by the recent recovery of freedom, ſeconded the Athenian ardor; and the confederates, having ſucceſsfully infeſted the territories of the great king, beſieged and took the rich city of Seſtos in the Cherſoneſus of Thrace, the only place of ſtrength which adhered to the Perſian intereſt in that fertile peninſula [12].

[10] Athenæus, l. i.

[11] Vita Euripid.

[12] Herodot. l. ix. c. cvi. Diodor. l. xi. c. xxxvii.

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Athens rebuilt and fortified. Olymp. lxxv. 3, 4. A. C. 478 et 477.

During the two following years the war languiſhed abroad, while the ſymptoms of jealouſy and diſcord, which had already appeared in the ſeparation of the Athenian and Spartan fleets, broke out with more virulence at home. The Athenians began the laborious taſk of rebuilding their ruined city, which the Perſian ſpoils might contribute to enrich with uncommon magnificence, and which the acquaintance gained in the courſe of the war, with the graceful forms of Ionic and Doric architecture, might enable them to adorn with more beauty and elegance than had yet been diſplayed in Europe. But the weighty advice of Themiſtocles prevailed on them to ſuſpend this noble undertaking, and engaged them, inſtead of decorating their capital with temples, theatres, and gymnaſia, to fortify it by walls of ſuch ſtrength and ſolidity as might thenceforth bid defiance to every enemy, whether foreign or domeſtic. In an age when the art of attack was ſo rude and imperfect, that the ſmalleſt fortreſs formed an object of importance, ſuch a deſign could not fail of exciting jealouſy in the neighbouring republics. The meaſure was ſcarcely determined when an embaſſy arrived from Sparta, remonſtrating againſt a deſign peculiarly dangerous and alarming to thoſe who owed their ſafety to the weakneſs of their cities. "If the Greeks," it was ſaid, "had poſſeſſed any town of impregnable ſtrength, they muſt have found it impoſſible to expel the Barbarians from

Jealouſy of Sparta.

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their country. The Athenians therefore, who had hitherto so generously maintained the cause of the confederacy, ought not only to desist from raising walls and fortifications, but even to prevent a similar design in any republic beyond the isthmus; the Peloponnesus was alone sufficient to afford, in time of danger, a secure refuge to the whole Grecian name."

discovered by Themistocles;

Themistocles easily unveiled the suspicion and hatred concealed under this specious mask of public utility, and encouraged his countrymen to elude the Spartan artifice by similar address. The senate of the five hundred, who gave audience to foreign ambassadors, declared that Athens would adopt no measure inconsistent with the public interest, and promised speedily to send an embassy, in their turn, which would remove all groundless apprehensions entertained on that subject. The Lacedæmonians having returned with this temporizing answer, Themistocles was immediately dispatched to Sparta, and expected, as he had previously concerted matters with his countrymen[12], to be followed, at a proper time, by Aristides, the most respected character of his age; and by Lisicles, an able orator in the senate and assembly. Meanwhile the Athenian walls arose with unexampled celerity. Not only slaves, artificers by profession, and the poorer classes of citizens, but magistrates of the

[12] Idem ibid. et in Themist. Lysias Orat. Funeb. et cont. Alcib.

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first rank, the venerable fathers of the republic, wrought with their own hands, and with unceasing industry. The feeble efforts of women and children contributed to the useful labor. The most superstitious of men neglected their accustomed solemnities, and no longer acknowledged the distinction of days or seasons; nor did even the silent tranquillity of night abate the ardor of their diligence. The ruins of their city happily supplied them with a rich variety of materials; no edifice was spared, public or private, sacred or profane; the rude sculpture of ancient temples, even the mutilated tombs of their ancestors, were confounded in the common mass; and, at the distance of near a century, the singular appearance of the wall, composed of stones rough and unpolished, of various colors and unequal size, attested the rapid exertions by which the work had been constructed.[33] CHAP. XII.

and its effects eluded by his address.

Themistocles had hitherto, under various pretences, avoided declaring his commission before the Spartan senate. When urged to this measure by some of the magistrates, who began to suspect his silence, he still alleged the absence of his colleagues as a sufficient reason for delay. But a company of travellers, who had recently visited Athens, gave intelligence of the extraordinary works carrying on in that city. This information, and the resentment of the Spartans which it occasioned, must have disconcerted a man who possessed less cool

[33] Thucydid. lib. i. c. lxxxix. et seqq.

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boldneſs than the commander at Salamis and Artemiſium. But Themiſtocles, with the addreſs congenial to his character, aſſerted, that it was unworthy the gravity of Sparta to regard the vague rumors of obſcure men; and that before lightly ſuſpecting the approved fidelity of their allies, ſhe ought to beſtow ſome pains in diſcovering the truth. This declaration was enforced, it is ſaid, by ſeaſonable bribes to the moſt popular of the Ephori; and the Spartans, deluded or corrupted, agreed to diſpatch a ſecond embaſſy to Athens, conſiſting of ſome of their moſt reſpectable citizens. Theſe men had no ſooner arrived at their deſtination, than they were taken into cuſtody, as pledges for the ſafe return of Themiſtocles and his colleagues, who by this time had brought him the welcome news, that the walls were completed. The Athenian ambaſſadors were now prepared to throw off the maſk. They appeared in the Lacedæmonian aſſembly; and Themiſtocles, ſpeaking for the reſt, declared, that his countrymen needed not to learn from their confederates, what meaſures were honorable to themſelves, and beneficial to the common cauſe; that, by his advice, they had firmly defended their city againſt the aſſaults of open enemies and jealous friends; and that if Sparta entertained any reſentment of this meaſure, which was evidently not leſs conducive to the public intereſt, than, perhaps, diſpleaſing to private ambition, her anger would be equally unjuſt and impotent, ſince her own citizens muſt remain as hoſtages at Athens, till his colleagues and himſelf ſhould be

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restored in safety to their country[14]. Whatever secret indignation this speech might excite, the Spartans thought proper to suppress their animosity. They allowed the ambassadors to return home; but the conduct of Themistocles laid the foundation of that unrelenting hatred with which he was persecuted by Sparta, whose intrigues engaged all Greece, not excepting Athens herself, in the destruction of this illustrious citizen. Yet his eminent services, before they were interrupted by the storm of persecution, gave an opportunity to his unworthy country to display more fully her signal ingratitude[15].

Themistocles builds the Piræus. Olymp. lxxv. 4. A. C. 477.

The ancient Athenian harbour of Phalericum was small, narrow, and inconvenient. To supply its defects, Themistocles, even before the Persian invasion, had recommended the Piræus, a place five miles distant from the citadel, furnished with three natural basons, which, if properly fortified, might form a far more commodious and secure station for the Athenian navy. The foundations were laid, and the walls began to rise, when the cruel ravages of the Barbarians interrupted the undertaking. Having in the preceding year fortified the city, Themistocles thought the present a proper time to finish the new harbour[16]. His address, his eloquence, and his bribes, were seasonably applied to divert the resentment of Sparta, who, though thenceforth less jealous of the naval than military power of her rival, threatened, on this

[14] Plut. etc. ibid. [15] Diodor. l. xi. p. 437.

[16] Thucydid. l. i. c. xciii. Plut. in Themist. Diodor. xi. 436.

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occaſion, to enter Attica with an armed force. But the artful Athenian had the ſkill to perſuade the Spartans and their allies, that the procuring a ſtrong and capacious harbour was a matter eſſentially requiſite to the common intereſt of the Grecian confederacy. The work, meantime, was carried on at Athens with much ſpirit and activity, and, in leſs than a twelvemonth, brought to ſuch a proſperous concluſion, as could ſcarcely be credited, but on the teſtimony of a contemporary hiſtorian of the moſt approved diligence and fidelity [17]. The new walls were ſufficiently broad to admit two carriages abreaſt; the ſtones compoſing them were of an immenſe ſize, ſtrongly united by bars of iron, which were faſtened by melted lead. The Piræus ſoon grew into a town, containing many thouſand inhabitants. It was joined to the city by walls begun by Cimon, but finiſhed by Pericles, twenty years after the harbour itſelf had been erected. A. C. 457. The new buildings of Cimon and Pericles are often mentioned in hiſtory under the name of the Long Walls. They extended forty ſtadia on either ſide; and when added to the circumference of the ancient city (about ſixty ſtadia), give us for the whole circuit of the Athenian fortifications an extent of nearly eighteen Engliſh miles [18].

The war againſt Perſia continued by the confederates;

The altercations and animoſities excited by ſuch undertakings among the confederates at home, prevented not their united arms from aſſaulting the

[17] Thucydid. ubi ſupra.

[18] Pauſanias, p. 20, et ſeq. Strabo, p. 395, et ſeqq. Plut. in Cimon.

dominions of the great king. Thirty Athenian, and fifty Peloponneſian ſhips, had been employed to expel the Perſian garriſons from the ſea-ports which they ſtill occupied in the Helleſpont, the Propontis, and the Ægean iſles. The European fleet, being ſeaſonably joined by various ſquadrons from the Greek cities of Aſia, ſcoured the eaſtern ſhores of the Mediterranean, and delivered from oppreſſion the long-enſlaved iſland of Cyprus. Their next operation muſt have been at a conſiderable diſtance of time; ſince they had to return near two hundred leagues weſtward, and then to proceed almoſt as far towards the north, and the Boſphorus of Thrace. At the entrance of this celebrated canal, which joins the Euxine and Propontis, the city of Byzantium, deſtined in future ages to become the ſeat of empire, and long to remain the chief emporium of Europe and of Aſia, had been firſt founded by a feeble colony of Megareans, which had gradually become populous, flouriſhing, and independent, but which was actually commanded and inſulted by armed Barbarians. It is not probable that Xerxes, or his miniſters, perceived the peculiar ſecurity of Byzantium, ſituate between the Boſphorus and the Helleſpont, two ſtraits, which it might occaſionally ſhut to an hoſtile navy, or open to the fleets of commerce. But had they been ſenſible of this advantage, the miſfortunes hitherto attending all their maritime enterpriſes muſt have rendered it impoſſible to encourage their ſeamen to reſiſt a victorious enemy. They diſcovered, however, more than their uſual

who take Byzantium. Olymp. lxxvi. 1. A. C. 476.

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vigor, in defending, by land, a place which they regarded as the centre of very valuable poſſeſſions. The adjacent coaſt of Thrace forms a ſtriking contraſt with the inland parts of that country. Inſtead of bleak heaths, and ſnowy mountains, which deform the inhoſpitable regions of Hæmus and Rhodopé, the maritime provinces produce in abundance, vines, olives, the moſt uſeful grains, and the moſt delicious fruits. The climate vies with the delightful ſoftneſs of the Aſiatic plains; and the ſoil had been long cultivated by Greek colonies, who had widely extended themſelves on both ſides of Byzantium. The Barbarians ſtrengthened the garriſon of the place, which was well ſupplied with proviſions, and commanded by Perſians of the firſt diſtinction, among whom were ſeveral kinſmen of the great king. The ſiege was obſtinate, but the events of it are not deſcribed in hiſtory. It is only known, that the walls were ſtormed, and that an immenſe booty, together with many Perſian princes and nobles, fell into the hands of the victors [19].

The conſpiracy of Pauſanias;

Here ends the glory of Pauſanias, who ſtill commanded the forces of the confederacy; a man whoſe fame would rival the moſt illuſtrious names of antiquity, had he fallen in the ſiege of Byzantium. The rich ſpoils of Platæa, of which the tenth was allotted to him, as general, raiſed him above the equality required by the republican inſtitutions of his country. His recent conqueſt ſtill farther augmented his wealth and his ambition; a continual

[19] Plut. in Ariſtid. Thucydid. l. i. 95, et ſeqq. Diodor. l. xi. 44—46.

flow of proſperity, which is dangerous to the beſt regulated minds, proved fatal to the aſpiring temper of Pauſanias. As he conceived himſelf too great to remain a ſubject, he was willing to become a ſovereign, through the aſſiſtance of Xerxes, the inveterate enemy of his country. To this prince he made application, by means of Gongylus the Eretrian, a fit inſtrument for any kind of villany. To ſuch an aſſociate Pauſanias had intruſted the noble Perſians taken in Byzantium. This man eſcaped with his priſoners acroſs the Boſphorus, and conveyed a letter to the great king, in which the Spartan general, having mentioned, as an indubitable proof of his ſincerity, the reſtoring his captive kinſmen, propoſed to enter into ſtrict amity with Xerxes, to take his daughter in marriage, to ſecond his efforts in conquering Greece, and to hold that country as a dependent province of the Perſian empire. The Perſian is ſaid to have highly reliſhed theſe propoſals, the ſubjugation of Greece being the great object of his reign. It is certain that he ſpeedily ſent Artabazus, a nobleman of confidence, to confer and cooperate with the traitor. CHAP. XII.

ill conducted.

But Pauſanias himſelf acted with the precipitance and inconſiſtency of a man, who had either been deluded into treaſon by bad advice, or totally intoxicated by the dangerous vapors of ambition that floated in his diſtempered brain. Inſtead of diſſembling his deſigns until they were ripe for execution, he aſſumed at once the tone of a maſter and the manners of a tyrant. He became difficult

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of access to his colleagues in command; disdained their advice in concerting measures which they were ordered to execute; he was surrounded by guards, chosen from the conquered Barbarians; and he punished the slightest offence in the allied troops with a rigor hitherto unknown to the Grecian discipline. He still managed, indeed, the fierce spirits of the Spartans, but without any degree of prudence, since the distinctions which he demanded for *them*, tended only to irritate and inflame their confederates, who were not allowed to forage, to draw water, to cut down straw for their beds, until the countrymen of Pausanias had been previously furnished with all these articles.

The allies reject his authority, Olymp. lxxvi. 1. A. C. 476.

This intolerable insolence disgusted and provoked the army in general, but especially the Ionians, who lamented that they had been no sooner delivered from the shackles of Persian despotism, than they were bent under the severer and more odious yoke of Sparta. By common consent, they repaired to the Athenian Aristides, and his colleague Cimon, the son of Miltiades, a youth of the fairest hopes, who had signalized his patriotism and valor in all the glorious scenes of the war. Their designs being approved by the Athenian admirals, Uliades and Antagoras, who respectively commanded the fleets of Samos and Chios, the bravest of all the maritime allies, seized the first opportunity to insult the galley of Pausanias; and when reproached and threatened by the Spartan, they desired him to thank Fortune, who had favored him at Platæa, the memory of which victory alone saved him from the

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the immediate punishment of his arrogance and cruelty. These words speedily re-echoed through the whole fleet, and served, as soon as they were heard, for the signal of general revolt. The different squadrons of Asia and the Hellespont sailed from their stations, joined the ships of Uliades and Antagoras, loudly declared against the insolent ambition of Pausanias, abjured the proud tyranny of Sparta, and for ever ranged themselves under the victorious colors of Athens, whose generous magnanimity seemed best fitted to command the willing obedience of freemen [30].

and submit to the Athenians.

This revolution had immediate and important effects, which we shall proceed to explain, when we have punished and dismissed the unworthy Pausanias. Apprized of his malversation and treachery, the Spartan senate recalled him, to stand trial for his life. But his immense wealth enabling him to corrupt the integrity of his judges, he escaped without farther punishment than degradation from his office, and paying a heavy fine. In his stead, the Spartans substituted, not one admiral, but several captains, with divided authority, thereby to remove the odium and resentment which the insolence of unlimited command had excited among their confederates. Pausanias, though divested of his public character, having accompanied these officers to the Hellespont, in a vessel fitted out at his private expense, began to display more arrogance than ever. He disdained not only the manners and

Pausanias recalled by the Spartans. Olymp. lxxvi. 2. A. C. 475.

Returns to the east;

[30] Nepos in Pausan. Plutarch. in Aristid.

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behaviour, but the dreſs and appearance of a Greek; carried on almoſt openly, his treacherous correſpondence with Artabazus; increaſed the number of his Barbarian guards and attendants; trampled with contempt on the moſt revered inſtitutions of his country; and aſſumed that provoking pomp of power, and that offenſive oſtentation of vice, which diſgraced the profligate lives of the Perſian ſatraps [21].

recalled by the ſcytalé;

When the Spartan magiſtrates received a full account of his pride and folly, they were apprehenſive leſt he might refuſe to return home on an ordinary ſummons, and therefore employed the form of the ſcytalé, a form reſerved for the moſt ſolemn occaſions. The ſcytalé (for opinion can give importance to any thing) was only a narrow ſcroll of parchment, which had been rolled on a piece of wood, and then ſtamped with the decree of the republic. Every Spartan, inveſted with authority at home or abroad, poſſeſſed a tally exactly correſponding to the rod on which the parchment had been firſt rolled. By applying his tally, the words of the ſcytalé neceſſarily arranged themſelves in their original form, and atteſted the authentic command of the magiſtrate. As tutor to the infant king of Sparta, Pauſanias had been furniſhed with an inſtrument of this kind; and ſuch is the effect of legal formality, that a man who would probably have deſpiſed the injunction of a ſimple letter, returned without delay to a country which he had

[21] Thucydid. i. 95. et 128.

betrayed, when recalled by this frivolous, but reſpected ceremony.

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The external profeſſions, and hypocritical pedantry, of Spartan virtue, were moſt ſhamefully detected and expoſed in the whole affair of Pauſanias. Though convicted of the moſt odious tyranny, extortion, and profligacy, he was ſtill allowed to enjoy the benefit of perſonal freedom; to correſpond by frequent meſſages with his accomplice Artabazus; and, at length, to tamper with the Helots and Meſſenians, thoſe oppreſſed ſlaves, who were ever ready to rebel againſt the unrelenting tyranny of their maſters. But as it exceeded even the opulence and effrontery of Pauſanias, to corrupt and influence the whole republic, thoſe who had either eſcaped the general contagion of venality, or who were offended at not ſharing his bribes, accuſed him, a third time, of treaſon to Greece, in conſequence of an event which enabled them in the fulleſt manner to make good the charge. An unhappy youth, who lived with Pauſanias as the infamous miniſter of his pleaſure, was deſtined by that monſter to become the victim of his ambition. He was charged with a letter from his maſter to Artabazus, in which, after explaining the actual ſtate of his affairs, Pauſanias hinted to him, as had been his uſual practice, to deſtroy the bearer. The ſuſpicious youth, who had obſerved that none of thoſe ſent on ſuch errands ever returned to their country, broke open the letter, and read his own fate. Fired with reſentment, he inſtantly carried the writing to the enemies of Pauſanias, who

and punished.

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prudently adviſed the meſſenger to take refuge in the temple of Neptune, expecting that his maſter would ſoon follow him. Meanwhile they practiſed a concealment in the wall of the temple, and having acquainted the Ephori, and other chief magiſtrates, with their contrivance for convicting the traitor by his own words, they obtained a deputation to accompany them, to remain concealed with them in the temple, and to overhear the mutual reproaches of Pauſanias and his meſſenger. Yet the ſuperſtition of the Spartans permitted them not to ſeize the criminal in that ſacred edifice. He was allowed to retire in ſafety; and when the ſenate had at length determined to lay hold of him, he was privately admoniſhed of his danger by ſome members of that venal aſſembly. Upon this intelligence, he took refuge in the temple of Minerva, from which it being unlawful to drag him, that aſylum was ſurrounded by guards, all neceſſaries were denied the priſoner, and he thus periſhed by hunger [22].

Ariſtides intruſted with the finances of the confederates. Olymp. lxxvi. 2. A. C. 475.

The late puniſhment of this deteſtable traitor could not repair the ruinous effects of his miſconduct and villany. Not only the Ionians, who had firſt begun the revolt, but the foreign confederates in general, loudly rejected the pretenſions of Dorcis and other captains whom the Spartans appointed to command them. A few communities of Peloponneſus ſtill followed the Lacedæmonian

[22] Thucyd. l. i. c. cxxviii. et ſeqq. Diodor. l. xi. c. xliv. et Nepos in Pauſan.

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ſtandard; but the iſlanders and Aſiatics unanimouſly applied to Ariſtides, to whoſe approved wiſdom and virtue they not only intruſted the operations of the combined armament, but voluntarily ſubmitted their more particular concerns; and experience ſoon juſtified their prudent choice. Pay was not yet introduced into the Grecian ſervice, becauſe the character of *ſoldier* was not ſeparated from that of *citizen*. It had been uſual, however, to raiſe annually a certain proportion of ſupplies among the ſeveral confederates, in order to purchaſe arms, to equip and victual the gallies, and to provide ſuch engines of war as proved requiſite in ſtorming the fortified towns belonging to the common enemy [33]. By unanimous ſuffrage, Ariſtides was appointed to new-model and apply this neceſſary tax, which had been impoſed and exacted by the Spartans without ſufficient attention to the reſpective faculties of the contributaries. The honeſt Athenian executed this delicate office with no leſs judgment than equity. The whole annual impoſition amounted to for hundred and ſixty talents, about ninety thouſand pounds ſterling; which was proportioned with ſuch nice accuracy, that no ſtate found the ſmalleſt reaſon to complain of partiality or injuſtice. The common treaſure was kept in the central and ſacred iſland of Delos; and, though intruſted to the perſonal diſcretion of the Athenian commander, was ſoon conceived to lie at the diſpoſition of his republic [34].

Their amount.

[33] Plut. in Ariſtid. p. 532, et ſeqq.

[34] Ibid. p. 534. Thucyd. l. i. c. xcvi. Diodor. p. 442.

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Merit and perſecution of Themiſtocles.

While the merit of Ariſtides thus procured his countrymen the management of the national treaſury of Greece, Themiſtocles was equally ſucceſsful in improving the internal reſources of the ſtate. By yielding more protection to ſtrangers than they enjoyed in neighbouring cities, he augmented not only the populouſneſs, but the wealth of Athens, as that deſcription of men paid an annual contribution in return for their ſecurity [55]. This, together with other branches of the revenue, he employed in building annually about ſixty gallies, the addition of which to the Athenian navy abundantly compenſated ſuch loſſes as were ſuſtained by the accidents of the ſea in foreign parts. Notwithſtanding the envy and malice of worthleſs demagogues, who infeſted the Athenian aſſembly and courts of juſtice, Themiſtocles was faſt advancing to the attainment of the ſame authority at home, which Ariſtides enjoyed abroad, when complaints arrived from Sparta, that he had conſpired with Pauſanias to betray the public liberty. The known reſentment of the Spartans againſt this extraordinary man, ſufficiently explains the reaſon why they, who were ſo dilatory in their proceedings againſt Pauſanias himſelf, ſhould be ſo eager to bring to puniſhment his ſuppoſed accomplice. But it is not eaſy to conceive, how the Athenians could admit ſuch an acculation againſt a citizen, whoſe ſingular valor and conduct had gained the deciſive victory at Salamis; whoſe counſels and addreſs

[55] Lyſias adv. Philon.

had fortified their city with impregnable strength; whose foresight and activity had procured them a fleet which no nation in the world could resist; and whose abilities and patriotism had not only saved his country from the most formidable invasion recorded in history, and which was principally directed against Athens; but amidst the terrors of this invasion, the treachery of false friends, and the violence of open enemies, had so eminently contributed to raise his republic to the first rank in the Grecian confederacy. Yet such, on the one hand, was the effect of that envy which, in republics, always accompanies excellence; and such, on the other, the influence of Spartan bribery and intrigues, that Themistocles was banished by the ostracism, a punishment inflicted on men whose aspiring ambition seemed dangerous to freedom, which required not the proof of any particular delinquency, and which had effect only during a term of years[26].

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It is probable, that the illustrious exile would have been recalled before the expiration of the appointed time; but the persecution of Sparta allowed not his countrymen leisure to repent of their severity. Having punished Pausanias, they acquainted the Athenians "That from the papers of that notorious traitor, complete evidence appeared of the guilt of Themistocles; that it was not sufficient, therefore, to have expelled him for a few years from Athens, by an indulgent decree, which the assembly

His death and character. Olymp. lxxvi. 4. A. C. 473.

[26] Diodor. p. 422. et seqq. Plut. ibid.

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might revoke at pleasure; that crimes against the general confederacy of Greece ought to be judged by the Amphictyonic council, and punished by death, or perpetual banishment." The Athenians shamefully complied with this demand. It appeared, indeed, that Themistocles had corresponded with Pausanias, and been privy to his designs; but he persisted in affirming that he never had approved them. The rivalship and enmity subsisting between Sparta and Argos, had induced him to chuse the latter as the place of his retreat. There he received the news of his condemnation; after which, not thinking himself secure in any city of Peloponnesus, he sailed to Corcyra. But his enemies still continuing to pursue him, he fled to the opposite coast of Epirus, and sought refuge among the barbarous Molossians. Soon afterwards he escaped into Persia, where his wonderful versatility of genius, in acquiring the language and manners of that country, recommended him to the new king Artaxerxes, who had lately succeeded the unfortunate invader of Greece. The suspicion of treason throws a dark shade on the eminent lustre of his abilities; nor does the disinterestedness of his private character tend to remove the imputation. Though he carried with him to Persia his most valuable effects, yet the estimate of the property which he left behind in Athens, amounted to an hundred talents (above twenty thousand pounds sterling), an immense sum, when estimated by the value of money in that age. The whole was confiscated to the exchequer; and the eagerness of

Olymp. lxxvii. 1. A. C. 472.

the populace to ſeize this rich booty, ſerves to explain the alacrity with which all parties agreed to his deſtruction. A report prevailed in Greece, that Themiſtocles could never forgive the ingratitude of the Athenians, which he had determined to revenge at the head of a powerful army, raiſed by Artaxerxes. But perceiving the unexampled ſucceſs of Cimon on the Aſiatic coaſt, he deſpaired of being able to accompliſh his deſign; and, in a melancholy hour, ended his life by poiſon at the age of ſixty-five, in Magneſia, a town of Lydia, which had been beſtowed on him by the liberality of the Perſian monarch [27].

Death of Ariſtides. Olymp. lxxvii. 2. A. C. 471.

It is worthy of obſervation, that the three great commanders who had reſiſted and diſgraced the arms of Xerxes, quitted the ſcene almoſt at the ſame time. While Pauſanias and Themiſtocles ſuffered the puniſhment of their real or pretended crimes, Ariſtides died of old age, univerſally regretted by the affectionate admiration of his country. He, who had long managed the common treaſury of Greece, left not a ſufficient ſum to defray the expenſe of his funeral. His ſon Lyſimachus received a preſent of three hundred pounds from the public, to enable him to purſue and finiſh his education. His daughters were maintained and portioned at the expenſe of the treaſury. This honorable poverty well correſponded with the manly elevation of his character, whoſe pure and unſullied

His character.

[27] Plut. et Nepos in Themiſt. Diodor. l. xi. c. liv.—lix. Thucyd. i. 135, et ſeqq.

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splendor, in the opinion of a good judge of merit [28], far eclipses the doubtful fame of his daring, but unfortunate rival.

Elevation of Cimon to the command.

By the death of Aristides, the conduct of the Persian war devolved on his colleague Cimon, who united the integrity of that great man to the valor of Miltiades and the decisive boldness of Themistocles. But as he felt an ambition for eminence which disdains bare imitation, he not only reflected the most distinguished excellences of his predecessors, but improved and adorned them by an elegant liberality of manners, an indulgent humanity, and candid condescension; virtues which long secured him the affections of his fellow-citizens, while his military talents and authority, always directed by moderation and justice, maintained an absolute ascendant over the allies of the republic.

He reduces the coast of Thrace. Olymp. lxxvii. 2. A. C. 471.

His first operations were employed against the coast of Thrace, which the taking of Byzantium seemed to render an easy conquest. The only places in that country fitted to make an obstinate resistance, were the towns of Eion and Amphipolis, both situate on the river Strymon; the former near its junction with the Strymonic gulph, the latter more remote from the shore, but entirely surrounded by an arm of the gulph, and the principal branches of that copious river. Amphipolis, however, was taken, and planted by a numerous colony of Athenians. But Eion still opposed a vigorous resistance; Boges, the Persian governor, having

[28] Plato apud Plutarch. in Aristid.

determined rather to perish than surrender. After long baffling the efforts of the besiegers, by such persevering courage and activity as none of his countrymen had displayed in the course of the war, this fierce Barbarian was at length not tamed, but exasperated by hunger. His companions and attendants, equally desperate with their leader, followed his intrepid example; and mounting the ramparts with one accord, threw into the middle stream of the Strymon their gold, silver, and other precious effects. After thus attesting their implacable hatred to the assailants, they calmly descended, lighted a funeral pile, butchered their wives and children, and again mounting the walls, precipitated themselves with fury into the thickest of the flames[29].

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With this signal act of despair ended the Persian dominion over the coast of Europe, which finally submitted to the victorious arms of Cimon; a general, who knew alike how to conquer, and how to use victory. The Athenians were eager to prolong the authority of a man, who seemed ambitious to acquire wealth by valor, only that by wealth he might purchase the public esteem; and whose affable condescension, and generous liberality, continually increased his fame and his influence both at home and abroad. The reinforcements with which he was speedily furnished by the republic, enabled him to pursue the enemy into Asia, without allowing them time to breathe, or recover strength, after their repeated defeats. The intermediate

Pursues the enemy into Asia. Olymp. lxxvii. 3. A. C. 470.

[29] Plut. in Cimon. Diodor. l. xi.

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islands ambitiously courted his protection and friendship; and *their* feeble aid, together with the more powerful assistance of the Ionian coast, speedily increased his fleet to the number of three hundred sail.

His rapid success in Caria and Lycia.

With this formidable armament he stretched towards the coast of Caria, where his approach served for the signal of liberty to the numerous Greek cities in that valuable province. Seconded by the ardor of the natives, he successively besieged and reduced the walled towns and fortresses, several of which were filled with powerful garrisons; and, in the course of a few months, totally expelled the Persians from all their strong holds in Caria. The victorious armament then proceeded eastward to Lycia, and received the submission of that extensive coast. The citizens of Phaselis alone, defended by strong walls, and a numerous garrison, refused to admit the Grecian fleet, or to betray their Persian master. Their resistance was the more formidable, because their ancient connexion with the Chians, who actually served under the colors of Cimon, enabled them to enter into a treacherous correspondence with the enemy. After other means of intercourse had been cut off, the Chians still shot arrows over the walls, and thus conveyed intelligence into the place of all the measures adopted by the assailants. Wherever the attack was made, the townsmen and garrison were prepared to resist; the besiegers were long baffled in all their attempts; but the perseverance of Cimon finally overcame the obstinacy of his enemies. Their vigorous

He takes Phaselis.

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resistance was not distinguished by any memorable punishment; the mediation of the Chians, who were justly esteemed among the best sailors in the Athenian fleet, easily prevailing on the lenity of Cimon to grant them a capitulation, on condition that they immediately paid ten talents, and augmented the Grecian armament by their whole naval strength [30].

The Persians prepare for defence;

The distracted state of Persia, the intrigues of the court, the discord of the palace, and the civil wars which raised to the throne of Xerxes his third son Artaxerxes, distinguished by the epithet of Longimanus, prevented that vast but unwieldy empire from making any vigorous effort to resist the European invasion. But after Artaxerxes had at length crushed the unfortunate ambition of his competitors, and acquired firm possession of the reins of government, which he continued to hold for half a century [31], he naturally concerted proper measures to defend his remaining dominions in Asia Minor. Having re-established the Persian authority in the isle of Cyprus, he considered that Pamphylia, being the next province to Lycia, would probably receive a speedy visit from the victorious Greeks. That he might meet them there with becoming vigor, he assembled a powerful army on the fertile banks of the Eurymedon. A fleet likewise, of four hundred sail, was collected,

A. C. 473 — 425.

[30] Plut. et Diodor. ibid.

[31] Compare Thucydid. l. i. c. cxxxvii. and Usher Chronol. See also Petav. de Doctrin. Temp. l. x. c. xxv. who endeavours to reconcile the chronological differences between Thucydides and Plutarch in Themist.

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chiefly from Cilicia and Phœnicia, and was commanded to rendezvous near the mouth of that river.

Are defeated at sea. Olymp. lxxvii. 3. A. C. 470.

The Greeks, conducted by the activity of Cimon, delayed not to undertake the enterprise which the prudence of Artaxerxes had foreseen. Their fleet, amounting to two hundred and fifty gallies, fell in with the Persian squadrons off the coast of Cyprus. The Barbarians, vainly confident in their superior numbers, did not decline the engagement, which was obstinate, fierce, and bloody. Many of their ships were sunk; an hundred were taken, the rest fled in disorder towards the shore of Cyprus; but, being speedily pursued by a powerful detachment of the Grecian fleet, were abandoned by the terror of their crews, to the victors; and thus the mighty preparations, which the great king had raised with such flattering hopes, strengthened in one day, with about three hundred sail, the hostile navy of Greece [12].

Cimon's valor and conduct.

The vigorous mind of Cimon, instead of being intoxicated with this flow of prosperity, was less elevated with good fortune, than solicitous to improve it. The captured vessels contained above twenty thousand Persians. The soldiers encamped on the Eurymedon were still ignorant of the battle. These circumstances instantly suggested to the quick discernment of Cimon a stratagem for surprising the Persian camp, which was executed on the evening of the same glorious day with unexampled

[12] Thucydid. Plut. Diod. ibid.

success. The prisoners were stripped of their eastern attire; the bravest of the Greeks condescended to assume the tiara and scymitar, and thus disguised, embarked in the Persian ships, and sailed up the river Eurymedon with a favorable gale. The unsuspecting Barbarians received them with open arms into their camp, as their long-expected companions. But the Greeks had no sooner been admitted within the gates, than on a given signal, at once drawing their swords, they attacked, with the concert of disciplined valor, the defenceless security of their now astonished and trembling adversaries. Before the Persians recovered from their surprise, Cimon had advanced to the tent of their general. Consternation and despair seized this numerous but unwarlike host. The few who were least overcome by the impressions of fear and amazement, betook themselves to flight; a panic terror suspended the powers of the rest; they remained, and fell, unarmed and unresisting, by the hands of an unknown enemy.

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Gains the decisive victory of Eurymedon.

The rich spoil of the Barbarian camp rewarded the enterprise and celerity of the Greeks, who, loaded with wealth and glory, returned home during winter, and piously dedicated to Apollo a tenth of the plunder acquired by these ever memorable atchievements. A considerable portion of the remainder was employed (as mentioned above) in strengthening the fortifications of Athens. Agreeably to the Grecian custom, the general was entitled to a valuable share. Cimon received it as a testimony of the public esteem, and expended

The spoil how employed.

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it for the public uſe; embelliſhing his beloved native city with ſhady walks, gardens, porticoes, ſchools of exerciſe, and other works of general pleaſure and utility [11].

The Athenians proſecute the war: Olymp. lxxvii. 4. A. C. 469.

After theſe deciſive victories, the Greeks, headed by the Athenians, carried on the war during twenty-one years, rather for plunder than glory. The manifeſt ſuperiority which they enjoyed on all the eaſtern ſhores of the Mediterranean, might have rendered their maritime allies ſufficiently ſecure. But the people of Athens, whoſe councils began about this time to be governed by the magnanimous ambition and profound policy of Pericles, had the addreſs to perſuade their confederates that naval preparations and enterpriſes were ſtill as neceſſary as ever. At length, however, moſt of thoſe ſcattered iſlands and ſea ports, which followed the colors of Athens, grew weary of perpetual hoſtilities, of which *they* ſhared the toil and the danger, while their ambitious leaders alone reaped the advantage and the glory, and became continually more anxious to enjoy the benefits of public peace, and the undiſturbed comforts of domeſtic tranquillity. The Athenians availed themſelves of this diſpoſition, to engage ſuch ſtates as appeared moſt backward in raiſing their contingents for the common armament, to compound for perſonal ſervice on ſhipboard, by an annual ſupply of money, which might enable Athens continually to keep in readineſs a fleet of obſervation, to

take money inſtead of ſhips from the allies;

[11] Idem, ibid. et Nepos in Cimon. et Thucydid. l. i.

watch

watch and check the motions of the common enemy. This, at first voluntary, contribution soon amounted to about an hundred thousand pounds. It was gradually augmented; and, at length, raised by Pericles to three times the original sum [34]; an immense income, considering that the proportional value of money to labor was then ten times higher than at present; and considering also the very limited revenues of the greatest monarchs of antiquity; since, from all the various provinces of the Persian empire, scarcely four millions sterling entered the royal treasury [35]. CHAP. XII.

prepare to undertake an expedition against Cyprus. Olymp. lxxvii. 3. A. C. 466.

In their eastern expeditions, the Greeks had an opportunity of visiting the large and beautiful island of Cyprus, which, though delivered by their valor from *some* Persian garrisons, either still continued, or again became, subject to that empire. The striking advantages [36] of a delightful territory, four hundred miles in circumference, producing in great abundance wine, oil, with the most delicious fruits, and deemed invaluable in ancient times on account of its rich mines of brass, naturally tempted the ambition of an enterprising nation. The conquest of Cyprus was still farther recommended to the Athenians, as the sea-coast had been peopled by a Grecian colony under the heroic Teucer, who built there a city called Salamis from the name of

[34] Thucydid. ibid. et Plut. in Pericl.

[35] Herodot. iii. 95. In modern times the precious metals have so much increased in quantity and diminished in value, that in 1660 the revenue of Hindostan amounted to thirty-two millions sterling.

[36] Strabo, p. 648.

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his native country [37], which, from the earliest antiquity, had been regarded as a dependence of Attica. The Grecian inhabitants of Cyprus had hitherto attained neither power nor splendor; their settlements had been successively reduced by the Phœnicians and the great king; and they actually languished in a condition of the greatest debility [38]. Honor prompted the Athenians to relieve their distressed brethren; interest incited them to acquire possession of a valuable island. With two hundred ships of war they prepared to undertake this important enterprise, when an object still more dazzling gave a new direction to their arms.

Diverted from that measure by the revolt of Egypt. Olymp. lxxviii. 4. A. C. 465.

Amidst the troubles which attended the establishment of Artaxerxes on the Persian throne, the Egyptians sought an opportunity to withdraw themselves from the yoke of a nation whose tyranny they had long felt and lamented. A leader only was wanting to head the rebellion. This also was at length discovered in Inarus, a bold Libyan chief, to whose standard the malecontents assembling from all quarters, gradually grew into an army, which attacked and defeated the Persian mercenaries, expelled the garrisons, banished or put to death the governors and officers of the revenue, and traversing the kingdom without control or resistance, every where proclaimed the Egyptians a free and independent nation. Nor was this the capricious revolt of short-sighted Barbarians. Inarus maintained his conquest with valor and policy; and in order to

[37] Isocrat. in Evagor. [38] Isocrat. ibid.

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ſtrengthen his intereſt by foreign alliance diſpatched an embaſſy to Athens, craving the aſſiſtance of that victorious republic againſt its moſt odious and inveterate enemy [11].

The Athenian armament ſails thither; Olymp. lxxix. 2. A. C. 463.

The negociation was ſucceſsful; the Athenians burned with deſire to ſhare the ſpoils of Perſia, and commanded the ſhips, deſtined for Cyprus, to ſail to Egypt. They had ſcarcely arrived in that kingdom, when a Perſian army of three hundred thouſand men, commanded by Achæmenes, encamped on the banks of the Nile. A battle ſpeedily enſued, in which the inſurgents obtained a complete victory, chiefly through the valor and diſcipline of their Grecian auxiliaries. The vanquiſhed ſought refuge within the walls of Memphis; that capital was inveſted; and after becoming maſter of two diviſions of the city, the Athenians puſhed with vigor the ſiege of the third, called, from the color of its fortifications, the White Wall. Artaxerxes, meanwhile, neglected no poſſible effort, for breaking, or eluding, a tempeſt, that threatened to diſmember his dominions. While Perſian nobles of diſtinction conveyed immenſe ſums of gold and ſilver into Greece, to rouſe, by ſeaſonable bribes, the hoſtility of rival ſtates againſt the audacity of Athens, a new army was collected, ſtill more numerous than the former, and intruſted to Megabazus, the braveſt general in the Eaſt. Such, at leaſt, he was deemed by his countrymen; yet we cannot perceive any very illuſtrious merit in forcing the Greeks to raiſe

is victorious;

beſieges Memphis.

[11] Thucyd. l. i. et Diodor. l. xi. p. 272.

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the ſiege of Memphis, the ſoldiers being already worn out with the fatigues of hard ſervice, and probably enfeebled by diſeaſes in a far diſtant climate, extremely different from their own.

Misfortunes of the Athenians in Egypt. Olymp. lxxx. 4. A. C. 457.

Megabazus, however, had the glory of firſt turning againſt the Greeks that current of ſucceſs which had run for many years ſo ſtrongly in their favor. They and the revolted Egyptians were now beſieged, in their turn, in a ſmall iſland of the Nile called Proſopis, along the coaſt of which the Athenians had anchored their ſhips. By diverting the courſe of the river, Megabazus left them on dry land. This operation ſo much confounded the Egyptians, that they immediately laid down their arms: but their wonted magnanimity did not forſake the Greeks: with their own hands they ſet fire to their fleet, and exhorting each other to ſuffer nothing unworthy of their former fame, determined, with one accord, to reſiſt the aſſailants, and, although they could not expect victory, to purchaſe an honorable tomb. Megabazus, intimidated by their countenance and reſolution, and unwilling to expoſe his men to the efforts of a dangerous deſpair, granted them a capitulation, and, what ſeems more extraordinary in a Perſian commander, allowed them to retire in ſafety. They endeavoured to penetrate through Libya to the Grecian colonies in Cyrenaica, from which they hoped to be tranſported by ſea to their native country. But the greater part periſhed through fatigue or diſeaſe in the inhoſpitable deſerts of Africa, and only a miſerable remnant of men, whoſe bravery deſerved a better fate, reviſited the

ſhores of Greece. To complete the diſaſter, a reinforcement of ſixty ſhips, which the Athenians had ſent to Egypt, was attacked ſurrounded, and totally deſtroyed by the Phœnicians, near the ſame ſcene which had already proved ſo fatal, but ſo honorable, to their countrymen **.

The Athenians renew their deſigns againſt Cyprus. Olymp. lxxxii. 3. A. C. 440.

Theſe repeated misfortunes, together with the growing troubles in Greece, which we ſhall ſpeedily have occaſion to deſcribe, prevented the Athenians, during ſeven years, from reviving their deſign againſt Cyprus. A fleet of two hundred ſail was at length intruſted to Cimon, who enjoyed a proſperous voyage to the Cyprian coaſt. The towns of Malos and Citium oppoſed a feeble reſiſtance, and the ſingular humanity with which Cimon treated his priſoners, would have facilitated more important conqueſts; but the Phœnician and Cilician fleets had again put to ſea, and Cimon wiſely determined to attack them as they approached the iſland, rather than wait their arrival, his countrymen being ſuperior to their enemies, ſtill more in naval than in military proweſs. In the battle which ſoon followed, he took above an hundred gallies; the number of thoſe ſunk or deſtroyed is unknown; the remainder fled to the coaſt of Cilicia, in hopes of protection from the army of Megabazus, encamped in that province; but that ſlow unwieldy body was unable to afford them any ſeaſonable or effectual relief. The Greeks, having purſued them on ſhore, totally deſtroyed *them*, as well as the

Their ſucceſs in that iſland.

** Iſocrat. de Pace et Panegyr. et Thucydid. et Diodor. ibid.

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Persian detachments who came to their succour, and returned loaded with spoil to Cyprus. The Athenian general then prepared to form the siege of Salamis, which, though defended by a numerous Persian garrison, and well provided with all the necessaries of defence, must have soon yielded to his skill and valor, had not sickness, in consequence of a wound received before the walls of Citium, prevented him from exerting his usual activity.

The Persian monarch solicits peace. Olymp. lxxxii. 4. A. C. 449.

Meanwhile Artaxerxes, who perceived that the acquisition of Salamis would naturally draw after it the conquest of the whole island, and who had been continually disappointed in expecting to prepare fleets and armies capable to contend with the Athenians, eagerly solicited peace from that people, almost on their own terms. His ambassadors were favorably heard in the Athenian assembly by those who were more solicitous about confirming their usurpations over their allies and colonies, than ambitious of extending their Asiatic conquests. Cimon, who invariably maintained the contrary system, was now no more. A peace, therefore, was concluded on the following conditions[a]: That all the Greek colonies in Lower Asia should be declared independent of the Persian empire; that the armies of the great king should not approach within three days journey of the western coast; and that no Persian vessel should appear between the Cyanean rocks and the Chelidonian isles, that is, in the wide extent of the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, between the northern extremity of the Thracian

Motives which determined the Athenians to compliance.

[a] Thucydid. Plutarch. Diodor. Isocrat. etc.

Bosphorus and the southern promontory of Lycia. On such terms the Athenians and their allies stipulated to withdraw their armament from Cyprus, and to abstain thenceforward from molesting the territories of the king of Persia[42]. Such was the conclusion of this memorable war, which, since the burning of Sardis, the first decisive act of hostility, had been carried on, with little intermission, during fifty-one years. The same magnanimous republic, which first ventured to oppose the pretensions of Persia, dictated to that haughty empire the most humiliating conditions of peace; an important and illustrious æra in Grecian history, which was often celebrated with pompous panegyric during the declining ages of Athenian glory. CHAP. XII.

Obstacles to a general or lasting confederacy in Greece.

Although, for reasons which will be explained hereafter, peace was alike necessary to both parties, yet the reader, who feels a warm interest in the cause of civilization and humanity, cannot but regret that, after disgracing the arms of Persia, and breaking the power of Carthage, the Greeks had not combined in one powerful exertion, and extended their victories and their improvements over the ancient world. But the internal defects in her political constitution, which stunted the growth of Greece, and prevented her manhood and maturity from corresponding to the blooming vigor of her youth, rendered impossible this most desirable union, which, could it have taken place, would probably have left little room for the transient conquests of Alexander, or the more permanent glory

[42] Isocrat. Panegyr.

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of the Roman arms. Inſtead of theſe imagined trophies, the ſubſequent hiſtory of Greece preſents us with the melancholy picture of inteſtine diſcord.

Its ſubſequent hiſtory peculiarly intereſting.

During an hundred and eleven years, which elapſed between the glorious peace with Perſia, in which the Athenians, at the head of their allies, ſeemed for ever to have repreſſed the ambition of that aſpiring power, and the fatal defeat at Cheronæa, in which the ſame people, with their unfortunate auxiliaries, ſubmitted to the valor and activity of Philip, Greece, with ſhort variations of domeſtic quiet and foreign hoſtility, carried on bloody wars, and obtained deſtructive victories, in which her own citizens, not the enemies of the confederacy, were the unhappy objects of her inglorious triumph. Yet the tranſactions of this diſtracted and miſerable period, however immaterial in the hiſtory of empire, are peculiarly intereſting in the ſtill more inſtructive hiſtory of human nature. A confederacy of ſoldiers and freemen, extending their dominion over ignorant ſavages, or effeminate ſlaves, muſt continually exhibit the unequal combat of power, courage, and conduct on the one ſide, againſt weakneſs, ignorance, and timidity on the other. But amidſt the domeſtic diſſenſions of Greece, the advantages of the contending parties were nicely balanced and accurately adjuſted. Force was reſiſted by force, valor oppoſed by valor, and art encountered or eluded by ſimilar addreſs. The active powers of man, excited by emulation, inflamed by oppoſition, nouriſhed by intereſt, and at once ſtrengthened and elevated by

a ſenſe of perſonal honor and the hope of immortal fame, operated in every direction with awakened energy, and were diſplayed in the boldeſt exertions of the voice and arm. In every field where glory might be won, men recogniſed the proper objects of their ambition, and aſpired to the higheſt honors of their kind; and although the prizes were often ſmall, and the victory always indeciſive, yet the pertinacious efforts of the combatants (great beyond example, and almoſt beyond belief) furniſh the moſt intereſting ſpectacle that hiſtory can preſent to the rational wonder of poſterity. CHAP. XII.

Sparta, Thebes, and Argos, hoſtile to Athens.

The powerful cities of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos, which had long rivalled Athens and each other, could not behold, without much diſſatisfaction and anxiety, the rapid growth of a republic which already eclipſed their ſplendor, and might ſome time endanger their ſafety. The Spartans had particular cauſes of diſguſt. The immortal victories of Cimon made them deeply regret that *they*, who had ſhared the firſt and ſevereſt toils of the war, had too haſtily withdrawn from a field of action that afforded ſo many laurels. They were provoked at being denied the command of the maritime allies, and not leſs offended at being overreached by Themiſtocles. All theſe reaſons had determined them, above twenty years before the peace with Perſia, to make war on the Athenians, expecting to be ſeconded in this deſign by the fears of the weak, and the jealouſy of the more powerful, ſtates, on both ſides the Corinthian iſthmus.

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Earthquake in Sparta; Olymp. lxxvii. 4. A. C. 469.

But their animoſity, before it broke out into action, was diverted by a calamity equally ſudden and unforeſeen. In the year four hundred and ſixty-nine before Chriſt, Sparta was overwhelmed by an earthquake [41]. Taygetus and the neighbouring mountains were ſhaken to the foundation, and twenty thouſand Lacedæmonian citizens or ſubjects periſhed in this dreadful diſaſter. But, amidſt the ruins of Sparta, one deſcription of men beheld the public misfortunes not only without horror, but with a ſecret ſatisfaction.

followed by the revolt of the Helots and Meſſenians;

The oppreſſed Spartan ſlaves, known by the appellations of Helots and Meſſenians, aſſembled in crowds from the villages in which they were cantoned, and took meaſures for delivering themſelves, during the cruelty of the elements, from the not leſs inexorable cruelty of their unfeeling tyrants. The prudent diſpoſitions of king Archidamus, who, foreſeeing the revolt, had ſummoned the citizens to arms, prevented them from getting immediate poſſeſſion of the capital; but they rendered themſelves maſters of the ancient and ſtrong fortreſs Ithome, from which they continued many years to infeſt the Lacedæmonian territories. The Spartans in vain exerted their utmoſt endeavours to expel this dangerous inteſtine enemy; and in the third year of the war (for this revolt is dignified in hiſtory by the name of the Third Meſſenian War), they had recourſe to the Athenians, who, of all the Greeks, were deemed the moſt ſkilful in ſieges. The Athenians, either not ſufficiently acquainted with the

[41] Thucydid. l. i. cap. c. et ſeqq. Diodor. l. xi. cap. lxiii.

ſecret hoſtility of Sparta, or willing to diſſemble their knowledge of it, as they were then totally bent on other projects and enterpriſes, ſent them the required aſſiſtance. The beſiegers, however, met with ſo little ſucceſs, that the Spartans diſmiſſed their Athenian auxiliaries, on pretence indeed that their help was no longer neceſſary; but, in reality, from a ſuſpicion that they favored the intereſt of the rebels; and, as they retained the troops of all the other allies, the Athenians were juſtly provoked by this inſtance of diſtruſt [44]. Meanwhile the inhabitants of Piſa, who, for a reaſon that will be immediately explained, were highly incenſed againſt Sparta, gave vigorous aſſiſtance to the beſieged.

The place thus held out ten years: many ſallies were made, ſeveral battles were fought with the fury that might be expected from the cruelty of tyrants chaſtiſing the inſolence of ſlaves. Both parties muſt have been reduced to extremity, ſince the Helots and Meſſenians, though obliged to ſurrender the place, obtained from the weakneſs, a condition which they would have vainly ſolicited from the mercy, of Sparta, "that they ſhould be allowed, with their wives, children, and effects, to depart, unmoleſted, from the Peloponneſus." The Athenians, deeply reſenting the affront of ſuſpected fidelity, determined to mortify the Spartans by kindly receiving thoſe needy fugitives, whom they finally eſtabliſhed in Naupactus, a ſea-port on the Criſſean gulph, which their arms had juſtly wreſted

part of whom are ſettled in Naupactus by the Athenians. Olymp. lxxx. 2. A. C. 459.

[44] Thucydid. l. i. cap. ci.

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Their signal gratitude.

from the Locri Ozolæ; a cruel and barbarous people, whose savage manners and rapacity disgraced their Grecian extraction. The Helots and Messenians repaid, by signal gratitude, the humane protection of Athens. During the long course of the Peloponnesian war, while their neighbours on every side espoused the opposite interest, the inhabitants of Naupactus alone invariably exerted themselves, with zeal and vigor, in defence of the declining power of their magnanimous confederate and ancient benefactor.

The war between the Elians and Pisans.

The cause above alluded to, which had incensed the Pisans against Sparta, dated beyond a century[45]. That people had long contended with Elis, the capital of their province, for the right of superintending the Olympic games. The Spartans enabled the Elians to prevail in the contest, who continued, without opposition, to direct that august solemnity, until the earthquake and subsequent calamities of Sparta emboldened the insolent and wealthy Pisans to renew their pretensions[46]. Their attempts, however, to maintain this bold claim, especially after the removal of the Helots and Messenians, appear to have been alike feeble and unfortunate. Pisa was taken, plundered, and so thoroughly demolished, that not a vestige, and scarce the name, remained.

Sack of Pisa. Olymp. lxxi. i. A. C. 456.

The temple of Olympian Jupiter.

With the valuable booty acquired in this warfare, the Elians executed a memorable undertaking; having, in the course of ten years[47], enlarged and

[45] Pausanias, l. vi. c. xxii. [46] Strabo, l. viii. p. 545.
[47] Between the years 456 and 446, A. C.

adorned the temple of Olympian Jupiter, and erected the celebrated ſtatue of that divinity; a work which no ſubſequent age could ever rival, and whoſe ſublimity is ſaid to have increaſed and fortified the popular ſuperſtition [48]. This famous temple was of the Doric order, encircled with a colonnade, and built of the ſtone of the country reſembling Parian marble. From the area, or ground, to the decoration over the gate, it reached ſixty-eight feet in height; it was ninety-five feet broad, and two hundred and thirty long: thus falling ſhort of the greateſt modern temples in magnitude, as much as it excelled them in beauty and the richneſs of material. It was covered with Pentelican marble, cut in the form of brick tiles. At each extremity of the roof ſtood a gilded vaſe; in the middle a golden victory; below which was a ſhield emboſſed with Meduſa's head, likewiſe of gold. Pelops and Oenomaus were repreſented, on the pediment, ready to begin the chariot-race before very illuſtrious ſpectators, ſince Jupiter himſelf was of the number. The vault was adorned with the battle of the Centaurs and Lapithæ. The labors of Hercules diſtinguiſhed the principal entrance [49].

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After paſſing the braſs gates, you diſcovered Iphitus crowned by his ſpouſe Echecheiria; from thence you proceeded, through a noble portico, to the majeſtic creation of Phidias the Athenian, which formed the principal ornament of the

Phidias's ſtatue of that divinity.

[48] Aliquid receptæ religioni adjeciſſe fertur. PLIN.

[49] Pauſan. in Eliac. p. 303, et ſeqq.

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temple, and of Greece. The god was ſitting on a throne, and being ſixty feet high, touched the roof with his head; and threatened, if he moved himſelf, to ſhake in pieces that noble edifice, which, lofty and ſpacious as it was, ſtill appeared unworthy to contain him. This vaſt coloſſus was compoſed of gold, taken in the ſack of Piſa, and of ivory, then almoſt as precious as gold, which was brought from the Eaſt by Athenian merchantmen. The god had an enamelled crown of olive on his head, an image of victory in his right hand, a burniſhed ſceptre in his left. His robes and ſandals were variegated with golden flowers and animals. The throne was made of ivory and ebony, inlaid with precious ſtones. The feet which ſupported it, as well as the fillets which joined them, were adorned with innumerable figures; among which you perceived the Theban children torn by ſphynxes, together with Apollo and Diana ſhooting the beautiful and once flouriſhing family of Niobé. Upon the moſt conſpicuous part of the throne which met the eye in entering, you beheld eight ſtatues, repreſenting the gymnaſtic exerciſes; and the beautiful figure, whoſe head was encircled with a wreath, reſembled young Pantarces, the favorite ſcholar of Phidias, who, in the conteſt of the boys, had recently gained the Olympic prize. Beſides the four feet, mentioned above, the throne was ſupported by four pillars, placed between them, and painted by Panænus, the brother of Phidias. There that admirable artiſt had delineated the Heſperides guarding the golden apples; Atlas painfully ſuſtaining

the heavens, with Hercules ready to aſſiſt him; Salamine with naval ornaments in her hand; and Achilles ſupporting the beautiful expiring Penthesilea. CHAP. XII.

It would be tedious to deſcribe the remaining ornaments of this celebrated ſtatue, and ſtill more of the ſacred edifice itſelf: yet the temple of Olympia was much inferior in ſize to that of Ceres and Proſerpine, at Eleuſis, in Attica. The latter was built by Ictinus, the contemporary and rival of Phidias; and ſufficiently capacious (could we believe the exaggerations of travellers) to contain thirty thouſand perſons [50]. This edifice was alſo of the Doric order; that of Diana at Epheſus, and of Apollo at Miletus, were both of the Ionic; and the celebrated temple of Jupiter at Athens, begun by Piſiſtratus, and enlarged by Pericles, was finiſhed in the Corinthian ſtyle, by Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria. Theſe four temples were the richeſt and moſt beautiful in the world, and long regarded as models of the three Grecian orders of architecture [51]. The Olympic temple compared with other ſacred edifices in Greece.

While the earthquake and the ſervile war confined within a domeſtic ſphere the activity of Sparta, Argos, the ſecond republic of the Peloponneſus, and long the moſt conſiderable principality in that peninſula, underwent ſuch revolutions and misfortunes, as left her neither inclination nor power to oppoſe the Athenian greatneſs. Ever rivals and enemies of Sparta, the Argives had jealouſly Inteſtine diſſenſions in Argolis. Olymp. lxxviii. 1. A. C. 468.

[50] Strabo, l. ix. p. 396. [51] Vitruvius, l. vii.

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declined the danger and glory of the Perſian war, to the ſucceſs of which their adverſaries had ſo eminently contributed. This ungenerous dereliction paſſed not unpuniſhed. As deſerters of the common cauſe, the Argives incurred the hatred and contempt of their public-ſpirited neighbours. Mycenæ, once the proud reſidence of royal Agamemnon, Epidaurus, and Trœzené, which formed reſpectively the greateſt ſtrength and ornament of the Argive territory, threw off the yoke of a capital, whoſe folly or baſeneſs rendered her unworthy to govern them. Sicyon, Nauplia, Heliæa, and other towns of leſs note, which were ſcattered at ſmall diſtances over the face of that delightful province, obeyed the ſummons to liberty, and aſſumed independence. The rebels (for as ſuch they were treated by the indignant magiſtrates of Argos) ſtrengthened themſelves by foreign alliance, and continued thenceforth to diſdain the authority of their ancient metropolis and ſovereign. At the commencement of the Peloponneſian war, they formed a reſpectable portion of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; while Argos alone, of all the cities in the Peloponneſus, openly eſpouſed the cauſe of the Athenians.

Deſtruction of Mycenæ.

The ancient city of Mycenæ, which had firſt ſounded the trumpet of ſedition, was the only victim of Argive reſentment. The Argives ſeized a favorable opportunity, while the allies and adherents of Mycenæ were occupied with their domeſtic concerns, to lead their whole forces againſt the place; and having taken it by ſtorm, they decimated

decimated the inhabitants, and demolished not only the walls, but the town[12] itself, which was never afterwards rebuilt. CH. XII.

The desultory transactions of so many states and cities as composed the name and nation of Greece, must appear a continual maze of perplexity and confusion, unless we carefully follow the threads which should direct us in this intricate, yet not inextricable, labyrinth. But if we seriously apply ourselves to investigate the hidden causes of events, and to trace revolutions to their source, we shall be surprised by the agreeable discovery, that the history of this celebrated people is not entirely that mass of disorder which it appears on a superficial survey. The same causes which repressed the activity, and humbled the pride of Argos, operated alike fatally on Thebes, the second republic beyond the isthmus, and the only one that ever aspired to rival the power of Athens. The Thebans, for similar, or more odious reasons, than those which had restrained the Argives, had also with-held their assistance in the Persian war; and by this mean selfishness or treachery had justly provoked the indignation of the subordinate cities of Bœotia. Not only Thespiæ and Platæa, which had ever borne with impatience the Theban yoke, but the sea-ports of Aulis, Anthemon, and Larymna; Aschra, the beloved habitation of old Hesiod; Coronea, overshadowed by mount Helicon, a favorite seat of the Muses; Lebadea, famous for its oracle of

The inferior cities in Bœotia reject the authority of Thebes.

[12] Diodor. l. xi. p. 276.

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Trophonius; Delium and Alalkomené, reſpectively ſacred to Apollo and Minerva, together with Leuctra and Chæronea, the deſtined ſcenes of immortal victories; all theſe cities ſucceſſively rejected the juriſdiction and ſovereignty of Thebes, which, during the invaſion of Xerxes, had ſo ſhamefully betrayed the common intereſt and glory of the nation [51].

The Thebans obtain aſſiſtance from Sparta. Olymp. lxxx. 2. A. C. 459.

During ſeveral years, the Thebans patiently yielded to a ſtorm, which they found it impoſſible to reſiſt. But when the Spartans began to breathe after the recovery of Ithomé, and had made a ſucceſsful expedition againſt the Phocians, in defence of their kinſmen in Doris, the Thebans warmly ſolicited them to take part in their domeſtic quarrels, and to enable them to regain their aſcendant in Bœotia; with aſſurance that they would employ the firſt moments of returning vigor to oppoſe the growing pretenſions of the Athenians. This propoſal was accepted, not only by the reſentment, but by the policy, of the Spartan ſenate, who perceived, that it equally concerned their intereſt, that the neighbouring city of Argos ſhould loſe her juriſdiction over Argolis; and that Thebes, the neighbour and rival of Athens, ſhould recover her authority in Bœotia.

Wiſe policy of that ſtate.

Athens enables the Bœotians to maintain their independence.

They were applying themſelves with vigor and ſucceſs, to effect this ſalutary purpoſe, when the active vigilance of Athens diſpatched an army, fifteen thouſand ſtrong, to maintain the independence

[51] Diodor. l. xi. p. 283, et ſeqq. et Thucydid. l. i. p. 273.

of Bœotia. The valor and conduct of Myronides, the Athenian general, obtained a decisive victory near the walls of Tanagra, one of the few places in the province which had preserved its fidelity to the capital. This memorable battle, which no ancient writer has thought proper to describe, although it is compared to the glorious trophies of Marathon and Platæa[54], confirmed the liberty of Bœotia; nor could the Thebans, notwithstanding their partial success against several of the revolted cities, recover their authority in that province, until, about fourscore years afterwards, they emerged into sudden splendor under the conduct of their heroic Epaminondas. CHAP. XII. A. C. 458—456.

The ambitious policy of Pericles, which will be fully explained in the sequel, was eager to profit by every favorable turn of fortune. He took care to place Athenian garrisons in several Bœotian fortresses; he made the neighbouring republics of Corinth and Megara feel and acknowledge the superiority of Athens; and after sending Tolmidas, a commander endued rather with an impetuous than well regulated courage, to ravage the coast of the Peloponnesus, he sailed thither next year in person, and made the Lacedæmonians and their allies deeply regret, that they had too soon discovered their animosity against a republic, alike capable to protect its friends and take vengeance on its enemies. The measures of this daring leader were actually uncontrolled by any opposition, since his eloquence Ambitious measures of Athens. A. C. 455. A. C. 454.

[54] Diodor. l. xi. p. 284.

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had prevailed over the innocence and merit of Cimon, and procured the baniſhment of that illuſtrious commander. But Cimon was recalled in two years; and his return was ſignalized by a ſuſpenſion of arms in Greece, which that real patriot had been as zealous to promote, as he was ambitious to purſue his Aſiatic triumphs. This treaty, however, was ſoon broke; but an ill-concerted and unfortunate enterpriſe againſt Thebes (diſapproved by Pericles himſelf), in which the raſh Tolmidas loſt his army and his life, made the Athenians again liſten to terms of accommodation. They agreed to withdraw their garriſons from Bœotia; to diſavow all pretenſions againſt Corinth and Megara, pretenſions which had no other effect than to exaſperate thoſe little republics againſt their uſurping neighbour; and, on complying with theſe conditions, the Athenians recovered their citizens made captive in Bœotia, through the miſconduct of Tolmidas[15].

A. C. 447.

A. C. 445.

The truce of thirty years. Olymp. lxxxiii. 4. A. C. 445.

This was the famous truce of thirty years, concluded in the fourteenth year preceding the Peloponneſian war. The former treaty had been limited to a much ſhorter period; for it is worthy of obſervation, that even in their agreements of peace, the Greeks diſcovered that perpetual propenſity to war, which was the unhappy effect of their political inſtitutions[16].

Motives of the Athenians for granting it.

The terms of this accommodation, ſeemingly little favorable to the intereſt of Athens, were

[15] Diodor. l. xii. p. 293. Thucydid. l. i. p. 71, et ſeqq.

[16] Idem. p. 74.

dictated, however, rather by the ambition than the equity of that republic; a conclusion that evidently results from examining the third series of events, which (as observed above) completes the history of this memorable period. Amidst the foreign expeditions of Cimon, and the domestic dissensions of Greece, the Athenian arms and policy had been gradually, during thirty years, establishing the sovereignty of the republic over her distant colonies and confederates. This bold undertaking was finally accomplished by Pericles, whose character contributed, more than that of any one man, to the glory and greatness, as well as to the calamities and ruin of his country.

CHAP. XII.

Between the years 470 and 440, A. C.

His father Xanthippus, who gained the illustrious victory at Mycalé, rejoiced in a son endued with the happiest natural talents, and an innate love of glory. His youth was intrusted to the learned and virtuous Damon, who concealed, under the uninvidious title of master of rhetoric, the art of animating his pupil with an ambition to deserve the first rank in the republic, as well as of adorning him with the accomplishments most necessary to attain it. From Aristagoras of Clazomené, denominated the philosopher of mind, on account of his continual solicitude to confirm the most important and most pleasing of all doctrines, that a benevolent intelligence presides over the operations of nature, and the events of human life, Pericles early learned to control the tempest of youthful passions, which so often blast the promising hopes of manhood; to preserve an unshaken constancy in

Character of Pericles;

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all the viciſſitudes of fortune, ſince all are the varied diſpenſations of the ſame wiſe providence; and to trample, with generous contempt, on the groveling ſuperſtition of the vulgar. Thus qualified by nature and education, he ſoon diſplayed, in the Athenian aſſembly, an eloquence, nouriſhed by the copious ſpring of philoſophy, and ennobled by the manly elevation of his character. His ſpeeches conſiſted not in the unpremeditated effuſions of a temporary enthuſiaſm; he was the firſt of his countrymen who, before pronouncing his diſcourſes, committed them to writing[57]: they were ſtudied and compoſed with the moſt laborious and patient care; and being poliſhed by repeated touches of correcting art, they roſe in admiration, in proportion as they were more cloſely examined by the piercing eye of criticiſm; and acquired the epithet of Olympian, to expreſs that permament and ſteady luſtre which they reflected[58].

he is ſuſpected of uſurpation;

But the ſuperior talents of Pericles, which, in a well-regulated government, would have increaſed his influence, had well nigh occaſioned his ruin in a turbulent and ſuſpicious democracy. The memory of the oldeſt citizens faithfully recollected, and the envy or fears of the younger readily believed, that the figure, the countenance, and the voice, of the young orator, ſtrongly reſembled thoſe of the ambitious and artful Piſiſtratus, whoſe ſpecious virtues had ſubverted the liberty of his country. The alarmed jealouſy of freedom, which often

[57] Suidas. [58] Plut. in Pericl.

deſtroyed, in an hour; the authority eſtabliſhed ſlowly, and with much labor, during many meritorious years, might be tempted to puniſh the imagined tyranny of Pericles; who, to eſcape the diſgrace of the oſtraciſm, ſhunned the dangerous admiration of the aſſembly.

he courts and corrupts the Athenian populace;

The active vigor of his mind, thus withdrawn from politics, was totally directed to war; and his abilities, alike fitted to excel in every honorable purſuit, and gradually opening with every occaſion to diſplay them, carried off the palm of military renown from the moſt illuſtrious captains of the age. Cimon alone ſurpaſſed him in the object of his victories gained over Barbarians; but Pericles equalled Cimon in valor and conduct. A rivality in warlike fame was followed by a competition for civil honors. Cimon, who had been introduced on the theatre of public life by the virtuous Ariſtides, regarded, like that great man, a moderate ariſtocracy, as the government moſt conducive to public happineſs. The contrary opinion was warmly maintained by Pericles, who found an oſtentatious admiration of democracy the beſt expedient for removing the prejudice excited againſt him, by his reſemblance to Piſiſtratus, of aſpiring, or at leaſt of being capable to aſpire, at royal power. On every occaſion he defended the privileges of the people againſt the pretenſions of the rich and noble; he embraced not only the intereſts, but adopted the capricious paſſions, of the multitude; cheriſhing their preſumption, flattering their vanity, indulging their rapacity, gratifying

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their taſte for pleaſure without expenſe, and fomenting their natural antipathy to the Spartans, who, as the patrons of rigid ariſtocracy, were peculiarly obnoxious to their reſentment.

encourages their ambitious pretenſions.

The condition of the times powerfully conſpired with the views and meaſures of Pericles, ſince the glory and wealth acquired in the Perſian war, procured not only allies and power to the ſtate, but induſtry and independence to the populace. The ſon of Xanthippus impelled this natural current, which ran ſo ſtrongly in favor of both, when he maintained, that the citizens of Athens were entitled to enjoy equal advantages at home, to challenge a juſt pre-eminence in Greece, and to aſſume a legal dominion over their diſtant colonies and confederates.

Means by which he ſubdued the Athenian colonies and allies. A. C. 470 — 440.

Theſe unfortunate communities had unwarily forged their own chains, when they conſented to raiſe an annual ſubſidy to maintain the guardian navy of Athens. They perceived not, that this temporary benevolence would be ſoon converted into a perpetual tribute, ſince, in proportion as they became unaccuſtomed to war, they laid themſelves at the mercy of that republic, to which they had tamely intruſted the care of their defence. When the rigorous exactions of Athens ſpeedily warned them of their error, the wide intervals at which they were ſeparated from each other, rendered it impoſſible for them to afford mutual aſſiſtance, and to act with united vigor. Naxos, Thaſos, Ægina, Eubœa, Samos, and other iſlands or cities of leſs importance, boldly ſtruggled to

repel uſurpation; but fighting ſingly, were ſucceſſively ſubdued; while new, and more grievous, burdens were cruelly impoſed on them. The leaſt patient again murmured, petitioned, rebelled, and taking arms to reſiſt oppreſſion, were treated with the ſeverity due to unprovoked ſedition. The puniſhment inflicted on them was uniformly rigorous. They were compelled to deliver up the authors of the revolt, to ſurrender their ſhipping, to demoliſh their walls, or receive an Athenian garriſon, to pay the expenſes of the war, and give hoſtages for their future obedience [59]. It is not the buſineſs of general hiſtory to deſcribe more minutely the events of this ſocial war, which was carried on chiefly by Pericles, and finiſhed in the courſe of thirty years; with every ſucceſs the moſt preſumptuous ambition of Athens could either expect or deſire. Samos, the capital of the iſland of that name, made the moſt vigorous reſiſtance; but at length ſurrendered to Pericles, after a ſiege of nine months, in the ninth year before the war of Peloponneſus [60].

CHAP. XII. 2d.

Spirit of the Athenian government.

Hiſtorians, partial or credulous, have handed down ſome atrocious cruelties committed after the taking of Samos, which may be confidently rejected as fictions, injurious to the fame of Pericles, who though he approved and animated the aſpiring genius of his country, and vainly flattered himſelf that he could juſtify, by reaſons of ſtate, its moſt ambitious uſurpations, uniformly ſhowed himſelf inca-

59 Thucydid. et Diodor. loc. citat.

60 Thucydid. l. i. p. 75.

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pable of any deliberate wickedneſs. It may be obſerved, however, that as the moderate peace with Sparta had been concluded chiefly with a view to allow the Athenians to apply their undivided attention to the affairs of their tributaries, the ſeverities exerciſed over theſe unfortunate ſtates were, in conſequence of that event, rather increaſed than mitigated. Athenian magiſtrates and garriſons were ſent to govern and command them. They were burdened with new impoſitions, and diſhonored by new badges of ſervitude. The lands, which the labor of their anceſtors had cultivated, were ſeized and appropriated by ſtrangers, who claimed the diſtinction of Athenian colonies; and all theſe once independent and flouriſhing republics were thenceforth compelled to ſubmit their mutual conteſts, their domeſtic differences, and even their private litigations, to the cogniſance and deciſion of Athenian aſſemblies and tribunals [61]. By drawing thus cloſely the reins of government, Pericles, in the courſe of ten years, brought into the treaſury of Athens the ſum of near two millions ſterling [62]. His vigilance ſeaſonably diſplayed the terrors of the Athenian navy before the moſt diſtant enemies or allies of the republic; by alternate pliancy and firmneſs, by ſucceſſive promiſes, bribes, and threats, he repreſſed the jealous hoſtility of neighbouring powers; and while his ambition and magnificence fortified and adorned the capital with

its exceſſive ſeverity towards its dependences.

[61] Iſocrat. de Pace; et Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.

[62] Thucyd. Diodor. Iſocrat. Plut. etc.

external ſtrength and ſplendor, they alſo laid the foundations of thoſe internal diſorders, which rendered his long adminiſtration glorious for his contemporaries, fatal to the ſucceeding generation, and ever memorable with poſterity.

CHAP. XIII.

Tranſition to the internal State of Athens. — Laws of Draco — Solon — Piſiſtratus — Cliſthenes — Ariſtides — Pericles. — Final Settlement of the Athenian Government. — View of the Athenian Empire. — The combined Effect of external Proſperity and democratic Government on Manners — Arts — Luxury. — Hiſtory of Grecian Literature and Philoſophy. — Singular Contraſt and Balance of Virtues and Vices. — The ſublime Philoſophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates. — The unprincipled Captiouſneſs of the Sophiſts. — The moral Tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides. — The licentious Buffoonery of Ariſtophanes. — The imitative Arts employed to the nobleſt Purpoſes — and abuſed to the moſt infamous. — Magnificence of public Feſtivals. — Simplicity in private Life. — Modeſt Reſerve of Athenian Women. — Voluptuouſneſs, Impudence, and Artifices of the School of Aſpaſia.

CHAP. XIII. Tranſition to the internal ſtate of Athens.

THE taking of Samos cloſed the long ſeries of Athenian conqueſts. During the nine ſubſequent years, that once fortunate people enjoyed and abuſed the bleſſings of peace and proſperity. Their oſtentatious diſplay of power increaſed the envy and terror of Greeks and Barbarians, and excited the obſtinate and bloody war of twenty-ſeven years, during which the force of the

whole Grecian nation was exerted to demoliſh or uphold the ſtately edifice of empire that had been reared by the ambitious patriotiſm of Pericles. Aſſiſted by feeble or reluctant allies, Athens long ſtruggled againſt the combined ſtrength of Peloponneſus, Bœotia, Macedon, Sicily, and Perſia; and our curioſity muſt deſervedly be attracted towards the internal reſources and moral condition of a people, who, with few natural advantages, could make ſuch memorable and pertinacious efforts, and who, amidſt the din of arms, ſtill cultivating and improving their favorite arts, produced thoſe immortal monuments of taſte and genius, which, ſurviving the deſtruction of their walls, navy, and harbours, have ever atteſted the glory of Athens, and the impotent vengeance of her enemies. In an inquiry of this kind, the ſcience of government and laws, which gives ſecurity to all other ſciences, merits the firſt place in our attention; nor, at this diſtance of time, will the enlightened reader contemplate with indifference the laws of Athens, which having been incorporated [1] into the Roman

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[1] The Romans ſent deputies to Athens, to obtain a copy of Solon's laws, four hundred and fifty-four years before Chriſt. The benefits derived from theſe ſalutary inſtitutions were gratefully acknowledged by the liberal candor of a people, who knew how to appreciate the merit of enemies and ſubjects. Hear the language of Pliny (l. viii. ep. 24.) to Maximus, who in the reign of Trajan was appointed governor of the province of Achaia, or Greece: "Remember that you go to a country where letters, politeneſs, and agriculture itſelf (if we believe common report), were invented .... Revere the gods and heroes, the ancient virtue and glory of the nation. Reſpect even its fables and its vanity; remembering that from Greece we derived our laws. The right of conqueſt, indeed, hath

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jurisprudence about the middle of the fifth century before Christ, served, after an interval of above sixteen hundred years, to abolish the barbarous practices of the Gothic nations, and to introduce justice, security, and refinement, among the modern inhabitants of Europe [a].

Laws and government.

* The admirable institutions of the heroic ages were built on religion; which, as we have fully

enabled us to impose our laws on the Greeks; but that people had first given us their laws, at our solicitation, and when they had nothing to fear from the power of our arms. It would be inhuman and barbarous to deprive them of the small remnant of liberty which they still possess."

[a] Justinian's Pandects, it is well known, were discovered at Amalfi, in Italy, A. D. 1130. In less than half a century afterwards, the civil law was studied and understood in all the great provinces of Europe; and this study (as Mr. Hume observes, Reign of Richard the Third) tended to sharpen the wits of men, to give solidity to their judgment, to improve their taste, and to abolish the barbarous jurisprudence which universally prevailed among the Gothic nations. To this law we owe the abolition of the mode of proof by the ordeal, the corsnet, the duel, and other methods equally ridiculous and absurd. Pecuniary commutations ceased to be admitted for crimes; private revenge was no longer authorized by the magistrate; and the community was made to feel its interest in maintaining the rights, and avenging the wrongs, of all its members. See more in the admirable discourse annexed to the Reign of Richard the Third. I shall add but one observation, in Mr. Hume's own words: "The sensible utility of the Roman law, both to public and private interest, recommended the study of it, at a time when the more exalted and speculative sciences carried no charms with them; and thus the last branch of ancient literature which remained uncorrupted, was happily the first transmitted to the modern world: for it is remarkable, that in the decline of Roman learning, when the philosophers were universally infected with superstition and sophistry, and the poets and historians with barbarism, the lawyers, who, in other countries, are seldom models of science or politeness, were yet able, by the constant study and close imitation of their predecessors, to maintain the same good sense in their decisions and reasonings, and the same purity in their language and expression." Hume's Hist. 4th vol. 8vo, p. 308.

explained above, ascertained and enforced the rights and obligations of public and private life. But the abused authority of priests and oracles, and the natural depravity of man, ever solicitous to obtain the partial favor of his heavenly protectors on easier terms than the faithful discharge of his duty, gradually severed, by fraud or violence, the natural and most salutary union between religion and morality; in consequence of which separation, the former degenerated into an illiberal superstition, and the latter relaxed into licentiousness, or stiffened into pedantry. The striking comparison, or rather contrast, between the genius and character, the virtues and vices, of the Greeks, as variously described by Homer and by Solon, and which is so much to the advantage of the earlier period, must, in the progress of this discourse, naturally present itself to the reflection of the attentive reader, and will set in the clearest point of view the unhappy revolution of manners, which time and accident had produced in the wide interval between the poet and the legislator.

CHAP. XIII.

Legislation of Draco; Olymp. xxxix. 1. A. C. 624.

The very imperfect legislation of Draco[3], who flourished thirty years before Solon[4], proved that the Athenians felt the want of a science, which they knew not how to acquire or cultivate. The austere gravity of that magistrate seems to have imposed on the easy credulity of the multitude; for his ignorance or severity were alike unworthy of the important office with which he was intrusted.

[3] Suidas in voce Draco. Pollux, l. viii. c. vi.

[4] Meursius, Solon.

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He gave laws, which, according to the lively expreſſion of an orator, ſeemed to be written [5], not with ink, but with blood; ſince death or baniſhment were his ordinary penalties for the moſt trivial offences, as well as for the moſt dangerous crimes: and he juſtified this rigor, by abſurdly obſerving, that the ſmalleſt diſorders deſerved death, and no ſeverer puniſhment could be inflicted on the greateſt. The laws of Draco, therefore, tended only to increaſe the evils which they were deſigned to remedy [6]; and no people ever preſented a ſcene of greater confuſion and miſery, than did the unhappy Athenians, when the abilities and virtues of Solon were ſeaſonably called to their relief.

of Solon. Olymp. xlvi. 3. A. C. 594.

In relating the general revolutions of Greece, we had occaſion to deſcribe the important ſervices, and illuſtrious merit, of this extraordinary man, whoſe diſintereſtedneſs, patriotiſm, and humanity, equalled his military conduct and ſucceſs. His royal extraction (for he ſprang from the race of the Codridæ), his experienced abilities, above all, his approved wiſdom and equity, pointed him out for the nobleſt and moſt ſublime employment of humanity, that of regulating the laws and government of a free people. Such, at leaſt, the Athenians may be conſidered, when their unanimous ſuffrage rendered Solon the abſolute umpire of their whole conſtitution and policy; although, prior

State of Athens in the time of Solon.

[5] The orator Demades, of whom more hereafter. The obſervation has been always repeated in ſpeaking of Draco, though his laws were certainly written neither with blood nor ink. Even thoſe of Solon were only engraved on tables kept in the citadel.

[6] Ariſtot. de Civ. l. ii. et Plut. in Solon.

to

to this period, they ſuffered the combined evils of anarchy and oppreſſion [7]. The magiſtrates plundered the treaſury and the temples; and often betrayed, for bribes, the intereſts of their country. The rich tyranniſed over the poor, the poor continually alarmed the ſafety of the rich. The rapacity of creditors knew no bounds. They compelled the inſolvent debtors to cultivate their lands, like cattle; to perform the ſervice of beaſts of burden; and to tranſfer to them their ſons and daughters, whom they exported as ſlaves to foreign countries. Solon, with a laudable vanity, boaſts of having recovered and reſtored to their native rights many of thoſe unhappy men, whoſe ſentiments had been debaſed, and language corrupted, by the infamy of Barbarian ſervitude [8]. The wretched populace, deriving courage from deſpair, had determined no longer to ſubmit to ſuch multiplied rigors; and before the wiſdom of the lawgiver interpoſed, they had taken the reſolution to elect and follow ſome warlike leader, to attack and butcher their oppreſſors, to eſtabliſh an equal partition of lands, and to inſtitute a new form of government [9]. But the numerous clients and retainers, who, in a country little acquainted with arts and manufactures, depended on the wealthy proprietors of the lands and mines of Attica, muſt have rendered this undertaking alike dangerous to both parties; ſo that both became willing rather to ſubmit their differences to law, than to decide them by the ſword.

[7] Fragm. Solonis apud. Demoſth. p. 234. edit. Wol.
[8] Idem, ibid. [9] Plut. in Solon.

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His regulations concerning property.

The impartiality of Solon merited the unlimited confidence of his country. He maintained the ancient diviſion of property, but aboliſhed debts. He eſtabliſhed the rate of intereſt at 12 per cent. at which it afterwards remained; but forbade, that the inſolvent debtor ſhould become the ſlave of his creditor, or be compelled to ſell his children into ſervitude. After theſe preliminary regulations, which ſeemed immediately neceſſary to the public peace, Solon proceeded, with an impartial and ſteady hand, to new-model the government [10]; on this generous, but equitable principle, that the few ought not, as hitherto, to command, and the many to obey; but that the collective body of the people, legally convened in a national aſſembly, were entitled to decide, by a plurality of voices, the alternatives of peace and war; to contract or diſſolve alliances with foreign ſtates; to enjoy

New-models the government.

[10] The moſt correct information concerning the ancient republic of Athens, and the laws of Solon, is contained in Ariſtot. Fragm. de Civit. Athen. and in various parts of his ſecond, fourth, and ſixth books of Politics. 2. In Iſocrat. Areopagit. Panathen. et Panegyr. And 3. In Plut. in Vit. Solon. Xenophon's Treatiſe concerning the Athenian republic relates to later times, when many corruptions had crept in, as will be afterwards explained. It is remarkable, that Polybius, l. vi. has confounded the moderate inſtitutions of Solon with the democratical licentiouſneſs and tyranny introduced by Pericles and his ſucceſſors in the adminiſtration. The palpable errors of ſo judicious an author prove how little accurate knowledge the Greeks poſſeſſed on the ſubject of their own hiſtory; and how impoſſible it is for a modern writer, who blindly follows ſuch guides, not to fall into innumerable errors and contradictions. The treatiſe of Ariſtotle (de Civitate) above-mentioned, deſerves particular attention from thoſe who write or ſtudy the hiſtory of republics. In it we ſee the germ, and often more than the germ, of the political works of Machiavel, which Monteſquieu has ſo often copied, without once acknowledging his obligation.

all the branches of legiſlative or *ſovereign* power[11]; and to elect, approve, and judge the magiſtrates or miniſters intruſted, for a limited time, with the *executive* authority. CHAP. XIII.

In the actual ſtate of moſt countries of Europe, ſuch a form of government, as only takes place in ſome ſmall cantons of Switzerland, would be attended with the inconvenience of withdrawing the citizens too much from their private affairs. But in ancient Greece, and particularly in Attica, the ſlaves were four times more numerous than the freemen[12]; and of the latter we may compute that little more than one-half were entitled to any ſhare in the ſovereignty. Strangers, and all thoſe who could not aſcertain their Athenian deſcent, both in the male and female line, were totally excluded from the aſſembly and courts of juſtice. The regulations of Solon marked the utmoſt attention to preſerve the pure blood of Athens unmixed and uncorrupted; nor could any foreigner, whatever merit he might claim with the public, be admitted to the rank of citizen, unleſs he abandoned for ever his native country, profeſſed the knowledge of ſome highly uſeful or ingenious art, and, in both caſes, His inſtitutions ſuited the condition of the times.

[11] The election contained a mixture of chance, ſince thoſe who were named by the people caſt lots to decide on whom the office ſhould be conferred. The ſame practice prevails in chuſing the ſenators of the republic of Berne. But Solon enacted, that the fortunate candidate ſhould undergo what is called a probation; his character and merits were thus expoſed to a ſecond examination; and it ſeemed ſcarcely poſſible, after this ſevere ſcrutiny, that any man ſhould attain power, who was altogether unworthy of public confidence.

[12] See my Introductory Diſcourſe to the Orations of Lyſias and Iſocrates, p. 5, et ſeqq.

Ol. XLIII. had been chosen by ballot, in a full assembly of six thousand Athenians. These circumstances (especially as the Athenian people were usually convened only four times in thirty-five days) prevented their assemblies from being either so inconvenient and burdensome, or so numerous and tumultuary, as might at first sight be supposed. Yet their numbers, and still more their impetuosity and ignorance, must have proved inconsistent with good government, if Solon had not secured the vessel of the republic from the waves of popular frenzy, by the two firm anchors of the Senate and the Areopagus; tribunals originally of great dignity and of very extensive power, into which men of a certain description only could be received as members.

His division of the citizens.

Solon divided the Athenians into four classes, according to the produce of their estates. The first class consisted of those whose lands annually yielded five hundred measures of liquid, as well as dry commodities; and the minimum of whose yearly income may be calculated at sixty pounds sterling; which is equivalent, if we estimate the relative value of money by the price of labor, and of the things most necessary to life, to about six hundred pounds sterling in the present age [11]. The second class consisted of those whose estates produced three hundred measures; the third, of those whose estates produced two hundred; the fourth, and by far the most numerous class of Athenians, either possessed no landed property, or at least enjoyed not a revenue in land equal to twenty-four

[11] See Introduction to Lysias, etc. p. 14.

pounds sterling, or, agreeably to the above proportion, two hundred and forty pounds of our present currency.

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All ranks of citizens were alike admitted to vote in the public assembly, and to judge in the courts of justice; whether civil or criminal, which were properly so many committees of the assembly [1]. But the three first classes were exclusively entitled to sit in the senate, to decide in the Areopagus, or to hold any other office of magistracy. To these dignities they were elected by the free suffrages of the people, to whom they were accountable for their administration, and by whom they might be punished for malversation or negligence, although they derived no emolument from the diligent discharge of their duty.

Prerogatives of the first classes.

The senate of four hundred, which, eighty-six years after its institution, was augmented to five hundred by Clisthenes, enjoyed the important prerogatives of convoking the popular assembly; of previously examining all matters before they came to be decided by the people, which gave them a negative before debate in all public resolutions; and of making laws which had force during a year, without requiring the consent of the populace. Besides this general superintendence and authority,

Of the senate of the 500.

[1] In my Introductory Discourses to the Orations of Lysias, etc. I had occasion to explain the nature of the Athenian tribunals. Since the publication of that work, the same subject, and particularly the form of civil process, has been accurately explained by Sir William Jones, in his Dissertations annexed to the translation of Isæus. Mr. Pettingal's learned work upon the use and practice of *juries* among the ancients, lately fell into my hands. Wherein my ideas and his differ, will easily appear from the text, and needs not be pointed out.

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the senate was exclusively invested with many particular branches of the executive power. The president of that council had the custody of the public archives and treasury. The senate alone built ships; equipped fleets and armies; seized and confined state-criminals; examined and punished several offences, which were not expressly forbidden by any positive law. The weight of such a council, which assembled every day, except festivals, infused a large mixture of aristocracy into the Athenian constitution. This, as we shall immediately explain, was still farther increased by the authority of the Areopagus, a court so named from the place where it was held; a hill sacred to Mars, adjoining to the citadel.

The nine archons.

The principal magistrates in Athens were the nine archons, the first of whom gave his name to the year, and presided in the civil courts of justice, where a committee of the people, chosen promiscuously from all classes by lot [11], sat as judges and jury; but where it belonged to the archon and his assessors, men appointed by suffrage, and acquainted with forms, to take what in Scotland is called a precognition, to prescribe the form of action, to give the ballot [12], and to receive and declare the

[11] The essential difference between the Roman and Athenian government, consisted in the different placing of the judicial power; which at Rome remained 200 years in the hands of the senate. The seditions of the Gracchi, and most of the civil dissensions which happened before the time of Augustus, had for their object or pretence, the altering of this order of things, and bringing the Roman constitution nearer the Athenian.

[12] Οἱ τιθέντες τον ἀγῶνα καὶ τὴν ψῆφον διδόντες, are the words of Lysias. The same writer mentions the παρέδροι, συνδικοι, assessors, syndics.

verdict and ſentence of the court. The archon next in dignity, who had the appellation of king, preſided in cauſes reſpecting religion and things ſacred, which formed the object of an important and dangerous branch of Athenian juriſprudence. The archon third in dignity, with his aſſeſſors the generals [17], preſided in military matters; and the ſix remaining, who were known by the general appellation of theſmothetæ, heard criminal pleas of various kinds, or rather directed the proceedings of the ſix courts where criminal cauſes were examined and determined. Theſe nine archons, or preſidents of the ſeveral courts of juſtice, like all other Athenian magiſtrates, were, at the expiration of their annual office, accountable to the people; and when their conduct, after a ſevere ſcrutiny, appeared to merit public approbation and gratitude, they were received, and remained for life, members of the Areopagus, a ſenate inveſted with a general inſpection over the laws and religion, as well as over the lives and manners of the citizens; and which, in dangerous emergencies, was even entitled to aſſume a ſort of dictatorial power [18].

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The Areopagus.

Such is the great outline of the conſtitution eſtabliſhed by Solon, according to which every Athenian citizen enjoyed the ineſtimable privilege of being judged by his peers, and tried by laws to

Happy tendency of Solon's plan of government.

[17] Lyſias, in the ſecond oration againſt Alcibiades (a military cauſe), not only mentions the στρατηγοι, or generals, but addreſſes them ſeparately from the ανδρες δικασται, or judges.

[18] Iſocrat. Oratio Areopagit.

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which he himself had consented. Although the legislative and judicial powers were thus lodged with the people, men of property and ability were alone intrusted with the administration of government; and as power in some measure followed property, the same expedient which served to maintain a due distinction of ranks in society, tended also to promote the industry and frugality of the multitude, that they might thereby become entitled to share those honors and offices, to which persons of a certain estate only could aspire.

Extensive nature of his laws.

The laws of Solon were of the most extensive nature, comprehending not only rules of right, but maxims of morality, regulations of commerce, and precepts of agriculture. To describe his institutions respecting such matters as are properly the objects of law, would be explaining those great, but familiar principles, concerning marriage, succession, testaments, the rights of *persons* and of *things*, which, through the medium of the civil law, have been conveyed into the jurisprudence of all the civilized nations of Europe. His laws concerning education and manners prove that drunkenness and unnatural love were the predominant vices of that early age. It was a particular duty of the archons, to prevent or punish offences committed in consequence of intoxication; and the regulations concerning schools [19], which were not to be opened till sun-rise, which were ordered to be shut before night, and into which none but such relations of

[19] Æschin. in Timarchum.

the master, as were particularly specified by law, could on any pretence be admitted; marked the utmost solicitude to root out an evil which already infected and disgraced the manners of Greece.

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The education recommended by Solon nearly resembled that above described, which generally prevailed in Greece [20]. The children of Athenian citizens, when taken from the hands of the women, were delivered to two masters, of whom the one formed the body, and the other the mind. Swimming, and the easier exercises, prepared them for the harder toils of the gymnastic. Reading, and learning by heart the lessons and examples of the poets, made way for the severer studies of eloquence and philosophy. In process of time, music, geometry, and drawing, seem to have entered into the plan of a liberal education [21]. At the age of twenty, the youth of all ranks took an oath in the temple of Agraulos (an appellation of Minerva), to obey and to maintain the laws of their country; to use their best endeavours to promote its prosperity; to follow the standard of whatever commanders might be appointed to conduct them; to sail to every part of the world, when summoned by the public service; to fight to death for their native land; and to regard wheat, barley, vines, and olives, as the only boundaries of Attica [22]: a preposterous arrogance in that little republic, which already betrayed an ambition to conquer and appropriate all

His system of education.

Duties and employments of the youth.

[20] See Chapters V. and VI. [21] Arist. Polit. l. vii. c. iii.

[22] See Introduction to Lysias, etc. p. 16.

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the cultivated parts of the world. When the Athenian youth were not, in consequence of this oath, engaged in military service, they were obliged by law to follow such employments as suited their respective fortunes. Agriculture, commerce, and mechanic arts, fell to the share of the poor; the rich still continued their application to gymnastic and philosophy, carefully studied the laws of the republic, examined the ancient and actual condition of their own and neighbouring states; and, at the age of thirty, appeared as candidates in the assembly for such offices of trust and honor as their regular manners, inoffensive and dutiful behaviour in all the relations of private life, temperance, œconomy, public spirit, and abilities[21], might obtain from the voluntary suffrage of the people.

Usurpation of Pisistratus. A. C. 578.

The usurpation of Pisistratus, though it destroyed for a time the political liberty of Athens, gave stability to most of the laws and forms introduced by Solon. That extraordinary *tyrant*, for so the Greeks styled him, was not more distinguished by the loftiness of his genius than the humanity of his disposition; and had not the violence of contending factions, and the fury of his enemies, inflamed his natural love of power, the name of Pisistratus would stand the foremost in the list of Grecian patriots and heroes. His valor and conduct were signalized in the conquest of Nisæa, Salamis, Naxos, Delos, and Sigæum; and if he displayed boldness and address in acquiring sovereignty, he displayed

[21] Lysias, passim.

still more moderation and virtue in administering it. He assumed, indeed, the royal dignities of priest and general, and took care that the chief offices of magistracy should be filled by his partisans. But he maintained the regular course of law and justice, not only by his authority, but by his example; having appeared in person to answer an accusation in the Areopagus. He not only enforced the laws of Solon against idleness, but endeavoured to give them more efficacy by introducing new arts and manufactures into Attica. He was the first who brought into that country the complete collection of Homer's poems, which he commanded to be sung at the Panathenæan festival; nor can we suppose that he should have been zealous to diffuse the liberal and manly sentiments of that divine poet, if his government had not resembled the moderation and equity of the heroic ages, rather than the despotism of tyrants.

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His moderate and wise administration;

His son Hipparchus imitated and surpassed the mild virtues of his father; and, amidst the turbulence of the later democracy, it was acknowledged with a sigh by the Athenians, that their ancestors were indeed happy under Solon and Pisistratus, but that the reign of the tyrant Hipparchus brought back on earth the golden days of Saturn. The father had required a tenth part of the produce of Attica, to support his guards, and the other appendages of royalty: his more generous son remitted one-half of this imposition. While he alleviated the burdens, yet encouraged the industry of his subjects, by building the temple of Olympian

surpassed by that of his son Hipparchus,

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Jupiter, he was ſolicitous to diſpel their ignorance and barbarity by erecting pillars in every part of the city, engraved with elegiac verſes, containing leſſons of wiſdom and precepts of morality. He collected the firſt library in Athens; and his liberal rewards, and ſtill more his agreeable manners and winning affability, attracted to that city the moſt diſtinguiſhed poets of the age.

His murder exaſperates Hippias.

The murder of Hipparchus exaſperated the temper of his brother and ſucceſſor Hippias; but notwithſtanding the calamities which the latter inflicted and ſuffered, it muſt be allowed that the government of Piſiſtratus and his family, which, with various interruptions, laſted ſixty-eight years [24], increaſed the ſtrength, and promoted the refinement of Athens [25].

The government changed by Cliſthenes. Olymp. lxvii. 3. A. C. 510.

Yet in nothing was that uſurpation more advantageous than in the animating ſenſe of liberty which the memory of paſt ſervitude, under Hippias, excited and kept alive in Athens, after the popular government had been reſtored by Cliſthenes and Alcibiades. We have already had occaſion to relate the foreign victories of the republic, which immediately followed that event; but at the ſame time the conſtitution of government underwent a conſiderable change. By admitting to the rank of citizens a promiſcuous crowd of ſtrangers, fugitives, Athenians of half blood, and perhaps ſlaves, the tribes were augmented from four to ten; and

[24] Between 578 and 510. B. C.

[25] See the treatiſe of Meurſius, entitled Piſiſtratus, one of the few ſatisfactory performances in the immenſe collection of Gronovius.

the ſenators from four to five hundred. The oſtraciſm was likewiſe eſtabliſhed; a law by which any citizen whoſe influence or abilities ſeemed dangerous to liberty, might be baniſhed ten years, without the proof or allegation of any poſitive crime. CHAP. XIII.

In this condition the republic continued thirty years, until the glorious victories of Salamis, Platæa, and Mycalé, encouraged the loweſt but moſt numerous claſs of citizens, by whoſe valor thoſe memorable exploits had been atchieved, to make further invaſions on the prerogatives of their ſuperiors. The ſudden wealth, which the rich ſpoils of the Barbarians had diffuſed among all ranks of men, increaſed the *cenſus* of individuals, and deſtroyed the balance of the conſtitution. Ariſtides, who perceived it to be impoſſible to reſiſt the natural progreſs of democracy, ſeaſonably yielded to men who had arms in their hands, and firmneſs in their hearts; and propoſed, with apparent ſatisfaction, but much ſecret reluctance [25], a law by which the Athenian magiſtrates ſhould be thenceforth promiſcuouſly elected from the four claſſes of citizens. This innovation paved the way for the ſtill greater changes begun twenty years afterwards, and gradually completed by Pericles; a revolution of which the conſequences were not immediately felt, but which continually became more ſenſible, and finally terminated in the ruin of Athens and of Greece.

Important alteration made by Ariſtides. Olymp. lxxv. 2. A. C. 479.

The general reaſons which prevailed on the equity and diſcernment of Pericles to eſpouſe, with

The democracy completed

[25] Ἑκων ακοντι δι θυμω, cited on this occaſion by Plutarch, well expreſſes the forced generoſity of Ariſtides to the populace.

CHAP. XIII. undue warmth, the cauſe of the populace, have in the preceding chapter been ſufficiently explained. Yet whatever partial motives of intereſt and ambition [27] might warp the views of this illuſtrious ſtateſman, it muſt be acknowledged, that the foreign tranſactions and ſucceſs of the republic, and particularly the new ſituation in which the Athenians found themſelves placed with regard to their diſtant allies and colonies, might naturally ſuggeſt and occaſion very important alterations in the Athenian conſtitution. The ancient and ſacred law, which obliged every citizen, without fee or reward, to take arms in defence of his country, could not eaſily be extended to the obligation of protecting, without a proper recompence, the intereſt of foreign communities. The ſcanty population of Attica ſufficed not to anſwer the demands of ſo many diſtant expeditions. It became neceſſary to hire troops wherever they might be found; and, as this neceſſity introduced pay into the Athenian armies, a ſimilar, though not equally cogent, reaſon eſtabliſhed fees and ſalaries for all the different orders of judges and magiſtrates. The ſame principle of duty and public ſpirit, which obliged every freeman to fight without pay, likewiſe obliged him gratuitouſly to judge, conſult, and deliberate, for

by Pericles. Olymp. lxxxii. 4. A. C. 449.

Introduction of pay to the troops;

of fees and ſalaries to the magiſtrates.

[27] Plutarch (in Pericle) mentions a particular reaſon which engaged Pericles to counteract the ariſtocracy, and to abridge the power of the Areopagus. Although he had been often *named* for the office of archon, the *lot* had never fallen on him; ſo that he could not be received as a member of that reſpected court. If this obſervation be well founded, it ſhows how little real weight the annual magiſtracies had at Athens; ſince Pericles, though he never attained the dignity of archon, governed the republic many years with unrivalled authority.

the benefit of his country. But when the contested intereſts of foreign, though dependent communities, were agitated and adjuſted in the tribunals of Athens, it ſeemed reaſonable for thoſe who ſpent their time in an employment, to which no natural obligation called them, to demand a proper reward for their uſeful ſervices. At firſt, therefore, a *ſmall* ſum, but which gradually increaſed with the power of the people, was regularly diſtributed among the citizens, for every deliberation which they held, and for every cauſe which they determined. CHAP. XIII.

The deſire of reaping this profit made the populace anxious to draw all cauſes and deliberations before their own tribunals and aſſemblies. This deſign was ſucceſsfully accompliſhed by Ephialtes [19], an artful and daring demagogue, whom Pericles employed as a proper inſtrument to effect ſuch invidious meaſures as were moſt obnoxious to the rich and noble. While his patron extended the renown of Athens by his foreign victories, and gradually reduced into ſubjection the colonies and allies of the republic, the obſequious Ephialtes zealouſly promoted his domeſtic meaſures; and by undermining the authority of the ſenate and of the Areopagus [20], the firmeſt bulwarks of the

Theſe circumſtances totally unhinge the government eſtabliſhed by Solon.

[19] Plut. in Pericle.

[20] Authors have not deſcribed in what particular reſpects, or by what particular means, Ephialtes effected his purpoſe: yet we may collect, from obſcure hints on this ſubject, that he not only brought before the inferior tribunals cauſes hitherto confined to the Areopagus, but took from that court its general inſpection and ſuperintendence over the religion and laws; which offices he beſtowed on the popular court of the ἡλιαια and the νομοφυλακες, who were appointed, and

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ariſtocracy, obtained a ſignal victory over the laws of Solon. The aſſaſſination of Ephialtes proved only the weakneſs of his enemies; and we ſhall find, in the ſubſequent hiſtory of Athens, that moſt matters of deliberation came, thenceforth, in the firſt inſtance, before the popular aſſembly; that the wiſe inſtitutions of Solon were reduced to an empty form; and that the magnanimity of Pericles, the extravagance of his immediate ſucceſſors, the patriotiſm of Thraſybulus and Conon, the integrity of Phocion, the artifices of Æſchines, and the eloquence of Demoſthenes, ſucceſſively ſwayed, at will, a wild and capricious democracy.

External and domeſtic proſperity of the republic. Olymp. lxxxv. 1. A. C. 440.

The revolution which immediately followed, in the manners, character, and conduct of the Athenians, was the natural conſequence of the change of government, combined with other circumſtances inſeparably connected with their domeſtic and external proſperity. In the courſe of a few years, the ſucceſs of Ariſtides, Cimon, and Pericles, had tripled the revenues, and increaſed, in a far greater proportion, the dominions of the republic. The Athenian gallies commanded the eaſtern coaſts of the Mediterranean; their merchantmen had engroſſed the traffic of the adjacent countries; the

diſmiſſed, at the will of the people. He likewiſe rendered the *probation* for becoming an *Areopagite* leſs ſevere than formerly. Perſons crept into this order, whoſe characters diſgraced it. The Areopagites became equally acceſſible to preſents and to beauty; and their deciſions fell into contempt. See the diſcourſe of Iſocrates upon reforming the government of Athens, and Athenæus, l. ix. That Ephialtes, or Pericles himſelf, likewiſe weakened the authority of the ſenate (although it is not remarked by any ancient author), appears from all the ſubſequent hiſtory of Athens.

maga-

magazines of Athens abounded with wood, metal, ebony, ivory, and all the materials of the useful as well as of the agreeable arts; they imported the luxuries of Italy, Sicily, Cyprus, Lydia, Pontus, and Peloponnesus; experience had improved their skill in working the silver mines of mount Laurium; they had lately opened the valuable marble veins in mount Pentelicus; the honey of Hymettus was more esteemed, in proportion as it became better known to their neighbours, the culture of their olives (oil being long their staple commodity, and the only production of Attica, which Solon allowed them to export) must have improved with the general improvement of the country in arts and agriculture, especially under the active administration of Pericles, who liberally let loose the public treasure to encourage every species of industry [50].

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But if that minister promoted the love of action, he found it necessary at least to comply with, if not to excite, the extreme passion for pleasure, which then began to distinguish his countrymen. The people of Athens, successful in every enterprise against their foreign as well as domestic enemies, seemed entitled to reap the fruits of their dangers and victories. For the space of at least twelve years preceding the war of Peloponnesus, their city afforded a perpetual scene of triumph and festivity. Dramatic entertainments, to which they were passionately addicted, were no longer performed in slight

Effect of this, combined with the change of government, on manners and arts.

[50] Isocrat. Areop. de Pace, et Panegyr. Xenoph. et Aristot. de Repub. Athen.

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unadorned edifices, but in ſtone or marble theatres, erected at great expenſe, and embelliſhed with the moſt precious productions of nature and of art. The treaſury was opened, not only to ſupply the decorations of this favorite amuſement, but to enable the poorer citizens to enjoy it, without incurring any private expenſe; and thus, at the coſt of the ſtate, or rather of its tributary allies and colonies, to feaſt and delight their ears and fancy with the combined charms of muſic and poetry. The pleaſure of the eye was peculiarly conſulted and gratified in the architecture of the theatres and other ornamental buildings; for, as Themiſtocles had ſtrengthened, Pericles adorned his native city; and unleſs we had the concurring teſtimony of antiquity, as well as the immortal remains of the Parthenon, or temple of Minerva, which ſtill excite the admiration of travellers, it would be difficult to believe that in the ſpace of a few years, there could have been created thoſe inеſtimable wonders of art, thoſe innumerable temples, theatres, ſtatues, altars, baths, gymnaſia, and porticoes, which, in the language of ancient panegyric, rendered Athens the eye and light of Greece [31].

Luxury and vices of Athens.

Pericles was blamed for thus decking one favorite city, like a vain, voluptuous harlot, at the expenſe of plundered provinces [32]; but it would have been fortunate for the Athenians if their extorted wealth had not been employed in more periſhing, as well as more criminal, luxury. The

[31] Iſocrat. et Ariſtid. in Panegyr. [32] Plutarch in Pericle.

pomp of religious ſolemnities, which were twice as numerous and as coſtly in Athens as in any other city of Greece; the extravagance of entertainments and banquets, which on ſuch occaſions always followed the ſacrifices; the increaſe of private luxury, which naturally accompanied this public profuſion, exhauſted the reſources, without augmenting the glory, of the republic. Inſtead of the bread, herbs, and ſimple fare recommended by the laws of Solon, the Athenians, ſoon after the eightieth Olympiad, availed themſelves of their extenſive commerce to import the delicacies of diſtant countries, which were prepared with all the refinements of cookery [33]. The wines of Cyprus were cooled with ſnow in ſummer; in winter [34] the moſt delightful flowers adorned the tables and perſons of the wealthy Athenians. Nor was it ſufficient to be crowned with roſes, unleſs they were likewiſe anointed with the moſt precious perfumes [35]. Paraſites, dancers, and buffoons, were an uſual appendage of every entertainment [36]. Among the weaker ſex, the paſſion for delicate birds, diſtinguiſhed by their voice or plumage, was carried to ſuch exceſs as merited the name of madneſs [37]. The bodies of ſuch youths as were not peculiarly addicted to hunting and horſes, which began to be a prevailing taſte [38], were corrupted

[33] Ariſtoph. Nubes, ver. 50. et Lyſiſtrat. paſſim.
[34] Athen. l. xi. 3. et Xenoph. Memorabilia, l. ii.
[35] Xenoph. ibid. [36] Athenæus, l. i. et Xenoph. Symp.
[37] Ὀρνιθομανια, Athen. l. xi. 3. [38] Ariſtoph. Nubes, paſſim.

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by the commerce of harlots, who had reduced their profeſſion into ſyſtem [19]; while their minds were ſtill more polluted by the licentious philoſophy of the ſophiſts. It is unneceſſary to crowd the picture, ſince it may be obſerved, in one word, that the vices and extravagances, which are ſuppoſed to characterize the declining ages of Greece and Rome, took root in Athens during the adminiſtration of Pericles, the moſt ſplendid and moſt proſperous in the Grecian annals.

Contraſt and balance of virtues and vices, advantages and diſadvantages.

This paradox, for ſuch it muſt appear, may be explained by conſidering the ſingular combination of circumſtances, which, in the time of that ſtateſman, gave every poiſon its antidote, and rendered the partial evils, already deſcribed, only the thorn that ever accompanies the roſe. The Grecian hiſtory of thoſe times affords a more ſtriking contraſt than ever appeared in any other age or country, of wiſdom and folly, of magnanimity and meanneſs, of liberty and tyranny, of ſimplicity and refinement, of auſterity and voluptuouſneſs. The ſublime philoſophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates was accompanied, as with a ſhadow, by the dark unprincipled captiouſneſs of the ſophiſts; the pathetic and moral ſtrains of Sophocles and Euripides were parodied by the licentious buffoonery of Ariſtophanes; painting and ſculpture, which, under geniuſes of the firſt order like Phidias, ſerved as handmaids to religion and virtue, degenerated under inferior artiſts into mean hirelings of vice and

[19] Alexis apud Athenæum, l. xiii.

diſorder; the modeſty of Athenian matrons was ſet off as by a foil, when compared with the diſſoluteneſs of the ſchool of Aſpaſia; and the ſimple frugality of manners, which commonly prevailed in private families, even of the firſt diſtinction, was contraſted with the extravagant diſſipation of public entertainments and feſtivals. To examine the parallel links of this complicated chain will illuſtrate the character of a people whoſe ſubſequent tranſactions form one principal object of Grecian hiſtory. CHAP. XIII.

Parallel links of this chain examined.

Philoſophy, which in Greece alone deſerves the peculiar attention of the hiſtorian, aroſe about the beginning of the ſixth century before Chriſt, and in a hundred and fifty years attained the higheſt degree of perfection, and ſunk into the loweſt degeneracy and corruption, to which the uſe or abuſe of the human intellect could raiſe or plunge it. Leſſer Aſia, to which Europe and America owe the ineſtimable benefits of their religion and letters, produced and nouriſhed the tender plant of philoſophy; and the flouriſhing Greek colonies on that delightful coaſt, communicated to their mother-country this precious offſpring of their ſoil. Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, Cleobulus of Lindus in the iſle of Rhodes, and the other wiſe men, as they were emphatically ſtyled, who lived in that age, not only gave advice and aſſiſtance to their countrymen in particular emergencies, but reſtrained their vices by wholeſome laws, improved their manners by uſeful leſſons of morality, and extended their knowledge by

Hiſtory of Greek philoſophy.

The ſeven Sages.

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important and difficult diſcoveries [40]. But the firſt attempt towards moral philoſophy, as independent on, and unconnected with religion, ſeems to have been the fables of Æſop, which, to men in an early period of ſociety, muſt have appeared a very ſerious and important ſpecies of compoſition. The ſphere of hiſtory was narrow; the examples of the gods, amidſt the continual corruptions of ſuperſtition, had become too flagitious for imitation; and men, whoſe ruſtic ſimplicity of life afforded them continual opportunities to obſerve the inſtinctive ſagacity of certain animals, might derive many uſeful leſſons from thoſe humble inſtructors. In the early ages of Greece and Rome, and of all other nations whoſe hiſtory is recorded, fables were told and in ſome degree believed, in the aſſembly and ſenate-houſe, on the moſt important occaſions; for in the infancy of ſociety men are children; and the deluſion, which the belief of a fable ſuppoſes, is not more groſs and improbable than many of thoſe errors into which (as we have already proved [41]) their lively fancy had often hurried them. The ſame romantic caſt of imagination which had animated woods and winds, mountains and rivers, which had changed heroes into gods, and gods into frail men, might endow animals with reaſon, and even ſpeech.

Æſop the fabuliſt.

The next ſtep towards moral ſcience was of a more refined and abſtract kind, conſiſting of the

The gnomonic poets.

[40] Plutarch. Sympoſ. et de Placit. Philoſoph. Plato in Protagor. Diogen. Laert. paſſim.

[41] See above, Chapter II.

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ſentences of the gnomonic poets [42], and in thoſe detached precepts or proverbs which, in all countries, have preceded any ſyſtematic account of morality. Each of the ſeven ſages, as they were called, had his favorite maxims [43], which he engraved in temples and other places of public reſort; but at this diſtance of time it is impoſſible, amidſt the differences of authors, to diſcover what belongs to each; nor is the ſearch important, ſince all their maxims or proverbs, whatever efforts of generalization they might coſt their inventors, now appear extremely ſimple and familiar.

Theſe reſpectable fathers of Grecian philoſophy, who ſilently diffuſed light through the gloom of a barbarous age, are ſaid to have maintained a correſpondence [44] with each other, as well as with Solon of Athens, Chilon of Sparta, and Periander of Corinth; men who, in imitation of their eaſtern brethren, chiefly cultivated ſuch practical knowledge as qualified them to be the legiſlators, magiſtrates, and generals of their reſpective countries.

The diſcoveries of Thales the Mileſian.

Thales the Mileſian, alone, quitted the ordinary purſuits of civil and military renown; and although he compoſed verſes, promulgated moral ſentences, and, on ſome particular emergencies, gave ſeaſonable advice to his countrymen, yet he eſtabliſhed his fame on a baſis more broad and

[42] See the Sentences of Theognis, which are evidently a collection, not the work of one man.

[43] Ariſtot. Rhet. ii. 21. Stobæus, Serm. p. 44, etc.

[44] Plut. Symp.

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permanent than the fluctuating intereſts of periſhing communities. Many of the elementary propoſitions of geometry, afterwards collected by Euclid, were firſt diſcovered [45] by Thales, who directed the acuteneſs of his mind with equal ſucceſs to aſtronomy. He divided the heavens into five zones; diſcovered the equinoxes and ſolſtices; remarked the Urſa Minor; obſerved, and nearly predicted, eclipſes. The diviſion of the year into three hundred and ſixty-five days was already known to the Egyptians; but although Thales might borrow this, and perhaps other diſcoveries, from that ancient people, among whom he ſometime reſided, it appears, even from thoſe authors who are ever prone to exaggerate the wiſdom of Egypt, that he owed much leſs to that country, than to the native ſagacity and penetration of his clear comprehenſive mind [46].

His ſchool and ſucceſſors.

Thales founded the Ionic ſchool, in which he was ſucceeded by Anaximander and Anaximenes, who were followed by Anaxagoras, the inſtructor of Pericles, and Archelaus, who is called by ancient writers the maſter of Socrates. About fifty years after Thales, the ſame ſpeculations which he had introduced were purſued by Xenophanes of Colophon, Leucippus and Parmenides of Elea, and Heraclitus of Epheſus. Theſe ingenious men diſcovered many uſeful truths; yet all of them, not

[45] Proclus in Euclid.

[46] Hieronym. apud Laert. l. i. c. xxvii. Plin. l. xxxviii. c. xvii.

excepting Thales himself, likewise busied themselves with subjects that will for ever excite and elude human curiosity. Their doctrines were equally liable to objection, whichever of the elements they assumed as the first principle of nature; they universally agreed in asserting the fallacy of the senses, and the unworthiness of the vulgar superstition; but their various opinions concerning the origin and destruction of worlds, the magnitudes and distances of heavenly bodies, the essence of matter and spirit [47], deserve only to be considered as the dreams of inquisitive men, whose ambition of knowledge carried them beyond the sphere of experience, and the clear deductions of reason. The system of Leucippus, the most famous of them all, was improved by Democritus of Abdera [48], and afterwards adopted by Epicurus, whose philosophy is sufficiently explained in the extraordinary work of Lucretius, the boldest monument which the world is ever likely to behold, of learning, genius, and impiety.

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degenerate into atheism.

But it is particularly worthy of observation, that at the same time Democritus assailed the celestial mansions, and unveiled, with a daring hand, the feeble majesty of Grecian superstition, Anaxagoras of Clazomené revealed a new and infinitely more august spectacle, by first announcing to the heathen world, a self-existent, all perfect mind, as the great

The sublime philosophy of Anaxagoras.

[47] See Diogen. Laert. l. i. Aristot. Metaph. passim. et Plut. de Placit. Philosoph.

[48] Laert. l. ix. Aristot. Physic. l. viii.

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cauſe and author of the material world. Thales and Pythagoras, with ſuch of their diſciples as faithfully adhered to their tenets, had indeed admitted ſpirit as a conſtituent principle of the univerſe; but they had ſo intimately blended mind and matter, that theſe diſſimilar ſubſtances ſeemed to make an indiſſoluble compound, as the ſoul and body conſtitute but one man. According to Anaxagoras, on the other hand, the creating and ſovereign intelligence was to be carefully diſtinguiſhed from the ſoul of the world, which he ſeems to have regarded merely as a poetical expreſſion for the laws which the Deity had impreſſed on his works. The great Ruler of the univerſe did not animate, but impel matter; he could not be included within its limited and periſhing terms; his nature was pure and ſpiritual, and totally incapable of pollution by any corporeal admixture [49].

The diſcovery and diffuſion of this luminous and ſublime principle, which was naturally followed by an inveſtigation of the moral attributes of the Deity, and the deducing from thence the great duties of morality, might have produced a general and happy revolution in Greece, under the zealous and perſevering labors of Socrates and his followers, if the tendence of this divine philoſophy had not been counteracted, not only by the groſs prejudices of the vulgar, but by the more dangerous refinements of incredulous Sophiſts.

[49] Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. l. i. c. iii. Plato in Cratylo, et Plut. in Pericle.

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The ſame ſpirit of inquiry, which leads to the diſcovery of truth, will ever promote the propagation of error; and unfortunately for Greece, in the middle of the fifth century before Chriſt, errors were propagated, ſo congenial to the condition of the times, that they could not fail to take deep root, and flouriſh in a ſoil which was peculiarly well prepared to receive them. The glorious victories over the Carthaginians and Perſians had increaſed the wealth and ſecurity, called forth the invention and induſtry, but, at the ſame time, multiplied the wants, and inflamed the paſſions, of the Greeks. The more powerful cities, and particularly Athens and Syracuſe, had attained a pitch of proſperity which exceeded their moſt ſanguine hopes; elated by the bloom of health and the pride of riches, they continually ſighed for new and unknown enjoyments, while both individuals and communities were ever ready to liſten to ſuch inſtructors as juſtified their vices, and taught them to abuſe the gifts of fortune.

Its tendency counteracted by the Sophiſts.

In this ſituation of affairs appeared the Sophiſts[50], whoſe name, ſtill familiar in the languages of Europe, pretty faithfully expreſſes their character. Hippias of Elis, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontium, with many inferior names, preſerved in the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Iſocrates, ſtarted up about the ſame time, and exhibited a new phænomenon in Greece. The Olympic, and other public aſſem-

Hiſtory of the Sophiſts. Olymp. lxxxv. 1. A. C. 440.

[50] Vid. Philoſtrat. de Vit. Sophiſt.

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blies, furniſhed them with an opportunity to diſplay their ſpecious accompliſhments to the admiring ſpectators. They frequented the great cities, particularly Athens, and acquired the friendſhip of the rich, and the applauſe of the multitude. They profeſſed the knowledge of every ſcience, and of every art, which they taught publicly, for a ſtipulated price; and, as they really poſſeſſed the art of perſuaſion, their diſciples continually increaſed among the rich and the voluptuous, the idle and the vain.

Their character and views.

Their language was glowing and harmonious, their manners elegant, their life ſplendid. When it ſerved their intereſt, and pleaſed the taſte of their hearers, they could paint virtue in the warmeſt and moſt alluring colors; but the capricious will of their ſcholars, whoſe paſſions they were ever careful to gratify, ſerved as the only ſtandard of their principles; and engaged them, for the moſt part, to deck out the barren doctrines of Leucippus and Democritus with the meretricious arts of the rhetorician. Their morality ſupplied the ſprings with which Epicurus watered his gardens; and their captious logic furniſhed the arguments by which Pyrrho attempted to juſtify his ſcepticiſm [51]. It would be eaſy to trace up to the Sophiſts that quibbling metaphyſic, which being embodied in the Greek language, thenceforth adhered too cloſely to the philoſophical writings of that people, and

Their influence on philoſophy and manners.

[51] See the note on the Sophiſts, in my tranſlation of Iſocrates's Panegyric of Athens, p. 1, et ſeqq.

which totally disfigures many otherwise valuable compositions of antiquity. But our present business is only to remark the destructive effects immediately resulting from their tenets, which, while they undermined, without openly opposing, the ancient and popular superstition, boldly set at defiance all those useful maxims of conduct, and all those salutary discoveries of reason, which, amidst the insolence of the Greek democracies, fomented by prosperity, appeared essentially requisite to restrain the intemperance, injustice, and violence, of individuals and communities.

Opposed by Socrates.

In several republics of Greece, the Sophists enjoyed a free career to display their talents, practise their artifice, and to promote their fame and fortune. But in Athens their frauds were detected, and their characters unmasked by Socrates[11], whose philosophy forms an important æra in the history of the human mind. The son of Sophroniscus was born at Athens, forty years before the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. The smallness of his patrimony, amounting only to three hundred pounds, and his original profession of a statuary[11], have encouraged an opinion of the obscurity of his birth, among writers who did not reflect on the narrowness of Athenian fortunes, and who forgot to consider, that as hereditary distinctions were little known or regarded in the Grecian republics,

[11] To avoid prolixity in the account of Socrates and his philosophy, I cite not particular passages, but give the general result of my reading in Plato and Xenophon.

[11] Laert. l. ii. art. Socrat.

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a solid and permanent lustre was naturally derived from the practice of ingenious arts, which could not be cultivated, as in ancient Rome, and sometimes in modern Europe, by servile or mercenary hands, but only by the first class of freemen and citizens. Whatever reputation or advantage Socrates might have acquired by the exercise of a profession, which was peculiarly encouraged by the taste of the times, and the magnificent spirit of Pericles, he readily sacrificed to the natural bent of his mind, which concealed, under an external form worthy to represent the voluptuous Silenus [54], the fruitful seeds of every amiable and manly sentiment, and determined him, by an irresistible impulse, to the study of wisdom and virtue.

His education and character.

In his early youth he heard the physics of Archelaus, and learned the geometry of Theodorus [55]; and from these, and other teachers, acquired such an acquaintance with the fashionable theories concerning the formation of the universe, the original principles of things, the hidden powers of matter, as enabled him to regard with just contempt, and occasionally to deride with inimitable humor, the vanity of those useless and shadowy speculations. He acknowledged with the pious Anaxagoras, the superintending mind, whose providence regulated the operations of nature, as well as the affairs of human life. He denied not the existence of those inferior intelligences, which formed the only

[54] Plato et Xenoph. in Symp.

[55] Plato in Theætet. et in Menon.

objects of popular adoration; he allowed the divine origin of dreams and omens; he was exemplary in all the religious duties of his country; and were we to judge the Athenian ſage by the ſtandard of ordinary men, we ſhould be inclined to believe that he had not entirely eſcaped the contagion of ſuperſtition; ſince he profeſſed to be accompanied by a dæmon, or inviſible conductor, who often reſtrained his paſſions, and influenced his behaviour [56]. If this aſſertion was not an effect of that refined *irony* familiar to Socrates, we muſt allow his temper to have been tinged with credulity: yet, whoever ſeriouſly reflects on a life of ſeventy years, ſpent in the ſervice of mankind, uniformly blameleſs, and terminated by a voluntary death, in obedience to the unjuſt laws of his country; whoever conſiders attentively the habitual temperance, the unſhaken probity, the active uſefulneſs, the diffuſive benevolence, the conſtant equanimity and cheerfulneſs of this ſingular man, will admit a degree of enthuſiaſm, rather as the ornament, than defect, of ſuch an extraordinary character. Men of learning and genius, who, examining the matter ſtill more deeply, have obſerved the important revolution produced by the life and death of Socrates, on the principles and ſentiments of his contemporaries, and of poſterity, are diſpoſed to believe that ſuch an extraordinary phænomenon could not have appeared in the moral world, without the particular interpoſition of heaven. The cheerful ſerenity of his laſt

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[56] Plut. de Genio Socratis.

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moments [57], and ſtill more, the undeviating tenor of his active virtue, juſtified the hardeſt maxims of Lycurgus and Pythagoras; while the main aim of his ſpeculations was to eſtabliſh the ſublime morality of thoſe ſages on the cleareſt deductions of reaſon and experience.

His philoſophy.

From the perfections of the ſupreme intelligence he deduced his juſt government of the univerſe, which implied the immortality of the human ſoul. But the great object of his reſearch was to diſcover the general laws by which, even in this life, the ſuperintending providence had variouſly diſpenſed to men good and evil, happineſs and miſery. Theſe laws he regarded as the promulgated will of the God, with which, when clearly aſcertained, it became our duty invariably to comply; ſince nothing but the moſt ſhortſighted folly could riſk incurring the divine diſpleaſure, in order to avoid pain or poverty, ſickneſs or death; far leſs to acquire periſhing gratifications, which leave a ſting behind them. Reaſoning on ſuch principles, and taking experience only for his guide, he deduced, with admirable perſpicuity, the intereſts and duties of nations and individuals, in all the complicated relations of ſociety. The actions of men furniſhed the materials, their inſtruction formed the object, their happineſs was the end of his diſcourſe. Wherever his leſſons might be moſt generally uſeful, there he was always to be found; frequenting, at an early hour, the Academy, Lyceum, and other

[57] This ſubject will be treated hereafter.

public

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public *Gymnaſia*; punctually attending the forum at mid-day, the hour of full aſſembly; and in the evening joining, without the affectation of auſterity, in the convivial entertainments of his friends, or accompanying them in the delightful walks which adorned the banks of the Ilyſſus. As a huſband, a father, a citizen, and a ſoldier, the ſteady practice of his duty continually illuſtrated his doctrines. The converſation and example of this truly practical philoſopher (and this is his higheſt panegyric) perſuaded many of his fellow-citizens ſincerely to embrace a virtuous courſe of life; and even thoſe who, like Critias and Alcibiades, allowed the current of their paſſions to prevail over the conviction of their ſober hours, were ſtill charmed with the wonderful extent, as well as the ſingular accuracy, of his various knowledge; with the acuteneſs and penetration of his arguments; the beauty, vivacity, and perſuaſiveneſs of his ſtyle; which, whether he aſſumed the tone of reaſon or of ridicule, ſurpaſſed whatever had been deemed moſt eloquent [58].

Its influence.

Yet, how great ſoever might be the perſonal influence of Socrates, the triumph of his philoſophy became more illuſtrious and complete, after his principles were embraced by thoſe who cultivated the imitative arts, and directed the public amuſements, which in all countries, but particularly in Greece, have ever produced immediate and powerful effects on the national opinions and character. In Greece alone, the theatre was regarded as an

Aſſiſted by the tragic poets;

[58] Xenoph. Memor. l. iv. c. xv. Laert. l. ii. c. xix. et ſeqq. et Cicero de Orat. iii. 16.

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object of the first importance and magnitude; it formed an essential, and by far the most splendid, part of religious worship; the expense of supporting it exceeded that of the army and navy together; and this celebrated entertainment, which united the tragedy and opera of the moderns, was carried to perfection by a favorite disciple of Socrates, whose works were so universally admired in Greece, that (as we shall have occasion to relate in the Sicilian war) the Syracusans released from captivity those Athenians, and those only, who had learned to repeat the verses of Euripides. This admired poet rendered the Grecian tragedy complete, by perfecting the chorus [59] the principal distinction between the ancient and the modern drama, and which, when properly conducted, rendered the former more regular, yet more varied; more magnificent, and at the same time more affecting; above all, more interesting and more instructive.

particularly Euripides.

who perfected the chorus.

From the prevailing manners of the times, when the principal citizens lived together in crowds, and daily frequented the public halls, the *gymnasia*, the

[59] In this part of the drama, the philosophy of Euripides excels the loftiness of Æschylus, and the richness of Sophocles. It is sufficient to compare the works of the three rivals, to perceive that the chorus in Euripides most faithfully answers the description of Horace:

Ille bonis faveatque, et consilietur amicis,
Et regat iratos, et amet peccare timentes.
Ille dapes laudet mensæ brevis, ille salubrem
Justitiam, legesque, et apertis otia portis;
Ille tegat commissa; deosque precetur et oret,
Ut redeat miseris, abeat fortuna superbis.

forums, and temples, it was natural to expect that the action of a Grecian tragedy ſhould conſiſt in ſome great public event, which intereſted the whole body of the people. The ſcene was uſually the portico of a temple, the gate of a palace, the wide expanſe of a forum, or market-place. In ſuch places many ſpectators muſt be ſuppoſed preſent, who would naturally take part in an action which concerned the public intereſt and happineſs[*]. On this principle was introduced the ancient chorus, conſiſting of ſuch perſons as moſt properly ſuited the occaſion, and who, though not immediately or principally concerned in the cataſtrophe, had ſuch general and indirect intereſt, as kept them continually on the ſcene, and made them approve or condemn, promote or oppoſe, the ſentiments and meaſures of the actors. The chorus, never quitting the ſtage, neceſſarily introduced the unity of place; and as their ſongs and dances between the acts expreſſed the feelings excited by the repreſentation, they connected the preceding act with that which immediately followed it, and rendered the whole ſpectacle uninterrupted and continuous.

[*] In the Oedipus Tyrannus, the chorus is compoſed of prieſts, ſenators, Theban youths, etc. Creon ſays to Oedipus,

Ει τωνδε χρηζεις πλησιοζοντων κλυειν
Ετοιμος εστιν, ειτι και ϛειχειν τεω

The anſwer is,

Ες παντας ουδε τωνδε γαρ πλειν ορω,
Ηκουσ' α και της ειτης ανυχης περι.

CREON. Shall I ſpeak in preſence of this numerous aſſembly? or ſhall we retire?

OEDIPUS. Speak before all preſent; for the public diſtreſs afflicts me more than my own danger.

C. II. A. P. XIII.

The muſic of the chorus was more rich and various, and the poetry more elevated and glowing, than what could be admitted into the acts, or ordinary dialogue, which was confined to the iambic meaſure; circumſtances which, together with the numbers, the dreſſes, the dances, and geſtures, of theſe fancied ſpectators, equally increaſed the magnificence and variety of the entertainment. They likewiſe rendered it more affecting; ſince nothing is more proper to intereſt us in any ſcene, than the beholding a great number of perſons deeply engaged by it, and expreſſing their feelings by natural tones and movements. But the principal advantage of the chorus was to furniſh the poet with an opportunity (without loading the dialogue, and rendering it too ſententious) of enforcing, by all the power of fancy and of numbers, that moral inſtruction, which was occaſionally attempted by Æſchylus and Sophocles, but which forms the continual end and aim of Euripides, who had a ſoul to feel, and a genius to expreſs, whatever is moſt lovely and moſt excellent in ſentiment and character. It is unneceſſary to mention the affecting delicacy of Admetus and his attendants towards his gueſt Hercules; the lively emotions of gratitude in that hero; the friendſhip of Pylades and Oreſtes; the amiable picture of conjugal affection in the character of Alceſtes; ſince the whole remains of that ineſtimable writer prove his unceaſing labors to warm his countrymen with all the virtues and charities that adorn private life, as well as to keep alive an ardent love of the republic, and a generous paſſion for its glory

and liberty; while, in ſeveral paſſages, he deſcribes and refutes the philoſophy of Epicurus [41] (which, as we have already obſerved, was chiefly borrowed from the licentious maxims of the Sophiſts) with ſuch fulneſs and accuracy as entitled him to the appellation of the Philoſophic Tragedian. CHAP. XIII.

His views counteracted by the authors of the old comedy.

That Euripides, though ten years older than Socrates, owed the characteriſtic excellences of his works to the converſation and friendſhip of that unrivalled moraliſt, is univerſally acknowledged by antiquity [42]; though the character and intentions

[41] See particularly Alceſt. ver. 782, etc. and ver. 960, etc.

Euripides flouriſhed near an hundred years before Epicurus and Zeno, the reſpective founders of the Epicurean and Stoical philoſophy. Yet we find the tenets of both ſects in the tragedian; which may be eaſily explained, by conſidering that thoſe oppoſite kinds of philoſophy aroſe from different aſpects of nature, which muſt often preſent themſelves to an obſerving eye; and as the doctrines of the Sophiſts laid the foundation for the moral ſyſtem of Epicurus, ſo the moderate doubt of Socrates, and the old academy, was corrupted into different degrees of ſcepticiſm, according to the fancy of their ſucceſſors; and his rational preference of virtue to all other objects, degenerated into a pretended contempt for theſe objects, as things totally indifferent, the inſenſibility and pedantry of the Stoics.

[42] Εδοκει συμποιειν Ευριπιδη. Diogen. Laert. in Vit. Socrat. The comic poets, who envied and hated Euripides, as the darling of the public, pretended that Socrates had even compoſed all the fineſt paſſages in his tragedies. Soon after the repreſentation of the Troes, Mneſilochus parodied it in a farce, which he called Φρυγες, Phrygians, probably to have an opportunity of playing on the word Φρυγανον, fuel.

Φρυγες ισι καινον δραμα τυτ' Ευριπιδυ
Ω και Σωκρατης τα Φρυγανα υποτιθησι.

"The Phrygians is a new play of Euripides, to whom Socrates furniſhes the fuel." But the pun cannot be tranſlated. The ſame Mneſilochus calls Euripides a ſort of hammerman to Socrates,

Ευριπιδης Σωκρατογομφευς.

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both of the poet and the philoſopher were groſsly miſrepreſented by ſome of their contemporaries. Before the commencement, and during the continuance of the Peloponneſian war, there flouriſhed at Athens a claſs of men who were the declared enemies, not only of Socrates and his diſciples, but of all order and decency. The reader will eaſily perceive, that I allude to Ariſtophanes, and the other writers of the old licentious comedy; an entertainment which was never carried to the ſame vicious exceſs in any other age or country. Yet this hideous ſpectre was the ſiſter of Tragedy, whoſe angelic ſweetneſs and dignity were long accompanied by this odious and diſguſting form; but to underſtand the natural connexion between objects ſeemingly ſo different, it is neceſſary to remount to their ſource.

Hiſtory of that licentious entertainment.

Tragedy, the ſong of the goat[61], and Comedy, the ſong of the village, ſufficiently indicate, by the meanneſs of their ancient names, the humility of their firſt original. They aroſe amidſt the ſacrifices and joyous feſtivity of the vintage, in a country which ſeldom adopted the amuſements, any more than the arts and inſtitutions, of others, but which was deſtined to communicate her own to all

[61] A goat, as the particular enemy of the vine, was very properly ſacrificed to Bacchus, whoſe praiſes compoſed the ſong. In the Antigoné of Sophocles, v. 1127,

Πολυωνυμε Καδμειας
Νυμφαις αγαλμα, και Διος
Καρυβρεμετα γενος, etc.

we have a ſpecimen of what formed the firſt buſineſs of tragedy.

the civilized portion of mankind. During the entertainments of a ſeaſon peculiarly dedicated to recreation and pleaſure, the ſuſceptible minds of the Greeks naturally yielded to two propenſities congenial to men in ſuch circumſtances, a diſpoſition to exerciſe their ſenſibility, and a deſire to amuſe their fancy. Availing himſelf of the former, the ſublime genius of Æſchylus [64] improved the ſong of the goat into a regular dramatic poem, agreeing with the Iliad and Odyſſey in thoſe unalterable rules of deſign and execution which are eſſential to the perfection of every literary performance, yet differing from thoſe immortal archetypes of art, in a circumſtance naturally ſuggeſted by the occaſion for which tragedies were compoſed. It had been uſual with the Athenians, when they celebrated in the ſpring and autumn the great feſtivals of Bacchus, to perſonate the exploits and fables handed down by immemorial tradition concerning that bountiful divinity; this imitation was conſidered as a mark of gratitude due to the beneficence of the god, to whoſe honors they aſſociated the kindred worſhip of Pan, Silenus, and their attendant fawns and ſatyrs. When Æſchylus repreſented, therefore,

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[64] Æſchylus is ſaid by Ariſtotle (de Arte Poeticâ) to have introduced interlocutors, dialogue, etc. which is acknowledging him the father of tragedy. We know little of Theſpis, but from Horace:

Ignotum tragicæ genus inveniſſe camœnæ
Dicitur, et plauſtris vexiſſe poëmata Theſpis.

The plauſtrum, however, has a more direct reference to comedy; ſince λαλεῖν ὡς ἐξ ἁμαξῆς, to ſpeak as from a cart, was a common Greek expreſſion for reviling with groſs indecent inſolence.

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inſtead of ſimply reciting, the real hiſtory, or agreeable fictions, of antiquity, he only adopted a mode of imitation already practiſed in the religious ceremonies of his country; a mode of imitation more powerful than the epic, ſince, inſtead of barely deſcribing the deeds of gods and heroes, it ſhows thoſe diſtinguiſhed perſonages on the ſcene, makes them ſpeak and act for themſelves, and thus approaching nearer to reality, is ſtill more forcible and affecting.

Its characteriſtics, as diſtinguished from tragedy;

As tragedy was introduced in imitation of the more ſerious ſpectacles of the Dionyſian feſtival; ſo comedy, which ſoon followed it, was owing to the more light and ludicrous parts of that ſolemnity [65]. Tragedy is the imitation of an important and ſerious action, adapted to affect the ſenſibility of the ſpectators, and to gratify their natural propenſity to fear, to weep, and to wonder. Comedy is the imitation of a light and ludicrous action, adapted to amuſe the fancy, and to gratify the natural diſpoſition of men to laughter and merriment. Terror and pity have in all ages been regarded as the main ſprings of tragedy, becauſe the laws of

[65] Horace is authentic, and the moſt agreeable authority:

Agricolæ priſci, fortes, parvoque beati
Condita poſt frumenta, levantes tempore feſto
Corpus, et ipſum animum ſpe finis dura ferentem,
Cum ſociis operum, pueris, et conjuge fidâ,
Tellurem porco, Silvanum lacte piabant,
Floribus et vino Genium, memorem brevis ævi.
Feſcennina per hunc invecta licentia morem
Verſibus alternis opprobria ruſtica fudit, etc. etc.

and ſtill more directly, Ars Poetic. v. 220, etc.

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ſenſibility, founded ſolely in nature, are always the ſame. Comedy has been infinitely varied by the innumerable modes of wit, humor, and ridicule, which prevail in different ages and countries, and which agree ſcarcely in any one particular, unleſs it may be reckoned an agreement, that men have ſeldom indulged them, except at the expenſe of their good-nature, and often of their virtue. The Grecian comedy was uncommonly licentious; the profligate characters of Ariſtophanes and his contemporaries, Mneſilochus, Callias, Eupolis, and Cratinus, contributed, doubtleſs, to this deformity; yet theſe poets could not eaſily have rendered their new entertainment agreeable to the taſte " and prejudices of the public, without incorporating in them the ſubſtance of the *phallic* ſongs [67], which conſtituted an ancient and eſſential part of the amuſements of the vintage. The fond admirers of antiquity have defended the abominable ſtrains of theſe licentious poets, by pretending, that their intention was to reform vice, not to recommend it; an apology which, if admitted, might tend to exculpate the writers, but could never juſtify their performances, ſince it is known by experience,

" Horace has expreſſed, with his uſual felicity, the ſituation of the ſpectators, and the fatal neceſſity of humoring it:

— Aſper
Incolumi gravitate jocum tentavit; eo quod
Illecebris erat et gratâ novitate morandus.
Spectator, functuſque ſacris, et potus et exlex!

[67] Φαλλος. Priapus ξυλον επιμηκες εχων εν τω αιδοιω σκυτινον. Suidas. This was carried in proceſſion, accompanied with the Φαλλικα ασματα.

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that lewd deſcriptions prove a poiſon rather than a remedy; and inſtead of correcting manners, tend only to corrupt them.

and from modern comedy.

Beſides the general licentiouſneſs of the ancient comedy, its more particular characteriſtics reſulted from the peculiar circumſtances of the Athenians, during the time of its introduction and continuance. The people of all ranks at Athens were then too deeply engaged in the military and political tranſactions of their country, to enjoy any amuſement which did not either directly flatter their paſſions, or bear an immediate relation to the great and important intereſts of the republic. It was during the confuſion and calamities of the Peloponneſian war, that all the comic pieces which remain were originally repreſented; a period too diſorderly and tumultuous to reliſh comedies, ſuch as are now written, or ſuch as were compoſed in Greece by Menander, in an age of greater moderation and tranquillity. The elegant and ingenious, the moral and inſtructive ſtrains of Moliere or Menander, may amuſe the idleneſs of wealth, and the ſecurity of peace. But amidſt the fermentation of war and danger, amidſt civil diſſenſions and foreign invaſions, the minds of men are too little at eaſe to enjoy ſuch refined and delicate beauties, which then appear lifeleſs and inſipid. In ſuch turbulent circumſtances, the reluctant attention muſt be excited by real, inſtead of imaginary characters; by a true, inſtead of a fictitious event; by direct and particular advice concerning the actual ſtate of their affairs, inſtead of vague or abſtract leſſons of wiſdom

and virtue. Coarſe buffoonery may often force them to laugh; delicate ridicule will ſeldom engage them to ſmile; they may be affected by the ſharpneſs of perſonal invective, but will remain impenetrable to the ſhafts of general ſatire. CHAP. XIII.

By combining the different parts of this deſcription, we may form a tolerably exact notion of the writings of Ariſtophanes, which commonly conceal, under a thin allegorical veil, the recent hiſtory of ſome public tranſaction, or the principal features of ſome diſtinguiſhed character, repreſented in ſuch a ludicrous light, as reflects on thoſe concerned, unexpected, and often unmerited, but not therefore the leſs ſtriking, flaſhes of inſolent ridicule. Such was the nature, and ſuch the materials of the ancient comedy, which, in its form, agreed entirely with tragedy, having borrowed from this entertainment (which was already in poſſeſſion of the theatre) the diſtribution of the whole, as well as the arrangement of the ſeveral parts; the muſic, the chorus, the dreſſes, decorations, and machinery; all of which were ſo modified and burleſqued as ſuited the purpoſes of the comic writer, and often rendered his pieces little elſe than parodies of the more faſhionable tragedies of the times. General notion of the pieces of Ariſtophanes.

This ſingular ſpecies of drama, which, in its leſs perfect ſtate, had long ſtrolled the villages of Attica, was ſimply tolerated at Athens, until the profuſion of Pericles, and his complaiſance for the populace, firſt ſupplied from the exchequer the neceſſary expenſes for the repreſentation of comedies, and propoſed prizes for the comic, as well as for He and his aſſociates encouraged at Athens by Pericles.

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the tragic, poets and actors. But, by this injudicious encouragement, he unwarily cherished a serpent in his bosom. Aristophanes and his licentious contemporaries having previously ridiculed virtue and genius, in the persons of Socrates and Euripides, boldly proceeded to avail themselves of the natural malignity of the vulgar, and their envy against whatever is elevated and illustrious, to traduce and calumniate Pericles himself; and though his successors in the administration justly merited (as we shall have occasion to relate) the severest lashes of their invective, yet, had their characters been more pure, they would have been equally exposed to the unprovoked satire of those insolent buffoons, who gratified the gross appetites of the vulgar, by an undistinguished mass of ridicule, involving vice and virtue, things profane and sacred, men and gods.

The Grecian festivals;

Dramatic entertainments formed an essential part of the festivals consecrated to the bountiful author of the vine. Minerva, who had given not only the olive, but what was deemed far more valuable, her peculiar protection to the city of Athens, was rewarded with innumerable solemnities. Jupiter enjoyed his appropriated honors; but more commonly, as is attested by Athenian medals, the worship of the father of the gods was associated with that of his wife and warlike daughter. We shall have occasion to speak more particularly of the festival and mysteries of Ceres, who taught the Athenians the important knowledge of agriculture, which they were supposed to have diffused over the

ancient world. It would be endleſs to mention the inſtitutions in honor of the crowd of inferior or leſs propitious divinities, which rendered the feſtivals at Athens twice more numerous than in any other Grecian city. Nor did their frequency abate any thing of the expenſive ſplendor which accompanied them. The ſhops and courts of juſtice were ſhut; the mechanic quitted his tools, the huſbandman ceaſed from his labors, the mourner intermitted his ſorrow. The whole city was diſſolved in feaſting and jollity; the intervals of which were filled up by pompous ſhows and proceſſions, by concerts of muſic, by exhibitions of painting; and at ſeveral feſtivals, particularly the Panathenæan, by hearing and judging the nobleſt productions of eloquence and poetry[68]. We ſhall have occaſion to mention ſome particular ceremonies of a more melancholy caſt; but the general character of the Grecian religion was as cheerful and attractive, as the ſuperſtition of the Egyptians, from whom they are ignorantly ſuppoſed to have borrowed it, was gloomy and forbidding. Even the Egyptian hymns conſiſted in diſmal complaints and lamentations[69]; the Grecian ſolemnities concluded with ſongs of joy and exultation. The feaſts which followed the ſacrifices were enriched by all the delicacies and luxuries of the ancient world; and, to uſe the words of Ariſtotle, many perſons thought it their duty, at thoſe religious entertainments, to get drunk in honor of the gods[70].

the ſplendor with which they were celebrated.

[68] Iſocrat. Panegyr. et Panathen.

[69] Apuleius de Genio Socratis.

[70] Ariſtot. Ethic. ad Nichom. l. viii. c. iii.

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Manners of the Athenians in private life.

It ſeems extraordinary, that the revenues of Athens, notwithſtanding their improvement by Pericles, ſhould have ſufficed for this multitude of expenſes. But we muſt conſider, that the general ſimplicity of manners in private life, formed a ſtriking contraſt with the extravagance of public feſtivals and amuſements. The houſes and tables of the moſt wealthy Athenians were little diſtinguiſhed above thoſe of their pooreſt neighbours. Pericles himſelf, though never ſuſpected of avarice, lived with the exacteſt œconomy; and the ſuperabundance of private wealth, which would have created envy and danger to the owner, if he had employed it for his particular convenience and pleaſure, procured him public gratitude and eſteem, when expended for the ſatisfaction of the multitude.

Condition of the female ſex.

For reaſons which will immediately appear, we have not hitherto found it neceſſary to deſcribe the manners and influence of the Grecian women; but the character and condition of the fair ſex will throw light on the preceding obſervations in this chapter, and preſent the moſt ſtriking contraſt of any to be met with in hiſtory. If we knew not the conſideration in which women were anciently held in Greece, and the advantages which they enjoyed at Sparta, after the laws of Lycurgus had revived the inſtitutions of the heroic ages [71], we ſhould be apt to ſuſpect that the ungenerous treatment of the feebler ſex, which afterwards ſo univerſally prevailed, had been derived from the

[71] Ariſtot. Politic. l. ii. p. 105.

Egyptian and Aſiatic colonies, which early ſettled in that part of Europe. Excluded from ſocial intercourſe, which nature had fitted them to adorn, the Grecian women were rigorouſly confined to the moſt retired apartments of the family, and employed in the meaneſt offices of domeſtic œconomy. It was thought indecent for them to venture abroad, unleſs to attend a proceſſion, to accompany a funeral[72], or to aſſiſt at certain other religious ſolemnities. Even on theſe occaſions, their behaviour was attentively watched, and often malignantly interpreted. The moſt innocent freedom was conſtrued into a breach of decorum; and their reputation, once ſullied by the ſlighteſt imprudence, could never afterwards be retrieved. If ſuch unreaſonable ſeverities had proceeded from that abſurd jealouſy which ſometimes accompanies a violent love, and of which a certain degree is nearly connected with the delicacy of paſſion between the ſexes, the condition of the Grecian women, though little leſs miſerable, would have been far leſs contemptible. But the Greeks were utter ſtrangers to that refinement of ſentiment[73], which, in the ages of chivalry, and which ſtill, in ſome ſouthern countries of Europe, renders women the objects of a ſuſpicious, but reſpectful paſſion, and leads men to gratify their vanity at the expenſe of their freedom. Married or unmarried, the Grecian females were kept in equal reſtraint; no pains were taken to render them, at any one period of their lives, agreeable members of ſociety; and their education was

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[72] Lyſias, p. 420. [73] Idem, p. 435.

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either entirely neglected, or confined at leaſt to ſuch humble objects, as, inſtead of elevating and enlarging the mind, tended only to narrow and to debaſe it. Though neither qualified for holding an honorable rank in ſociety, nor permitted to enjoy the company of their neareſt friends and relations, they were thought capable of ſuperintending or performing the drudgery of domeſtic labor, of acting as ſtewards for their huſbands, and thus relieving them from a multiplicity of little cares, which ſeemed unworthy their attention, and unſuitable to their dignity. The whole burden of ſuch mercenary cares being impoſed on the women, their firſt inſtructions and treatment were adapted to that lowly rank, beyond which they could never afterwards aſpire [74]. Nothing was allowed to divert their minds from thoſe ſervile occupations in which it was intended that their whole lives ſhould be ſpent; no liberal idea was preſented to their imagination, that might raiſe them above the ignoble arts in which they were ever deſtined to labor; the ſmalleſt familiarity with ſtrangers was deemed a dangerous offence; and any intimacy or connexion beyond the walls of their own family, a heinous crime; ſince it might engage them to embezzle the houſehold furniture and effects committed to their care and cuſtody. Even the laws of Athens confirmed this miſerable degradation of women, holding the ſecurity of the huſband's property a matter of greater importance

[74] Xenoph. Memorab. l. v. paſſim, particularly Socrates's Diſcourſe with Iſchomachus.

than

than defending the wife's perſon from outrage, and protecting her character from infamy.[71] By ſuch illiberal inſtitutions were the moſt amiable part of the human ſpecies inſulted, among a people in other reſpects the moſt improved of all antiquity. They were totally debarred from thoſe refined arts and entertainments, to which their agreeable qualities might have added a new charm. Inſtead of directing the taſte, and enlivening the pleaſures of ſociety, their value was eſtimated, like that of the ignobleſt objects, merely by profit or utility. Their chief virtue was reſerve, and their point of honor, œconomy.

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The extreme depreſſion of women levelled the natural inequalities of their temper and diſpoſition; the prude, the coquette, with the various intermediate ſhades of female character, diſappeared; and all the modeſt and virtuous part of the ſex (if virtue and modeſty can ever be the effects of reſtraint) were reduced to humble imitation and inſipid uniformity. But, in the time of Pericles, there appeared and flouriſhed at Athens a bolder claſs of females, who diveſted themſelves of the natural modeſty, diſdained the artificial virtues, and avenged the violated privileges of their ſex. Aſia, the mother of voluptuouſneſs, produced this dangerous brood, whoſe meretricious arts and occupations met with no check or reſtraint from the laxity of Ionian morals, and were even promoted and encouraged by the corruptions of Pagan ſuperſtition.

Grecian courtezans;

[71] See the laws quoted by Lyſias, explained in my Introductory Diſcourſe to that orator, p. 100.

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In moſt of the Greek colonies of Aſia, temples were erected to the *earthly* Venus; where courtezans were not merely tolerated, but honored, as prieſteſſes of that condeſcending divinity [76]. The wealthy and commercial city of Corinth firſt imported this innovation from the Eaſt; and ſuch is the extravagance of the human mind, that after the repulſe of Xerxes, the magiſtrates of that republic aſcribed the ſafety of their country to the powerful interceſſion of the votaries of Venus, whoſe portraits they cauſed to be painted at the public expenſe, as the Athenians had done thoſe of the warriors who gained the battle of Marathon [77]. The fame of all thoſe accompliſhed, but mercenary beauties, though highly celebrated by the poets and hiſtorians of the times, was eclipſed by the ſplendor of Aſpaſia of Miletus, who ſettled at Athens under the adminiſtration of Pericles, and is ſaid to have embarked in the fleet with which that fortunate commander ſubdued the powerful and wealthy iſland of Samos. The perſonal character of Aſpaſia gave temporary luſtre to a profeſſion, which, though exalted by the caſual caprices of ſuperſtition, muſt naturally have fallen into contempt; ſince later writers among the Greeks [78] acknowledge, that though ſhe carried on a very diſhonorable commerce in female virtue, yet her wit and eloquence, ſtill more than her beauty, gained her extraordinary conſideration among all ranks in the republic. The ſuſceptible

Their artifices and influence.

[76] Athenæus, l. xiii. et Plutarch, p. 637.

[77] Simonides apud Athen. l. xiii.

[78] Plutarch. in Pericle.

minds of the Athenians were delighted with what their abſurd inſtitutions rendered a novelty, the beholding the native graces of the ſex, embelliſhed by education. Aſpaſia is ſaid to have acquired a powerful aſcendant over Pericles himſelf; ſhe certainly acquired his protection and friendſhip; which is leſs extraordinary than that her converſation and company ſhould have pleaſed the diſcernment of the ſage Socrates. She is accuſed (as we ſhall afterwards have an opportunity to mention) of having excited, from motives of perſonal reſentment, the war of Peloponneſus; yet, calamitous as that long and obſtinate conflict proved to Greece, and particularly to Athens, it may be ſuſpected that Aſpaſia occaſioned ſtill more incurable evils to both. Her example, and ſtill more her inſtructions, formed a ſchool at Athens, by which her dangerous profeſſion was reduced into ſyſtem. The compoſitions of Aſpaſia ſerved as models for painting and ſtatuary, and themes for poetry and panegyric. Nor were they merely the objects, but the authors of many literary works, in which they eſtabliſhed rules for the behaviour of their lovers, particularly at table; and explained the art of gaining the heart, and captivating the affections [79]; which would have been an imprudence, had they not conſidered, that the myſteries of *their* calling alone loſe little by being diſcloſed, ſince men may often perceive the ſnare, without having courage to avoid it. The dreſs, behaviour, and artifices of this claſs of women, became continually more

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[79] Athenæus. ibid.

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seductive and dangerous; and Athens thenceforth remained the chief school of vice and pleasure, as well as of literature and philosophy.

It has been already hinted, that the fine arts, and particularly painting, were prostituted to the honor of harlots, and the purposes of voluptuousness. Licentious pictures are mentioned by ancient writers as a general source of corruption, and considered as the first ambush that beset the safety of youth and innocence [89]. Yet this unhappy effect of the arts was only the vapor that accompanies the sun; since painting, architecture, and above all, statuary, attained their meridian splendor in the age of Pericles; and shed peculiar glory on this period of Athenian history, not only by the powers of genius which they displayed, but by the noble purposes to which they were directed. But the arts of design form so important a subject, that they merit to be examined apart, in the following chapter.

[89] Euripid. in Hippolyt.

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History of the Arts of Design. — Superiority of the Greeks in those Arts. — Causes of that Superiority — Among the Asiatic Greeks — Who communicated their Inventions to Europe. — Bathycles the Magnesian — Dipenus and Scillis — Imitated in Greece, Italy, and Sicily. — The Athenians surpass their Masters. — Sublime Style of Art. — Works of Phidias, Polygnotus, &c. — Characteristic Excellence of Grecian Art. — Different Impressions made by Painters and Poets — Depended on the Nature of their respective Arts.

CHAP. XIV. History of the arts of design.

THAT the history of arts has been less cultivated than that of arms and politics, is a general and just complaint, to which writers will seldom be inclined to pay regard, because they will always find it an easier task to relate wars and negociations, debates and battles, than to describe the gradual and almost imperceptible progress of genius and taste, in works of elegance and beauty.

The origin of the imitative arts[1] (so congenial is imitation to man) reaches beyond the limits of

[1] Concerning the arts of the Greeks, the most copious materials are furnished by Pausanias throughout; and by the 34th and 35th books of Pliny. The best modern guides are Winckelman and Lessing in German, and Caylus in French. Many important errors of Winckelman are detected by the learned professor Heine, in his Antiquarische Abhandlungen.

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profane hiſtory; and to diſpute who were their inventors, is only to examine what nation is the moſt ancient. In this reſpect, the Egyptians and Phœnicians merit, doubtleſs, the pre-eminence. From the earlieſt ages of Heathen antiquity, both theſe nations ſeem to have cultivated the arts of deſign. In the remoteſt periods of their hiſtory, the Egyptians engraved on precious ſtones, and ſtrove to render their public tranſactions immortal, by recording them in hieroglyphics, on the hardeſt bazaltes; nor can we ſufficiently admire the perfection to which the patience of that laborious people had carried the mechanical part of ſculpture, before the Perſian conqueſt, and the reign of Cambyſes. But beauty, the eſſence and the end of art, was never ſtudied by the natives of either Phœnicia or Egypt, who faithfully copied their national features, without attempting to improve them; until the traces of Grecian conqueſt and colonization appeared in the medals of the Ptolemies, particularly thoſe with the head of Jupiter Ammon.

Superiority of the Greeks in thoſe arts.

Allowance, doubtleſs, muſt be made for the prejudices of national vanity, when Euripides, Ariſtotle, and Epicurus, endeavour to perſuade us, that the clear ſkies and happy temperature of Greece engendered a peculiar aptitude for arts, letters, and philoſophy. The teſtimony, however, of modern travellers confirms the evidence of antiquity, that the ſhores and iſlands of the Archipelago produce more elegant and liberal forms, and features more animated and expreſſive, with fewer individual imperfections, and more of general

nature, than can be found in any other diviſions of the world [2]. Yet whatever the Greeks owed to their ſkies and climate, they were probably not leſs indebted to their active laborious education and way of life, and to the manly ſpirit of their religious, civil, and military inſtitutions. Long before the invaſion of Xerxes, the Grecian ſculpture was diſtinguiſhed by an air of majeſty peculiar to itſelf [3]; and the awful images of the gods, as yet rudely finiſhed, diſplayed a grandeur and ſublimity of expreſſion, that delighted and aſtoniſhed the beſt judges, in the moſt refined ages of art [4].

Cauſes of that ſuperiority.

This ſingularity might be expected from the deſcription already given of the religion and manners of Greece, and from the inimitable excellence of its poets. The divinities of Greece being imagined of the human form, though incomparably more noble and perfect, artiſts would naturally begin, at a very early period [5], to exalt and generalize their conceptions. The bold enthuſiaſm of poetry ſerved to elevate and ſupport their flight, and the native country of Homer was the firſt ſcene of their ſucceſs, the happy climate of Ionia rendering frequent and *natural*, in that delightful region,

[2] Belon. Obſervat. l. ii. 34.

[3] Pauſan. Corinth. l. ii. 34.

[4] Plato et Ariſtot. paſſim.

[5] We omit the fabulous accounts of Dedalus the Athenian, who is ſaid to have flouriſhed in the time of Hercules and Theſeus, and forty years before the Trojan war. It has been already proved that, during the heroic ages, the Greeks paid no adoration to ſtatues. Athenian writers, who lived a thouſand years after that period, might eaſily confound the ſuppoſed works of the ancient Dedalus with thoſe of Dedalus of Sicyon, eſpecially ſince the error was extremely flattering to their national vanity.

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those beautiful and lovely forms which are elsewhere merely *ideal*, while other circumstances concurred to accelerate the progress of invention and genius in that highly-favored country.

among the Asiatic Greeks;

In the eighth century before the Christian æra, the Asiatic colonies, as we already had occasion to explain, far surpassed their mother-country in splendor and prosperity. For this pre-eminence, they were indebted to the superior fertility of their soil, the number and convenience of their harbours, the advantages of their situation and climate, the vicinity of the most wealthy and refined nations in Asia; above all, to their persevering diligence and ingenuity, by which they not only improved and ennobled the arts derived from the Lydians and Phrygians, but invented others long peculiar to themselves, particularly painting, sculpture in marble, together with the Doric and Ionic orders of architecture.

who communicated their inventions to Europe.

In the seventh century before Christ, the magnificent presents which the far-famed oracle of Apollo received from the superstition or vanity of the Lydian kings, were the productions, not of Egyptian or Phœnician, but of Ionian artists; and, during both that and the following century, the Ionians diffused the elegant inventions of their country through the dominions of their ancestors in Europe. Alarmed by the inroads of the Cimmerians, and disturbed by the continual hostility of Lydia, many Eastern artists sought refuge in the commercial cities of Ægina, Sicyon, and Corinth, where the peaceful spirit of the inhabitants,

comparatively wealthy and luxurious, afforded the Ionian artiſts both encouragement and ſecurity.

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The Aſiatic fugitives, however, did not confine themſelves to theſe ſecondary republics. Bathycles, a native of Ionian Magneſia, a place early celebrated for painting[6], fixed his abode in Sparta, the moſt conſiderable community in Greece. By order of the magiſtrates of that illuſtrious republic, he made the throne of Amyclæan Apollo, the ſtatue of Diana Leucophryné, the figures of the Graces and Horæ, and all the other gifts and ornaments encloſed within the conſecrated ground ſurrounding the temple of Amyclæ. The ſtatue of Apollo, thirty cubits high, ſeemed to be the work of an ignorant ſculptor, and probably was the production of a far earlier age than that of Bathycles. But whoever conſiders the coloſſean bulk of the principal figure, the baſe of which was formed into an altar, containing the tomb of Hyacinth, muſt admire the proportional magnitude of his throne, both ſides of which were adorned with ſculpture[7]. Among theſe ornaments, many ſubjects of hiſtory

Bathycles, the Magneſian.

The throne of Amyclæan Apollo.

[6] Plin. l. xxxv. I call it Ionian Magneſia, to diſtinguish it from other places of the ſame name. Vid. Plin. edit. Berolin. tom. i. p. 167. et tom. iii. p. 136. 139. et 255.

[7] Winkelmann, who ſcarcely mentions the throne of Amyclæan Apollo, though undoubtedly the greateſt ancient monument in Greece, confounds Bathycles the Magneſian, with a later artiſt of the ſame name, who made the celebrated cup which the ſeven ſages modeſtly ſent one to the other, as moſt worthy of ſuch a preſent, and which was finally conſecrated to Delphian Apollo. Diogenes Laertius, ſpeaking on this ſubject, ſays, Βαθυκλεα τινα Αρκαδα; and that he was an Arcadian appears alſo from Plut. in Solon. et Caſaubon, ad Athenæum, l. xi. 4.

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or fable are mentioned by Pauſanias, which bear no known relation to Apollo or Hyacinth, to Bathycles or the Spartans; but the top of the throne contained a chorus of Magneſians, ſuppoſed to repreſent the artiſts who aſſiſted in the execution of this ſtupendous work. The altar repreſented a celeſtial group, Minerva, Venus, Diana, and ſeveral other divinities, conveying Hyacinth to the ſkies. Its ſides were adorned with the combat of Tyndareus and Eurytus; the exploits of Caſtor and Pollux; and the extraordinary ſcene between Menelaus and the Egyptian Proteus, as deſcribed in the Odyſſey [a]. Nor was this the only ſubject copied from the divine bard. It was eaſy to diſtinguiſh his favorite Demodocus ſinging among a chorus of Phæatians; a circumſtance confirming our obſervations in a former part of this work, that the poems of Homer were generally known in Sparta long before they had been collected by the Athenian tyrant Piſiſtratus.

Dipenus and Scillis.

Almoſt ſix centuries before the Chriſtian æra, the Cretans, Dipenus and Scillis, adorned many Grecian cities in Europe as well as in Aſia; and about fifty years afterward, the Chians, Bupalus and Anthermus, diffuſed over Greece thoſe precious works in Parian marble, which were highly admired in the age of Auguſtus [b]. About the ſame time, Polydorus of Samos, who ſeems to have been much employed by Crœſus, the laſt king of Lydia, made the famous ring for the

[a] Pauſan. Lacon. p. 196, et ſeqq.

[b] Vid. Plin. l. xxxvi. § 4.

Samian tyrant Polycrates, which is extolled by Pliny [10] as a maſter-piece of art.

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The production of thoſe Eaſtern artiſts were imitated with ſucceſsful emulation by their diſciples in ancient Greece, and likewiſe by the Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily; as ſufficiently appears from the medals of thoſe laſt-mentioned countries. Theſe more durable monuments, however, can afford but an imperfect idea of the innumerable ſtatues which were formed of tuf or gravel ſtone [11], and of various kinds of wood. The moſt eſteemed were made of ivory, which, like the teeth of other animals, calcines under ground; an unfortunate circumſtance for the arts, ſince, before the invaſion of Xerxes, Greece could boaſt an hundred ivory ſtatues of the gods, all of a coloſſean magnitude, and many of them covered with gold [12]. The white marbles of Paros, together with thoſe of Cyprus and Ægina, furniſhed the chief materials for ſculpture, before the Athenians opened the hard ſparkling veins of mount Pentelicus. Ebony, cypreſs, and other materials, were gradually brought into uſe, in conſequence of the more general diffuſion of the art, which was deſtined not only to repreſent gods and heroes, but to commemorate the uſeful merit of illuſtrious citizens [13]. At the four ſacred feſtivals common to the Grecian name, the victors in the gymnaſtic exerciſes, as well as in the muſical and poetical entertainments, were frequently diſtinguiſhed by the honor of a ſtatue. The ſcenes of

Their works imitated in Greece, Italy, and Sicily.

[10] L. xxxvii. § 4.
[11] Pauſanias.
[12] Plut. in Vit. Andoc.
[13] Lucian. Imagin.

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those admired solemnities thus became the principal repositories of sculpture; and the cities of Delphi and Olympia, in particular, long surpassed the rest of Greece in the number and value of their statues, as well as in the splendor and magnificence of all their other ornaments [24].

The Athenians surpass their masters.

But the time approached when those cities themselves were to be eclipsed by the lustre of Athens, which, in the course of forty years, became the seat not only of opulence, power, and politics, but of literature, philosophy, and the fine arts, and thenceforth continued to be regarded as the sovereign of Greece, rather than as the capital of the narrow and unfruitful territory of Attica. During that memorable period, the Athenians, whose circumstances had hitherto proved little favorable to the progress of taste and elegance, acquired unrivalled power and renown. Having disgraced the arms, they plundered the wealth of Persia. Their valor gave them possession of those maritime provinces of Lower Asia, which were justly regarded as the cradle of the arts. Their magnanimity and firmness commanded respect abroad, and ensured preeminence in Greece; while, by a rare felicity, their republic, amidst this uninterrupted flow of external prosperity, produced men capable to improve the gifts of valor or fortune to the solid and permanent glory of their country.

Athenian artists,

It is difficult to determine whether the discerning encouragement of Pericles was more useful in

[24] Pausanias Phocic. and Eliac.

animating the induſtry of Phidias, or the genius of Phidias in ſeconding the views of his illuſtrious protector. Their congenial minds ſeemed as happily formed for each other, as both were admirably adapted to the flouriſhing circumſtances of their country. In the language of Plutarch [25], this great *miniſter*, whoſe virtues gradually rendered him the *maſter* of the republic, found Athens well furniſhed with marble, braſs, ivory, gold, ebony, and cypreſs, together with all the other materials fitted to adorn a city, which, having raiſed to the glory of empire, he wiſhed likewiſe to render the model of elegance. According to the popular principles which he profeſſed, he deemed it the duty of a ſtateſman to provide not merely for the army, the navy, the judges, and others immediately employed in the public ſervice; the great body of the people he regarded as the conſtant and moſt important object of his miniſterial care. The immenſe revenues of the ſtate, which had hitherto been chiefly ſquandered in ſhows and feſtivals, in gaudy oſtentation and periſhing luxury, he directed to objects more ſolid and durable, which, while they embelliſhed the city might exerciſe the induſtry and diſplay the talents of the citizens. Guided by ſuch motives, he boldly opened the treaſury, and expended about four thouſand talents; a ſum which then might command as much labor as ſix or ſeven millions ſterling in the preſent age. By this liberal encouragement, he animated every art, excited every hand,

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conſpire with the views of Pericles.

[25] Plut. in Pericle.

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enlivened every exertion, and called forth into the public ſervice the whole dexterity, ſkill, and genius of his countrymen; while the motives of gain or glory which he propoſed, allured from all quarters the moſt ingenious ſtrangers, who readily tranſported their talents to Athens, as to the beſt market, and moſt conſpicuous theatre.

Sublime ſtyle of art,

But it was the peculiar felicity of Pericles, to find Athens provided not only in all the materials of art, but in artiſts capable of employing them to the beſt advantage. In the inaccurate, but often expreſſive, language of Pliny, ſculpture and painting then firſt aroſe, under the plaſtic hands of Phidias and his brother Panænus. Both arts, however, are known to have flouriſhed at an earlier period; but in the age of Pericles, they aſſumed more elevation and majeſty. The inventive genius of man tried a new and nobler flight. The ſuperiority of Phidias and his contemporaries obſcured, and almoſt obliterated, the memory of their predeceſſors, and produced that ſublime ſtyle of art, which, having flouriſhed about an hundred and fifty years, decayed with the glory of Greece, and diſappeared ſoon after the reign of Alexander.

compared with that preceding it.

It appears from the gems and medals, and the few remains in marble, preceding the age of Pericles, that the mechanical part of engraving and ſculpture had already attained a high degree of perfection. In many of thoſe works, the minuteſt ornaments are finiſhed with care, the muſcles are boldly pronounced, the outline is faithful; but the deſign has more hardneſs than energy, the attitudes

are too constrained to be graceful, and the strength of the expression distorts, and for the most part destroys, beauty. The sculptors Phidias, Polycletus, Scopas, Alcamenes, and Myron, together with the contemporary painters, Panænus, Zeuxis, and Parrhasius, softened the asperities of their predecessors [a], rendered their contours more natural and flowing, and by employing greater address to conceal the mechanism of their art, displayed superior skill to the judgment, and afforded higher delight to the fancy, in proportion as less care and labor appeared visible to the eye. In the works of those admired artists, the expression was skilfully diffused through every part, without disturbing the harmony of the whole. Pain and sorrow were rather concentrated in the soul than displayed on the countenance; and even the more turbulent passions of indignation, anger, and resentment, were so tempered and ennobled, that the indications of them became consistent with the sublimest grace and beauty. But the triumph of art consisted in representing and recommending the social affections; for, setting aside the unwarranted assertions of Pliny, in his pretended epochs of painting, it appears from much higher authority, that as early as the age of Socrates, painters had discerned and attained that admired excellence of style, which has been called in modern times the manner of Raphael; and had learned to express, by the outward air, attitude, and features, whatever (in the words of

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[a] Plut. in Pericl. et Quintilian, l. xii. c. x. p. 578.

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Xenophon [17]) is moſt engaging, affectionate, ſweet, attractive, and amiable, in the inward ſentiments and character. Of theſe Grecian paintings, indeed, which were chiefly on wood, and other periſhing materials, no veſtige remains; but the ſtatuary of that celebrated age, while it diſplays its own excellence, is ſufficient to redeem from oblivion (as far at leaſt as invention, expreſſion, and ideal beauty are concerned) the obliterated charms of the ſiſter art.

The works of Phidias. Olymp. lxxxiii. 4. A. C. 445.

In ſtatuary, the ſuperior merit of Phidias was acknowledged by the unanimous admiration of independent and rival communities. Intruſted by Pericles with the ſuperintendence of the public works, his own hands added to them their laſt and moſt valuable ornaments. Before he was called to this honorable employment, his ſtatues had adorned the moſt celebrated temples of Greece. His Olympian Jupiter we had already occaſion to deſcribe. In the awful temple of Delphi, ſtrangers admired his bronze ſtatues of Apollo and Diana. He likewiſe made for the Delphians a group of twelve Grecian heroes, ſurrounding a figure of braſs, that repreſented the Trojan horſe. His admired ſtatue of the goddeſs Nemeſis, or Vengeance, was formed from a block of marble, which the vain confidence of the Perſians tranſported to Marathon for a trophy of victory, but which their diſgraceful and precipitate flight left for a monument of their cowardice on the Marathonian ſhore. The grateful piety of Greece adored his Venus Urania, and Parthenopean Apollo. His three Minervas were

[17] See the converſation of Socrates with the painter Parrhaſius, in Memorab. l. iii.

reſpectively

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respectively made for the Pallenians, Plateans, and Lemnians, and all three presented by those tributary states to their Athenian protectors and sovereigns. These inimitable works silenced the voice of envy. The most distinguished artists of Greece, sculptors, painters, and architects, were ambitious to receive the directions, and to second the labors, of Phidias, which were uninterruptedly employed, during fifteen years, in the embellishment of his native city.

A. C. 449—430.

During that short period he completed the Odeum, or theatre of music; the Parthenon, or temple of Minerva; the Propylæa or vestibule, and porticoes belonging to the citadel, together with the sculptured and picturesque ornaments of these and other immortal works; which, when new (as Plutarch finely observes), expressed the mellowed beauties of time and maturity, and when old, still preserved the fresh charms and alluring graces of novelty. The Parthenon, which still remains, attests the justice of this panegyric. It is two hundred and seventeen feet nine inches long, composed of beautiful white marble, and acknowledged by modern travellers [18] to be the noblest piece of antiquity existing in the world. It appears at first sight extraordinary, that the expense of two thousand talents should have been bestowed on the Propylæa [19]. But we must consider, that this extensive name comprehended the temple of Minerva, the treasury, and other public edifices.

The Odeum, Parthenon, and Propylæa.

[18] Sir George Wheeler's Travels, etc.

[19] Plutarch. in Pericle, et Demosth. p. 78.

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Works of Panænus, Polygnotus, and Micon.

The Pœcile, or diverſified portico, which was painted by Panænus, the brother of Phidias, aſſiſted by Polygnotus and Micon, muſt have been a work of great time and expenſe. Its front and ceilings were of marble, like thoſe of all the other porticoes leading to the citadel, which ſtill remained in the time of Pauſanias, and were regarded, both on account of the workmanſhip and materials, as ſuperior to any thing extant. In the Pœcile, thoſe great painters, whoſe merit Pliny[20] forgets in his inaccurate epochs of art, had repreſented the moſt illuſtrious events of Grecian hiſtory; the victory of Theſeus over the Amazons, the ſacking of Troy, and particularly the recent exploits againſt the Perſians. In the battle of Marathon, the Athenian and Plataean heroes were drawn from the life, or more probably from the innumerable ſtatues which preſerved the faithful lineaments of thoſe illuſtrious patriots. The whole extent of the Acropolis, above ſix miles in circumference, was ſo diverſified by works of painting and ſtatuary, that it became one continued ſcene of elegance and beauty.

The Minerva in the Acropolis.

But all theſe ornaments were ſurpaſſed by one production of Phidias, which probably was the laſt of that great maſter; his admired ſtatue of Minerva, the erecting of which ſerved to conſecrate the Parthenon, was compoſed of gold and ivory, twenty-ſix cubits high, being of inferior dimenſions

[20] He places the firſt epoch of great painters in the 90th Olymp. A. C. 420.

to his Minerva Poliades of bronze, the ſpear and creſt of which was ſeen from the promontory of Sunium [21], at twenty-five miles diſtance. Parrhaſius had painted the ornaments of the latter [22], Phidias himſelf adorned every part of the former; and the compliment which, in this favorite work, he took an opportunity of paying to the merit of Pericles, occaſioned (as we ſhall have occaſion to explain [23]) his own baniſhment, a diſgrace which he ſeems not to have long ſurvived. Cicero, Plutarch, Pliny, and Pauſanias, had ſeen and admired this invaluable monument of piety, as well as genius, ſince the Minerva of Phidias increaſed the devotion of Athens towards her protecting divinity. It belongs only to thoſe who have ſeen and ſtudied, to deſcribe ſuch maſter-pieces of art; and as they exiſt no more, it will better ſuit the deſign of this hiſtory, to confine ourſelves to ſuch works as we ourſelves have ſeen, and which are generally acknowledged to bear the impreſſion of the Socratic age, when philoſophy gave law to painting and ſculpture, as well as to poetry and eloquence.

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Were it allowed to make the melancholy ſuppoſition, that all the monuments of Grecian literature had periſhed in the general wreck of their nation and liberty, and that poſterity could collect nothing farther concerning that celebrated people, but what appeared from the Apollo Belvedere, the groups of the Laocoon and Niobe, and other ſtatues, gems, or medals, now ſcattered over Italy and

Characteriſtic excellence of Grecian art.

[21] Pauſanias Attic. [22] Idem, ibid.
[23] Plutarch. in Pericl. et Thucydid. *l. ii.*

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Europe, what opinion would mankind form of the genius and character of the Greeks? would it correspond with the impressions made by their poets, orators, and historians? which impression would be most favorable? and what would be the precise difference between them? The solution of these questions will throw much light on the present subject.

Circumstances in which it agreed with poetry and eloquence.

The first observation that occurs on the most superficial, and that is strongly confirmed by a more attentive, survey of the ancient marbles, is, that their authors perfectly understood proportion, anatomy, the art of clothing, without concealing the naked figure, and whatever contributes to the justness and truth of design. The exact knowledge of form is as necessary to the painter or statuary, whose business it is to represent *bodies*, as that of language to the poet or historian, who undertakes to describe *actions*. In this particular, it would be unnecessary to institute a comparison between Grecian writers and artists, since they are both allowed as perfect in their respective kinds as the condition of humanity renders possible.

The expression of passions, sentiments and character, in the works of poets and orators;

But when we advance a step farther, and consider the expression of passions, sentiments, and character, we find an extraordinary difference, or rather contrariety. Homer, Sophocles, and Demosthenes, are not only the most original, but the most animated and glowing, of all writers. Every sentence is energetic; all the parts are in motion; the passions are described in their utmost fury, and expressed by the boldest words and gestures. To

keep to the tragic poet, whose art approaches the nearest to painting and sculpture, the heroes, and even the gods of Sophocles, frequently display the impetuosity of the most ungoverned natures; and, what is still more extraordinary, sometimes betray a momentary weakness, extremely inconsistent with their general character. The rocks of Lemnos resound with the cries of Philoctetes; Oedipus, yielding to despair, plucks out his eyes; even Hercules, the model of fortitude, sinks under the impressions of pain or sorrow.

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Nothing can be more opposite to the conduct of Grecian artists. *They* likewise have represented Philoctetes; but, instead of effeminate tears and lamentations, have given him the patient concentrated woe of a suffering hero. The furious Ajax of Timomachus was painted, not in the moment when he destroyed the harmless sheep instead of the hostile Greeks, but after he had committed this mad deed, and when his rage having subsided, he remained, like the sea after a storm, surrounded with the scattered fragments of mangled carcases, and reflecting with the silent anguish of despair on his useless and frantic brutality. The revenge of Medea against her husband was not represented, as in Euripides, butchering her innocent children, but while she was still wavering and irresolute, agitated between resentment and pity. Even Clytemnestra, whose unnatural, intrepid cruelty, poets and historians had so indignantly described and arraigned, was not deemed a proper subject for the pencil, when embruing her hands in the blood of

Beautiful in those of painters and statuaries.

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Agamemnon. And although this may be referred to a rule of Ariſtotle, "that the characters of women ſhould not be repreſented as too daring or deciſive;" yet we ſhall find on examination that it reſults from principles of nature, whoſe authority is ſtill more univerſal and indiſpenſable. The conſideration of the Apollo, Niobé, and Laocoon, whoſe copies have been infinitely multiplied, and are familiarly known, will ſet this matter in the cleareſt point of view.

illuſtrated by that of Apollo Belvidere.

The Apollo Belvedere is univerſally felt and acknowledged to be the ſublimeſt figure that either ſkill can execute, or imagination conceive. That favorite divinity, whom ancient poets ſeem peculiarly fond of deſcribing in the warmeſt colors [24], is repreſented in the attitude of darting the fatal arrow againſt the ſerpent Pytho, or the giant Tityus. Animated by the nobleſt conception of heavenly powers, the artiſt has far outſtepped the perfections of humanity, and (if we may ſpeak without irreverence) made the corrupt put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality. His ſtature is above the human, his attitude majeſtic; the Elyſian ſpring of youth ſoftens the manly graces of his perſon, and the bold ſtructure of his limbs. Diſdain ſits on his lips, and indignation ſwells his noſtrils; but an unalterable ſerenity inveſts his front, and the ſublime elevation of his aſpect aſpires at deeds of renown ſtill ſurpaſſing the preſent object of his victory.

[24] Horace, b. iii. ode 4. ver. 60.

The irascible passions are not represented with more dignity in the Apollo, than are those of fear, terror, and consternation, in the Niobé. This group contained Niobé and her husband Amphion, with seven sons, and as many daughters. Their melancholy story, which is too well known[25] to be related here, required the deepest expression, and the genius of the artist has chosen the only moment when this expression could be rendered consistent with the highest beauty; a beauty not flattering the senses by images of pleasure, but transporting the fancy into regions of purity and virtue. The excess and suddenness of their disaster, occasioned a degree of amazement and horror, which, suspending the faculties, involved them in that silence and insensibility, which neither breaks out in lamentable shrieks, nor distorts the countenance, but which leaves full play to the artist's skill to represent motion without disorder, or, in other words, to render expression graceful.

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by the group of Niobé;

The Laocoon may be regarded as the triumph of Grecian sculpture, since bodily pain, the grossest and most ungovernable of all our passions, and that pain united with anguish and torture of mind, are yet expressed with such propriety and dignity, as afford lessons of fortitude superior to any taught in the schools of philosophy. The horrible shriek which Virgil's Laocoon[26] emits, is a proper circumstance for poetry, which speaks to the fancy

and by that of the Laocoon.

[25] Ovid. Metamorph. l. vi 146 ver. 146, et seqq.

[26] Æneid, l. ii. ver. 222.

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by images and ideas borrowed from all the ſenſes, and has a thouſand ways of ennobling its object; but the expreſſion of this ſhriek would have totally degraded the ſtatue. It is ſoftened, therefore, into a patient ſigh, with eyes turned to heaven in ſearch of relief. The intolerable agony of ſuffering nature is repreſented in the lower part, and particularly in the extremities, of the body; but the manly breaſt ſtruggles againſt calamity. The contention is ſtill more plainly perceived in his furrowed forehead; and his languiſhing paternal eye demands aſſiſtance, leſs for himſelf, than for his miſerable children, who look up to him for help.

Different impreſſion made by the ſame objects as exhibited by poets and painters,

If ſubjects of this nature are expreſſed without appearing hideous, ſhocking, or diſguſtful, we may well ſuppoſe that more temperate paſſions are repreſented with the greateſt moderation and dignity. The remark is juſtified by examining the remains or imitations of Grecian art; and were we to deduce from theſe alone the character of the nation, it would ſeem at firſt ſight, that the contemporaries of Pericles muſt have been a very ſuperior people in point of fortitude, ſelf-command, and every branch of practical philoſophy, to the Athenians who are deſcribed by poets and hiſtorians.

founded in the different nature of their reſpective arts.

But when we conſider the matter more deeply, we ſhall find that it is the buſineſs of hiſtory to deſcribe men as they are; of poetry and painting, to repreſent them as may afford moſt pleaſure and inſtruction to the reader or ſpectator. The aim of theſe imitative arts is the ſame, but they differ widely in the mode, the object, and extent, of

their imitation. The poet who deſcribes *actions* CHAP. XIV.
in *time*, may carry the reader through all the gradations of paſſion, and diſplay his genius moſt powerfully in its moſt furious exceſs. But the painter or ſtatuary, who repreſents *bodies* in *ſpace*, is confined to one moment, and muſt chuſe that which leaves the freeſt play to the imagination. This can ſeldom be the higheſt pitch of paſſion, which leaves nothing beyond it; and in contemplating which, the ſympathy of the ſpectator, after his firſt ſurpriſe ſubſides, can only deſcend into indifference. Every violent ſituation, moreover, is felt not to be laſting; and all extreme perturbation is inconſiſtent with beauty, without which no viſible object can long attract or pleaſe [27].

[27] This ſubject is admirably treated in Leſſing's Laocoon, in which he traces the *bounds* of painting and poetry; a work which, it is much to be regretted, that great genius did not finiſh.

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Cauſes of the Peloponneſian War. — Rupture between Corinth and its Colony Corcyra. — Sea Fights. — Inſolence and Cruelty of the Corcyreans. — They provoke the Reſentment of the Peloponneſians — Obtain the Protection of Athens — Are defeated by the Corinthians — Who dread the Reſentment of Athens. — Their Scheme for rendering it impotent. — Deſcription of the Macedonian Coaſt. — It revolts from Athens. — Siege of Potidæa. — General Confederacy againſt Athens. — Peloponneſian Embaſſy. — Its Demands firmly anſwered by Pericles. — His Speech to the Athenians. — The Thebans ſurpriſe Platæa. — Preparations for War on both Sides. — Invaſion of Attica. — Operations of the Athenian Fleet. — Plague in Athens. — Calamitous Situation of that Republic. — Magnanimity of Pericles. — Firmneſs of his laſt Advice. — His Death and Character.

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Pericles ſummons to Athens deputies from all the Grecian republics.

BY the luſtre of the elegant arts, the magnificence of Pericles had diſplayed and ennobled the military glory of his country; and the pre-eminence of Athens ſeemed immoveably eſtabliſhed on the ſolid foundation of internal ſtrength, adorned by external ſplendor. But this abundant meaſure of proſperity ſatisfied neither the active ambition of the republic, nor the enterpriſing genius of

its minister. The Greeks beheld and admired, but had not yet formally acknowledged, the full extent of Athenian greatness. In order to extort this reluctant confession, than which nothing could more firmly secure to him the affectionate gratitude of his fellow-citizens, Pericles dispatched ambassadors to the republics and colonies in Europe and in Asia, requiring the presence of their deputies in Athens, to concert measures for rebuilding their ruined temples, and for performing the solemn vows and sacrifices promised, with devout thankfulness, to the immortal gods, who had wonderfully protected the Grecian arms, during their long and dangerous conflict with the Persian empire. This proposal, which tended to render Athens the common centre of deliberation and of union, was readily accepted in such foreign parts as had already submitted to the authority of that republic. But in neighbouring states, the ambassadors of Pericles were received coldly, and treated disrespectfully; in most assemblies of the Peloponnesus they were heard with secret disgust, and the pride of the Spartan senate openly derided the insolence of their demands. When, at their return home, they explained the behaviour of the Spartans, Pericles exclaimed, in his bold style of eloquence, that he "beheld war advancing with wide and rapid steps from the Peloponnesus [1]."

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Such was the preparation of materials which the smallest spark might throw into combustion. But

Introduction to the history of

[1] Plut. in Pericle.

CHAP. XV. the Peloponnesian war.

before we relate the events which immediately occasioned the memorable war of twenty-seven years, it is impossible (if the calamities of our own times have taught us to compassionate the miserable) not to drop a tear over the continual disasters which so long and so cruelly afflicted the most valuable and enlightened portion of mankind, and whose immortal genius was destined to enlighten the remotest ages of the world. When rude, illiterate peasants are summoned to mutual hostility, and, unaffected by personal motives of interest or honor, expend their strength and blood to gratify the forbid ambition of their respective tyrants, we may lament the general stupidity and wretchedness of human nature; but we cannot heartily sympathize with men who have so little sensibility, nor very deeply and feelingly regret, that those should suffer pain, who seem both unwilling and incapable to relish pleasure. Their heavy unmeaning aspect, their barbarous language, and more barbarous manners, together with their total indifference to the objects and pursuits which form the dignity and glory of man; these circumstances, interrupting the ordinary course of our sentiments, divert or repel the natural current of sympathy. Their victories or defeats are contemplated without emotion, coldly related, and read without interest or concern. But the war of Peloponnesus presents a different spectacle. The adverse parties took arms, not to support the unjust pretensions of a tyrant, whom they had reason to hate or to despise, but to vindicate their civil rights, and to maintain their political

independence. The meaneſt Grecian ſoldier knew the duties of the citizen, the magiſtrate, and the general [a]. His life had been equally divided between the moſt agreeable amuſements of leiſure, and the moſt honorable employments of activity. Trained to thoſe exerciſes and accompliſhments which give ſtrength and agility to the limbs, beauty to the ſhape, and grace to the motions, the dignity of his external appearance announced the liberal greatneſs of his mind; and his language, the moſt harmonious and expreſſive ever ſpoken by man, comprehended all that variety of conception, and all thoſe ſhades of ſentiment, that characterize the moſt exalted perfection of human manners. CHAP. XV.

Ennobled by ſuch actors, the ſcene itſelf was highly important, involving not only the ſtates of Greece, but the greateſt of the neighbouring kingdoms; and, together with the extent of a foreign war, exhibiting the intenſeneſs of domeſtic ſedition. As it exceeded the ordinary duration of human power or reſentment, it was accompanied with unuſual circumſtances of terror, which, to the pious credulity of an unfortunate age, naturally announced the wrath of heaven, juſtly provoked by human cruelty. While peſtilence and famine multiplied the actual ſufferings, eclipſes and earthquakes increaſed the conſternation and horror of

Magnitude and importance of the ſubject.

[a] Such is the teſtimony uniformly given of them in the panegyric of Athens by Iſocrates, and confirmed by the more impartial authority of Xenophon, in the expedition of Cyrus. Their exploits in that wonderful enterpriſe juſtify the higheſt praiſe; and yet the national character had rather degenerated than improved, in the long interval between the periods alluded to.

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that lamentable period[1]. Several warlike communities were expelled from their hereditary poſſeſſions; others were not only driven from Greece, but utterly extirpated from the earth; ſome fell a prey to party-rage, others to the vengeance of foreign enemies; ſome were ſlowly exhauſted by the contagion of a malignant atmoſphere, others overwhelmed at once by ſudden violence; while the combined weight of calamity aſſailed the power of Athens, and precipitated the downfal of that republic from the pride of proſperous dominion, to the dejection of dependence and miſery[2].

Rupture between Corinth and its colony Corcyra. Olymp. lxxxv. 2. A. C. 439.

The general, but latent hoſtility of the Greeks, of which we have already explained the cauſe, was firſt called into action by a rupture between the ancient republic of Corinth, and its flouriſhing colony Corcyra. The haughty diſdain of Corcyra, elated with the pride of wealth and naval greatneſs, had long denied and ſcorned thoſe marks of

[1] Thucydid. l. i. p. 16, et ſeqq.

[2] For the Peloponneſian war we have not, indeed, a full ſtream of hiſtory, but a regular ſeries of annals in Thucydides and Xenophon; authors, of whom each might ſay,

Quæque ipſe miſerrima vidi,
Et quorum pars magna fui:——

Many material circumſtances may likewiſe be learned from the Greek orators, the writings of Plato and Ariſtotle, the comedies of Ariſtophanes, the twelfth and two following books of Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch's Lives of Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, Lyſander, and Ageſilaus. It is remarkable, that the heavy compiler, as well as the lively biographer, have both followed the long loſt works of Ephorus and Theopompus, in preference to thoſe of Thucydides and Xenophon; a circumſtance which ſtrongly marks their want of judgment, but which renders their information more intereſting to poſterity.

deference and reſpect which the uniform practice of Greece exacted from colonies towards their mother-country. At the Olympic and other ſolemn feſtivals, they yielded not the place of honor to the Corinthians; they appointed not a Corinthian high-prieſt to preſide over their religion; and when they eſtabliſhed new ſettlements on diſtant coaſts, they requeſted not, as uſual with the Greeks, the auſpicious guidance of a Corinthian conductor[1].

CHAP. XX.

The Corinthians protect Epidamnus.

While the ancient metropolis, incenſed by thoſe inſtances of contempt, longed for an opportunity to puniſh them, the citizens of Epidamnus, the moſt conſiderable ſea-port on the coaſt of the Hadriatic, craved aſſiſtance at Corinth againſt the barbarous incurſions of the Taulantii, an Illyrian tribe, who, having united with a powerful band of Epidamnian exiles, greatly infeſted that territory, and threatened to ſtorm the city. As Epidamnus was a colony of Corcyra, its diſtreſſed inhabitants had firſt ſought protection there; but although their petition was preferred with reſpectful deference, and urged with the moſt affecting demonſtrations of abaſement and calamity, by ambaſſadors who long remained under the melancholy garb of ſupplicants in the temple of Corcyrean Juno, the proud inſenſibility of theſe intractable iſlanders ſhowed not the ſmalleſt inclination to relieve them; partly reſtrained, it is probable, by the ſecret practices of the Epidamnian exiles, conſiſting of ſome

[1] Schol. in Thucydid. ad locum. He mentions the other circumſtances which I have melted into the text, and which will afterwards be confirmed by more claſſic authority.

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of the principal and richeſt families of that maritime republic. The Corinthians readily embraced the cauſe of a people abandoned by *their* natural protectors, and *their own* inveterate enemies; and immediately ſupplied Epidamnus with a conſiderable body of troops, leſs with a view to defend its walls againſt the aſſaults of the Taulantii, than in order irrecoverably to detach and alienate its inhabitants from the intereſt of Corcyra.

Are defeated at ſea by the Corcyreans. Olymp. lxxxvi. 2. A. C. 435.

The indignation of the Corcyreans was inflamed into fury, when they underſtood that thoſe whom they had long affected to conſider as aliens and as rivals, had interfered in the affairs of their colony. They inſtantly launched a fleet of forty ſail, proceeded in hoſtile array to the harbour of Epidamnus, ſummoned the inhabitants to re-admit their exiles, and to expel the foreign troops. With ſuch unconditional and arbitrary demands, the weakeſt and moſt puſillanimous garriſon could ſcarcely be ſuppoſed to comply. The Epidamnians rejected them with ſcorn; in conſequence of which their city was inveſted and attacked with vigor, by land and ſea. The Corinthians were now doubly ſolicitous, both to defend the place, and to protect the troops already thrown into it, conſiſting partly of their Leucadian and Ambracian allies, but chiefly of Corinthian citizens. A proclamation, firſt publiſhed at Corinth, was induſtriouſly diſſeminated through Greece, inviting all who were unhappy at home, or who courted glory abroad, to undertake an expedition to Epidamnus, with aſſurance of enjoying the immunities and honors

honors of a republic whose safety they had ventured to defend. Many exiles and military adventurers, at all times profusely scatteted over Greece, obeyed the welcome summons. Public assistance, likewise, was obtained, not only from Thebes and Megara, but from several states of the Peloponnesus. In this manner the Corinthians were speedily enabled to fit out an armament of seventy-five sail; which, directing its course towards Epidamnus, anchored in the Ambracian gulph, near the friendly harbour of Actium, where, in a future age, Augustus and Antony decided the empire of the Roman world. Near this celebrated scene of action, the impetuous Corcyreans hastened to meet the enemy. Forty ships were employed in the siege of Epidamnus. Twice that number sailed towards the Ambracian gulph. The hostile armaments fought with equal animosity; but the Corcyreans far surpassed in bravery and skill. Fifteen Corinthian vessels were destroyed; the rest escaped in disorder, and the decisive battle was soon followed by the surrender of Epidamnus. By a clemency little expected from the victors, the ancient inhabitants of the place were allowed their lives and liberties; but the Corinthians were made prisoners of war, and their allies condemned to death.

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Epidamnus surrenders to the conquerors.

The Corcyreans thanked their gods, and erected a conspicuous trophy of victory on the promontory Leucimné, whose lofty ridges overlooked the distant scene of the engagement. During the two following years they reigned undisturbed masters of the neighbouring seas; and though a

Their insolence and cruelty. A. C. 436—433.

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principle of fear, or perhaps a faint remnant of reſpect towards their ancient metropolis, prevented them from invading the territory of Corinth, they determined to make the confederates of that republic feel the full weight of their vengeance. For this purpoſe they ravaged the coaſt of Apollonia; plundered the city Ambracia; almoſt deſolated the peninſula, now the iſland of Leucas; and, emboldened by ſucceſs, ventured to land in the Peloponneſus, and ſet fire to the harbour of Cyllene, becauſe in the late ſea-fight the Elians, to whom that place belonged, had ſupplied Corinth with a few gallies [6].

which provoke the Peloponneſians.

The ſouthern ſtates of Greece, highly provoked by this outrage to the peaceable Elians, whoſe religious character had long commanded general reſpect, were ſtill farther incenſed by the active reſentment of the Corinthians, who, exaſperated at the diſgrace of being vanquiſhed by one of their own colonies, had, ever ſince their defeat, bent their whole attention, and employed the greateſt part even of their private fortunes, to hire mercenaries, to gain allies, and eſpecially to equip a new fleet, that they might be enabled to chaſtiſe the impious audacity (as they called it) of their rebellious children [7].

The Corcyreans and Corinthians ſend ambaſſadors to Athens.

The magiſtrates of Corcyra ſaw and dreaded the tempeſt that threatened to burſt on them; and which the unaſſiſted ſtrength of their iſland was totally unable to reſiſt. They had not taken part

[6] Thucydid. l. i. p. 22, et ſeqq. [7] Idem, ibid.

in the late wars; they had not acceded to the laſt treaty of peace; they could not ſummon the aid of a ſingle confederate. In this difficulty they ſent ambaſſadors to Athens, well knowing the ſecret animoſity between that republic and the enemies by whom their own ſafety was endangered. The Corinthians likewiſe ſent ambaſſadors to defeat their purpoſe. Both were allowed a hearing in the Athenian aſſembly; but firſt the Corcyreans, who, in a ſtudied oration, acknowledged, "that having no previous claim of merit to urge, they expected no ſucceſs in their negotiation, unleſs an alliance between Athens and Corcyra ſhould appear alike advantageous to thoſe who propoſed, and to thoſe who accepted it. Of this the Athenians would immediately become ſenſible, if they reflected that the people of Peloponneſus being equally hoſtile to both (the open enemies of Corcyra, the ſecret and more dangerous enemies of Athens), their country muſt derive a vaſt acceſſion of ſtrength by receiving, without trouble or expenſe, a rich and warlike iſland, which, unaſſiſted and alone, had defeated a numerous confederacy; and whoſe naval force, augmenting the fleet of Athens, would for ever render that republic ſovereign of the ſeas. If the Corinthians complained of the injuſtice of receiving their colony, let them remember, that colonies are preſerved by moderation, and alienated by oppreſſion; that men ſettle in foreign parts to better their ſituation, not to ſubmit their liberties; to continue the equals, not to become the ſlaves of their leſs adventurous fellow-citizens. If they

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Speech of the Corcyreans.

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pretended; that the demand of Corcyra was inconsistent with the last general treaty of peace, let the words of that treaty confound them, which expressly declare every Grecian city, not previously bound to follow the standard of Athens or of Sparta, at full liberty to accede to the alliance of either of those powers [a]. But it became the dignity of Athens to expect honor and safety, not from the punctilious observance of a slippery convention, but from the manly and prompt vigor of her councils. It suited the renowned wisdom of a republic, which had ever anticipated her enemies, to prevent the fleet of Corcyra from falling a prey to that confederacy, with whose inveterate envy she herself must be soon called to contend; and to merit the useful gratitude of an island possessing other valuable advantages, and most conveniently situate for intercepting the Sicilian and Italian supplies, which, in the approaching and inevitable war, would otherwise so powerfully assist their Doric ancestors of Peloponnesus."

Speech of the Corinthians.

The Corinthians indirectly answered this discourse by inveighing, with great bitterness, against the unexampled insolence and unnatural cruelty of Corcyra: "That infamous island had hitherto declined connexion with every Grecian state, that she might carry on her piratical depredations unobserved, and alone enjoy the spoil of the unwary mariners who approached her inhospitable shores.

[a] Εφηται γαρ εν αυταις, των Ελληνιδων πολιων ητις μηδεσιν ξυμμαχει, εξεινας παρ' οποτερους αν αρεσκηται ελθειν. The οποτερους justifies the paraphrase in the text.

Rendered at once wealthy and wicked by this inhuman practice, the Corcyreans had divested themselves of all piety and gratitude towards their mother-country, and embrued their parricidal hands in their parent's blood. Their audacity having provoked a late vengeance, which they were unable to repel, they unſeaſonably ſought protection from Athens, deſiring thoſe who were not accomplices of their injuſtice to participate their danger, and deluding them through the vain terror of contingent evil, into certain and immediate calamity; for ſuch muſt every war be regarded, its event being always deſtructive, often fatal. The Corcyreans vainly chicaned as to *words*; Athens, it was clear, muſt violate the *ſenſe* and *ſpirit* of the laſt treaty of peace, if ſhe aſſiſted the enemies of any contracting power. Theſe fierce iſlanders acknowledged themſelves a colony of Corinth, but pretended that ſettlements abroad owe nothing to thoſe who eſtabliſhed them, to thoſe whoſe foſtering care reared their infancy, from whoſe blood they ſprung, by whoſe arms they have been defended. We affirm, on the contrary (and appeal to you, Athenians! who have planted ſo many colonies), that the mother-country is entitled to that authority which the Corcyreans have long ſpurned, to that reſpect which their inſolence now refuſes and diſdains: that it belongs to us, their metropolis, to be their leaders in war, their magiſtrates in peace; nor can you, Athenians! oppoſe our juſt pretenſions, and protect our rebellious colony, without ſetting an example moſt dangerous to yourſelves."

CHAP. IX.

The Athenians enter into a treaty of defence with the Corcyreans.

These sensible observations made a deep impression on the moderate portion of the assembly; but the speech of the Corcyreans was more congenial to the ambitious views of the republic, and the daring spirit of Pericles. He wished, however, to avoid the dishonor of manifestly violating the peace, and therefore advised his countrymen to conclude with Corcyra, not a general or complete alliance, but only a treaty of defence, which, in case of invasion, obliged the two states reciprocally to assist each other.

Second sea-fight between the Corinthians and Corcyreans. Olymp. lxxxvii. 1. A. C. 432.

This agreement was no sooner ratified than ten Athenian ships reinforced the fleet of Corcyra, stationed on the *eastern* coast of the island; because the Corinthians, with their numerous allies, already rendezvoused on the opposite shore of Epirus. The hostile armaments met in line of battle, near the small islands Sibota, which seem anciently to have been separated from the continent by the impetuosity of the deep and narrow sea between Epirus and Corcyra. The bold islanders, with an hundred and ten sail, furiously attacked the superior fleet of the Corinthians, which was divided into three squadrons; the Megareans and Ambracians on the right, the Elians and other allies in the centre, their own ships on the left, which composed the principal strength of their line. The narrowness of the strait, and the immense number of ships (far greater than had ever assembled in former battles between the Greeks), soon rendered it impossible, on either side, to display any superiority in sailing, or any address in

manœuvre. The action was irregular and tumultuous, and maintained with more fierceness and vigor than naval skill. The numerous troops, both heavy and light-armed, who were placed on the decks, advanced, engaged, grappled, and fought with obstinate valor; while the ships, continuing motionless and inactive, made the sea-fight resemble a pitched battle. At length twenty Corcyrean gallies, having broke the left wing of the enemy, and pursued them to the coast of Epirus, injudiciously landed there to burn or plunder the Corinthian camp. CHAP. XVI.

The Corcyreans defeated.

This inessential service too much weakened the smaller fleet, and rendered the inequality decisive. The Corcyreans were defeated with great slaughter, their incensed adversaries disregarding plunder and prisoners, and only thirsting for blood and revenge. In the blindness of their rage they destroyed many of their fellow-citizens, who had been captured by the enemy in the beginning of the engagement. Nor was their loss of ships inconsiderable; thirty were sunk, and the rest so much shattered, that when they endeavoured to pursue the feeble remains of the Corcyrean fleet, which had lost seventy gallies, they were effectually prevented from executing this design by the small Athenian squadron, which, according to its instructions from the republic, had taken no share in the battle, but, agreeably to the recent treaty between Athens and Corcyra, hindered the total destruction of their allies, first by hostile threats, at length by actual resistance.

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Arrival of an Athenian squadron.

The Corinthians having dragged up their wreck, and recovered the bodies of their slain, refitted on the coast of Epirus, and hastened to Corcyra; considerably off which they beheld the enemy reinforced, and drawn up in line of battle, in order to defend their coast. They advanced, however, with intrepidity, till, to their surprise and terror, they perceived an unknown fleet pressing towards them. This new appearance shook their resolution, and made them change their course. The Corcyreans, whose situation at first prevented them from seeing the advancing squadron, were astonished at the sudden retreat of the enemy; but when they discovered its cause, their uncertainty and fears, increased by their late afflicting calamity, made them prefer the safest measure. They also turned their prows; and, while the Corinthians retired to Epirus, pressed in an opposite direction to Corcyra. There, to their inexpressible joy, not unmixed with shame, they were joined by the unknown fleet, consisting of twenty Athenian gallies; a reinforcement which enabled them, next morning, to brave the late victorious armament off the coast of Sibota, a deserted harbour of Epirus, opposite to the small islands of the same name.

The Corinthians remonstrate against the proceedings of the Athenians.

The Corinthians, unwilling to contend with the unbroken vigor of their new opponents, dispatched a brigantine with the following remonstrance: "You act most unjustly, men of Athens! in breaking the peace, and commencing unprovoked hostilities. On what pretence do you hinder the Corinthians from taking vengeance on an insolent

foe? If you are determined to perſiſt in iniquity and cruelty, ſeize us who addreſs you, and treat us as enemies." The words were ſcarcely ended when the Corcyreans exclaimed, with a loud and unanimous voice, "Seize, and kill them." But the Athenians anſwered with moderation: "Men of Corinth, we neither break the peace, nor act unjuſtly. We come to defend our allies of Corcyra: ſail unmoleſted by us to whatever friendly port you deem moſt convenient; but if you purpoſe making a deſcent on Corcyra, or on any of the dependences of that iſland, we will exert our utmoſt power to fruſtrate your attempt."[a]

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Their anſwer.

This menace, which prevented immediate hoſtility, did not deter the Corinthians from ſurpriſing, as they ſailed homeward, the town of Anactorium, on the Ambracian gulph, which, in the time of harmony between the colony and parent ſtate, had been built at the joint expenſe of Corinth and Corcyra. From this ſea-port they carried off two hundred and fifty Corcyrean citizens, and eight hundred ſlaves. The former, added to the captives ſaved during the fury of the ſea fight, by the clemency or the avarice of a few Corinthian captains, made the whole priſoners of war amount to twelve hundred and fifty; a capture which, as we ſhall have occaſion to relate, produced moſt important and lamentable conſequences on the future fortune of Corcyra.

The Corinthians ſurpriſe Anactorium, and take many Corcyrean priſoners.

The Corinthians, having chaſtiſed the inſolence of their revolted colony, had reaſon to dread the

Their ſcheme for defeating

[a] Thucydid. i. 37.

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the vengeance of Athens, Olymp. lxxxvii. 1. A. C. 432.

vengeance of its powerful ally. Impressed with this terror, they labored with great activity and with unusual secrecy and address, to find for the Athenian arms an employment still more interesting than the Corcyrean war. The domestic strength of Athens defied assault; but a people who, on the basis of a diminutive territory and scanty population, had reared such an extensive fabric of empire, might easily be wounded in their foreign dependences, which, for obvious causes, were ever prone to novelty and rebellion. The northern shores of the Ægean sea, afterwards comprehended under the name of Macedon, and forming the most valuable portion of that kingdom, reluctantly acknowledged the stern authority of a sovereign whom they obeyed and detested. This extensive coast, of which the subsequent history will deserve our attention, composed, next to the Ægean islands and colonies of Asia, the principal foreign dominions of the Athenian republic. The whole country (naturally divided by the Thermaic and Strymonic gulphs into the provinces of Pieria, Chalcis, and Pangæus) stretched in a direct line only an hundred and fifty miles; but the winding intricacies of the coast, indented by two great, and by two smaller bays, extended three times that length; and almost every convenient situation was occupied by a Grecian sea-port. But neither the extent of above four hundred miles, nor the extreme populousness of the maritime parts, formed the chief importance of this valuable possession. The middle division, called the region of Chalcis, because originally

Description of the Macedonian coast.

peopled by a city of that name in Eubœa, was equally fertile and delightful. The inland country, continually diverſified by lakes, rivers, and arms of the ſea, afforded an extreme facility of water-carriage; Amphipolis, Acanthus, Potidæa, and many other towns, furniſhed conſiderable marts of commerce for the republics of Greece, as well as for the neighbouring kingdoms of Thrace and Macedon; and the conſtant demands of the merchant excited the patient induſtry of the huſbandman. This beautiful diſtrict had, on one ſide, the black mountains of Pangæus, and on the other, the green vales of Pieria. The former, extending ninety miles towards the eaſt and the river Neſſus, abounded neither in corn nor paſture, but produced variety of timber proper for building ſhips; and the ſouthern branches of the mountain contained rich veins of gold and ſilver, which were ſucceſſively wrought by the Thaſians and the Athenians, but of which the full value was firſt diſcovered by Philip of Macedon, who annually extracted from them the value of two hundred thouſand pounds ſterling [10]. The laſt and ſmalleſt diviſion, Pieria, extended fifty miles along the Thermaic gulph to the confines of Theſſaly and Mount Pindus. The towns of Pydna and Methone enriched the ſhore with the benefits of arts and commerce. Nature had been peculiarly kind to the inland country, whoſe ſhady hills, ſequeſtered walks and fountains, lovely verdure, and tranquil ſolitude, rendered it, in the fanciful belief of antiquity, the favorite

CHAP. XI.

[10] Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 514.

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haunt of the Muſes; who borrowed from this diſtrict their favorite appellation of *Pierides*. According to the ſame poetical creed, theſe goddeſſes might well *envy* the mortal inhabitants, who led a paſtoral life, enjoyed happineſs, and are ſcarcely mentioned in hiſtory.

That country revolts from Athens.

Such was the nature and ſuch the diviſions of a territory, which the policy and reſentment of Corinth encouraged to ſucceſsful rebellion againſt the ſovereignty of Athens. Several maritime communities of the Chalcidicé [11] took refuge within the walls of Olynthus, a town which they had built and fortified, at the diſtance of five miles from the ſea, in a fertile and ſecure ſituation, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnius, which flow into the lake Bolyce, the inmoſt receſs of the Toronaic gulph. The neighbouring city of Potidæa, a colony of Corinth, and governed by annual magiſtrates ſent from the mother-country, yet like moſt eſtabliſhments in the Chalcidicé, a tributary confederate [12] of Athens, likewiſe ſtrengthened its walls, and prepared to revolt. But the Athenians anticipated this deſign, by ſending a fleet of thirty ſail, which having entered the harbour of Potidæa,

[11] In uſing the name of Chalcidicé I have followed the analogy of the Greek language rather than complied with cuſtom; yet that part of the Macedonian coaſt, uſually called the region of Chalcis, gave name to the province of Chalcidice in Syria, as Strabo mentions in his ſixteenth book; wherein he explains how the principal diviſions of Syria, as well as Meſopotamia, came to be diſtinguished, after the conqueſts of Alexander, by Grecian appellations, borrowed from the geography deſcribed in the text.

[12] Συμμαχος ὑποτελης. Thucydid.

commanded the citizens to demoliſh their fortifications, to give hoſtages as ſecurity for their good behaviour, and to diſmiſs the Corinthian magiſtrates. The Potidæans artfully requeſted that the execution of theſe ſevere commands might be ſuſpended until they had time to ſend ambaſſadors to Athens, and to remove the unjuſt ſuſpicions of their fidelity. CHAP. XV.

The weakneſs or avarice of Ancheſtratus, the Athenian admiral, liſtened to this deceitful requeſt, and, leaving the coaſt of Potidæa, directed the operations of his ſquadron againſt places of leſs importance, not ſparing the dependences of Macedon. Meanwhile the Potidæans ſent a public but illuſive embaſſy to Athens, while one more effectual was ſecretly diſpatched to Corinth, and other cities of the Peloponneſus, from which they were ſupplied with two thouſand men, commanded by the Corinthian Ariſteus, a brave and enterpriſing general. Theſe troops were thrown into the place during the abſence of the Athenian fleet; and the Potidæans, thus reinforced, ſet their enemies at defiance. Alarmed by this intelligence, the Athenians fitted out a new fleet of forty ſail, with a large body of troops, under the command of Callias; who, arriving on the coaſt of Macedon, found the ſquadron of Ancheſtratus employed in the ſiege of Pydna. Callias judiciouſly exhorted him to deſiſt from that enterpriſe, comparatively of little importance, that the united ſquadrons might attack Potidæa by ſea, while an Athenian army of three thouſand citizens, with a due proportion of allies, aſſaulted it by land. This meaſure was adopted;

The Athenians beſiege Potidæa. Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A. C. 432.

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but the ſpirit of the garriſon ſoon offered them battle, almoſt on equal terms, though with unequal ſucceſs. Callias however was ſlain, and ſucceeded by Phormio; who, conducting a freſh ſupply of troops, deſolated the hoſtile territory of Chalcis and Pieria; took ſeveral towns by ſtorm; and, having ravaged the adjoining diſtrict, beſieged the city of Potidæa.

The Corinthians endeavour to exaſperate the Lacedæmonians againſt Athens.

While thoſe tranſactions were carrying on in the north, the centre of Greece was ſhaken by the murmurs and complaints of the Corinthians and their Peloponneſian confederates, who loſt all patience when their citizens were blocked up by an Athenian army. Accompanied by the deputies of ſeveral republics beyond the iſthmus, who had recently experienced the arrogance of their imperious neighbour, they had recourſe to Sparta, whoſe actual power and ancient renown juſtly merited the firſt rank in the confederacy, but whoſe meaſures[13] were rendered ſlow and cautious by the foreſight and peaceful counſels of the prudent Archidamus. When introduced into the Spartan aſſembly, the repreſentatives of all the ſtates inveighed, with equal bitterneſs, againſt the injuſtice and cruelty of Athens, while each deſcribed and exaggerated the weight of its peculiar grievances. The Megareans

[13] Plutarch (in Pericl.) aſcribes the backwardneſs of the Spartans to engage in war to the advice of their principal magiſtrates, bribed by Pericles, who wiſhed to gain time for his military preparations; a report as improbable as another calumny, that they were bribed by their allies to take arms againſt Athens (Ariſtoph. in Pace). The cauſe of their irreſolution, aſſigned in the text, is confirmed by the ſubſequent behaviour of Archidamus.

complained that, by a recent decree of that ſtern unfeeling republic, they had been excluded from the ports and markets of Attica[*]; an excluſion which, conſidering the narrowneſs and poverty of their own rocky diſtrict, was equivalent to depriving them of the firſt neceſſaries of life. The inhabitants of Ægina explained and lamented that, in defiance of recent and ſolemn treaties, and diſregarding the liberal ſpirit of Grecian policy, the Athenians had reduced their unfortunate iſland into the moſt deplorable condition of ſervitude. CHAP. XVI.

When other ſtates had deſcribed their particular ſufferings, the Corinthians laſt aroſe, and their ſpeaker thus addreſſed the Lacedæmonian aſſembly: "Had we come hither, men of Lacedæmon! to urge our private wrongs, it might be ſufficient barely to relate the tranſactions of the preceding, and preſent, years. The revolt of Corcyra, the ſiege of Potidæa, are facts which ſpeak for themſelves; Speech of the Corinthians;

[*] The Megareans were accuſed of ploughing ſome conſecrated lands: they were accuſed of harbouring the Athenian ſlaves, fugitives, and exiles: other cauſes of complaint might eaſily have been diſcovered or invented by their powerful neighbours, who were provoked that ſuch a ſmall community on their frontier ſhould uniformly ſpurn their authority. But the malignity of the comic writers of the times aſcribed the ſevere decree againſt Megara to an event equally diſgraceful to the morals of their country, and injurious to the honor of Pericles. The following verſes are tranſlated from the Acharnenſes of Ariſtophanes:

Juvenes profecti Megaram ebrii auferunt
Simæthæ ex ſcortatione nobilem:
Megarenſis hinc populus dolore percitus
Furatur Aſpaſiæ duo ſcorta haud impiger:
Hinc initium belli prorupit
Univerſis Græcis ob tres meretriculas.

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but the thoughts of this assembly should be directed to objects more important than particular injuries, however flagrant and enormous. The *general* oppressive system of Athenian policy,—it is this which demands your most serious concern; a system aiming at nothing less than the destruction of Grecian freedom, which is ready to perish through your supine neglect. That moderation and probity, men of Sparta! for which your domestic counsels are justly famous, render you the dupes of foreign artifice, and expose you to become the victims of foreign ambition; which, instead of opposing with prompt alacrity, you have nourished by unseasonable delay; and, in consequence of this fatal error, are now called to contend, not with the infant weakness, but with the matured vigor of your enemies, those enemies, who, ever unsatisfied with their present measure of prosperity, are continually intent on some new project of aggrandizement. How different from *your* slow procrastination is the ardent character of the Athenians! Fond of novelty, and fertile in resources, alike active and vigilant, the accomplishment of one design leads them to another more daring. Desire, hope, enterprise, success, follow in rapid succession. Already have they subdued half of Greece; their ambition grasps the whole. Rouse, then, from your lethargy, defend your allies, invade Attica, maintain the glory of Peloponnesus, that sacred deposit, with which being intrusted by your ancestors, you are bound to transmit unimpaired to posterity."

Several

Several Athenians, then reſiding on other buſineſs at Sparta, deſired to be heard in defence of their country. Equity could not deny the requeſt of theſe voluntary advocates, who ſpoke in a ſtyle well becoming the loftineſs of their republic[15]. With the pride of ſuperiority, rather than the indignation of innocence, they affected to deſpiſe the falſe aſperſions of their adverſaries; and, inſtead of anſwering directly the numerous accuſations againſt their preſumptuous abuſe of power, deſcribed, with ſwelling encomiums, "the illuſtrious and memorable exploits of their countrymen; exploits which had juſtly raiſed them to a pre-eminence, acknowledged by their allies, uncontеſted by Sparta, and felt by Perſia. When it became the dignity of Greece to chaſtiſe the repeated inſults of that ambitious empire, the Spartans had declined the conduct of a diſtant war; Athens had aſſumed the abandoned helm, and, after demoliſhing the cruel dominion of Barbarians, had acquired a juſt and lawful ſway over the coaſts of Europe and of Aſia. The new ſubjects of the republic were long treated rather as fellow-citizens, than as tributaries and ſlaves. But it was the nature of man to revolt againſt the *ſuppoſed* injuſtice of his equals, rather than againſt the *real* tyranny of his maſters. This circumſtance, ſo honorable to Athenian lenity, had occaſioned ſeveral unprovoked rebellions, which the republic had been compelled to puniſh with an exemplary ſeverity. The apprehenſion of future

OLYMP. LXXXVI. anſwered by the Athenians.

[15] Thucydid. l. xliii. et ſeqq.

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commotions had lately obliged her to hold, with a firmer hand, the reins of government, and to maintain with armed power, an authority juſtly earned, and ſtrictly founded in nature, of which it is an unalterable law, that the ſtrong ſhould govern the weak. If the Spartans, in violation of the right of treaties, thought proper to oppoſe this immoveable purpoſe, Athens well knew how to redreſs her wrongs, and would, doubtleſs, uphold her empire with the ſame valor and activity by which it had been eſtabliſhed."

Pacific advice of king Archidamus;

Having heard both parties, the aſſembly adjourned, without forming any reſolution. But next day, it appeared to be the prevailing opinion, that the arrogance and uſurpation of Athens had already violated the peace, and that it became the prudence as well as the dignity of Sparta, no longer to defer hoſtilities. This popular current was vainly oppoſed by the experienced wiſdom of king Archidamus, who ſtill counſelled peace and moderation, though his courage had been conſpicuouſly diſtinguiſhed in every ſeaſon of danger. He exhorted his countrymen "not to ruſh blindly on war, without examining the reſources of the enemy and their own. The Athenians were powerful in ſhips, in money, in cavalry, and in arms; of all which the Lacedæmonians were deſtitute, or, at leaſt, but feebly provided. Whatever provocation, therefore, they had received, they ought in prudence to diſſemble their reſentment, until they could effectually exert their vengeance. The preſent criſis required negociation; if that failed, the ſilent preparation of a few years would enable them to take the field

with well-founded hopes of redreſſing the grievances of their confederates." Had this moderate language made any impreſſion on ſuch an aſſembly, it would have been ſpeedily obliterated by the blunt boldneſs of Sthenelaides, one of the Ephori, who cloſed the debate. "Men of Sparta! Of the long ſpeeches of the Athenians I underſtand not the drift. While they dwell with ſtudied eloquence on their own praiſes, they deny not their having injured our allies. If they behaved *well* in the Perſian war, and now *otherwiſe*, their degeneracy is only the more apparent. But then, and now, we are ſtill the ſame; and if we would ſupport our character, we muſt not overlook their injuſtice. They have ſhips, money, and horſes; but we have good allies, whoſe intereſts we muſt not abandon. Why do we deliberate, while our enemies are in arms? Let us take the field with ſpeed, and fight with all our might." The acclamations of the people followed, and war was reſolved.

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opposed by Sthenelaides, one of the Ephori.

This reſolution was taken in the fourteenth year after the concluſion of the general peace; but near a twelvemonth elapſed before the propereſt meaſures for invading Attica could be finally adjuſted among the diſcordant members of ſo numerous a confederacy. It conſiſted of all the ſeven republics of the Peloponneſus, except Argos and Achaia, the firſt of which from ambition, and the ſecond perhaps from moderation[16], preſerved, in the

War determined. Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A. C. 431.

General confederacy againſt Athens;

[16] The ambition of Argos is confirmed by the ſubſequent meaſures of that republic; the moderation of Achaia is ſuſpected, from the nature of the Achæan laws, which will afterwards be deſcribed.

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beginning of the war, a ſuſpicious neutrality. Of the nine northern republics, Acarnania alone declined joining the allies, its coaſt being particularly expoſed to the ravages of the Corcyrean fleets. The cities of Naupactus and Platæa, for reaſons that will ſoon appear, were totally devoted to their Athenian protectors; whoſe cauſe was likewiſe embraced by ſeveral petty princes of Theſſaly. But all the other ſtates beyond the iſthmus longed to follow the ſtandard of Sparta, and to humble the aſpiring ambition of their too powerful neighbour.

ſends a menacing embaſſy to that republic;

The repreſentatives of theſe various communities having, according to the received practice of Greece, aſſembled in the principal city of the confederacy, were ſtrongly encouraged by the Corinthians, who, as their colony of Potidæa was ſtill cloſely beſieged, labored to accelerate repriſals on Attica, by exhibiting the moſt advantageous proſpect of the approaching war. They obſerved, "That the army of the confederacy, exceeding ſixty thouſand men, far out-numbered the enemy, whom they excelled ſtill more in merit, than they ſurpaſſed in number. The one was compoſed of national troops, fighting for the independence of thoſe countries in whoſe government they had a ſhare; the other chiefly conſiſted in vile mercenaries, whoſe pay was their government and their country. If ſupplies of money were requiſite, the allied ſtates would doubtleſs be more liberal and forward to defend their intereſt and honor, than the reluctant tributaries of Athens to rivet their ſervitude and chains: and if ſtill more money

ſhould be wanted, the Delphic and Olympic treaſures afforded an inexhauſtible reſource, which could not be better expended than in defending the ſacred cauſe of juſtice and of Grecian freedom." In order to gain full time, however, for ſettling all matters among themſelves, the confederates diſpatched to Athens various overtures of accommodation, which they well knew would be indignantly rejected. In each embaſſy they roſe in their demands, ſucceſſively requiring the Athenians to raiſe the ſiege of Potidæa; to repeal their prohibitory decree againſt Megara; to withdraw their garriſon from Ægina; in fine, to declare the independence of their colonies[17].

which alarms the Athenians.

Theſe laſt demands were heard at Athens with a mixture of rage and terror. The capricious multitude, who had hitherto approved and admired the aſpiring views of Pericles, now trembled on the brink of the precipice to which he had conducted them. They had hitherto puſhed the ſiege of Potidæa with great vigor, but without any near

[17] Beſides complying with the demands mentioned in the text, the Athenians were required "to expel the deſcendants of thoſe impious men who had profaned the temple of Minerva." This alluded to an event which happened the firſt year of the 45th Olympiad, or 598 years before Chriſt. Cylon, a powerful Athenian, having ſeized the citadel, and aſpiring at royalty, was defeated in his purpoſe by Megacles, a maternal anceſtor of Pericles, who having decoyed the aſſociates of Cylon from the temple of Minerva, butchered them without mercy, and with too little reſpect for the privileges of that venerable ſanctuary. The whole tranſaction is particularly related by Plutarch in his life of Solon. The renewal of ſuch an antiquated complaint, at this juncture, pointed particularly at Pericles, and ſhowed the opinion which the Spartans entertained of his unrivalled influence and authority.

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prospect of success. They must now contend with a numerous confederacy, expose their boasted grandeur to the doubtful chance of war, and exchange the amusements and pleasures of the city for the toils and hardships of a camp. Of these discontented murmurs the rivals and enemies of Pericles greedily availed themselves, to traduce the character and administration of that illustrious statesman. It was insinuated, that, sacrificing to private passion the interest of his country, he had enacted the imperious decree, of which the allies so justly complained, to resent the personal injury of his beloved Aspasia, whose family had been insulted by some licentious youths of Megara [18]. Diopeithes, Dracontides, and other demagogues, derided the folly of taking arms on such a frivolous pretence, and as preparatory to the impeachment of Pericles himself, the courts of justice were fatigued with prosecutions of his valuable friends.

Clamor excited against Pericles.

Persecution of his friends.

The philosopher Anaxagoras, and Phidias the statuary, reflected more lustre than they could derive from the protection of any patron. The mixed character of Aspasia was of a more doubtful kind. To the natural and sprightly graces of Ionia, her native country, she added extraordinary accomplishments of mind and body; and having acquired in high perfection the talents and excellences of the other sex, was accused of being too indifferent to the honor of her own. Scarcely superior in modesty to Phryné, Thais, or Erigoné [19], her wit, her knowledge, and her eloquence,

[18] See above, p. 335. [19] See above, p. 289.

excited universal admiration or envy [20], while the beauty of her fancy and of her person inspired more tender sentiments into the susceptible breast of Pericles. She was reproached, not with entertaining free votaries of pleasure in her family (which in that age was regarded as a very allowable commerce), but of seducing the virtue of Athenian matrons; a crime severely punished by the laws of every Grecian republic. But we have reason to conclude her innocent, since the arguments and tears of her lover saved her from the fury of an enraged populace, at a crisis when his most strenuous exertions could not prevent the banishment of Anaxagoras and Phidias. CHAP. XV.

Banishment of Anaxagoras and Phidias.

The former was accused of propagating doctrines inconsistent with the established religion; the latter, of having indulged the very pardonable vanity (as it should seem) of representing himself and his patron, on the shield of his admired statue of Minerva. There, with inimitable art, Phidias had engraved the renowned victory of the Athenians over the warlike daughters of the Thermodon [21]; he had delineated himself in the figure of a bald old man raising a heavy stone (an allusion to his skill in architecture), while the features of Pericles were distinguished in the countenance of an Athenian chief, bravely combating the queen of the Amazons, though his elevated arm hid part of the face, and in some measure concealed the resemblance [22]. For this fictitious crime, Phidias was

[20] Plato in Menex. [21] Lysias Orat. Funeb.
[22] Plut. in Pericl. et Aristot. de Mund.

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driven from a city which had been adorned by the unwearied labors of his long life, and debarred beholding those wonders of art which his sublime genius had created.

Accusation of Pericles.

The accusation of the principal friends of Pericles paved the way for his own. He was reproached with embezzling the public treasure; but, on this occasion, plain facts confounded the artifices of his enemies. It was proved, that his private expenses were justly proportioned to the measure of his patrimony; many instances were brought of his generous contempt of wealth in the service of his country; and it appeared, after the strictest examination, that his fortune had not increased since he was intrusted with the exchequer. This honorable display of unshaken probity, which had ever formed the basis of the authority[1] of Pericles, again reconciled to him the unsteady affections of his countrymen, and gave irresistible force to that famous and fatal speech, which unalterably decided the war of Peloponnesus.

[1] This testimony, which is given by the impartiality of Thucydides, destroys at once the numerous aspersions of the comic poets of the times, which have been copied by Plutarch, and from him transcribed by modern compilers. Pericles, it is said, raised the war of Peloponnesus, merely for his own convenience and safety; and was encouraged to this measure by the advice of his kinsman Alcibiades, then a boy; who, calling one day at his house, was refused admittance, "because Pericles was occupied in considering how he might best state his accounts." "Let him rather consider," said the sagacious stripling, "how to give no account at all." Pericles took the hint, and involved his country in a war, which allowed no time for examining the public expenditure. Such anecdotes may amuse those who can believe them.

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"Often have I declared, Athenians! that we muſt not obey the unjuſt commands of our enemies. I am ſtill firmly of that mind, convinced as I am of the dangerous viciſſitudes of war and fortune; and that human hopes, deſigns, and purſuits, are all fleeting and fallacious. Yet, in the preſent criſis, neceſſity and glory ſhould alike fix us to this immoveable reſolution. The decree againſt Megara, which the firſt embaſſy required us to repeal, is not the cauſe of that hoſtile jealouſy which has long ſecretly envied our greatneſs, and which has now more openly conſpired our deſtruction. Yet that decree, of which ſome men have ſpoken ſo lightly, involved the honor of our councils and the ſtability of our empire. By puſillanimouſly repealing it, we ſhould have emboldened that malignant enmity, which, notwithſtanding our proper firmneſs in the firſt inſtance, has yet ſucceſſively riſen to higher and more arbitrary demands; demands which merit to be anſwered, not by embaſſies, but by arms.

He juſtifies his meaſure, and maintains the neceſſity of the war;

"The flouriſhing reſources, and actual ſtrength, of the republic, afford us the moſt flattering proſpect of military ſucceſs. Impregnably fortified by land, our ſhores are defended by three hundred gallies; beſides a body of cavalry, to the number of twelve hundred, together with two thouſand archers, we can immediately take the field with thirteen thouſand pikemen, without draining our foreign garriſons, or diminiſhing the complete number of ſixteen thouſand men who defend the walls and fortreſſes in Attica. The wealthy ſea-ports

explains the ſtrength and reſources of the republic;

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of Thrace and Macedon; the flouriſhing colonies of Ionia, Eolia, and Doria; in a word, the whole extenſive coaſt of the Aſiatic peninſula, acknowledge, by annual contributions, the ſovereignty of our guardian navy, whoſe ſtrength is increaſed by the ſhips of Chios, Leſbos, and Corcyra, while the ſmaller iſlands furniſh us, according to their ability, with money and troops. Athens thus reigns queen of a thouſand [24] tributary republics, and notwithſtanding the expenſes incurred by the ſiege of Potidæa, and the architectural ornaments of the city, ſhe poſſeſſes ſix thouſand talents in her treaſury.

which he contraſts with the weakneſs of the enemy.

"The ſituation of our enemies is totally the reverſe. Animated by rage, and emboldened by numbers, they may be rouſed to a tranſient, deſultory aſſault; but deſtitute of reſources, and divided in intereſts, they are totally incapable of any ſteady, perſevering exertion. With ſixty thouſand men they may enter Attica; and if our unſeaſonable courage gives them an opportunity, may win a battle; but unleſs our raſh imprudence aſſiſts and enables them, they cannot poſſibly proſecute a ſucceſsful war. Indeed, Athenians! I dread leſs the power of the enemy, than your own ungovernable ſpirit. Inſtead of being ſeduced from your ſecurity, by a vain deſire to defend, againſt ſuperior numbers, your plantations and villas in the

[24] Ariſtoph. Veſp. He ſays, that twenty thouſand Athenians might live as in the Elyſian fields, if each tributary city undertook to provide for twenty citizens. V. 705, etc.

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open country, you ought to deſtroy theſe ſuperfluous poſſeſſions with your own hands. To you who receive the conveniences of life from ſo many diſtant dependences, the devaſtation of Attica is a matter of ſmall moment; but how can your enemies repair, how can they ſurvive, the devaſtation of the Peloponneſus? How can they prevent, or remedy, this fatal, this intolerable calamity, while the ſquadrons of Athens command the ſurrounding ſeas? If theſe conſiderations be allowed their full weight; if reaſon, not paſſion, conducts the war, it ſeems ſcarcely in the power of fortune to rob you of victory. Yet let us anſwer the Peloponneſians with moderation, "that we will not forbid the Megareans our ports and markets, if the Spartans, and other ſtates of Greece, aboliſh their excluſive and inhoſpitable laws: that we will reſtore independent governments to ſuch cities as were free at the laſt treaty of peace, provided the Spartans engage to follow our example: that we are ready to ſubmit all differences to the impartial deciſion of any equitable tribunal; and that, although theſe condeſcending overtures be rejected, we will not commence hoſtilities, but are prepared to repel them with our uſual vigor[35]." The aſſembly murmured applauſe; a decree was propoſed and

Dictates a reply to the Peloponneſians,

which is taken for a declaration of war.

[35] In examining the ſpeech aſcribed to Pericles, on this occaſion, by Thucydides, the attentive reader will perceive that it ſuppoſes the knowledge of ſeveral events omitted in the preceding narrative of that hiſtorian, but which are carefully related in the text. The Engliſh ſpeech is ſhorter than the Greek, but contains more information, collected from Plutarch, Diodorus, Ariſtophanes, and the 2d book of Thucydides himſelf.

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ratified; the ambaſſadors returned home with the reply dictated by Pericles; which, moderate as it ſeemed to the Athenian ſtateſman, ſounded like an immediate declaration of war to the Spartans and their allies.

The Thebans ſurpriſe Platæa. Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A. C. 431. May the 7th.

Six months after the battle of Potidæa, the Thebans, who were the moſt powerful and the moſt daring of theſe allies, undertook a military enterpriſe againſt the ſmall but magnanimous republic of Platæa. Though ſituate in the heart of Bœotia, amidſt numerous and warlike enemies, the Platæans ſtill preſerved an unſhaken fidelity to Athens, whoſe toils and triumphs they had ſhared in the Perſian war. Yet even this feeble community, ſurrounded on every ſide by hoſtile Bœotians, was not exempted from domeſtic diſcord. Nauclides, the perfidious and bloody leader of an ariſtocratical faction, engaged to betray the Platæan gates to a body of foreign troops, provided they enabled him to overturn the democracy, and to take vengeance on his political adverſaries, whom he regarded as his perſonal foes. Eurymachus, a noble and wealthy Theban, with whom, in the name of his aſſociates, this ſanguinary agreement had been contracted, entered Platæa with three hundred of his countrymen, at the firſt watch of the night; but, regardleſs of their promiſe to Nauclides, who expected that they would break tumultuouſly into the houſes, and butcher his enemies, the Thebans formed regularly in arms, and remained quietly in the market-place, having iſſued a proclamation to invite all the citizens indiſcri-

minately to become allies to Thebes. The Platæans readily accepted a propoſal, which delivered them from the terror of immediate death. But while they ſucceſſively ratified the agreement, they obſerved, with mixed ſhame and joy, that darkneſs and ſurpriſe had greatly augmented the number of the conſpirators. Encouraged by this diſcovery, they ſecretly diſpatched a meſſenger to Athens; and, while they expected the aſſiſtance of their diſtant protector, determined to leave nothing untried for their own deliverance.

Daring enterpriſe of the Platæans.

The night was ſpent in an operation not leſs daring than extraordinary. As they could not aſſemble in the ſtreets without alarming ſuſpicion, they dug through the interior walls of their houſes, and fortified the outward in the beſt manner the time would allow, with their ploughs, carts, and other inſtruments of huſbandry. Before day-break the work was complete; when, with one conſent, they ruſhed furiouſly againſt the enemy, the women and children animating with horrid ſhrieks and geſtures the efforts of their rage. It was night, and a ſtorm of rain and thunder augmented the gloomy terrors of the battle. The Thebans were unacquainted with the ground; above an hundred fell; near two hundred fled in trepidation to a lofty and ſpacious tower adjoining the walls, which they miſtook for one of the gates of the city. In the firſt movements of reſentment, the Platæans prepared to burn them alive; but a moment's reflection deterred them from this dangerous cruelty. Meanwhile, a conſiderable body of Thebans

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advanced towards Platæa, to co-operate with their countrymen. Their progreſs would have been haſtened by a fugitive who met them, and related the miſcarriage of the enterpriſe, had not the heavy rain ſo much ſwelled the Aſopus, that an unuſual time was ſpent in croſſing that river. They had ſcarcely entered the Platæan territory, when a ſecond meſſenger informed them, that their unfortunate companions were all killed or taken priſoners. Upon this intelligence they pauſed to conſider, whether, inſtead of proceeding to the Platæan walls, where they could not perform any immediate ſervice, they ought not, as an eaſier enterpriſe, to ſeize the citizens of that place, who were diſperſed over their villages in the open country.

Their ſtratagem for deſtroying the Thebans, without danger to themſelves.

But while they deliberated on this meaſure, a Platæan herald arrived, complaining of the unjuſt and moſt unexpected infraction of the peace, by a daring and atrocious conſpiracy; commanding the Thebans immediately to leave the territory of Platæa, if they hoped to deliver their fellow-citizens from captivity; and denouncing, if they refuſed compliance, that their countrymen would inevitably be puniſhed with a cruel death. This ſtratagem, not leſs audacious than artful, prevailed on the enemy to repaſs the Aſopus, while the Platæans loſt not a moment to aſſemble within their walls the ſcattered inhabitants of their fields and villas; and braving the Theban reſentment, the immediate effects of which they had rendered impotent, maſſacred the unhappy priſoners, to the number of an

hundred and eighty, among whom was Eurymachus, the chief promoter of the expedition. After this ſignal act of vengeance, they ſtrengthened the works of the place; tranſported their wives and children to the tributary iſlands of Athens; and, that they might more ſecurely ſuſtain the expected ſiege, required and received from that republic a plentiful ſupply of proviſions, and a conſiderable reinforcement of troops. CHAP. XV.

Preparations for war on both ſides. A. C. 431.

The ſword was now drawn, and both parties ſeemed eager to exert their utmoſt ſtrength. The Spartans ſummoned their confederates to the Iſthmus; demanded money and ſhips from their Italian and Sicilian colonies; and ſolicited aſſiſtance from the Perſian monarch Artaxerxes, and from Perdiccas king of Macedon; both of whom naturally regarded the Athenians as dangerous neighbours, and ambitious invaders of their coaſts. The people of Athens alſo condeſcended to crave the aid of Barbarians, and actually contracted an alliance with Sitalces, the warlike chief of the Odryſians, who formed the moſt powerful tribe in Upper Thrace. They required at the ſame time an immediate ſupply of cavalry from their Theſſalian allies, while their fleet already cruiſed along the coaſt of Peloponneſus, to confirm the fidelity of the ſurrounding iſlands; an object deemed eſſential to the ſucceſsful invaſion of that territory. The unexperienced youth, extremely numerous in moſt republics of Greece, rejoiced at the proſpect of war. The aged ſaw and dreaded the general commotion, darkly foretold, as they thought, by

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ancient oracles and prophecies, but clearly and recently announced, by an earthquake in the ſacred, and hitherto immoveable iſland of Delos. Such was the ardor of preparation, that only a few weeks after the ſurpriſe of Platæa, the Lacedæmonian confederates, to the number of ſixty thouſand, aſſembled from the north and ſouth, at the Corinthian Iſthmus. The ſeveral communities were reſpectively commanded by leaders of their own appointment; but the general conduct of the war was intruſted to Archidamus, the Spartan king.

Archidamus addreſſes the confederates.

In a council of the chiefs, that prince warmly approved their alacrity in taking the field, and extolled the greatneſs and bravery of an army, the moſt numerous and beſt provided that had ever followed the ſtandard of any Grecian general. Yet their preparations, however extraordinary, were not greater than their enterpriſe required. They had waged war with a people not leſs powerful, than active and daring; who had diſcernment to perceive, and ability to improve, every opportunity of advantage; and whoſe reſentment would be as much inflamed, as their pride would be wounded, by the approach of invaſion and hoſtility. It ſeemed probable, that the Athenians would not allow their lands to be waſted, without attempting to defend them. The confederates, therefore, muſt be always on their guard; their diſcipline muſt be ſtrict, regular, and uniform; to elude the ſkill, and to oppoſe the ſtrength of Athens, demanded their utmoſt vigilance and activity.

Archidamus,

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Archidamus, after leading his army into Attica, seems blamable in allowing their martial ardor to evaporate in the fruitless siege of Oenoé, the strongest Athenian town towards the southern frontier of Bœotia. This tedious and unsuccessful operation enabled the Athenians to complete, without interruption, the singular plan of defence so ably traced by the bold genius of Pericles. They hastened the desolation of their own fields; demolished their delightful gardens and villas, which it had been their pride to adorn; and transported, either to Athens or the isles, their valuable effects, their cattle, furniture, and even the frames of their houses. The numerous inhabitants of the country-towns, and villages, where the more opulent Athenians commonly spent the greater part of their time, flocked to the capital, which was well furnished with the means of subsistence, though not of accommodation, for such a promiscuous crowd of strangers, with their families, slaves, or servants. Many people of lower rank, destitute of private dwellings, were obliged to occupy the public halls, the groves and temples, the walls and battlements. Even persons of distinction were narrowly and meanly lodged; an inconvenience severely felt by men accustomed to live at large in the country, in rural ease and elegance. But resentment against the public enemy blunted the sense of personal hardship, and silenced the voice of private complaint.

Leads them to Attica.

Meanwhile, the confederate army, having raised the siege of Oenoé, advanced along the eastern

The confederates ravage Attica.

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Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A. C. 431.

frontier of Attica; and, within eighty days after the ſurpriſe of Platæa, invaded the Thriaſian plain, the richeſt ornament of the Athenian territory. Having waſted that valuable diſtrict with fire and ſword, they proceeded to Eleuſis, and from thence to Acharnæ, the largeſt borough in the province, and only eight miles diſtant from the capital. There they continued an unuſual length of time, gradually demoliſhing the houſes and plantations, and daily exerciſing every act of rapacious cruelty, with a view either to draw the enemy to a battle, or to diſcover whether they were unalterably determined to keep within their walls; a reſolution, which, if clearly aſcertained, would enable the invaders to proceed with more boldneſs and effect, and to carry on their ravages with ſecurity, even to the gates of Athens.

The Athenians retort their injuries.

The Athenians, hitherto intent on their naval preparations, had exerted an uncommon degree of patience and ſelf-command. But their unruly paſſions could no longer be reſtrained, when they learned the proceedings in Acharnæ. The proprietors of that rich and extenſive diſtrict boaſted that they alone could ſend three thouſand brave ſpearmen into the field, and lamented, that they ſhould remain cooped up in diſhonorable confinement, while their poſſeſſions fell a prey to an hoſtile invader. Their animated complaints inflamed the kindred ardor of the Athenian youth. It appeared unworthy of thoſe, who had ſo often ravaged with impunity the territories of their neighbours, patiently to behold the deſolation of their

own. Intereſted prieſts announced approaching calamity; ſeditious orators clamored againſt the timid councils of Pericles; the impetuous youth required their general to lead them to battle. Amidſt this popular commotion, the accompliſhed general and ſtateſman remained unmoved, bravely reſiſting the ſtorm, or dexterouſly eluding its force. Though determined not to riſk an engagement with the confederates, he ſeaſonably employed the Athenian and Theſſalian cavalry to beat up their quarters, to intercept their convoys, to haraſs, ſurpriſe, or cut off their advanced parties. While theſe enterpriſes tended to divert or appeaſe the tumult, a fleet of an hundred and fifty ſail ravaged the defenceleſs coaſt of Peloponneſus. A ſquadron, leſs numerous, made a deſcent on Locris. The rebellious inhabitants of Ægina were driven from their poſſeſſions, and an Athenian colony was ſettled in that iſland. The wretched fugitives, whoſe country had long rivalled Athens itſelf in wealth, commerce, and naval power, received the maritime diſtrict of Thyrea [24] from the bounty of their Spartan protectors.

The confederates evacuate Attica.

Intelligence of theſe proceedings, and ſtill more the ſcarcity of proviſions, engaged the confederates to return to their reſpective republics. Having advanced by the eaſtern, they retired along the weſtern, frontier of Attica; every place in their line

[24] This diſtrict lay on the frontier of the Argive and Lacedæmonian territory, and was long an object of contention between thoſe republics. See vol. i. p. 322, 323.

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of march experiencing the fatal effects of their reſentment or rapacity. Soon after their retreat, Pericles, towards the beginning of autumn, led out the Athenians to ravage the neighbouring and hoſtile province of Megara. The invading army was accidentally obſerved by the fleet, while it returned from the coaſt of Peloponneſus. The ſailors haſtened to ſhare the danger and plunder. The whole Athenian force thus amounted to near twenty thouſand men; a number far more than ſufficient to deprive the induſtrious Megareans of the hope of a ſcanty harveſt, earned with infinite toil and care, in their narrow unfruitful territory.

Pericles invades Megara.

The winter was not diſtinguiſhed by any important expedition on either ſide. The Corinthians, long enured to the ſea in all ſeaſons, carried on indeciſive hoſtilities againſt the Athenian allies in Acarnania. During this inactive portion of the year, the Athenians, as well as their enemies, were employed in celebrating the memory of the dead, with much funeral pomp, and high encomiums on their valor [37]; in diſtributing the

[37] This mournful ſolemnity, as practiſed by the Athenians, is deſcribed by Thucydides, l. ii. p. 120, et ſeqq. The bones of the deceaſed were brought to a tabernacle previouſly erected for receiving them. On the day appointed for the funeral, they were conveyed from thence in cypreſs coffins, drawn on carriages, one for each tribe, to the public ſepulchre in the Ceramicus, the moſt beautiful ſuburb of the city. The relations of the dead decked out the remains of their friends, as they judged moſt proper (See Lyſias againſt Agoratus). One empty bier was drawn along in honor of thoſe whoſe bodies had not been recovered. Perſons of every age, and of either ſex, citizens and ſtrangers, attended this ſolemnity. When the bones were depoſited in the earth, ſome citizen of dignity and merit, named

prizes of merit among the ſurviving warriors; in confirming their reſpective alliances; and in fortifying ſuch places on their frontier as ſeemed moſt expoſed to military excurſions, or naval deſcents. CHAP. XV.

The return of ſummer brought back into Attica the Peloponneſian invaders; but it likewiſe introduced a far more dreadful calamity. A deſtructive peſtilence, engendered in Æthiopia, infected Egypt, and ſpread over great part of the dominions of the king of Perſia. Hiſtory does not explain by what means this fatal diſorder was communicated to Greece. The year had been in other reſpects remarkably healthful. As the diſeaſe firſt appeared in the Piræus, the principal Athenian harbour, we may be allowed to conjecture, that it was imported from the eaſt, either by the Athenian merchantmen, or by the ſhips of war, which annually ſailed to that quarter, in order to levy money on the tributary cities. When its miſerable ſymptoms broke out in the Piræus, the inhabitants ſuſpected that the enemy had poiſoned their wells. But it ſoon extended over the adjoining diſtricts, and raged

The plague breaks out in Athens. A. C. 430.

by the ſtate, mounted a lofty pulpit, and pronounced the panegyric of the deceaſed, of their anceſtors, and the Athenian republic. On this occaſion, Pericles himſelf had been appointed to that ſolemn office. He performed it with great dignity. His ſpeech, containing almoſt as many ideas as words, is incapable of abridgment; nor does its nature admit the inſertion of it entire in the preſent hiſtory, in which eloquence is merely conſidered as an inſtrument of government, and ſuch ſpeeches only introduced as influenced public reſolutions and meaſures. It is, however, worthy of obſervation, that his magnificent diſplay of the advantages, the ſecurity, and the glory of Athens, forms a ſtriking contraſt with the unexpected calamities which ſoon overwhelmed his unhappy country.

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with peculiar violence in the populous ſtreets which ſurrounded the citadel.

Deſcription of that malady.

The malady appeared under various forms, in different conſtitutions; but its ſpecific ſymptoms were invariably the ſame. It began with a burning heat in the head; the eyes were read and inflamed; the tongue and mouth had the color of blood. The pain and inflammation deſcended to the breaſt with inexpreſſible anguiſh; the ſkin was covered with ulcers; the body of a livid red; the external heat not ſenſible to the touch, but the internal ſo violent, that the ſlighteſt covering could not be endured. An inſatiable thirſt was an univerſal ſymptom; and, when indulged, increaſed the diſorder. When the bowels were attacked, the patient ſoon periſhed through debility. Some lived ſeven or nine days, and died of a fever, with apparent remains of ſtrength. The life was ſaved, when the internal vigor diverted the courſe of the diſeaſe towards the extremities. Thoſe who once recovered were never dangerouſly attacked a ſecond time, from which they conceived a vain hope of proving thenceforth ſuperior to every bodily infirmity. The diſorder, which was always accompanied with an extreme dejection of ſpirits, often impaired the judgment, as well as the memory. All remedies, human and divine, were employed in vain to ſtop the progreſs of this fatal contagion. The miſerable crowds expired in the temples, preferring unavailing prayers to the gods. A ſhocking ſpectacle was ſeen round the ſacred fountains, where multitudes lay dead, or periſhed in agonizing

Its effects on the mind.

torture. At length all medical assistance was despised [28], and all religious ceremonies neglected. Continually suffering or apprehending the most dreadful calamities, the Athenians became equally regardless of laws human and divine. The fleeting moment only was theirs. About the future they felt no concern, nor did they believe it of concern to the gods, since all alike perished, guilty or innocent. Decency no longer imposing respect, the only pursuit was that of present pleasure. To beings of an hour, the dread of punishment formed no restraint; to victims of misery, conscience presented no terrors. Athens thus exhibited at once whatever is most afflicting in wretchedness, and most miserable in vice, uniting to the rage of disease the more destructive fury of unbridled passions.

CHAP. XV. on morals.

While the city fell a prey to these accumulated evils, the country was laid waste by an implacable enemy. On the present occasion, the confederates advanced beyond Athens; they destroyed the works of the miners on Mount Laurium; and, having

Devastation of Attica. Olymp. lxxxvii. 3. A. C. 430.

[28] The supposed decree of the Athenians in favor of Hippocrates, says, that his scholars showed the means both of preventing and curing the plague. Τισι χρη θεραπειαις ασφαλως διαφυξασθαι τον λοιμον; and again, Οπως τε ιατρικη δοξεισα ασφαλως σωζειν τους καμνοντας. Hippocrates, p. 1290. This decree therefore, as well as the letters of Hippocrates, mentioning the plague at Athens, are unquestionably spurious. The malady is minutely described by Thucydides, l. ii. c. xlvii. by Lucretius, l. vi. ver. 1136, et seqq. Diodorus, l. xii. differs widely from them both, probably having copied from Ephorus and Theopompus. Hippocrates has several cases of the plague from Thasos, Abdera, etc. but not one from Athens. See Hippocrat. de Morbis Epidem.

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ravaged all that ſouthern diſtrict, as well as the coaſt oppoſite to Eubœa and Naxos, they traced a line of devaſtation along the Marathonian ſhore, the glorious ſcene of an immortal victory, obtained by the valor of Athens, in defence of thoſe very ſtates by which her own territories were now ſo cruelly deſolated.

Magnanimity of Pericles.

If conſcious wiſdom and rectitude were not ſuperior to every aſſault of fortune, the manly ſoul of Pericles muſt have ſunk under the weight of ſuch multiplied calamities. But his fortitude ſtill ſupported him amidſt the flood of public and domeſtic woe. With decent and magnanimous compoſure, he beheld the unhappy fate of his numerous and flouriſhing family, ſucceſſively ſnatched away by the rapacious peſtilence. At the funeral of the laſt of his ſons, he dropped, indeed, a few reluctant tears of paternal tenderneſs. But, aſhamed of this momentary weakneſs, he bent his undejected mind to the defence of the republic. Having collected an hundred Athenian, together with fifty Chian or Leſbian veſſels, he ſailed through the Saronic gulph, and ravaged the unprotected coaſts of Elis, Argos, and Laconia. While this armament weighed anchor in the Piræus, there happened an eclipſe of the ſun [39], which terrified the ſuperſtitious mariners, whoſe minds were already clouded by calamity. The pilot of the admiral galley betrayed the moſt unmanly cowardice, when

[39] Plutarch. in Pericle. But as Thucydides mentions no ſuch eclipſe that ſummer, although extremely attentive in recording ſuch phænomena, I would not warrant the chronology of Plutarch.

Pericles, throwing a cloak before his eyes, asked, "whether the obscurity surprised him?" the pilot answering him in the negative, "Neither," rejoined Pericles, "ought an eclipse of the sun, occasioned by the intervention of a revolving planet, which intercepts its light." CHAP. XV.

His unfortunate expedition to the Peloponnesus. Olymp. lxxxvii. 3. A. C. 430.

Having arrived on the Argolic coast, the Athenians laid siege to the sacred city Epidaurus, whose inhabitants gloried in the peculiar favor of Æsculapius. The plague again breaking out in the fleet, was naturally ascribed to the vengeance of that offended divinity. They raised the siege of Epidaurus; nor were their operations more successful against Trœzené, Hermioné, and other Peloponnesian cities. They took only the small fortress of Prasiæ, a sea-port of Laconia; after which they returned to the Piræus, afflicted with the pestilence, and without having performed any thing that corresponded to the greatness of the armament, or the public expectation.

Athenians equally unfortunate in Thrace.

The Athenian expedition into Thrace was still more unfortunate. Into that country Agnon conducted a body of four thousand men, to co-operate with Phormio in the siege of Potidæa. But in the space of forty days, he lost one thousand and fifty men in the plague; and the only consequence of his expedition was, to infect the northern army with that melancholy disorder.

Pericles traduced.

These multiplied disasters reduced the Athenians to despair. Their sufferings exceeded example and belief, while they were deprived of the only expected consolation, the pleasure of revenge. The

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bulk of the people desired peace on any terms. Ambassadors were sent to Sparta, but not admitted to an audience. The orators clamored, and traduced Pericles. The undiscerning populace ascribed their misfortunes to the unhappy effect of his councils; but his magnanimity did not yet forsake him, and, for the last time, he addressed the assembly:

The magnanimous firmness of his last advice to the Athenians.

"Your anger, Athenians! occasions no surprise, because it comes not unexpected. Your complaints excite no resentment, because to complain is the right of the miserable. Yet as you mistake both the cause and the measure of your present calamity, I will venture to expose such dangerous, and, if not speedily corrected, such fatal errors. The justice and necessity of the war I have often had occasion to explain: it is just that you, who have protected and saved, should govern Greece; it is necessary, if you would assert your pre-eminence, that you should now resist the Peloponnesians. On maintaining this resolution, not your honor only, but your safety, depends. The sovereignty of Greece cannot, like an empty pageant of grandeur, be taken up with indifference, or without danger laid down. That well-earned dominion, which you have sometimes exercised tyrannically, must be upheld and defended, otherwise you must submit, without resource, to the resentment of your injured allies, and the animosity of your inveterate enemies. The hardships, to which you were exposed from the latter, I foresaw and foretold; the pestilence, that sudden and improbable disaster, it was impossible for human prudence to conjecture; yet great

and unexpected as our calamities have been, and continue, they are ſtill accidental and tranſitory, while the advantages of this neceſſary war are permanent, and its glory will be immortal. The greatneſs of that empire which we ſtrive to uphold, extends beyond the territories of our moſt diſtant allies. Of the two elements, deſtined for the uſe of men, the ſea and the land, we abſolutely command the one, nor is there any kingdom, or republic, or confederacy, that pretends to diſpute our dominion. Let this conſideration elevate our hopes; and perſonal afflictions will diſappear at the view of public proſperity. Let us bear, with reſignation, the ſtrokes of providence; and we ſhall repel, with vigor, the aſſaults of our enemies. It is the hereditary and glorious diſtinction of our republic, never to yield to adverſity. We have defied danger, expended treaſure and blood; and, amidſt obſtinate and formidable wars, augmented the power, and extended the fame, of a city unrivalled in wealth, populouſneſs, and ſplendor, and governed by laws and inſtitutions worthy its magnificence and renown. If Athens muſt periſh, (as what human grandeur is not ſubject to decay?) let her never fall, at leaſt, through *our* puſillanimity; a fall that would cancel the merit of our former virtue, and deſtroy at once that edifice of glory which it has been the work of ages to rear. When our walls and harbours are no more; when the terror of our navy ſhall have ceaſed, and our external magnificence fallen to decay, the glory of Athens ſhall remain. This is the prize which

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I have hitherto exhorted, and ſtill exhort you to defend, regardleſs of the clamors of ſloth, the ſuſpicions of cowardice, or the perſecution of envy."

Death and character of Pericles. Olymp. lxxxvii. 4. A. C. 429.

Such were the ſentiments of Pericles, who, on this occaſion, declared to his aſſembled countrymen, with the freedom of conſcious merit, that he felt himſelf inferior to none in wiſdom to diſcover, and abilities to explain and promote, the meaſures moſt honorable and uſeful; that he was a ſincere and ardent lover of the republic, unbiaſſed by the dictates of ſelfiſhneſs, unſeduced by the allurements of partiality, and ſuperior to the temptations of avarice. The anger of the Athenians evaporated in impoſing on him a ſmall fine, and ſoon after they re-elected him general. The integrity and manly firmneſs of his mind reſtored the fainting courage of the republic. They reſcued the dignity of Pericles from the rage of popular frenzy; but they could not defend his life againſt the infectious malignity of the peſtilence. He died two years and ſix months after the commencement of the war. The character which he draws of himſelf is confirmed by the impartial voice of hiſtory, which adds a few circumſtances fitted to confirm the texture of a virtuous and laſting fame. During the firſt invaſion of the Peloponneſians, he declared that he would convey his extenſive and valuable eſtate to the public, if it ſhould be excepted from the general devaſtation, by the policy or the gratitude of Archidamus, his hereditary gueſt and friend[30]. Yet this generous patriot lived

[30] Thucydid, p. 108.

with the moſt exemplary œconomy in his perſonal and domeſtic expenſe. His death-bed was ſurrounded by his numerous admirers, who dwelt with complacency on the illuſtrious exploits of his glorious life. While they recounted the wiſdom of his government, and enumerated the long ſeries of his victories by ſea and land, "You forget," ſaid the dying ſtateſman and ſage, "you forget the only valuable part of my character: none of my fellow-citizens was ever compelled, through any action of mine, to aſſume a mourning robe[11]." He expired, teaching an invaluable leſſon to human kind, that in the laſt important hour, when all other objects diſappear, or loſe their value, the recollection of an innocent life is ſtill preſent to the mind, and ſtill affords conſolation more valuable than Pericles could derive from his nine trophies erected over the enemies of his country, from his long and proſperous adminiſtration of forty years, the depth of his political wiſdom, the perfection of his military and naval ſkill, and the immortal fame of his unrivalled eloquence.

[11] Plut. in Pericl.

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Subſequent Events of the War. — Platæa taken. — Revolt of Lesbos. — Deſcription and Hiſtory of that Island. — Nature of its political Connexion with Athens. — Addreſs of Lesbos. — Its Capital beſieged by the Athenians. — Meaſures of the Peloponneſians for relieving it. — Mitylene ſurrenders. — Deliberations in Athens concerning the Treatment of the Priſoners. — Reſettlement of the Affairs of Lesbos. — The Corinthians foment Factions in Corcyra. — Sedition in that Island. — The contending Factions reſpectively ſupported by the Athenians and Peloponneſians — Progreſs, Termination, and Conſequences of the Sedition.

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THE dignity and vigor of the republic ſeemed to periſh with Pericles, and ſeveral years elapſed ſcarcely diſtinguiſhed by any event that tended to vary the uniformity, much leſs to decide the fortune of the war. While the Peloponneſians invaded Attica, the Athenian fleet annually ravaged the coaſt of Peloponneſus. In vain the inhabitants of that country, little accuſtomed to the ſea, collected ſhips, and uſed their utmoſt endeavours to contend with the experienced ſkill of the Athenian mariners. They were always defeated, and often by an inferior force; one proof among many, that naval ſuperiority is ſlowly acquired

and ſlowly loſt. Neither the Athenians nor the Peloponneſians derived any effectual aſſiſtance from their reſpective alliances with Sitalces and Perdiccas. The former, reinforced by many independent tribes of Thrace, who were allured to his ſtandard by the hopes of plunder, poured down an hundred and fifty thouſand men on the Macedonian coaſt. But a haſty agreement between the two kings diſſipated that numerous and deſultory band with the ſame rapidity with which it had been collected [1].

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One benefit, indeed, the Athenians received from Sitalces, if that can be reckoned a benefit, which enabled them to commit an action of atrocious cruelty: he put into their hands Ariſtæus, the Corinthian, a bold and determined enemy of their republic; and actually travelling through Thrace into Perſia, to ſolicit money from Artaxerxes to ſupport the war againſt them. Both Ariſtæus and his colleagues in the embaſſy ſuffered a painful and ignominious death.

The ſucceſs of the adverſe parties was equally balanced in the ſieges of Potidæa and Platæa. The former, having ſurrendered on capitulation, was occupied by new inhabitants. The expelled citizens retired to Olynthus and other places of the Chalcidicé, where they ſtrengthened and exaſperated the foes of Athens. Platæa alſo capitulated, after a long and ſpirited reſiſtance during five years. Notwithſtanding the warm and affecting remon-

Taking of Potidæa: Olymp. lxxxvii. 4. A. C. 429.

Of Platæa. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

[1] Thucydid. p. 167—179.

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ſtrances of the citizens who had acted ſuch an illuſtrious part in the Perſian war, when the Thebans behaved moſt diſgracefully, the capitulation was ſhamefully violated by the Spartans, who ſacrificed to the reſentment of Thebes, the eternal enemy of Platæa, two hundred brave men, whoſe courage and fidelity merited a better fate. But the youth of Platæa ſtill flouriſhed in the boſom of Athens, and were deſtined, in a future age, to reaſſume the dignity of independent government, which always formed the higheſt ambition of their ſmall but magnanimous community.

Revolt of Lesbos.

Among the tranſactions of this otherwiſe unimportant period, happened the revolt of Leſbos, and the ſedition of Corcyra. Both events deeply affected the intereſt of Athens; and the former is diſtinguiſhed by ſuch circumſtances as ſerve to explain the political condition of the times, while the latter exhibits a ſtriking but gloomy picture of Grecian manners.

Deſcription and hiſtory of that iſland.

The iſland of Leſbos, extending above an hundred and fifty miles in circumference, is the largeſt, except Eubœa, in the Ægean ſea. Originally planted by Eolians, Leſbos was the mother of many Eolic colonies. They were eſtabliſhed on the oppoſite continent, and ſeparated from their metropolis by a ſtrait of ſeven miles, which expands itſelf into the gulf of Thebe, and is beautifully diverſified by the Hecatonneſian and Arginuſſian iſles, of old ſacred to Apollo. The happy temperature of the climate of Leſbos conſpired with the rich fertility of the ſoil to produce thoſe delicious

delicious fruits, and thoſe exquiſite wines, which are ſtill acknowledged by modern travellers to deſerve the encomiums ſo liberally beſtowed on them by ancient writers [1]. The convenience of its harbours furniſhed another ſource of wealth and advantage to this delightful iſland, which, as early as the age of Homer, was reckoned populous and powerful, and, like the reſt of Greece at that time, governed by the moderate juriſdiction of hereditary princes. The abuſe of royal power occaſioned the diſſolution of monarchy in Leſbos, as well as in the neighbouring iſles. The rival cities of Mitylené and Methymna contended for republican pre-eminence. The former prevailed; and having reduced Methymna, as well as ſix cities of inferior note, began to extend its dominion beyond the narrow bounds of the iſland, and conquered a conſiderable part of Troas. Meanwhile the internal government of Mitylené was often diſturbed by ſedition, and ſometimes uſurped by tyrants. The wiſe Pittacus, contemporary and rival of Solon, endeavoured to remedy theſe evils by giving his countrymen a body of laws, compriſed in ſix hundred verſes, which adjuſted their political rights, and regulated their behaviour and manners. The Leſbians afterwards underwent thoſe general revolutions, to which both the iſlands and the continent of Aſia Minor were expoſed from the Lydian and Perſian power. Delivered from the yoke of Perſia

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[1] Monſ. de Guys, Tournefort, etc. agree with Horace (paſſim) and Strabo, l. xiii. p. 583— 617. from which the following particulars, in the text, concerning Lesbos, are extracted.

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by the ſucceſsful valor of Athens and Sparta, the Leſbians, as well as all the Greek ſettlements around them, ſpurned the tyrannical authority of Sparta and Pauſanias, and ranged themſelves under the honorable colors of Athens, which they thenceforth continued to reſpect in peace, and to follow in war.

Nature of its political connexion with Athens.

In the exerciſe of power the Athenians diſplayed principles totally different from thoſe by which they had attained it. The confederacy between Athens and Leſbos was ſtill ſupported, however, by mutual fear rather than by reciprocal affection. During peace, the Leſbians dreaded the navy of Athens; the Athenians feared to loſe the aſſiſtance of Leſbos in war. Beſides this, the Athenians were of the Ionic, the Leſbians of the Eolic, race; and the latter juſtly regretted that the allies of Athens ſhould be ſucceſſively reduced to the condition of ſubjects. They perceived the artful policy of that republic in allowing the Chians and Leſbians alone to retain the ſemblance of liberty. While the Chians and Leſbians, ſtill free in appearance, aſſiſted in ſubduing the other confederates of Athens, that ambitious republic was always furniſhed with a plauſible juſtification of her general oppreſſion and tyranny; ſince it was natural to imagine that men, left to the unreſtrained liberty of choice, ſhould, in matters indifferent to themſelves, prefer the cauſe of juſtice to that of uſurpation. But even the apparent freedom which the Leſbians enjoyed had become extremely precarious. They felt themſelves under the diſagreeable neceſſity to

ſooth, to bribe, and to flatter the Athenian demagogues, and in all their tranſactions with that imperious people, to teſtify the moſt mortifying deference and ſubmiſſion. Notwithſtanding their watchful attention never deſignedly to offend, they were continually endangered by the quarrelſome humor of a capricious multitude, and had reaſon to dread, leſt, in conſequence of ſome unexpected guſt of paſſion, they ſhould be compelled to demoliſh their walls, and to ſurrender their ſhipping, the puniſhments already inflicted on ſuch of the neighbouring iſlands as had incurred the diſpleaſure of Athens. CHAP. XVI.

Meaſures of the Leſbians previous to their revolt.

This uneaſy ſituation naturally diſpoſed the Leſbians, amidſt the calamities of the ſecond Peloponneſian invaſion, heightened by the plague at Athens, to watch an opportunity to revolt. The following year was employed in aſſembling the ſcattered inhabitants of the iſland within the walls of Mitylené, in ſtrengthening theſe walls, in fortifying their harbours, in augmenting their fleet, and in collecting troops and proviſions from the fertile ſhores of the Euxine ſea. But in the fourth year of the war, their deſign, yet unripe for execution, was made known to the Athenians by the inhabitants of Tenedos, the neighbours and enemies of Leſbos, as well as by the citizens of Methymna, the ancient rival of Mitylené, and by ſeveral male-contents in the Leſbian capital. Notwithſtanding the concurrence of ſuch powerful teſtimonies, the Athenian magiſtrates affected to diſbelieve intelligence which their diſtreſſed circumſtances rendered

Olymp. lxxxviii. 1. A. C. 428.

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peculiarly alarming. The Leſbians, it was ſaid, could never think of forſaking the alliance of a country, which had always treated them with ſuch diſtinguiſhed favor, how powerfully ſoever they might be urged to that meaſure by the Thebans, their Eolian brethren, and the Spartans, their ancient confederates. Ambaſſadors, however, were ſent to Leſbos, deſiring an explanation of rumors ſo diſhonorable to the fidelity and gratitude of the iſland.

Activity of Athens.

The ambaſſadors having confirmed the report, Athens equipped a fleet of forty ſail, intending to attack the enemy by ſurpriſe, while they celebrated, with univerſal conſent, the anniverſary feſtival of Apollo, on the promontory of Malea. But this deſign was rendered abortive by the diligence of a Mitylenian traveller, who, paſſing from Athens to Eubœa, proceeded ſouthward to Geraiſtos, and, embarking in a merchant-veſſel, reached Leſbos in leſs than three days from the time that he undertook this important ſervice. His ſeaſonable advice not only prevented the Mitylenians from leaving their city, but prepared them to appear, at the arrival of the enemy, in a tolerable poſture of defence. This ſtate of preparation enabled them to obtain from Cleippidas, the Athenian admiral, a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, until they diſpatched an embaſſy to Athens, to remove, as they pretended, the groundleſs reſentment of the people, and to give ample ſatisfaction to the magiſtrates.

Addreſs of Leſbos.

On the part of the Leſbians, this tranſaction was nothing more than a contrivance to gain time,

CHAP. XVI. Olymp. lxxxviii. 1. A. C. 428.

They expected no favor or forgiveneſs from the Athenian aſſembly; and while this illuſive negociation was carrying on at Athens, other ambaſſadors went ſecretly to Sparta, requeſting that the Leſbians might be admitted into the Peloponneſian confederacy, and thus entitled to the protection of that powerful league. The Spartans referred them to the general aſſembly, which was to be ſoon held at Olympia, to ſolemnize the moſt ſplendid of all the Grecian feſtivals. After the games were ended, and the Athenians, who little expected that ſuch matters were in agitation, had returned home, the Leſbian ambaſſadors were favorably heard in a general convention of the Peloponneſian repreſentatives or deputies, from whom they received aſſurance of immediate and effectual aſſiſtance.

Mitylené beſieged.

This promiſe, however, was not punctually performed. The eyes of the Athenians were at length opened; and while the Peloponneſians prepared or deliberated, their more active enemies had already taken the field. Various ſkirmiſhes, in which the iſlanders ſhowed little vigor in their own defence, engaged the neighbouring ſtates of Lemnos and Imbros to ſend, on the firſt ſummons, conſiderable ſupplies of troops to their Athenian confederates; but as the combined forces were ſtill inſufficient completely to inveſt Mitylené, a powerful reinforcement was ſent from Athens; and before the beginning of winter, the place was blocked up by land, while an Athenian fleet occupied the harbour

Meaſures of the Peloponn-

The unfavorable ſeaſon, and ſtill more, that dilatoriness which ſo often obſtructed the meaſures

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neſians for relieving it.

of the confederates, prevented timely aid from arriving at Mitylené. But in order to make a diverſion in favor of their new allies, the Peloponneſians aſſembled a conſiderable armament at the iſthmus, intending to convey their ſhips over land from Corinth to the ſea of Athens, that they might thus infeſt the Athenian ſhores with their fleet, while the army carried on its uſual ravages in the central parts of Attica. The activity of the Athenians defeated this deſign. Notwithſtanding their numerous ſquadrons on the coaſts of Peloponneſus, Thrace, and Leſbos, they immediately fitted out an hundred ſail to defend their own ſhores. The Peloponneſian ſailors, who had been haſtily collected from the maritime towns, ſoon became diſguſted with an expedition, attended with unforeſeen difficulties; and, as autumn advanced, the militia from the inland country grew impatient to return to their fields and vineyards. During winter, the Mitylenians were ſtill diſappointed in their hope of relief. They were encouraged, however, to perſevere in reſiſtance, by the arrival of Salæthus, a Spartan general of conſiderable merit, who having landed in an obſcure harbour of the iſland, travelled by land towards Mitylené; and, during the obſcurity of night, paſſed the Athenian wall of circumvallation, by favor of a breach made by a torrent. Salæthus gave the beſieged freſh aſſurances that a powerful fleet would be ſent to their aſſiſtance early in the ſpring; and that, at the ſame time, the Athenians ſhould be haraſſed

by an invaſion more terrible and deſtructive than any which they had yet experienced. CHAP. XVI.

The latter part of the promiſe was indeed performed. The Peloponneſians invaded Attica. Whatever had been ſpared in former incurſions, now fell a prey to their fury. But after the ſpring was conſiderably advanced, the long-expected fleet was looked for in vain. The ſame procraſtination and difficulties ſtill retarded the preparations of the confederates; and when at length forty ſail were collected, the command was beſtowed on the Spartan Alcidas, a man totally devoid of that ſpirit and judgment eſſential to the character of a naval commander. Inſtead of ſailing directly to the relief of Mitylené, he waſted much precious time in purſuing the Athenian merchantmen, in haraſſing the unfortified iſlands, and in alarming the defenceleſs and unwarlike inhabitants of Ionia, who could ſcarcely recover from their aſtoniſhment, at ſeeing a Peloponneſian fleet in thoſe ſeas. Many trading veſſels, that ſailed between the numerous iſlands and harbours on that extenſive coaſt, fell into the hands of Alcidas; for when they deſcried his ſquadron, they attempted not to avoid it; many fearleſsly approached it, as certainly Athenian. In conſequence of this imprudence, Alcidas took a great number of priſoners, whom he butchered in cold blood at Myoneſus.

Imprudent conduct of Alcidas. Olymp. lxxxviii. 3. A. C. 427.

This barbarity only diſgraced himſelf, and injured the Spartan cauſe in Aſia, many cities of which were previouſly ripe for revolt. Before he attempted to accompliſh the main object

Mitylené ſurrenders. Olymp. lxxxviii. 3. A. C. 427.

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of his expedition, the opportunity was for ever loſt by the ſurrender of Mitylene. Deſpair of aſſiſtance, and ſcarcity of proviſions, had obliged Salæthus, who began himſelf by this time to ſuſpect that the Peloponneſians had laid aſide all thoughts of ſuccouring the place, to arm [1] the populace, in order to make a vigorous aſſault on the Athenian lines. But the lower ranks of men, who in Leſbos, as well as in all the Grecian iſles, naturally favored the cauſe of Athens, the avowed patron of democracy, no ſooner received their armor, than they refuſed obeying their ſuperiors, and threatened, that unleſs the corn were ſpeedily brought to the market-place, and equally divided among all the citizens, they would inſtantly ſubmit to the beſiegers. The ariſtocratical party prudently yielded to the torrent of popular fury, which they had not ſtrength to reſiſt; and juſtly apprehenſive, leſt a more obſtinate defence might totally exclude them from the benefit of capitulation, they ſurrendered to Paches, the Athenian commander, on condition that none of the priſoners ſhould be enſlaved or put to death, until their agents, who were immediately ſent to implore the clemency of Athens, ſhould return with the ſentence of that republic.

Terror of the Lesbian captives.

The terms were accepted and ratified; but ſuch were the furious reſentments which prevailed in that age, ſuch the dark ſuſpicions, and ſuch the

[1] He gave the populace, who were before light armed, heavy armor. Thucydid. p. 188. English cannot imitate his expreſſion: ὁπλίζει τον δημον προτερον ψιλον ὀντα.

total diſregard to all laws of juſtice and humanity, that the Athenian army had no ſooner taken poſſeſſion of the place, than the chief authors and abettors of the revolt, judging it imprudent to truſt their ſafety to the faith of treaties, and the ſanctity of oaths, flew for protection to their temples and altars. This unſeaſonable diffidence (for Paches appears to have united uncommon humanity with a daring ſpirit, and great military abilities) diſcovered conſcious guilt, and enabled the Athenians to diſtinguiſh between their friends and enemies. The latter were protected by Paches, and prevailed on to withdraw from their ſanctuaries. He afterwards ſent them to the iſle of Tenedos, until their fate, as well as that of their fellow-citizens, ſhould be finally determined by the Athenian republic. CHAP. XVI.

They are doomed to death by an Athenian decree.

Immediately after the arrival of the Mitylenian ambaſſadors, the people of Athens had aſſembled to deliberate on this important ſubject. Agitated by the giddy tranſports of triumph over the rebellious ingratitude and perfidy of a people, who, though diſtinguiſhed by peculiar favors, had abandoned and betrayed their protectors in the ſeaſon of danger, the Athenians doomed to death all the Mitylenian citizens, and condemned the women and children to perpetual ſervitude. In one day the bill was propoſed, the decree paſſed, and the ſame evening a galley was diſpatched to Paches, conveying this cruel and bloody reſolution. But the night left room for reflection; and the feelings of humanity were awakened by the ſtings of remorſe. In the morning, having aſſembled,

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as uſual, in the public ſquare, men were ſurpriſed and pleaſed to find the ſentiments of their neighbours exactly correſponding with their own. Their dejected countenances met each other; they lamented, with one accord, the raſhneſs and ferocity of their paſſion, and bewailed the unhappy fate of Mitylené, the deſtined object of their miſguided frenzy. The Mitylenian ambaſſadors availed themſelves of this ſudden change of ſentiment; a new aſſembly was convened, and the queſtion ſubmitted to a ſecond deliberation.

Character of Cleon.

A turbulent impetuous eloquence had raiſed the audacious profligacy of Cleon, from the loweſt rank of life, to a high degree of authority in the Athenian aſſembly. The multitude were deceived by his artifices, and pleaſed with his frontleſs impudence, which they called boldneſs, and manly openneſs of character. His manners they approved in proportion as they reſembled their own; and the worſt of his vices found advocates among the dupes of his pretended patriotiſm. This violent demagogue, whoſe arrogant[4] preſumption ſo unworthily ſucceeded the enlightened magnanimity of Pericles, had, in the former aſſembly, propoſed and carried the ſanguinary decree againſt Mitylené. He ſtill perſevered in ſupporting that atrocious meaſure, and upbraided the weak and wavering

[4] The character of Cleon, sketched in miniature by Thucydides, pp. 193 and 266. is painted at full length by Ariſtophanes, in his comedy of the Ἱππεῖς, "The Horſemen." Yet we could not ſafely truſt the deſcription of the angry ſatiriſt, who bore a perſonal grudge to Cleon, unleſs the principal ſtrokes were juſtified by the impartial narrative of Thucydides.

counſels of his countrymen, liable to be ſhaken by every guſt of paſſion, and totally incapable of that ſtability eſſential in the management of great affairs, and particularly indiſpenſable in the government of diſtant dependences. C. H. A. P. XVI.

"Such a temper of mind (he had often ventured to declare, and would repeat the ſame diſagreeable truth as often as their folly obliged him) was alike unworthy, and incapable, of command. That a democracy was unfit for ſovereign rule, paſt experience convinced him, and the preſent inſtance now confirmed his opinion. The empire of Athens could not be maintained without an undivided attachment, an unalterable adherence, to the intereſt and honor of the republic. But the maſters of Greece were the ſlaves of their own capricious paſſions; excited at will by the perfidious voice of venal ſpeakers, bribed to betray them. Lulled to a fatal repoſe by the ſoftneſs of melodious words, they forgot the dignity of the ſtate, and reſtrained their perſonal reſentment againſt multiplied and unprovoked injuries. What was ſtill more dangerous, they invited, by an ill-judged lenity, the imitation and continuance of ſuch crimes as muſt terminate in public diſgrace and inevitable ruin. What elſe can be expected from pardoning the aggravated guilt of Mitylené? Encouraged by this weakneſs, muſt not the neighbouring cities and iſlands, whoſe reſources form the principal vigor of the republic, greedily ſeize the firſt opportunity of ſhaking off the yoke, which they have long reluctantly borne; and follow the example of a revolt, which, without

Cleon enforces that decree.

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Deodatus oppoſes it with equal addreſs and ſpirit.

preſenting them with the fear of danger, promiſed them the hope of deliverance?"

This ſanguinary ſpeech was anſwered by Deodatus, a man endowed with an amiable moderation of character, joined to a profound knowledge of government, and a deep inſight into human nature. In the former aſſembly, this reſpectable orator had ventured, almoſt ſingle and alone, to plead the cauſe of the Mitylenians, and to aſſert the rights of humanity. He obſerved, "that aſſemblies were liable to be miſled by the fury of reſentment, as well as by the weakneſs of compaſſion; and that errors of the former kind were often attended by conſequences not leſs deſtructive, and always followed by a far more bitter repentance. Againſt vague ſlanders and calumny no man is ſecure; but a true patriot muſt learn to deſpiſe ſuch unmanly reproaches. Undaunted by oppoſition, he will offer good counſel, to which there are no greater enemies than haſte and anger. For my part, I ſtand up neither to defend the Mitylenians, nor to waſte time in fruitleſs accuſations. They have injured us moſt outrageouſly, yet I would not adviſe you to butcher them, unleſs *that* can be proved expedient; neither were they objects of forgiveneſs, would I adviſe you to pardon them [1], unleſs that were conducive to the public intereſt, the only point on which our preſent deliberation turns. Guided by vulgar prejudices, Cleon has

[1] This is ſpeaking like an orator. It will appear in the ſequel, that Deodatus by no means conſidered the innocence or guilt of the Mitylenians as things indifferent.

loudly aſſerted, that the deſtruction of the Mity- CHAP.
lenians is neceſſary to deter neighbouring cities XVI.
from rebellion. But diſtant ſubjects muſt be kept in obedience by the mildneſs of diſcretionary caution, not by the rigor of ſanguinary examples. What people were ever ſo mad as to revolt, without expecting, either through their domeſtic ſtrength, or the aſſiſtance of foreign powers, to make good their pretenſions? Men who have known liberty, how ſweet it is, ought not to be puniſhed too ſeverely for aſpiring at that ineſtimable enjoyment. But their growing diſaffection muſt be watched with care, and anticipated by diligence; they muſt be prevented from taking the firſt ſteps towards emancipation; and taught, if poſſible, to regard it as a thing altogether unattainable.

"Yet ſuch is the nature of man, conſidered either individually or collectively, that a law of infallible prevention will never be enacted. Of all crimes that any reaſonable creature can commit, Deſire is the forerunner, and Hope the attendant. Theſe inviſible principles within, are too powerful for all external terrors; nor has the increaſing ſeverity of laws rendered crimes leſs frequent in latter times, than during the mildneſs of the heroic ages, when few puniſhments were capital. While human nature remains the ſame, weakneſs will be diſtruſtful, neceſſity will be daring, poverty will excite injuſtice, power will urge to rapacity, miſery will ſink into meanneſs, and proſperity ſwell into preſumption. There are other

CHAP. XVI. contingencies, which ſtir up the mutiny of paſſions, too ſtubborn for control. The authority of government can neither change the combination of events, nor interrupt the occaſions of fortune. Impelled by ſuch cauſes, the ſelfiſh deſires of men will hurry them into wickedneſs and vice, whatever penalties await them. The imagination becomes familiar with one degree of puniſhment, as well as with another; and, in every degree, hope renders it alike ineffectual and impotent; ſince neither individuals nor communities would be guilty of injuſtice, if they believed that it muſt infallibly ſubject them to puniſhment, ſmall or great. When individuals commit crimes, they always expect to elude the vengeance of law. When communities rebel, they expect to render their revolt not the occaſion of triumph to their enemies, but the means of their own deliverance and ſecurity.

"The ſevere puniſhment of Mitylené cannot, therefore, produce the good conſequences with which Cleon has flattered you. But this cruel meaſure will be attended with irreparable prejudice to your intereſt. It will eſtrange the affections of your allies; provoke the reſentment of Greece; excite the indignation of mankind; and, inſtead of preventing rebellion, render it more frequent and more dangerous. When all hopes of ſucceſs have vaniſhed, your rebellious ſubjects will never be perſuaded to return to their duty. They will ſeek death in the field rather than await it from the hand of the executioner. Though reduced

to the laſt extremity, they will ſpurn ſubmiſſion, and gathering courage from deſpair, either repel your aſſaults, or fall an uſeleſs prey, weak and exhauſted, incapable of indemnifying you for the expenſe of the war, or of raiſing thoſe ſubſidies and contributions, which rendered their ſubjugation a reaſonable object either of intereſt or ambition. CHAP. XVI.

"The revolt of Mitylené was the work of an ariſtocratical faction, fomented by the Lacedæmonians and Thebans. The great body of the people were no ſooner provided with arms, than they diſcovered their affection for Athens. It would be moſt cruel and moſt ungrateful, to confound the innocent with the guilty, to involve friends and foes in undiſtinguiſhed ruin. Yet this odious meaſure would ſhow more weakneſs than cruelty, more folly than injuſtice. What advantage could the enemies of Athens more earneſtly deſire? What boon could the ariſtocratical factions, ſo profuſely ſcattered over Greece, more anxiouſly requeſt from Heaven? Furniſhed with your ſanguinary decree againſt Mitylené, they might for ever alienate from the republic the affections of her ſubjects and confederates; for having once ſeduced them to revolt, they might unanſwerably convince them, that ſafety could only be purchaſed by perſevering in rebellion, and that to return to duty was to ſubmit to death."

The moderation and good ſenſe of Deodatus (ſuch was the influence of Cleon) were approved only by a ſmall majority of voices. Yet it remained uncertain, whether this late and reluctant

His opinion prevails.

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repentance would avail the Mitylenians, who, before any advice of it arrived, might be condemned and executed in consequence of the former decree. A galley was instantly furnished with every thing that might promote expedition. The Mitylenian deputies promised invaluable rewards to the rowers. But the fate of a numerous, and lately flourishing community, still depended on the uncertainty of winds and currents. The first advice-boat had sailed, as the messenger of bad news, with a slow and melancholy progress. The second advanced with the rapid movement of joy. Not an adverse blast opposed her course. The necessity of food and sleep never restrained a moment the labor of the oar: And her diligence was rewarded by reaching Lesbos in time to check the cruel hand of the executioner.

Narrow escape of the Mitylenians.

The bloody sentence had been just read, even the orders had been issued for its execution, when the critical arrival of the Athenian galley converted the lamentable outcries, or gloomy despair of a whole republic, into expressions of admiration and gratitude.

Resettlement of affairs in Lesbos. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

The punishment, however, of Mitylené was still sufficiently severe, even according to the rigorous maxims of Grecian policy. The prisoners, who had been sent to Tenedos, were transported to Athens. They exceeded a thousand in number, and were indiscriminately condemned to death. Salæthus, the Spartan general, shared the same fate, after descending to many mean contrivances to save his life. The walls of Mitylené were

were demoliſhed, its ſhipping was ſent to Athens, and its territory divided into three thouſand portions, of which three hundred were conſecrated to the gods, and the reſt diſtributed by lot among the people of Athens. The Leſbians were ſtill allowed to cultivate, as tenants, their own fields, paying for each ſhare an annual-rent of about ſix pounds nine ſhillings ſterling [6]. CHAP. XVI.

Merit and perfection of Paches.

The activity and judgment of Paches thus effected an important conqueſt to his country. Though the affairs of Leſbos might have required his undivided attention, he no ſooner was apprized of the appearance of the Peloponneſian fleet, than he immediately put to ſea, protected the allies of Athens, and chaſed the enemy from thoſe ſhores. During the whole time of his command, he behaved with firmneſs tempered by humanity. But, at his return to Athens, he met with the uſual reward of ſuperior merit. He was accuſed of miſconduct; and finding ſentence ready to be pronounced againſt him, his indignation roſe ſo high, that he ſlew himſelf in court [7].

Operations of the Spartan fleet.

The Spartan admiral, Alcidas, met, on the other hand, with a reception (ſuch is the blindneſs of popular prejudice!) far better than his behaviour deſerved. The Peloponneſian fleet of forty ſail, imprudently intruſted to his command, retired inglorioufly, after a moſt expenſive and fruitleſs expedition, to the protection of their friendly harbours. A northerly wind, however, drove them

[6] Thucydid. p. 173 — 206. [7] Plutarch. in Nicia, et in Ariſtid.

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on the ſhores of Crete; from whence they dropped in ſucceſſively to the port of Cyllené, which had recovered the diſaſter inflicted on it by the Corcyreans at the beginning of the war, and become the ordinary rendezvous of the Peloponneſian fleet. In this place, Alcidas found thirteen gallies, commanded by Braſidas, a Spartan of diſtinguiſhed valor and abilities, purpoſely choſen to aſſiſt the admiral with his counſels. This ſmall ſquadron had orders to join the principal armament; with which the confederates, as their deſign had miſcarried at Leſbos, purpoſed to undertake an expedition to Corcyra, then agitated by the tumult of a moſt dangerous ſedition.

Intrigues of the Corinthians with the Corcyrean priſoners,

Among the hoſtilities already related between the republics of Corinth and Corcyra, we deſcribed the enterpriſes by which the Corinthians took above twelve hundred Corcyrean priſoners. Many of theſe perſons were deſcended from the firſt families in the iſlands; a circumſtance on which the policy of Corinth founded an extenſive plan of artifice and ambition. The Corcyreans, inſtead of feeling the rigors of captivity, or experiencing the ſtern ſeverity of republican reſentment, were treated with the liberal and endearing kindneſs of Grecian hoſpitality. Having acquired their confidence by good offices, the Corinthians inſinuated to them, in the unguarded hours of convivial merriment, the danger as well as the diſgrace of their connection with Athens, the univerſal tyrant of her allies; and repreſented their ſhameful ingratitude in deſerting Corinth, to which the colony of Corcyra

owed not only its early happineſs and proſperity, but its original eſtabliſhment and exiſtence. Theſe arguments, ſeaſonably repeated, and urged with much addreſs, at length proved effectual. The Corcyreans recovered their freedom, and returned to their native country; and, while they pretended to be collecting the ſum of eight hundred talents (about an hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling) to pay their ranſom, they left nothing untried to detach Corcyra from the Athenian intereſt. CHAP. XVI.

excite dangerous factions in Corcyra.

Their firſt expedient for accompliſhing this purpoſe was, to traduce the popular leaders, who were the moſt ſteadfaſt partiſans of that republic. Accuſations, impeachments, all the artifices and chicane of legal perſecution, were directed and played off againſt them. The demagogues, who were not of a temper to brook ſuch injuries, retorted on their antagoniſts with equal ingenuity, and far ſuperior ſucceſs. Peithias, the moſt diſtinguiſhed advocate of the Athenian or democratic party, accuſed five ringleaders of the oppoſite faction of having deſtroyed the fence which encloſed the grove of Jupiter; a treſpaſs eſtimated by the Corcyrean law at a ſevere pecuniary puniſhment[a]. In vain the perſons accuſed denied the charge; in vain, after conviction before the ſenate, they fled as ſupplicants to the altars. They could obtain no mitigation of the amercement. The

[a] The fine was, for every pale a ſtater (one pound and nine pence ſterling). Such cauſes were frequent in other parts of Greece, as we learn from the oration of Lyſias in defence of a citizen accuſed of cutting down a conſecrated olive. See the tranſlation of Lyſias and Iſocrates, p. 377.

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demagogue was inflexible; and his influence with his colleagues in the ſenate, of which he happened that year to be a member, determined them to execute the law in its utmoſt rigor.

Aſſaſſination of the demagogues.

Exaſperated by this ſeverity, and not doubting that during the adminiſtration of the preſent ſenate, many ſimilar proſecutions would be raiſed againſt them, the ariſtocratical party entered into a conſpiracy for defending themſelves and their country againſt the oppreſſive injuſtice of Athens and Athenian partiſans. On this emergency they acted like men who knew the danger of delay. Having fortified their cauſe with a ſufficient number of adherents, they armed themſelves with concealed daggers, ſuddenly ruſhed into the ſenate-houſe, and aſſaſſinated Peithias, with ſixty of his friends. This boldneſs ſtruck their opponents with terror. Such perſons as felt themſelves moſt obnoxious to the conſpirators, immediately fled to the harbour, embarked, and ſailed to Athens.

Sedition in Corcyra. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

The people of Corcyra, thus deprived of their leaders by an event equally unexpected and atrocious, were ſeized with ſuch aſtoniſhment as ſuſpended their power of action. Before they had ſufficiently recovered themſelves to take the proper meaſures for revenge, or even for defence, the arrival of a Corinthian veſſel, and a Lacedæmonian embaſſy, encouraged their opponents to attempt their deſtruction. The attack was made at the hour of full aſſembly; the forum, or public ſquare, preſented a ſcene of horror; the ſtreets of Corcyra ſtreamed with blood. The unguarded citizens

were incapable of making reſiſtance againſt ſuch ſudden and unforeſeen fury. They fled in trepidation from the forum, and the more ſpacious ſtreets. Some took poſſeſſion of the citadel; others of the Hillæan harbour; and in general occupied, before evening, the higher and more remote parts of the town. Their adverſaries kept poſſeſſion of the market-place, around which moſt of their houſes ſtood, or aſſembled in the principal harbour, that points towards Epirus, from which they expected ſuccour. The day following was ſpent in doubtful ſkirmiſhes, and in ſummoning from the country the aſſiſtance of the peaſants, or rather ſlaves, by whom chiefly the lands of the iſland were cultivated. Theſe naturally ranged themſelves on the ſide of the people: The Corcyrean women zealouſly embraced the ſame party, and ſuſtained the tumult with more than female courage. One inactive day intervened. The partiſans of ariſtocracy were reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent of Epirus. But in the ſucceeding engagement, the numbers and fury of the ſlaves, who ſeized the preſent opportunity to reſent the barbarous cruelty of their reſpective maſters, and the generous ardor of the women, rendered the friends of liberty completely victorious. The vanquiſhed fled towards the forum and the great harbour. Even theſe poſts they ſoon deſpaired of being able to maintain; and, to eſcape immediate death, ſet fire to the ſurrounding houſes, which being ſoon thrown into a blaze, preſented an impervious obſtacle to the rage of the aſſailants.

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The moſt beautiful part of Corcyra was thus deſtroyed in one night; the houſes, ſhops, magazines, and much valuable merchandiſe, were totally conſumed; and had an eaſterly wind aided the conflagration, the whole city muſt in a ſhort time have been reduced to aſhes. Amidſt this ſcene of confuſion and horror, the Corinthian galley, together with the auxiliaries from Epirus, retired in conſternation from a place that ſeemed doomed to inevitable deſtruction.

An Athenian ſquadron arrives at Corcyra.

Next day twelve Athenian gallies arrived from Naupactus, containing, beſides their ordinary complement of men, five hundred heavy-armed Meſſenians. Nicoſtratus, who commanded this armament, had, upon the firſt intelligence of the ſedition, haſtened with the utmoſt celerity to ſupport the cauſe of Athens and democracy. He had the good fortune not only to anticipate the Peloponneſian ſquadron, which was ſo anxiouſly expected by the enemy, but to find his friends triumphant. They had obtained, however, a melancholy triumph over the ſplendor of their country, which, if its factions were not ſpeedily reconciled, was threatened with total ruin. Nicoſtratus omitted nothing that ſeemed proper to heal the wounds of that afflicted commonwealth. By authority, entreaties, and commands, he perſuaded the contending parties to accommodate matters between themſelves, and to renew their alliance with Athens. Having happily terminated this buſineſs, he was intent on immediate departure; but the managers for the people propoſed, that he ſhould leave five

of his ſhips with them, to deter the enemy from any freſh commotion, and take in exchange five of theirs, which ſhould be inſtantly manned to attend him on his ſtation. With this propoſal he complied; and the Corcyreans ſelected the mariners deſtined to ſail with Nicoſtratus. Thoſe named for this ſervice were, to a man, partiſans of the oligarchy and Lacedæmon: a circumſtance which created in them juſt alarm, leſt they ſhould be tranſported to Athens, and, notwithſtanding the faith of treaties, condemned to death. They took refuge in the temple of Caſtor and Pollux: the aſſurances of Nicoſtratus could ſcarcely remove them from this ſanctuary; and all his declarations and oaths were incapable to prevail on them to embark. The oppoſite party aſſerted, that this want of confidence betrayed not only the conſciouſneſs of paſt, but the fixed purpoſe of future, guilt; and would have immediately diſpatched them with their daggers, had not Nicoſtratus interpoſed. Terrified at theſe proceedings, the unhappy victims of popular malice and ſuſpicion aſſembled, to the number of four hundred, and retired with one accord, as ſupplicants, to the temple of Juno. From this ſanctuary they were perſuaded to ariſe, and tranſported to a neighbouring iſland, or rather rock, ſmall, barren, and uninhabited. There they remained four days, ſupplied barely with the means of ſubſiſtence, and impatiently waiting their fate.

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In this poſture of affairs a numerous fleet was ſeen approaching from the ſouth. This was the long-expected ſquadron of fifty-three ſhips

The Peloponneſian fleet appears off the coaſt.

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commanded by Alcidas and Braſidas. With the unfortunate ſlowneſs inherent in all the meaſures of the confederacy, this armament arrived too late to ſupport the ruined cauſe of their friends. The Peloponneſian commanders, however, might ſtill expect to take an uſeleſs but agreeable vengeance on their enemies. To accompliſh this deſign they prepared to attack the harbour of Corcyra, while all was hurry and confuſion. The iſlanders had ſixty veſſels fit for ſea, in which they embarked with the utmoſt expedition, and ſucceſſively ſailed forth as each happened to be ready. Their ardor and impatience diſdained the judicious advice of Nicoſtratus, who alone, calm and unmoved amidſt a ſcene of unexpected danger, exhorted them to keep the harbour until they were all prepared to advance in line of battle, generouſly offering, with his twelve Athenian gallies, to ſuſtain the firſt aſſaults of the enemy.

A ſea fight, in which the Peloponneſians prevail.

The Peloponneſians, obſerving the hoſtile armament ſcattered and unſupported, divided their own fleet into two ſquadrons. The one, conſiſting of twenty gallies, attacked the Corcyreans; the other, amounting to thirty-three, endeavoured to ſurround the Athenians. But the addreſs of the Athenian mariners fruſtrated this attempt. Their front was extended with equal order and celerity. They aſſaulted, at once, the oppoſite wings of the Peloponneſian fleet, intercepted their motion, and ſkilfully encircled them around, hoping to drive their ſhips againſt each other, and to throw them into univerſal diſorder. Perceiving theſe manœuvres,

the ships which followed the Corcyreans left off the pursuit, and steered to support the main squadron: and now, with their whole embodied strength, they prepared to pour on the Athenians. These prudently declined the shock of superior forces: but the glory of their retreat was equal to a victory. They seasonably shifted their helms, slowly and regularly gave way, and thus covered the retreat of their Corcyrean allies, who, having already lost thirteen vessels, were totally unable to renew the engagement. CHAP. XVI.

Having reached the harbour, the Corcyreans still feared lest the enemy, in pursuance of their victory, should make a descent on the coast, and even assault the city. But the manly counsels of Brasidas, who strongly recommended the latter measure, were defeated by the timidity and incapacity of Alcidas. The Corcyreans seized, therefore, the present opportunity to remove the supplicants from the uninhabited island to the temple of Juno, as less exposed there, to be discovered and taken up by the Peloponnesian fleet. Next day they entered into accommodation with these unhappy men, and even admitted several of them to embark in thirty vessels, which they hastily equipped, as the last defence of the island. The Peloponnesians, meanwhile, still prevented, by the dastardly counsels of Alcidas, from attacking the capital, wreckeil their resentment on the adjacent territory. But before the dawn of the succeeding day, they were alarmed by lights on the northern shore of Leucadia, which, by their number and

The misconduct of Alcidas saves Corcyra.

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disposition, signified the approach of an Athenian fleet of sixty sail.

The Athenians reinforced.

The situation of the invaders was now extremely dangerous. If they stretched out to sea, they might be obliged to encounter the unbroken vigor of the Athenians: if they cruised off the coast, they would be compelled to contend, not only with the power of Athens, but with the resentment of Corcyra. One measure alone promised the hope of safety: it was immediately adopted. Having crept along the shore to Leucadia, they carried their vessels across the isthmus [1], afterwards buried in the sea, but which then joined the peninsula, now the island of Leucas, to the adjacent coast of Acarnania. From thence sailing through the narrow seas, which separate the neighbouring isles from the continent, they escaped without discovery, and safely arrived in the harbour of Cyllené.

The Peloponnesians retire from Corcyra.

The democratical party in Corcyra soon perceived the flight of the enemy, and descried the approach of the Athenian fleet, commanded by Eurymedon. These fortunate events, which ought in generous minds to have effaced the dark impressions of enmity and revenge, only enabled the Corcyreans to display the deep malignity of their character. They commanded the thirty gallies, recently manned, to pass in review, and in proportion as they discovered their enemies, punished them with immediate death. Fifty of the principal citizens, who still clung to the altars in the temple

Massacre of the Lacedæmonian partisans.

[1] D'Anville considers the ancient Leucadia as an island; Ptolemy speaks of it as a peninsula.

of Juno, they ſeduced from their aſylum, and inſtantly butchered.

CHAP. XVI. Malignant paſſions of the Corcyreans.

Politics and party formed the pretence for violence, while individuals gratified their private paſſions, and wrecked vengeance on their perſonal foes. The ſedition became every hour more fierce: the confuſion thickened; the whole city was filled with conſternation and horror. The altars and images of the gods were ſurrounded by votaries, whom even the terrors of a ſuperſtitious age could no longer protect. The miſerable victims were dragged from the moſt revered temples, whoſe walls and pavement were now firſt ſtained with civil blood. Many withdrew themſelves by a voluntary death from the fury of their enemies. In every houſe, and in every family, ſcenes were tranſacted too horrid for deſcription. Parents, children, brothers, and pretended friends, ſeized the deſired moment for gratifying their latent malignity, and perpetrating crimes without a name. The unfeeling Eurymedon (whoſe character, as will ſhortly appear, was a diſgrace to human nature) ſhowed neither ability nor inclination to ſtop the carnage. During the ſpace of ſix days that his fleet continued in the Corcyrean harbour, the actors in this lamentable tragedy continually aggravated the enormity of their guilt, and improved in the refinement of their cruelty. A dreadful calm ſucceeded this violent agitation. Five hundred partiſans of ariſtocracy eſcaped to the coaſt of Epirus; and the Athenian fleet retired.

CHAP. XVI.

The ariſtocratical party receive aſſiſtance from Epirus.

The fugitives, inſtead of rejoicing in their ſafety, thought only of revenge. They ſent agents to Lacedæmon and Corinth. By deſcribing their ſufferings to the aſtoniſhed Epirots, they excited their compaſſion, and acquired their aſſiſtance. The ſeverity of the prevailing party in Corcyra increaſed the number of outlaws; who, at length, finding themſelves ſufficiently powerful to attack and conquer the iſland, which, from the moment of their baniſhment, they had infeſted by naval deſcents, ſailed with their whole ſtrength for that purpoſe in boats provided by the Barbarians. In landing at Corcyra, the rowers drove with ſuch violence againſt the ſhore, as broke many of their veſſels in pieces; the reſt they immediately burned, diſdaining ſafety unleſs purchaſed by victory. This deſperate meaſure deterred oppoſition: they advanced, ſeized, and fortified, Mount Iſtoné; a ſtrong poſt in the neighbourhood of the city, from which they ravaged the territory, and ſubjected their enemies to the multiplied evils of war and famine.

The Athenians again arrive in the iſland. Olymp. lxxxviii. 4. A. C. 425.

An epidemical diſorder increaſed the meaſure of their calamities. The flames of civil diſcord, which had never been thoroughly extinguiſhed, again broke out within the walls. The miſery of the Corcyreans was verging to deſpair, when an Athenian fleet of forty ſail appeared off the coaſt. This armament was commanded by Eurymedon and Sophocles. It was principally deſtined againſt Sicily, as we ſhall have occaſion to relate, but ordered in its voyage thither to touch at Corcyra, and regulate the affairs of that iſland. This unex-

pected aſſiſtance enabled the beſieged to become the beſiegers. The outworks and defences of Mount Iſtoné were ſucceſſively taken, the parties who defended them gradually retiring to the more elevated branches, and, at length, to the very ſummit, of the mountain. They were on the point of being driven from thence, and of falling into the hands of enemies exaſperated by innumerable injuries ſuffered and inflicted. Alarmed by this reflection, they called out to the Athenians for quarter, and ſurrendered to Eurymedon and Sophocles, on condition that their fate ſhould be decided by the people of Athens. They were ſent priſoners to the ſmall iſland of Ptychia, till it ſhould be found convenient to tranſport them to Athens, and commanded not to make any attempt to ſtir from thence under pain of annulling the capitulation which had been granted them. CHAP. XVI.

Perfidious cruelty of the Corcyreans;

If the malignity of the Corcyrean populace had not exceeded the ordinary ſtandard of human pravity, their reſentment muſt have been ſoftened by the ſudden tranſition wrought by accident in their favor. But their firſt concern was to intercept the precarious clemency of Athens, and to aſſure the deſtruction of their adverſaries. This atrocious deſign was executed by a ſtratagem equally deteſtable, uniting, by a ſingular combination, whatever is ſavage in ferocity, and baſe in perfidy. By means of proper agents diſpatched ſecretly to Ptychia, the leaders of the popular faction acquainted thoſe of the priſoners, with whom, in peaceable times, they had reſpectively lived in ſome

CHAP. XVI.

habits of intimacy, that the Athenians had determined to give them up indiſcriminately to the fury of the populace. Pretending much regret that perſons in whom they once had ſo tender a concern, ſhould ſhare the common calamity, they exhorted them, by all poſſible means, to contrive their eſcape; and offered to provide them with a bark for that purpoſe. The known cruelty of Eurymedon made the artifice ſucceed. The bark was already launched from the iſland; the terms of the capitulation were thus infringed; the deluded victims were apprehended in the very act of departure, ſeized, bound, and delivered into the hands of their inexorable enemies.

and of the Athenian commanders, Eurymedon and Sophocles.

The Athenian commanders, Eurymedon and Sophocles, favored the deceit, becauſe, as they were themſelves obliged to proceed towards Sicily, they envied the honor that would accrue to their ſucceſſors in conducting the captives to Athens. To gratify this meanneſs of ſoul without example, they permitted barbarities beyond belief.

Unexampled barbarities committed in Corcyra.

The unhappy priſoners were firſt confined in a dungeon. Dragged ſucceſſively from thence, in parties of twenty at a time, they were compelled to paſs in pairs, their hands tied behind their backs between two ranks of their enemies, armed with whips, prongs, and every inſtrument of licentious and diſgraceful torture. The wretches left in priſon were long ignorant of the ignominious cruelty inflicted on their companions; but, as ſoon as they learned the abominable ſcenes tranſacted without, they refuſed to quit their confinement,

guarded the entrance, and invited, with one consent, the Athenians to murder them. But the Athenians wanted either humanity or firmneſs to commit this kind cruelty. The Corcyrean populace ventured not to force a paſſage from deſpair. They mounted the priſon walls, uncovered the roof, and overwhelmed thoſe below with ſtones, darts, and arrows. Theſe weapons were deſtructive to many, and furniſhed others with the means of deſtroying themſelves, or each other. They laid down their heads, opened their breaſts, expoſed their necks, mutually ſoliciting, in plaintive or frantic accents, the fatal ſtroke. The whole night (for the night intervened) was ſpent in this horrid ſcene; and the morning preſented a ſpectacle too ſhocking for deſcription. The obdurate hearts of the Corcyreans were incapable of pity or remorſe; but their relenting eyes could not bear the ſight; and they commanded the bodies of their fellow-citizens, now breathleſs or expiring, to be thrown on carts, and conveyed without the walls.

Thus ended the ſedition of Corcyra[10]; but its conſequences were not ſoon to end. The contagion of that unhappy iſland engendered a political malady, which ſpread its baneful influence over Greece. The ariſtocratical, and ſtill more, the popular governments of that country, had ever been liable to faction, which occaſionally blazed into ſedition. But this morbid tendence, congenial to the conſtitution of republics, thenceforth aſſumed a more dangerous appearance, and

The conſequences of the ſedition permanent.

[10] Thucydid. p. 220 — 285.

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betrayed more alarming ſymptoms. In every republic, and almoſt in every city, the intriguing and ambitious found the ready protection of Athens, or of Sparta, according as their ſelfiſh and guilty deſigns were ſcreened under the pretence of maintaining the prerogatives of the nobles, or aſſerting the privileges of the people. A virtuous and moderate ariſtocracy, an equal impartial freedom, theſe were the colorings which ſerved to juſtify violence and varniſh guilt. Sheltered by the ſpecious coverings of fair names, the prodigal aſſaſſin delivered himſelf from the importunity of his creditor. The father, with unnatural cruelty, puniſhed the licentious extravagance of his ſon: the ſon avenged, by parricide, the ſtern ſeverity of his father. The debates of the public aſſembly were decided by the ſword. Not ſatisfied with victory, men thirſted for blood. This general diſorder overwhelmed laws human and divine. The ordinary courſe of events was reverſed: ſentiments loſt their natural force, and words their uſual meaning [11]. Dulneſs and ſtupidity triumphed over abilities and refinement; for while the craſty and ingenious were laying fine-ſpun ſnares for their enemies, men of blunter minds had immediate recourſe to the ſword and poniard. This ſucceſsful audacity was termed manly enterpriſe; ferocity aſſumed the name of courage; faction and ambition paſſed for patriotiſm and magnanimity; perfidy was called prudence; cunning, wiſdom; every vice was clothed in the garb of every virtue:

[11] Thucydid. p. 227, et ſeqq.

while-

while juſtice, moderation, and candor, were branded as weakneſs, cowardice, meanneſs of ſoul, and indifference to the public intereſt. Such was the perverſion of ſentiment, and ſuch the corruption of language, firſt engendered amidſt the turbulence of Grecian factions, and too faithfully imitated, as far as the ſoft effeminacy of modern manners will permit, by the diſcontented and ſeditious of later times — Wretched and deteſtable deluſions, by which wicked men deceive and ruin the public and themſelves.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM